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ABSTRACT 
This study set out to contribute to the Hterature on intemational human resource 
management (IHRM) strategies of multinational corporations (MNCs) and the factors that 
influence them. In doing sof it sought to address a number of weaknesses in the existing 
Hterature, notably a marked lack of research into the strategies adopted by MNCs in 
developing economies, particularly when they become involved under the auspices of 
privatisation programmes. More specifícally, the study sought to investígate the human 
resource management (HRM) reforms introduced by three French MNCs in privatised 
Jordanian companies and the factors that influenced them. 
The research utilised a longitudinal multiple-case design to achieve the study's aim and 
objectives, and was conducted in three phases over three years. More specifícally, the 
study was based upon a sample of three case studies of privatised Jordanian companies 
that had recently come under the control of French MNCs operating in different sectors. 
Primary data was gathered through 67 in-depth semi-structured interviews with company 
directors, sénior line and finance managers, and HR staff, including sénior personnel based 
at headquarters in France. In addition, 14 interviews were conducted with government 
ofñcials in Jordán and a range of supplementary documentary evidence was examined. 
In general, the fíndings from the case study companies revealed that in each of the 
Jordanian subsidiaries a wide range of changes had been made to the previously existing 
H R M policies. These encompassed the making of reforms in each of the specifíc áreas of 
HR activity investigated: the people management responsibilities of line managers; 
stafñng, recruitment and selection; training and development; performance appraisal; 
rewards; and communication and consultation. Taken together, the case studies 
highlighted similarities in terms of the objectives and broad thrust of the structural, poiicy 
and cultural reforms that were introduced. However, they also showed the companies to 
differ in terms of the way in which the reforms were centrally authored, the extent to 
which they were implemented in a participative way, the types of control mechanisms that 
were used to support the reform process, and the pace with which the reforms were 
introduced. 
The above similarities and differences appeared to nave been influenced by a number of 
interrelated factors. Most important was the beliefs that sénior management held of what 
constituted 'good and appropriate' human resource practice. Others related to the 
characteristics of the industries in which the MNCs operated and the implications these 
had for company business strategies and structures; the parent company's country of 
origin and experience in managing intemational operations; the strategic role of the 
subsidiarles and their mode of establishment; and a number of host country effects. 
Overall, it is argued, that the study's fíndings contribute to existing knowledge in a 
number of ways. First, the fíndings lend some further support to the validity of 
Perlmutter's typology of the IHRM strategies that are adopted by MNCs, while also 
raisíng doubts about its future usefulness. They also add weight to the view that a process 
of convergence is occurring in respect of the H R M policíes utilised by MNCs, and that 
this convergence is centred around an Anglo-Saxon conceptualisation of H R M best 
practice. At the same time, they also lend weight to the argument that this process of 
Anglo-Saxonisation is occurring in the context of national specific frameworks. As a 
result, the study suggests that there remains some country of origin influence over the way 
MNCs mange their human resources. 
More generally, the study's findings tend to suggest, contrary to some arguments in the 
literature, that MNCs do not apply différent IHRM stratégies and practices to their 
subsidiaries in developing économies. They also suggest that more attention needs to be 
paid to the way in which government policies and wider political pressures, surrounding 
the privatisation programmes of such countries act to influence the way in which MNCs 
approach the process of reform in subsidiaries acquired as a resuit of privatisation. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
This study focuses on changes in the human resource management (HRM) policies and 
practices in Jordanian companies taken over by multinationals under a privatisation 
programme. Initially, this introductory chapter highlights the t\vo-fold rationale for this 
focus: first, the importance of privatisation to the expansionary activities of multinationals; 
secondly, a number of related weaknesses in the existing literature of multinational 
corporations (MNCs) human resource stratégies. Following this, the overall aim and 
supporting objectives of the study are detailed, along with a brief description of the 
research methodology utilised. Finally, the last section of the chapter describes the 
structure of the remaining parts of the thesis. 
Multinational Expansion Through Privatisation 
Against a background of globalisation and internationalisation, it is widely argued that the 
period since the mid-1980s has been marked by changes in the world economy that have 
led to profound developments in MNCs ' international opérations, stratégies and structures. 
Six major forces of change have been identified (UN, 1993; Ferner and Hyman, 1998; 
Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998; Debrah, 2001). First, globalisation and the removal of trade 
barners, as manifested in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and World 
Trade Organisation (WTO) agreements. Secondly, the continuing intégration and growth 
of regional trade blocs such as the European Union (EU) and North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), and the more general incorporation of former communist countries 
into the world économie System. Thirdly, the libéralisation of financial markets, and the 
deregulation and privatisation of monopoly state utilities. Fourthly, advances in 
information technology. Fifthly, some cross-national convergence in demand patterns. 
Finally, an intensification of competition world-wide. 
As a consequence of these changes in the global economic environment, 'speed' has 
become the ñame of the game, pushing MNCs to adopt fast track expansionary strategies, 
such as cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M & As), and a variety of non-equity 
arrangements, such as franchising, licensing, subcontracting and management contraéis 
(Luostarinen and Welch, 1990; Hirst and Thompson, 1999; Rugman, 2000; UN, 2000; 
Dicken, 2003). For example, over the past decade, most of the growth of international 
production within MNCs has been via cross-border M & As rather than greenfíeld 
investment. Indeed, the share of total cross-border M & As in world foreign direct 
investment (FDI) flows increased frora 52% in 1987 to 83% in 1999. It is also evident 
that M & As has been contributing towards an increasing share of FDI flows to both 
developed and developing economies (UN, 2000). 
Given the number, valué and spread of cross border transactions, one can now speak of a 
market for firms that is increasingly global in nature. It can also be seen that, 
notwithstanding the view that a triadisation (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995; Dicken, 1998; 
Hirst and Thompson, 1996) of the world economy is occurring, more and more countries, 
including developing countries and countries from Central Europe (Harvey et al, 1999), 
are becoming drawn into this emerging global market, as are more and more industries and 
ñrms, both large and small. At the same time, it is claimed that this quest of MNCs to 
enhance competitiveness by spreading activities over different locations - to acquire a 
good portfolio of "locational assets" - is matched by the desire of countries to attract more 
FDI. For example, many developing countries are creating more friendly business 
environments (Debrah, 2001) to achieve greater integration into the global economy, 
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including integration into the regional or global production networks of MNCs, in order to 
become more prominent players in the world market and benefit more from FDI. Changes 
in many government policies on FDI in recent years have both conñrmed and strengthened 
this trend. In particular, developing countries and transition economies have reduced 
sectoral restrictions to foreign entry, or liberised operations in industries, which had 
previously been either closed or restricted to FDI. Consequently, privatisation programmes 
have been an important means for M N C expansión into developing countries. For 
example, approximately 14% of FDI flows going into Africa during 1990-199S have been 
linked to privatisation (UN, 2000), and approximately 40% of the over $700 billion in 
assets that have been privatised in the world*s economies in the last decade have resided in 
emerging economies (Ramamurti, 2000; Zahra, 2000). The importance of this link 
between FDI and privatisation is further illustrated by the fací that FDI has been noted to 
be higher in countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, where substantial privatisation has 
occurred and to be lower in some African States where far less action has been taken to 
dispose of publicly owned undertakings (UN, 2000; Duarte, 2000). 
Weaknesses in the International Human Resource Management Literature 
The already noted growth in the international activities of MNCs has been reflected in a 
growing literature on their human resources management (HRM) strategies and policies. 
Much of this literature has focused on distinguishing between different types of MNCs ' 
strategies and identifying the factors that influence their adoption and implementation. A 
further component of it has been the issue of how MNCs control their subsidiaries. 
Nevertheless, despite this growth in literature, a number of limitations in that which exists 
can be identified. In particular, seven weaknesses can be distinguished. First, the main 
focus of most of the studies conducted to date has been on the utilisation of H R M 
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strategíes and control methods in respect of well-estabüshed overseas subsidiarles (Welch 
and Welch, 1994). Secondly, attention has been primarily paid to the relationships that 
MNCs have with subsidiaries that they both own and control, with the result that there has 
been a marked lack of consideration given to other forms of MNC-subsidiary relationship, 
such as joint ventures, management contraéis and strategic alliances (Welch and Welch, 
1994; U N , 1997). Thirdly, relatively little attention has been paid to the H R M strategies 
adopted in respect of subsidiaries based in developing, as opposed to developed, 
economies (Lawler et al, 1995; Arthur et al, 1995; Napier and Vu, 1998; Myloni and 
Harzing, 2001). 
Fourthly, to date the dynamics of the interaction between the parent company (country of 
origin) and the subsidiary (the host country effect) have been relatively little explored 
(Ferner, 1997). Moreover, insofar as they have been explored, attention has been largely 
restricted to the role of cultural factors (Hofstede, 1980; Eramilli, 1996) and the impact of 
employment laws (Florkowski and Nath, 1993). In contrast, much less attention has been 
paid to the way in which the H R M strategies of MNCs are influenced by wider political 
considerations, despite the evidence reviewed above that in the developing world much of 
the MÑCs' involvement and expansión is occurring under the auspices of privatisation 
programmes (UN, 1993; 1997; 2000), and the fací that such considerations are therefore 
likely to be of considerable importance (Negandhi, 1985; Doz, 1986; Cook and 
Kirkpatrick, 1998; Baddar and James, 2001). Fifthly, the literature has largely 
concentrated on US and Japanese companies, with the result that research on European 
MNCs is still underdeveloped (Ferner, 1997; Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998; Harzing, 1999; 
Myloni and Harzing, 2001; Muller-Camen el al, 2001). Sixthly, most of the research 
conducted has tended to concéntrate on manufacturing rather than services, with the result 
that, in Sisson's (2001) terms, there is a "tertiarisation gap" in terms of the focus of the 
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existing literature. Finally, existing studies have predominantly relied on survey-based 
quantitative research methods which do not therefore adequately capture the subtle, 
complex and evolving relationships between corporate HQ and subsidiaries, nor the 
processes by which practices are diffused and adapted across borders (Ferner, 2001; 
Martin and Beaumont, 1999). 
These weaknesses in the existing literature both provided the motives for the study 
detailed in this thesis and also informed its design. In particular, they led the author to 
develop a study which: 
• Focused attention on multinational H R M stratégies in developing économies; 
• Embraced parent-subsidiary relationship that extended beyond füll ownership and 
control; 
• Investigated subsidiaries recently acquired through privatisation; and 
• Utilised a qualitative case study methodology 
Aim and Objectives of tbe Study 
The study's overall aim was: 
To examine the impact offoreign ownershipfcontrol on the HRMpolicies and practices of 
privatised Jordanian companies. 
To achieve this overall aim, the following key objectives were identified: 
• To examine the nature and scale of récent privatisation policies in Jordan, including 
the rôle played by foreign companies 
• To review the literature on the H R M stratégies and policies of MNCs 
• To investigate how foreign ownership/control has affected the H R M policies and 
practices of privatised Jordanian companies, and 
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• To analyse the variables that have ínfluenced the adoption of these H R M policies and 
practices in the privatised companies. 
Outline of Research Methodology 
Both secondary and primary data were used to achieve the aim and objectives of the study. 
The secondary/desk research focused on the literature on the international human resource 
management strategies of MNCs, the methods they utilise to implement them and the 
factors which influence the adoption of these strategies and methods. This review 
contributed to the formulation of the research questions and helped the investigator to 
specify the kind of organisations to be approached and the type of data to be collected. 
A qualitative research design was utilised to achieve the study's aim and objectives. More 
specifically, three detailed cases studies were conducted of privatised Jordanian companies 
that had been taken over by three French MNCs. The primary research tool was the in-
depth semi-structured interview and the research was conducted in the subsidiaries m 
Jordán and at the corporate headquarters of the MNCs in France. 
The research was conducted in three phases over three years. The first phase involved 
gathering data on the H R M strategies and policies of the selected companies that were in 
place before, or immedíately after, privatisation in order to establish a baseíine for tracing 
any subsequent changes. This data was obtained through interviews with government 
officials and sénior managers and human resources specialists in each of the case study 
organisations. The second and third phases of the study involved the conducting of follow 
up interviews at different time periods in order to collect information on the changes 
which had been, or were in the process of being, introduced in the área of H R M , the 
factors which had influenced these changes, and likely future developments in H R M 
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policies. The information in question was gathered primarily through interviews 
conducted with Company directors, senior line and finance managers, department 
managers, human resource staff, including senior personnel based at corporate 
headquarters in France, and union représentatives. In total, 67 interviews were conducted 
with participants from the case study organizations. In addition, 14 interviews were 
carried out with government officiais in Jordan. 
The findings from the above interviews, which were taped and, on average, lasted for one 
and a half hours, were, in turn, supplemented by a range of documentary évidence. This 
was gathered from such sources as annual reports, in-house Journals and newsletters, 
officiai company historiés, organisation al charts, officiai policy Statements, and corporate 
Web sites. 
Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of the thesis comprises eight chapters. The next chapter provides an 
overview of Jordan's history and economic situation, and the scale and nature of its 
privatisation programme. It reveals that, following an economic crisis in 1989, the 
Jordanian government initiated a programme of privatisation during the early 1990s as part 
of an economic restructuring plan under the guidance of the IMF and the World Bank, No 
real progress was, however, made in taking the programme forward as a resuit of a range 
of social and political pressures, including fears concerning foreign asset Stripping, the 
enrichment of a few business élites, and potential price rises and increases in 
unemployment. Nevertheless, the privatisation process was resumed in 1996 against the 
background of a deteriorating economy and mcreasing pressures from the World Bank and 
the IMF. However, in order to allay surrounding social and political concerns, the 
government decided to impose various conditions on foreign Investors that would, among 
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other things, enable the government to keep control over board decisions to protect the 
national interest, limit potential redundancies, and require the provisión of greater access 
to training. The chapter concludes wíth a review of the progress that has so far been made 
in implementing the planned privatisation programme. 
Chapter 3 presents a systematic review of the intemational human resource management 
literature. This reveáis that four themes domínate the existing literature: the nature of the 
overall intemational H R M strategies of multinational companies; the factors that influence 
the choice and adoption of these strategies; the modes of control utilised to implement 
them; and the extent to which the H R M practices of MNCs are converging or diverging 
against the backcíoth of globalisation. The existing literature relating to each of these 
themes is therefore explored in detail, The chapter subsequently concludes with a 
discussion of the literature reviews implications for the present study's underlying 
rationale and design. 
Chapter 4 goes on to detail the study's research design and the considerations that 
informed it. It explains that a qualitative, longitudinal, multiple-case study method was 
adopted which involved an examination of the nature of the H R M reforms that the three 
MNCs introduced into their Jordanian subsidiaries over a three year period, the way in 
which they were implemented and the factors that influenced their adoption. The chapter 
further notes that, in examming the reforms introduced, the study focussed attention on 
changes made in respect of the following issues: the structure and role of human resource 
(HR) functions; the people management responsibilíties of line managers; staffíng levéis 
and composition; recruitment and selection; performance appraisal; training and 
development; rewards; and communicaüon and consultation. In addition, it reports that 
data on these issues were gathered through a combination of documentary evidence and 
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interviews with government officials, expatríate and local managers at the subsidiar/ level, 
and corporate staff at the M N C s ' French headquarters. 
Chapters 5 to 7 subsequently report the findings from each of the case study organisations. 
Each of these chapters begins by descnbing the H R M policies and practices that were in 
place before privatisation. They then go on to explain the changes that were subsequently 
made to them in preparation for, and following, privatisation, and the considerations that 
informed their introduction from the perspectives of managerial staff, both in the 
Jordanian business unit and the parent company's headquarters. 
Chapter 8, then, compares and contrasts the findings obtained from the preceding three 
case study chapters. It notes that the three case studies exhibited marked similarities in 
terms of the objectives and the broad thrust of the structural, policy and cultural reforms 
introduced by the French MNCs. At the same time, the chapter also reveáis that the three 
companies exhibited differences with regard to how the reforms were determined, the pace 
with which they were introduced, the extent to which their implementation was supported 
by participative change mechanisms, and the relative reliance which was placed on the 
different types of methods that can be used to control subsidiaries. It further reveáis that 
these similarities and differences reflected the influence of a range of factors. These 
included the beliefs that sénior management held concerning what constituted 'good and 
appropriate' HR; the characteristics of the industries in which the MNCs operated and 
their associated mtemational strategies and structures; the parent company's experience in 
managing intemational operations and its country of origín; the strategic role of the 
subsidiaries and their mode of establishment; and a number of host country effects, 
including governmental policies. 
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Finally, Chapter 9 draws together the key findings of the study, considers their 
implications for existing knowledge on the human resource strategies and policies of 
MNCs, and identifies possible directions for future research. Taken together, the 
conclusions are seen to add weight to the view that a process of homogenisation and 
convergence is occurring in the international human resource policies of MNCs ' centred 
on Anglo-Saxon 'best practices'. At the same time, it is noted that, in the case of the three 
MNCs studied, this process of Anglo-Saxonisation was being informed by some 
traditional features of French H R M - a finding which suggests, in line with other studies, 
that the country of origin of MNCs continúes to exert an influence over their international 
H R M strategies and policies. However, in contrast to some of the existing research 
evidence, the chapter also notes that the three MNCs studied appeared to be adopting 
similar approaches to the management of their subsidiaries in both developing and 
developed countries, although each recognised that the pace of reform might need to be 
slower in the former due to weaknesses in the resources and infrastructures available to 
facilitate it. Finally, in light of the fact that in each of the case studies the Jordanian 
government was found to have exerted an important influence over the H R M reforms 
introduced by the three MNCs, the chapter argües that future research needs to pay greater 
attention to the way in which the behaviour of MNCs in developing economies is shaped 
by governmental policies and wider political considerations. 
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CHAPTER TWO: PRIVATISATION IN JORDAN - BACKGROUND 
"As we have recently declared, there is no turning back from democracy. In the same vein, we are 
announcing today, with equal détermination and vigour, that there will be no retreat from 
economic and social development, or from efforts to raise the standard of living, improve the 
quality oflife and achieve equity in the distribution of development gains among ail social groups 
and régions. Tlie human being is the principal componenî of the development process as well as ils 
object and goal". 
The Laie King of Jordan, His Majesty Kïng Hussein 
Economie and Social Development Plan 1993-1997 
Introduction 
The Jordanian govemment adopted an economic structural reform programme in 1989, 
encompassing privatisation as its major component. The overall aim of this chapter is to 
outline the nature of this privatisation programme. To do this, five related issues are 
explored. Initially attention is paid to the economic and political factors that led to Jordan's 
economic crisis in the late 1980s. This is followed by a considération of the government's 
response to this crisis and the rôle that it accorded to the issue of privatisation. Attention 
then tums to the potential scope of privatisation, and the évolution and scope of the 
privatisation programme eventually adopted. Finally, the last section examines the extent 
to which this programme has been implemented. 
Privatisation and the Economie Crisis in the Late 1980s 
The Emirate of Jordan was established in 1921 and Prince Abdullah Bin A l - Hussein 
became the Prince of Trans-Jordan. In 1946 the country obtained its independence from 
the British Mandate and Prince Abdullah was proclaimed King of Jordan. Today the 
country has a population of about 4.5 million and occupies an area of approximately 
92,300 square kilomètres, more than two-third of which is barren land. The country is 
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bordered to the north by Syria, to the east by Iraq, by Saudi Arabia on the east and south, 
the Gulf of Aqaba and the Red Sea on the south, and the Palestine National Authority and 
Israel to the west. Consequently, Jordan represents an ideal gateway to the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA) région (JMG, 1995). 
Ever since its inception Jordan has suffered economic hardships and vulnerability 
stemming from fwe main factors. First, a scarcity of natural resources. Secondly, an export 
market characterised by a high degree of commodity and geographical concentration. 
Thirdly, reliance on external financial support in the form of aid from other countries and 
remittances from Jordanians working abroad, mainly, in the neighbouring Arab Gulf 
States. Fourthly, fréquent political instability in the Middle East and fmally, the nature of, 
and interruptions to, government economic planning. 
Notwithstanding thèse factors, during the period 1973-1980 the Jordanian economy grew 
substantially. This growth reflected high rates of Investments, which in turn reflected a 
number of other factors: large increases in Arab assistance and loans in the wake of the oil 
boom in the Gulf countries; the growing demand for Jordanian manpower in the Gulf 
countries, causing a significant increase in the value of remittances by Jordanians working 
abroad; and the rise in exports to regional markets (World Bank, 1995). Thus, the real 
average annual growth rate of GDP, at factor cost, increased from 5.9% during the period 
1973-1975 to 12.1% during the period 1976-1980 (Ministryof Planning, 1981; 1986). 
Against this background, the 1981-1985 Five-Year Plan was formulated on the 
assumption of a continuation of existing positive trends, such as the inflow of aid and 
capital, and the favourable development of trade relations. However, the unprecedented 
economic growth that Jordan had enjoyed since 1973 ended by 1983 as a resuit of five 
related sets of factors. First, aid from the United States, which was the largest single donor 
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apart from Saudi Arabia in the mid- 1970s, feil sharply after 1980, despite the key role that 
Jordan was assigned in the Reagan plan for an Arab-Israeli seulement (Wilson, 1988). 
Secondly, a décline in oil prices and the subséquent slowdown in the regional économies 
led to a fall in domestic and external demand, as well as aid from Arab countries (World 
Bank, 1995). Thirdly, the war in Lebanon in 1974 and, particularly, the Gulf (Iraq-lran) 
War in 1980 had a negative impact on overall economic activities both in Jordan and the 
Middle Hast région as a whole (Ministry of Planning, 1986). For example, by 1982 Iraq 
was bankrupt and had become dépendent on other Gulf countries, thus competing with 
Jordan for assistance and finance, and, in 1985, Kuwait's level of disbursements feil to one 
fourth of the level of the previous year. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the trend was similar, 
though less marked (Wilson, 1988). As a resuit, the size of transfers to the central 
government from remittances from abroad decreased from JD 415 million in 1981 to JD 
364, JD 289, JD 251 and JD 290 million in the years 1982, 1983, 1984 and 1985 
respectively. 
Fourthly, exports were adversely affected by recessions in Jordan's traditional markets, 
especially the neighbouring countries, where a number of protectionist measures were 
introduced to safeguard domestic production (Ministry of Planning, 1986). In addition, the 
strong Dinar during the 1980s had a detrimental impact on exports (ILO, 1990). 
Consequently, there was a fall in the real annual growth of commodity exports (including 
re-exports) from 33.5% during the period 1973-1980 to 7.4% during the period 1981-
1985. 
Fifthly, the recession in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, and a deliberate policy of 
replacing immigrant workers with local nationals in these states, led to a décline in 
remittances by Jordanians working abroad between 1981-1985 (Ministry of Planning, 
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1986; Wilson, 1988). For example, as Table 2.1 shows, the percentage growth in 
remittances by Jordanians working abroad feil from 44% in 1981 to 12% in 1982 and to 
5,49% in 1983. These falls were admittedly followed by a temporary increase to 
approximately 18% in 1984, due to the permanent retum of Jordanians who brought their 
money with them. This was, however, followed by a related 15% decrease in remittances, 
as a resuit of fewer Jordanians working abroad, from JD 475 million in 1984 to JD 402.9 
million in 1985. 
Table 2.1 Jordanian Workers Remittances from Abroad (1980-1985) 
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Source: ILO, 1990; Central Bank of Jordan, Electronic Data Base, 1998. 
As a conséquence of thèse factors, Jordan experienced a drastic slowdown in growth, and 
severe fiscal and extemal account déficits (World Bank, 1995). Thus, the real average 
growth rate of GDP, at factor cost, decreased from 6.2% in 1981 to 3.0% in 1985, leading 
to a fall in the standard of living. In addition, Investment by the private sector declined by 
more than 30% in the years 1986 and 1987, due to the recession and uncertainty about 
economic prospects (Anani and Khalaf, 1988; ILO, 1990). 
These factors, in tum, led the government to increase ils borrowing with the resuit that the 
size of average annual extemal borrowing increased from JD 72.9 million in the period 
1981-1983 to JD 141.3 million in 1984, then to JD 201.5 million in 1985. Furthermore, 
this increase was accompanied by a rise in internai borrowing from JD 18 million in 1980 
to JD 138.5 million by 1985 (Ministry of Planning, 1993), and a shift in the composition 
of extemal borrowing towards a greater reliance on short-term borrowing, that is loans that 
1980 236.7 
1981 340.9 
1982 381.9 
1983 402.9 
1984 475 
1985 402,9 
+ 44 
+ 12 
+ 5.49 
+ 17.89 
-15 
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had to be repaid within two or three years. This growth in the stock of public debt 
subsequently led the government to identify privatisation as an alternative source of funds 
(Mansur, I999)1. However, a severe fiscal and monetary crisis (see below) diverted the 
attention of the government from giving priority to the issue (Al-Kodah, 1998a). 
Düring the second half of the 1980s the above adverse trends continued. At the same time, 
the 10-year comprehensive communient of oil producing countries to aid Jordan 
economically ended in 1988 and was replaced by ad hoc grants (Mansur, 1998). 
Consequently, real average annual economic growth declined even further from 3.0% in 
1985 to minus 10.4 % in 1989 (Ministry of planning, 1993). 
Against this background, to maintain consumption at a bare minimum, the government 
approved increasing budget déficits, leading to an increase in the budget deficit (including 
grants) from JD 153.1 million in 1986 to JD 316.9 million in 1988. Hence, as a percentage 
of GDP, the budget deficit, including grants, rose from 7.2% in 1986 to 14.2% in 1988. As 
a resuit of this tremendous increase in the current account and budget déficits, the 
government resorted to yet more external and domestic borrowing, including advances 
from the Central Bank, leading to a larger external domestic debt and a heavier debt 
service. Thus, by 1988 the external debt rose to $6,444.6 million, while the external debt 
service reached $1,301.4 million in the same year. 
Consequently, by 1989 Jordan was unable to pay off her debts, as overall debts stood at 
180% of GDP 2 , reserves were wiped out, the country's currency had devalued by nearly 
35%, and inflation had increased to 25.8%3. This situation led one leading Jordanian 
economist to make the following observation about this period: (Bani Hani, 1998) 
"..As Ipersonally recall from the séries of events, which occurred in late 1988, the economy was 
on the verge of collapse. Our CentralBank's foreign reserves went below thepermissible leveis. 
Budget deficit was climbing and reached 25% of our GDP. Consumption to GDP touched the level 
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of 110%. Inflation was staggering and the wholesale and retail price indexes almost doubled in a 
few months period. Foreign debt service ratiopassed the unsustainable level,,.the whole economy 
had gone into turmoil with especially severe negative impact on the social sectors ". 
Responses to the Economie Crisis 
This economic crisis led to an IMF-supported stabilisation programme and a major debt 
rescheduling at the Paris Club (Kanaan, 1998). However, Jordan had to adopt an amended 
economic adjustment programme for the period 1992-1998, after the suspension of the 
first one as a resuit of the Gulf War. This, like the other earlier one, required the 
govemment to pursue a reform agenda to stabilise the economy, improve efficiency, and 
broaden the role of the private sector (World Bank, 1996). 
The Structural Reform Programme 
In April 1989, Jordan signed a five-year structural readjustment package with the IMF 
with the goal of restoring sustainable growth, curbing inflation, stabilising the Dinar's 
exchange rate, and reducing internai and external financial imbalances (JMG, 1995; 
Mansur, 1998). Under this programme, the World Bank and the IMF agreed to support the 
Jordanian economy by successive debt rescheduling, substantial donor assistance, and 
officiai bilateral debt réductions. However, this fmancial support was given in return for 
the adoption by the Jordanian govemment of a number of specific stabilisation and 
adjustment measures. These included: (a) a séries of fiscal adjustments to reduce budget 
déficits, and various tariff and tax reforms to enlarge the revenue base and enhance 
revenue performance; (b) a large dévaluation of the Jordanian Dinar in 1989 followed by a 
flexible exchange rate policy to maintain export competitiveness; (c) a number of 
measures to reduce tariff protection and improve the trade incentives regime; (d) decontrol 
of interest rates; (e) the introduction of comprehensive structural reforms in the energy and 
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agriculture sectors; and (f) the srrengthening of institutional support for export 
development (World Bank, 1995). 
The Adjusted Economie Structural Reforms Programme 
Another upheaval shook the Arab World on 2 August 1991 when Iraqi forces invaded 
Kuwait causing what has become to be known as the Gulf Crisis. Jordan stood in füll 
agreement with the international community that the Iraqi invasion and annexation of 
Kuwait was a breach of international law that could not be allowed to stand. However, 
Jordan opposed the UN's coalition military action against Iraq, which Kuwait and the rest 
of the Gulf States approved of, and instead called for a regional and peaceful resolution to 
theconflict (JMG, 1995). 
As a conséquence, Jordan suffered tremendous losses during and after the Gulf War on 
both the political and economic fronts. (Ministry of Planning, 1993). The Gulf countries 
punished Jordan for its independent political stand by cutting off aid, oil and export 
markets. In addition, the international sanctions against Iraq deprived Jordan of its major 
trading partner, accounting for 20% of Jordan's exports. 
Moreover, thèse economic problems were compounded by the repatriation of over 300,000 
Jordanians working in the Gulf during the post-war period, and the arrivai of over one 
million temporary évacuées. This influx of refugees and returnees led to an increased 
demand on the country's limited water supplies and infrastructure, raising poverty and 
causing a sharp increase in unemployment to around 30%. As a resuit of thèse unforeseen 
developments, Jordan was forced to temporarily suspend payment of its rescheduled debt 
and seek the assistance of the World Bank and the IMF once more. 
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Subsequently, in October 1991, the governrnent concluded a new seven-year économie 
adjustment programme with the IMF for the period 1992-1998 which was designed to 
improve Jordan's balance of payments, reduce inflation, shrink the public sectors share of 
GDP and boost real GDP growth (JMG, 1995, Mansur, 1998; IPO, 1999). Under this 
revised programme the World Bank offered to provide further support in the form of 
loans, debt rescheduling and technical assistance. However, the Economie Reform and 
Development Loans (ERDLs) were designed as single-tranched loans, payment of which 
was dependent on the. governrnent taking specified prior actions (World Bank, 1996). For 
example, the 1997/98 ERDL-III loan of US$ 75 million was dependent on a set of 
privatisation, trade, financial sector and regulatory reforms (World Bank, 1997). 
In light of the amended adjustment programme, the governrnent developed an Economie 
and Social Development Plan covering the period 1993-1997. This plan was based on a 
range of gênerai principles, which were intended to détermine the future course of the 
national economy. The most important of thèse for présent purposes was the 
"Libéralisation of the economy and its institutions, élimination of distortions obstructing 
sound économie performance, and development of an appropriate investment climate" 
(Ministry of Planning, 1993: 103). In support of this principle the governrnent proposed a 
séries of measures aimed at the following objectives (Ministry of Planning, 1993)4: 
a) Enhancing the regulatory and supervisory role of the governrnent and initiating 
législation designed to: 
• Encourage savings, maintain capital assets, and curb conspicuous consumption; 
• increase opportunités for fair compétition; 
• Prevent monopolies; 
• Protect consumers through the development and enforcement of standards and 
spécifications; 
• Raise export capability and reducing excessive protectionism of domestic products; 
• Promote the use of domestic factors in production; 
• Conserve resources and the environment; and 
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• Protect patent rights. 
b) Reduce the government role in direct production; enhance the role of the prívate sector 
through improving incentives for domestic and foreign investment; and discouraging 
government compétition with the prívate sector. 
c) Actívate the role of the prívate sector in the areas of infrastructure and basic services, 
and increase prívate sector participation in the management and ownership of public 
sector institutions on an équitable and well-considered basis. 
d) Develop and actívate financial markets with the aim of ensuring the free movement of 
capital, and increasing savings and directing them towards investment. 
e) Restructure public sector institutions undergoing financial difficultés; improve their 
efficiency; and gradually implement measures to elimínate subsidies, recover costs, 
free prices, production and wages, and adopt commercial performance criteria. 
f) Increase the efficiency of government departments, promote decentralization and 
délégation of authority andprevent duplication and overlapping in the functions of the 
various departments. 
g) Develop and promote the commodity and services sectors, including the 
manufacturing industries, utilise and process available ores, and encourage the export 
industries. 
The Potential Scope of Privatisation 
As part of this new économie strategy, which calis for a much larger role for the prívate 
sector, the government initiated a privatisation programme in the early 1990s, as well as 
starting to open up some of the sectors which had previously been closed to prívate 
investors, such as communication and energy. This section highlights the potential 
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significance of this privatisation programme by examining the size of the public sector and 
its composition in Jordan, including major potential enterprises for privatisation. 
Economie Significance of the Public Sector 
The government's heavy involvement in development efforts, particularly from the mid-
1970s to the mid-1980s, was accompanied by a substantial growth of the public sector to 
the point where it accounted for 35-37% of GDP (Anani, 1997), and came to comprise 25 
ministries with 20 central departments and 37 public corporations (Ministry of Planning, 
1993). 
The resulting economic significance of the public sector can be illustrated by the following 
five features of the Jordanian economy in the early to mid-1990s. First, the public sector5 
constituted about 55% of employment (1993 figures) and consisted of more than 300 
thousand employées, équivalent to more than 40% of the total employed population in 
1995 (WB, 1995). Secondly, the public sector was responsible for about 35% of gross 
domestic fixed capital formation (GDFCF) over the period 1990-92. Thirdly, several 
important sectors of the economy - infrastructure services, mining, and tourism, which 
accounted for 30% of GDP in 1992, were dominated by the public sector (WB, 1995). 
Fourthly, exports originating in enterprises with majority government ownership 
accounted for 29% and 25% of total commodity exports in 1993 and 1995 respectively 
(Kanaan, 1998). Finally, the public sector also had shares m more than 60% of the 
companies Iisted in the Amman Financial Market (AFM), the country's stock exchange 
(WB, 1995). 
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The Composition of the Public Sector6 
The Jordanian state-owned enterprises are concentrated mainly in the infrastructure 
sectors: water; télécommunications; and transport services (public bus transport, air 
transport, and port services). However, through the Jordanian Investment Corporation 
(JIC), the state-owned investment agency, the government has substantial share-ownership 
in other sectors of the economy. 
The Jordan Investment Corporation (JIC) was established in 1991 and is 100% owned by 
the government. Its assets are mainly investments in company shares, and its funding is 
mainly equity contribution from the government and dividends from companies. About 
70% of JIC's investments are in manufacturing and mining. Ten companies account for 
more than 50% of total investments (at cost). 
JIC has investments in 43 public shareholding companies (PSCs) listed in the Amman 
Financial Market (AFM) and, as noted above, thèse PSCs account for about 60% of 
A F M ' s capitalisation. More specifically, as shown in figure 2.1, the JIC owns more than 
50% of shares in 24% of PSCs on the basis of their market capitalisation, and has a 
shareholding of 50% in another 37% of them. In addition, JIC has shareholdings in 28 
unlisted joint-stock companies; in six of which it has a 50% or greater ownership share. 
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Figure 2.1 Participation of the Jordan fnvestment Company in Public Shareholding Companies 
(PSCs) - (Capitaiised Value) 
Mort than 1 0% , 
but less than 50% More than 50% 
Participation Participation 
22% 24% 
Less than 1 0% 
Partie ipation 
1 5% 
No Participation 
39% 
Source: World Bank Report, 1995. 'Jordán Prívate Sector Assessment'. 
Privatisation and the Jordanian Labour Market 
This section provides some background information on three issues relating to the 
Jordanian labour market which have implications for the privatisation of Jordanian public 
sector organisations. These are the way in which features of it have served to increase the 
importance and political sensitivity of public sector employment, the contrasting legal 
frameworks which regúlate the individual employment rights of civil servants and other 
categories of employees, and the differing rights that civil servants and non-civil servants 
possess with regard to trade unión membership and activity. 
Jordanian Labour Market policy and public Sector Employment 
Because of its modest natural resources, Jordán has historically placed considerable 
attention on developing its human resources (JMG, 1995). An important consequence of 
this has been that, in the context of limited domestic employment opportunities, the country 
has, with government encouragement, long been an exporter of skilled technical and 
professional labour, particularly to other Middle Eastern states región (UN, 1994.142). 
Thus, Wilson (1988: 326) has noted that: 
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'Jordan has the most highly educated and besi trained workforce in the 
Arab World. Its workers have been in heavy demand in the Gulf States and 
Saudi Ârabia. Jordanian citizens play an important rôle in the running of 
thèse économies, occupying key positions in govemment ministries and 
agencies, as well as in many service activities such as health and 
éducation '. 
Hence, by the mid-1980s, approximately 46% of the Jordanian workforce worked outside 
the country (UN, 1994:142). This situation, in tum, had three important implications for 
the Jordanian economy. First, worker remittances from Jordanians working abroad came 
to constitute, as already noted, the largest single portion of the country's GNP. Secondly, 
labour migration resulted in selected shortages within the Jordanian workforce with the 
resuit that the need arose to import lesser skilled workers, primarily from Egypt. Thirdly, 
during periods of political and économie difficulties in the Middle East workers return to 
Jordan, thus creating problems for the country not only in terms of the loss of overseas 
remittances, but also with regard to absorbing them into the labour market (UN, 1994). 
In fact, since the mid-1980s Jordan has been suffering from rising unemployment levels. 
Thus, the unemployment rate rose from 8.9% in 1988 to 18.8% in 1991 (RSS, 1996; JMG, 
1995) and to 27.5% in 1998 (Al-Kasasbah, 1998). This rise in unemployment has been 
attributed to a number of factors. In addition, to the return of large numbers of Jordanians 
working abroad and an associated décline in 'out-migration' to the Gulf States thèse 
include (R.S.S., 1996; Ministry of Planning, 1999): 
• An increase in the natural growth rate of the population to an average of 3.5% per 
annum and a conséquent increase in the size of the labour force from 446,000 
workers in 1979 to 920,000 in 1991 (Ministry of Planning, 1993) and to 1, 250,000 
in 2001 (Ministry of Labour, 2002); 
• An increase in foreign labour; 
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• An incompatibility between the outputs of the educational and training Systems and 
the requirements of the domestic labour market; 
• A décline in economic growth rates; and 
• An increase in female participation in the labour force. 
For social and political reasons, the govemment sought to respond to this situation by 
expanding recruitment in the public sector, to the extent that in 1993 around 51% of the 
country's labour force was employed in it. As a resuit, hidden unemployment was created 
within the public sector, which had a negative impact on its productivité and efficiency 
(RSS, 1996; Abu Jaber et al, 1991; Al-Kasasbah, 1998). At the same time, public sector 
employment became a highly sensitive political issue given its rôle in providing 
employment in a situation where alternative sources of work were limited. 
Individual Employment Law 
lndividual employment rights in Jordan are regulated through two différent legal Systems: 
the civil service law, and the gênerai labour law that applies to employées subject to the 
social security system. These two legal Systems differ significantly in terms of the rights 
they provide to workers. 
Employées subject to the civil service law cannot be made redundant, enjoy lower income 
tax rates, and have better pension rights and other benefits. For example, civil servants are 
able to retire after 20 years of service whereas those covered by the social security system 
need to reach a retirement âge of 60 or 65. Meanwhile, in contrast to the job security 
provided under civil service law, the gênerai labour law allows employers to dismiss 
employées under situations of restructuring or excess labour or for any other reason (Abu 
Jaber et al, 1991). 
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To confuse the matter further, public sector employées are divided into the following three 
catégories and, as is shown below, thèse catégories differ in terms of whether they fall 
within the Jurisdiction of civil service or gênerai labour law (Civil Service Commission, 
1998): 
• Classified Employées: include staff with permanent classified jobs specified in the 
national grading system and pay scale. Constitute the largest proportion of public 
sector workers and covered by the civil service law. 
• Unclassified Employées: include staff with permanent unclassified jobs that are 
covered by their own specific grading and pay scales. Covered by the gênerai 
labour law. 
• Contractual Employées: comprise of staff whose services are subject to the gênerai 
labour law and include: 
o employées who are appointed to specialised jobs and whose salaries are 
difficult to specify under the civil service pay structure; 
o temporary employées appointed to work on a specific project or to 
Substitute for staff on leave; and 
o fixed-term contract employées. 
Trade Union Membership and Activities 
Trade unions in Jordan can only be formed with the permission of the Ministry of Labour. 
At présent, there are 17 unions that between them have around 30% of the workforce in 
membership. Each of the unions is affiliated to the General Fédération of Jordanian Trade 
Unions (GFJTU). The GFJTU actively participâtes in the International Labour 
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Organisation (ILO), and belongs to the Arab Labour Organisation, the International 
Confédération of Arab Trade Unions, and to the International Confédération of Free Trade 
Unions (ICFTU). 
The GFJTU member unions regularly engage in collective bargaining with employers and 
hold negotiations over a wide range of issues, including salaries, safety standards, working 
conditions, worker lay offs, and health and life insurance. If a union is unable to reach 
agreement with an employer, the dispute is referred to the Ministry of Labour for 
médiation. If a seulement cannot be reached through médiation, the Ministry of Labour 
may, with the agreement of both parties, refer the dispute to an industrial tribunal for 
arbitration. If, however, only one party agrées to arbitration, then the Ministry may refer 
the dispute to the cabinet and then to Parliament. Should the Ministry fail to make such a 
referral within two weeks, the union may call a strike. However, the right to strike is 
considerably limited by the fact that permission must be obtained from the government 
before a strike can take place (Ministry of Labour, 2002; www.state.gov). 
In fact, union activities are also the subject of a number of other legal restrictions and 
other forms of governmental intervention. For example, the govemment subsidises and 
audits the GFJTU's salaries, co-sponsors and approves the timing of trade union élections, 
and, more generally, monitors union activities to ensure that they comply with the law. 
Furthermore, under Jordanian law civil servants are prohibited from trade union 
membership and from engaging in strike action and collective bargaining. As a resuit, 
trade union organisation is concentrated in the private sector of the economy (ICFTU, 
2003; www.state.gov). 
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The Evolution of Privatisation 
As mentioned earlier, the privatisation programme was initiated in the early 1990s. 
However, by 1995 no real progress had been made in implementing this programme. This 
lack of progress reflected an absence of political consensus about the privatisation of state 
owned enterprises. The lack of political consensus over the programme stemmed front a 
number of considérations. These included, fears of foreign asset Stripping; concerns about 
loss of revenue and national wealth by the divestment of state owned assets, especially 
those regarded as stratégie (Al-Khalidi, 1998; Anani, 1997), and worries that privatisation 
would lead to higher priées and unemployment. In addition, doubts existed as to whether 
the local financial market had sufficient capacity to absorb a comprehensive privatisation 
programme - doubts that led to fears that such a programme would depress share priées 
with the resuit that it would not generale the desired revenue (Anani, 1997; Akel, 1997). 
Fears of asset Stripping and the notion that a stratégie investor could provide a gateway for 
Israeli economic stranglehold, for example, formed an important part of the debates that 
took place on the proposais to privatise Jordan Télécommunications and Jordan Cernent. 
So too did the concem held by many Jordanians that the World Bank and the IMF, in line 
with other arguments (e.g. IMF, 2003), act las agents for multinational corporations and 
banks', and consequently represent forces for another form of colonisation, namely 
economic colonisation. 
With regard to the possible impact of privatisation on labour (Al-Nabulsi, 1999; Akel, 
1979), this also reflected a number of distinct areas of concem. One of the most important 
of thèse was the threat of potential labour redundancies in a situation of high 
unemployment and against a background of the govemment bearing the main 
responsibility for employing nomadic Bédouins and people from East Bank origins -
27 
people who have traditionally provided the backbone of popular support for the Hashemite 
monarchy (www.state.gov; World Bank, 1995). Another concemed the possible impact of 
privatisation on the pensión entitlements of employees and, in particular, the threat that it 
would lead to workers being moved from the civil service pensión scheme, under which a 
pensión accrues after only 20 years service, to the less favourable Social Security Fund or 
less generous prívate pensión schemes (World Bank, 1995). 
As regards prices, there were fears conceming the affordabilíty of social services and 
essential goods due the abolition of subsidies and the new owners' interest in making 
profit (Anani, 1997). Concems were also voiced about the potential political implications 
of such developments. These last concerns were informed by the fact that when the 
government had reduced subsidies in 1999, in order to comply with the conditions of the 
World Bank and IMF's new structural reform programrne, the subsequent increase in the 
price of bread spurred demonstrations and caused clashes with the pólice and the army, 
even in the stronghold cities of traditional support for the monarchy such as Maan and 
Karak. 
These factors meant that there was a lack of strong central support from the government 
for the privatisation programrne and a consequent absence of legal changes needed to 
support it. This lack of central direction was, moreover, compounded by a conflict 
berween individual interests in relation to particular projects (Sweiti, 1997) as a result of 
the fact that the responsibility for carrying out a privatisation often rests with the 
management of a PE which may not be keen to privatise their own undertaking and 
subsequently lose control over it (World Bank, 1995). For example, the director of the 
state-owned Jordán Telecommunications Corporation (JTC) criticised the govemment's 
plan to sell 40% of its equity to a foreign firm for 'security reasons', and stated that 'íf the 
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govemment was adamant to seil some of its equity, priority should be given to Jordanian 
or Arab Investors' (Ayyoub, 1998). In a similar vein, the chairman of the Jordan Cement 
Factories urged the govemment several times not to seil 30% of the firm's equity to a 
strategie partner (ibid). 
Nevertheless, notwithstanding the above pressures and concems, the Jordanian 
govemment did, eventually, décide to proeeed with the privatisation programme in the 
face of World Bank and IMF pressures and the urgent need to bolster depleted foreign 
exchange reserves and obtain the IMF support to shore up its battered economy. However, 
such 'poutjcal contingentes' (Batstone et al, 1984) 1984) had important implications for 
the way in which the govemment went about the privatisation of its public enterprises (Al-
Khatib, 1997; Fischer, 1997). 
From the outset, the govemment sought to learn from the privatisation expériences of 
other developing and developed countries in order to enable it to develop stratégies that 
would minimise the potential social and political problems stemming from privatisation. 
Thus, at an initial stage, a team consisting of représentatives from Ministry of Finance and 
Ministry of Planning, as well as consultants from the World Bank, was set up to formulate 
the new privatisation programme. In embarking on this exercise, the team condueted 
detailed studies of the privatisation programme undertaken in the United Kingdom, Latin 
America and New Zealand (EPC, 2001). The govemment subsequently drew heavily on 
thèse studies when subsequently formulating its own privatisation programme. 
More specifically, to allay fears about foreign asset Stripping and loss of control over 
strategie national assets, it was decided to impose conditions on foreign investors that 
would enable the govemment to keep control over board décisions that could harm 
national interests. These conditions, which included the right of the govemment to hold a 
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golden share and to use this to veto board decisions that were seen to conflict with such 
interests, were introduced despite the government's recognition that they might discourage 
foreign investors. In fact, this view was subsequently shown to be well-founded when 
some British and US firms lost interest in the privatisation of Jordán Cement Faetones on 
the grounds that they were unwilling to accept anything less than full management control. 
As regard the labour-related concems identifíed above, the govermnent decided to address 
these on a case by case basis. Nevertheless, in all the privatisations undertaken to date 
steps have been taken to protect employment security and address difficulties arising with 
regard to the loss of civil service pensión entitlements through the purchase of additional 
years of service from the Social Security Corporation. For example, in some cases, 
provisions have been included in the agreements concluded with investors to ensure the 
continued employment of workers for at least two years, as was the case with those signed 
at Maen Spa and Jordán Telecommunications Company. Meanwhile, at Water Co, the 
government provided that civil servants would only be seconded, rather than permanently 
transferred, to the incoming foreign M N C , and at Aqaba Railway Corporation (ARC) it 
was provided, albeit after the privatisation had taken place, that employees not wanted by 
the new investor would be absorbed by various government departments (EPU, 2000). 
The Development of a Privatisation Strategy 
ín response to this lack of progress, the World Bank published a report in 1995 which 
stressed the importance of speedy action being taken. In doing so, the Bank emphasised 
that a well designed and executed privatisation programme would aid the attraction of 
external investment, a rapid expansión in infrastructure, an improvement in efficiency, the 
development of the local capital markets, and fiscal consolidation. It also argued that 
launchíng a credible privatisation programme would be a powerful way to signal to the 
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world Jordan's commitmerit to econornic reform (Al-Fanek, 1997). The report further 
indicated that the govemrnent needed to take a more systematic approach towards 
privatisation and establish an appropriate structure for its management (World Bank, 
1995). 
In light of the above, in the second half of the 1990s the govemrnent developed an ¡nitial 
strategy for a privatisation programrne which specified the shape and, scale of 
privatisation, the mechanisms to implement the programrne and the methods through 
which privatisation would take place (Prime Ministry, 1998). In this strategy, the 
govemrnent decíared that it was withdrawing from the secondary and tertiary industries 
where the private sector operates. In addition, it announced its intention to divest its 
shareholding in other sectors with commercial functions, particularly those which opérate 
in competition with the private sector, such as hotels, or where the private sector was able 
to opérate freely in competition with others, such as cement (World Bank, 1997). 
At the same time, the govemrnent stated that it had no intention to withdraw from specific 
vital actívities such as health, education and social services, but instead would seek to 
encourage the private sector to particípate in their production through such means as the 
building of private schools and hospitals, and the establishment of social co-operatives 
(Al-Kodah, 1998a). The govemrnent also proposed to keep its current share in some of the 
strategic industries and natural resources, such as phosphate, potash and water, but to 
allow the private sector, both local and foreign, to contribute to their expansión and 
operation through participaron in new projects and the obtaining of management contracts 
(Al-Kodah, 1998a). 
As regards the privatisation programrne itself, it was decided that this would be 
implemented in two phases. The first phase was to encompass the partial divestment of the 
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portfolio of Jordan Investment Corporation and the privatisation of the following: Jordan 
Télécommunication Corporation, National Electric Power Company, Jordan Cernent 
Factories, Ma-in Spa Complex, Royal Jordanian Airlines, Public Transport Corporation, 
Aqaba Railway Corporation, and the Water Authority (Sweiti, 1998). The second phase 
would subsequently include the privatisation of the National Petroleum Corporation, the 
Arab Potash Company, the Jordan Phosphate Mines Company, and the Postal Service 
(Mansur, 1998). 
Institutionell Framework for Privatisation 
To activate and ensure rapid Implementation of the privatisation programme, the 
govemment established an institutional framework for privatisation in July 1996. The key 
éléments of this organisational structure include the Higher Committee for Privatisation 
(HCP), the Executive Privatisation Unit (EPU), the Privatisation Steering/Directive 
Committees, and Work Teams (EPU, 2000). 
A) The Higher Ministerial Committee (HMC) 
The Cabinet-appointed Higher Ministerial Committee (HMC) is headed by the Prime 
Minister and comprises the economic ministers and heads of the concerned departments 
and institutions. To ensure transparency in the whole privatisation process, the Audit 
Bureau is represented in the H M C . The H M C supervises the Executive Privatisation Unit 
(see below), steers the overall privatisation programme and acts as the approval authority 
on the govemment's privatisation policy, objectives and programme (Al-Kodah, 1998b). 
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B) The Executive Privatisation Unit (EPU) 
The privatisation implementation office at the Prime Ministry is called the Executive 
Privatisation Unit. Its main responsibilities include: co-ordination of the préparation of the 
privatisation transactions (selling method, valuation, legal work, financial audits, sales 
memoranda); management of the various teams of technical experts and extemal advisors; 
management of the marketing of enterprises being divested; negotiations with various 
groups of stakeholders such as the senior management of the enterprise to be privatised, 
the potential investors, the stock market and the financial advisors; exécution of 
transactions; and dissémination of information regarding the progress of the programme 
(World Bank, 1996). In addition, the World Bank is providing technical and financial 
assistance to the EPU regarding the privatisation programmes implementation. 
C) Directive Commutées 
A Directive Committee is usually formed for each project which includes the minister or 
director general of the sector to be privatised, the head of the Executive Privatisation Unit, 
and others, such as the head of the audit bureau. Thèse commutées oversee the 
privatisation process, facilítate communication and coordination with ail relevant parties, 
and présent recommendations to the Higher Ministerial Committee. 
D) Work Teams 
Usually work teams are formed in respect of the individual undertakings that are to be 
privatised. Thèse teams comprise technocrats (specialists) from the related ministry or 
enterprise, représentatives from the EPU, and the audit bureau, financial and legal 
consultants, and other experts. Thèse teams follow up the préparation and évaluation 
opérations and then submit recommendations to the relevant directive committees8. 
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The legal and institutional framework for privatisation in Jordan was subsequently 
supported by the adoption of the privatisation law no. 25 of 2000. As a resuit, an 
Executive Privatisation Commission (EPC) was created to take over the role of the 
Executive Privatisation Unit (EPU), as an independent administrative and financial entity 
associated with the Prime Minister. In addition, a new Privatisation Council was 
established to take over the tasks and responsibilities of the Higher Privatisation 
Committee, and the new law mandated the création of the Privatisation Proceeds Fund that 
would be used to pay the country's debts and support new Investments. In addition, part of 
this fund's proceeds were to be used to train the laid off employées in the privatised 
companies and to buy years of pensions service for the employées who were to be 
transferred to the national insurance scheme after the privatisation of the organisations in 
which they were employed (EPC, 2001). 
Forms of Privatisation 
The Jordanian government adopted a multi-track strategy which encompassed a range of 
possible forms of privatisation. These included: Capital Privatisation; Sales to Long Term 
Investors; Concession Agreements; Management Contracts; Leasing; Franchising; and 
other modes, such as Build, Opérate and Transfer (BOT), and Build, Opérate and Obtain 
(BOO). 
This multi-track approach was adopted so as to allow individual privatisation projects to 
be shaped in a way most appropriate to the nature, type, size, financial position and 
stratégie importance of the enterprise concemed, as well as the aims of its privatisation 
(Gupta, 2000; Khandah, 2000). For example, in the case of water, which is seen as an 
essential resource, the government decided that rather than selling the Water Authority, it 
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would opt for a management contract. On the other hand, in the case of more 
commercially based non-essential activities, Hke some of the holdings of Jordan 
Investment Corporation, the government opted to sell 100% of the shares of the 
enterprises to the public because such assets could be easily absorbed by the prívate sector. 
Recent Progress in Privatisation 
The progress in privatisation was slow and only began to be significant after August 1998, 
despite the establishment of the privatisation strategy and its related institutional 
arrangements. Prior to August 1998, most of the transactions were in abeyance or 
sidetracked by the same political issues and fears that had led to the original slow 
progress. Consequently the government needed to address thèse issues before privatisation 
could proceed. 
The first breakthrough in the privatisation programme took place with the successful 
privatisation of Jordan Cernent Factories in December 1998. The success of this deal 
involving, as it did, a foreign company, helped overeóme fears about passing control to 
overseas investors and henee facilitated the subséquent progress of the privatisation 
programme. 
Consequently, by August 2001, out of the eight major privatisation transactions identified 
în the first phase in Jordan's privatisation programme, six have been completed - Jordan 
Cernent Factories; Public Transport Corporation; Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ); the 
Ma'in Spa Complex, the Aqaba Railway Corporation; and Jordan Télécommunications 
Company. In addition, a number of smaller transactions has been concluded including the 
selling of around forty of the Govemment's smaller holdings in the portfolio of the Jordan 
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Investmerit Corporation (EPC, 2001). Details of these transactions, as well as those 
planned for the futurę, are given below. 
Main Transactions 
}. Jordan Cement Faetones (JCF): The government's first attempt to privatise JCF in 
autumn 1996 did not raise an adequate level of interest from the prívate sector investors 
due to the small proportion of the shares offered (20%), a lack of clarity on the 
government's tariff policy, and the limited time provided for investor "due diligence" 
exercises. To address these issues and revitalise the transaction, the government decided to 
increase the amount of shares to be sold to (33%), raise the price of cement and clarify the 
tariff policy while pursuing an aggressive marketing strategy. 
At the beginning of November 1998, the Cabinet decided to sell 1.25 million shares (1%) 
out of the government shareholding in JCF, to the Jordanian employees working at JCF at 
a subsidised selling price of JD 1.5 per share. Subsequently, the government sold 33% of 
its JCF's shares to the French Company "Lafarge" on December 14, 1998. Accordingly, 
four representatives of Lafarge were elected to the board of directors of JCF. The proceeds 
of the sale amounted to $102 million, at a selling price of JD 3.6 per share, a figure that 
was substantially higher than the last market price on the Ammán Financial Market (AFM) 
of JD 1.8 per share. 
2. Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ): A performance-based management contract relating 
to the management of all water-related services within the Ammán region, was signed on 
19 April 1999 between the government and a consortium led by the French Company 
"Suez Lyonnaise Des Euax", with Arabtech Jardaneh as the local partner. A Regulatory 
body was also established within WAJ to monitor the performance of this contract. Under 
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the contract, the operator was granted a four-year license to manage the distribution of 
water without loss of government ownership or control. The operator was also made 
responsible for running and managing the water network, maintaining ít, and collecting 
fees on behalf of the Water Authority. In return, the company was to be paid a fee of S8.8 
million through a water-linked loan from the World Bank of $55 million. If this contract 
succeeds, the government intends to adopt similar contractual arrangements in other parts 
of the water industry (Mansur, 1998). 
3. Jordán Telecommunications Company (JTC): 40% of JTC's shares were sold to France 
Telecom (FT) and the Arab Bank consortium for about US $508 million on 23 January 
2000. A fee-based management contract was also awarded to the new tecfmical/strategic 
partner (FT). Furthermore, 8% of the government's shares were sold to the Social Security 
Corporation, and 1% to the Employee Saving Fund of the JTC. The distribution of the 
board of directors' seats amongst the partners is proportional to their shares in the 
company; four to the government and three to the consortium. 
4. Main Spa Complex: A 30-year Leasing and Investment agreement for the management 
of the spa complex was signed at the end of October 1998 with a consortium led by the 
French Company "Accor", and a local Investor Group. The site was handed over to the 
consortium during March 1999 and the complex was inaugurated in June 2000. It should 
be noted that the government continúes to own 78% of the company. 
5. Aqaba Railway Corporation (ARC): A leasing, investment and operating agreement for 
25 years was signed between the government and Raytheon/Winconson Central" on 18 
August 1999 to upgrade and opérate the existing Aqaba railway and build two new 
extensions -Wadi2 and Shediah. Under the agreement, the government retains ownership 
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of the railway network. In addition, the Ministry of Transport retains a role in the 
régulation, licensing and supervision of the corporation. 
6. Public Transport Corporation (PTC): Agreements were signed on 19 November 1998 
with three local bus-operating companies. Under thèse, companies were awarded 
"concessions/franchises" for ten years to operate (PTC) routes in the Greater Amman 
Area. A Public Transport Administrator (PTA) was also appointed to act as the regulatory 
agency for public transport in Jordan. 
Other Transactions 
Some of the JIC portfolio companies have also been divested through the Amman 
Financial Market. By 2001 the transactions had involved the divesture of shares in around 
40 companies as follows: 
- Divestures of shares of 21 companies with less than 5% government ownership 
Divesture of shares of 10 companies with 5-10% government ownership 
Divesture of shares of 8 companies with more than 10% government ownership. 
Ongoing Transactions 
Royal Jordanian Airlines (RJ): The fmancial, institutional and légal restructuring of RJ 
was completed in 2001. The Royal Jordanian Law was cancelled, and a new law - No. 13 
(2000) transformed RJ into a shareholding company totally owned by the government. 
Subsequently, the RJ mother company was divided into a core business operating 
Company, and five non-core support activities that were registered as independent 
companies and were offered for sale to the private sector. Thèse non- core support 
companies consisted of: the Airport's Duty Free Shops; Jordan Flight Catering Company; 
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Engine Overhauling Centre; Jordan Airline Training and Simulation; and Aircrafí 
Maintenance Centre. 
As for the core business (aviation services), the government retained control over the 
national airline and intends to privatise it through the sale of 49% of the shares to a 
financial and/or a stratégie partner. Currently, the RJ management and privatisation team 
are in the process of updating the information mémorandum and bidding documents in 
préparation for the sale. 
Power Sector; On 1 January 1999 the National Electric Power Company (NEPCO) was 
unbundled into three companies: Génération (CEGCO), Distribution (EDCO) and 
Transmission (NEPCO). The restructuring of the three companies to work on a 
commercial basis is now underway and a consulting fírm has been appointed to conduct a 
study on electricity bulk tariff and the restructuring of the three new registered companies. 
This is viewed as a preliminary step towards privatising the generating and distribution 
companies. NEPCO - the transmission company - will, however, be retained by the 
govemment. 
Conclusion 
Since its inception as a state in 1921, Jordan has suffered from a variety o f économie 
problems stemming from a number of factors: limited natural resources; export 
concentration in terms of the limited variety of exports and destinations; dependence on 
extemal financial aid and remittances from Jordanians working abroad; perennial 
instability stemming from the various crisis that have affected the Middle East région 
during the past five décades; and the nature and limitations of économie planning. Thèse 
factors have resulted in a chronic trade déficit in the balance of payments, increased the 
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vulnerabüity of the Jordanian economy to external regional and international economic 
and political developments, diverted Jordan's limited resources to military expenditures, 
and made it highly dépendent on foreign assistance. 
Notwithstanding the dearth of natural resources and the economic impact of the wars in 
the région in 1948 and 1967, the period 1973-1980 marked a new era within the history of 
Jordan's economic development due to the high levels of Investments made as a resuit of 
increased fmancial aid, a growing demand for Jordanian labour and a subséquent rise in 
remittances, and favourable trade conditions in the wake of the oil boom in the Arab Gulf 
states. However, the unprecedented economic growth that Jordan enjoyed during these 
years came to an end by 1983 as a resuit of the economic recession in the Gulf States 
prompted by a fall in oil priées which led to déclines in exports, external fmancial 
assistance and remittances from Jordanians. These negative effects on the Jordanian 
economy were compounded by the new wars in the région, particularly, the 1980 Iraq-Iran 
War. In response to this situation, Jordan resorted during the period 1982 - 1985 to short-
term borrowing to meet its expenditures and in 1986 identified privatisation as a means to 
generate revenue. 
The economic situation, however, continued to deteriorate. In large part this was due to a 
continuation of the above adverse economic effects. The impact of these was, however, 
compounded by the termination of the ten-year commitment of the Gulf States to aid 
Jordan economically. As a resuit, to maintain consumption at a bare minimum, the 
government approved increasing budget déficits and increased its borrowing to the point 
that, in 1988, the external debt rose to $6,444.6 million and the external debt service 
reached $1,301.4 million. Consequently, by 1989 Jordan faced an economic crisis as it 
was unable to pay its externa! debts, which constituted 180% of GDP, its reserves were 
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wiped out, the country's currency had been devaluated by nearly 35%, and inflation 
reached 25.8%. 
Against this background of economic crisis, Jordan embarked on an economic reform 
programme in 1989 with the aid the World Bank and the IMF to rein in the fiscal deficit 
and rebuild the reserves while liberalising the exchange rate. The plan also aimed at 
restructuring the economy at both the macroeconomic and sectoral levels in order to 
enhance growth, productivity, and efficiency. More specifically, the World Bank and the 
IMF agreed to extend fmancial assistance to Jordan in return for specific structural 
adjustments and reforms. However, Jordan had to adopt an amended economic adjustment 
programme for the period 1992-1998 after the suspension of the first one as a resuit of the 
GulfWar in 1991. 
In light of the above adjustment programme, Jordan developed a new Economic and 
Social Plan for the period 1993-1997 which designated a major rôle for the private sector 
and confined the role of the govemment mostly to infrastructure-related projects deemed 
essential for stimulating private investment. Accordingly, the govemment initiated a 
privatisation programme in the early 1990s and started to open up some of the sectors 
previously closed to the private sector. Progress on implementing this privatisation 
programme was, however, initially very slow due to a number of factors, notably a lack of 
political consensus and strong central direction, and fears about the negative impact of 
privatisation on employment and prices, and the absorptive capacity of the Jordanian 
fmancial market. 
Consequently, the World Bank published a report in 1995 in which it urged the 
govemment to speed up the privatisation process. Accordingly, in 1996 the govemment 
announced its privatisation programme and developed an initial strategy, which specified 
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the shape and scale of privatisation, the mechanisms to implement the programme and the 
methods through which privatisation should occur. This privatisation programme is being 
implemented in two phases and so far six out of the eight major privatisation transactions 
identified in the first phase have been concluded. In addition, progress is being made in 
respect of the remaining two and steps have also been taken to start implementing the 
second phase of the privatisation programme. 
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Notes 
Interview with Dr Yusuf Mansur, former Director of the Aid Competitiveness Unit and 
the EU-Jordan Technical Support Unit, Ministry of Planning (July, 1999). 
2 Between 1980-90 Jordanian Debt increased by 37% to reach 201% of GNP or 190%) of 
GDP (Mansur, 1989). 
3 The Jordanian Dinar devalued from JD 0.33 per US S in October 1988 to the current 
managed floating position, of JD 0.67 (October 1989) per US $. 
4 The other principals of the 1993-1997 Plan were: Development and promotion of natural 
resources, particularly water and energy; development of the export sector by opening new 
export outlets, expanding traditional markets and training manpower in a manner 
commensurate with the needs of exploiting available resources and the requirements of 
industries and services enjoying a comparative advantage; striving for the balance between 
human and économie resources; and création of rurther employment opportunities in the 
various production sectors, with the aim of achieving a réduction in unemployment to an 
acceptable level. 
5 The public sector consists of the Government and the public enterprises 
6 The discussion in this section excludes from considération the "non-trading" part of the 
public sector, which embodies govemment ministries and departments. Employment in 
this part of the public sector is nevertheless significant. 
It should be noted that a range of légal reforms were introduced to facilitate the 
privatisation programme. For example, thèse have included: National Economy Protection 
Law of 1992; Companies Law of 1997; the Stock Exchange Law of 1997; the Investment 
and Promotion Law of 1995; the Income Taxation Law of 1995; the Jordan Investment 
Corporation Law of 1987; General Electricity Law of 1999; Télécommunications Law No. 
13 (1995); Customs Law of 1998; Anti-Trust Laws; and Privatisation Law No. 35 (2000). 
In addition, regulatory bodies and commissions have been establiśhed for securities and 
télécommunications and others are going to be established for electricity and transport. 
Pricing régulations have been abolished and restrictions on foreign exchange have been 
totally removed. 
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CHAPTER THREE: MULTINATIONALE AND HUMAN RESOURCE 
MANAGEMENT 
Introduction 
The foreign Investments of multinational companies (MNCs) are considered to be more 
important for the growth of the world economy than international trade (Harzing, 1995; 
Edwards et al, 1999; Edwards, 2000). At the beginning of the 1990s, it was estimated that 
one third of the world's private sector productive assets were owned by MNCs (UN, 
1993), and they accounted for around two-thirds of world exports of goods and services 
(UN, 1996). It was further estimated that around 73 million people were employed directly 
by MNCs Worldwide (UN, 1996), and a similar number were employed in firms who were 
suppïying MNCs and were dépendent on them (Ruigrok and Tulder, 1995). In addition, 
the United Nations has more recently estimated that there are 63,000 MNCs in the world, 
Controlling 690,000 subsidiarles and selling goods and services valued at around $ US 14 
trillion (UN, 2000; Edwards and Ferner, 2002). 
In 1986, about one third of total employment in foreign affiliâtes was accounted for by 
MNCs subsidiarles in developing countries. In such countries, the output of foreign 
affiliâtes contributed, in 1994, more to gross domestic product than in developed 
countries: 9 per cent compared to 5 per cent. Moreover, the U N C T A D survey, conducted 
in 1995, showed that MNCs are increasingly incorporating developing countries into their 
future investments plans due to the sustained economic growth and continuing 
libéralisation and privatisation in thèse countries. Indeed, inflows of FDI to developing 
countries have been increasing steadily (UN, 1997). 
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Evidence suggests that M N C s ' human resource strategies and policies are importan! to 
host countries as they have a distinctive impact on the level and structure of employment, 
training, wages and working conditions, and industrial relations (Dunning, 1993; U N , 
2000; Debrah, 2001). Indeed, there are grounds for believing that the impact of MNCs 1 
human resource strategies is likely to be more evident in developing countries. For 
example, in a comparison between the annual training expenditures per employee of a 
group of Nigerian enterprises, Iyanda and Bello (1979) concluded that MNCs spent six 
times as much as their local competitors (ILO, 1981). In addition, much of the training 
produced by MNCs tends to be higher in quality than that generally provided by the host 
country, particularly in developing countries, and more likely to be undertaken outside the 
nation economy, often within the parent company (ILO, 1981; Enderwick, 1994; Romijn 
et al, 2000 cited in U N , 2000: 187). The literature also suggests that investments by 
MNCs and their cross border experience in people management, often help to restructure 
economic activities and upgrade human resources (Dunning, 1993). 
Againstthis background, the present chapter provides an analysis of H R M within MNCs. 
To do this initial attention is paid to what is meant by a M N C and the related issue of 
whether a distinction can usefully be drawn between multinational (MNC) and 
Transnational (TNC) companies. The various models of M N C Human Resource 
Management (HRM) strategies, as well as the factors which influence them, are then 
outlined and discussed. Finally, the mechanisms used to implement these strategies are 
reviewed. 
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Multinational v Transnational 
A définition widely accepted in académie and business circles, as well as by international 
organisations, such as the Organisation for Economie Co-operation and Development 
(OECD), and the United Nations Centre on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), is that 
la multinational or transnational1 enterprise is an enterprise that engages in foreign 
direct investment (FDî)1 and owns or controls value-adding activities in more than one 
country'(Dunning, 1993). It can be seen therefore that the ternis 'multinational' and 
'transnational' are often used interchangeably. For example, Dicken has argued that ail 
multinational corporations are transnational corporations (1998), while Pitelis and Sugden 
(1991) conclude that MNCs and TNCs are 'essentially the same entities'. Accordingly, 
they Ieave the choice of the terminology open. 
On the other hand, some scholars and business analysts do draw a distinction between the 
two terms. They do so, however, on two rather différent bases. The first group of scholars 
(e.g. Marginson and Sisson, 1994; Dunning, 1993; Cowling and Sugden, 1987) draw their 
distinction on the basis of whether an integrated management strategy exists. For example, 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998), make a clear distinction between the two concepts on the 
following grounds: 
'MNC is a decentralised fédération of assets and responsibilities, a 
management process defined by simple financial control Systems overlaid 
on informal personal co-ordination, and a dominant stratégie mentality 
that viewed the company's world wide opérations as a portfolio of 
national business ' (1998: 56). 
TNC is an organisation in which multidimensional management 
perspectives and capabilities are kept legitímate and viable, dispersed 
assets and resources are developed in a differentiated and interdependent 
network, and the whole system is integrated with a flexible co-ordinating 
process'(1998: 296). 
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The second group takes another perspective based on the presence of a clear home base. 
For example, Hirst and Thompson (1996; 1999) define the two terms as follows: 
MNCs...retain a clear national home base; they are subject to the 
national regulation of the mother country, and by and Iarge they are 
effectively policed by that home country' (1996; 1999: 9) 
'The TNC would be genuine footloose capital, without specific national 
identification and with an internationalised management, and at least 
potentially willing to lócate and relocate anywhere in the globe to obtain 
either the most secare or highest returns' (1996; 1999:11). 
In practice, however, there are a number of problems associated with drawing a distinction 
between a multinational and a transnational along each of the above lines. These are 
discussed below. 
Distinction on the Basis of Management Strategy 
The presence of an integrated managerial strategy as a basis for distinguishing between a 
M N C and a TNC is problematic for two main reasons. The first is that the intensity and 
balance of forces for global integration and local responsiveness vary from one industry to 
the next. For example, where consumer tastes differ significantly between countries, 
multinationals are constrained in the extent to which they are able to intégrate their 
activities internationally and tend to organise around national subsidiaries. Conversely, 
where tastes are similar, MNCs have more scope for cross-national integration and 
standardisation (Edwards et al, 1999). Accordingly, Bartlett (1986), for example, claims 
that the cement industry would not particularly benefít from building global scale plants 
and scale economies due to logistical barriers. By contrast, industries such as electronics 
can benefit from integration and global scale production (Bartlett, 1986). Thus, it is argued 
that in some sectors older strategies remain since local-content requirements mean that 
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MNCs must serve a host country market via a multi-domestic strategy and stand alone-
affiliates. However, the same firms may serve another market through a regional strategy 
with a complex intégration of the main corporate functions (UN, 1993). Given that a MNC 
can therefore be managerially integrated in some parts of its business and not integrated in 
other parts, such différences create difficulties for an approach to the définition of 
transnational based on managerial intégration. 
Secondly, in addition to the point that the nature of strategie intégration may vary ffom 
one sector to another, there are a number of conceptual problems surrounding the notion of 
intégration. In summary thèse are three fold. First, there is no consistent interprétation of 
what strategie intégration means in the literaturę (e.g. Doz and Prahalad, 1984; Bartlett 
and Ghoshal, 1987a; Kobrin, 1991; Brewster and Larsen, 1992; 411; Schuler et al, 1993; 
Adler and Ghadar, 1990; Muller-Camen et ai, 2001; Edwards and Ferner, 2002). 
Secondly, there is no accepted approach in the literaturę to measuring it (e.g. Kobrin, 
1991; Harzing, 2000a). Thirdly, since, by définition, strategie intégration is a continuum, it 
becomes somewhat arbitrary as to where on the continuum a line is drawn to distinguish a 
strategically integrated organisation. For example, Komache (1996) maintains that: 
'Integration: is a matter of degree: one extreme end entails the quest for 
"convergence" across borders and the application or imposition of 
'universalist ' practices, while a more moderate view might suggest the 
mere use ofguidelines to influence policy Implementation ai the subsidiary 
level'(1996: 233). 
Distinction on the Basis of the Degree of Footlooseness 
Hirst and Thompson define an M N C on the basis that it retains a clear national home base 
whereas a true TNC would be genuine footloose capital, without specific national 
identification. This view can be seen to accord with the views of writers Hke Ohmae 
(1990), and Reich (1991) who claim that a truly global economy has emerged, and that 
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MNCs are becoming 'stateless', owing allegiance to no nation state. Reich, for example. 
states that: 
'We are living through a transformaron that will rearrange the politics 
and economics of the coming century. There will be no national producís 
or technologies, no national corporations, no national industries. Hiere 
will no longer be national economies, at least as we have come to 
understand that concept...'. 
Some support for this view comes from evidence provided by the United Nations 
Investment Report (1993) which indicates that some MNCs have established functional 
headquarters outside their home countries which specialise in carrying out functions for all 
affíliates in a specific región. For example, Toyota Motor Management Services 
Singapore, a wholly owned affíliate of Toyota Motor Corporation-Japan, was established 
to co-ordinate transactions in components between Toyota affíliates in several Asian 
countries, and reports directly to the company's headquarters in Japan. Similarly, others 
like IBM, have established product-line headquarters, either regionally or globally. In 
addition, some MNCs, such as General Motors and Ford, have established regional 
headquarters in response to regional integration schemes. 
Despite the changes mentioned above, however, much contrary evidence suggests that 
even the most global of companies remain deeply embedded in their country of origin 
(Ferner, 1994; Casper and Hancke, 1999). For example, the majority of MNCs conduct 
their research and development at home (Dunning, 1993), and have the majority of their 
assets and employment at home. This last point can illustrated by considering data from 
U N C T A D which ranks the largest 100 TNCs in the world in terms of a transnationality 
index (TNI) that measures the' share of a company's activities taking place in a country 
other than its own on the basis of three ratios: foreign assets to total assets, foreign sales to 
total sales and foreign employment to total employment. 
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Dicken (1998) argües that if the 'global/transnational corporation' hypotheses is valid then 
it would be expected that at least the majority of these largest MNCs have the majority of 
their assets and employment outside their home country. However, examination of the 
transnationality índex figures reveáis no clear evidence to support the view that even the 
largest 100 MNCs are truiy 'global' or 'transnational'. Thus, these show that the biggest 
MNCs in terms of total foreign assets all have relatively low transnational index scores. 
For example, the largest MNC (in terms of foreign assets), General Electric, ranks 75 I h on 
the index of transnationality; the fourth, G M , ranks 83^; the sixth, Toyota, ranks 82 n d (UN, 
2001). Henee Dicken (1998; 2003) argües that 'not only are there very few, if any, truly 
"global" corporations but also TNCs remain strongly affected by specific national and 
local environments'. 
This conclusión is echoed by others. For example, Hirst and Thompson (1999: 84) 
conclude that 'in the aggregaíe, International companies are still predominantly MNCs 
with a clear home base to their operations and not TNCs which represent footloose 
stateless companies'. Similarly, Hu (1992), who suggested criteria for evaluating the 
extent to which TNCs are stateless, has concluded that '...the TNC is a national 
corporation with International operations...'. Indeed, Yip et al. claim that 'for the vast 
majority of MNCs, the original and current countries of corporate headquarters and of 
most business headquarters are still the same' (1997: 366). 
More generally, a further problem with the transnationality index is that, as with 
management integration, it raises the question as to at what point on its continuum of 
transnationality a corporation moves from M N C to TNC status. In support of this view, 
Dunning (1993:3) argües that 'there is no escaping the fact that the cholee of the point at 
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which an enierprise is deemed to become a multinational - not to mention a global 
corporation - is bound to be arbitra/y '. 
Doubts can also be raised about the validity of the index itself. Thus, the index is based on 
foreign direct investment data, that is, foreign assets owned overseas (Dicken, 1998: 177). 
However, an increasing number of MNCs are engaging in cross-border non-equity, co­
opérative ventures, such as licensing agreements, franchising, subcontracting and stratégie 
alliances, which are not taken into account in FDI data (Luostarinen and Welch, 1990; 
Dunning, 1993; Marginson, 1994; Dicken, 1998; U N , 2000; Rugman, 2001). For this 
reason, Rasmstetter (1998: 208 cited in Hirst and Thompson, 1999: 87) has argued that 
'...FDI-related indicators are ratherpoor indicators of foreign MNCprésence... \ 3 
In summary, a number of authors and political/economic institutions do not differentiate 
between the two terminologies of MNCs and TNCs and use them interchangeably. Others, 
however, have tried to distinguish between the two terms and sought to do so on two 
différent grounds: the existence of an integrated managerial strategy and the présence of a 
clear home base. 
In practice, however, it is very difficult to operationalise thèse distinctions and draw a 
clear distinction between an M N C and a TNC. Therefore, in this study it has been decided 
to amalgamate the two concepts and use the term ' M N C in the following way: 
'A MNC is a firm which has the power to co-ordinate and control 
opérations in more than one country, even if it does not own them ' 
(Dicken, 1998: 177; 2003: 198). 
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Multinational Human Resource Strategies 
H R M is increasingly viewed as a crucial component of a firm's overall corporate or 
business strategy (Myloni and Harzing, 2001), and a growing body of research is 
developing on the human resource strategies and policies of multinationals (Schuler et al., 
1993; Taylor et al., 1996). This research indicates that multinationals differ significantly 
in terms of the way in which they approach the management of human resources in their 
overseas operations (Ferner, 1994; Dowling and Schuler, 1990). 
A useful starting point in terms of considering the human resource strategies of MNCs is 
the work of Perlmutter (1969) since this has made a seminal contribution to the literature. 
Perlmutter originally identified three broad strategies: ethnocentric, polycentric and 
geocentric. A fourth strategy, regiocentric, was later added (Heenan and Perlmutter, 1979). 
According to Perlmutter (1969), a company with an "ethnocentric" strategy applies H R M 
policies and practices in its foreign subsidiaries similar to those adopted in its home 
country. Overseas subsidiaries, consequently, tend to be wholly-owned and expatriates, 
managers from the source country, are used to staff key managerial positions everywhere 
in the world to transfer headquarters' culture and philosophy. In a similar vein, the board 
and top management in the headquarters are from the home country and the parent 
company's organisational culture is considered superior to that of the subsidiaries. 
Accordingly, personnel management is highly centralised. 
At the opposite extreme is the "polycentric" strategy, which is described by Perlmutter 
(1969) as a loosely connected group with quasi-independent subsidiaries as centres -
more akin to a confederation'. Thus, according to the Perlmutter, under a polycentric 
strategy local environmental factors are given greater weight, and top executives assume 
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that people are different in every country. As a result, human resource management tends 
to be decentralised to subsidiarles and there is no overall personnel policy at group level 
(Perlmutter, 1969; Heenan and Perlmutter, 1979). 
Differently again, a regiocentric strategy, in Perlmutter's view, is one in which the parent 
company tries to blend its own strategic interests with those of its subsidiaries on a 
regional basis, most often by operating regional offices staffed by managers appointed 
from the same región (e.g. IBM-Europe). As a result, the regiocentric firm utilises a wider 
pool of host- and third-country nationals to manage subsidiaries on a regional basis, such 
as the European Union región or the Middle East región. Mobility is important inside one 
región and the H R M policy is generally defined at regional level. 
Finally, the geocentric strategy is one in which, Perlmutter (1969) argües, the MNCs 
devise and implement a universal (common) company-wide H R M policy for all its 
subsidiaries, fostered through an organisational culture and philosophy which could be an 
amalgam of a number of different local cultures. According to Perlmutter, the ultímate 
goal of a geocentric strategy is a worldwide approach in both headquarters and 
subsidiaries. Consequently, it is argued that 'the firm's subsidiaries are thus neither 
satellites ñor independent city states, but parts of a whole whose focus is on worldwide 
objectives, as well as local objectives, each part making its unique contribution with its 
unique competence'. 
A variety of studies have been done since Perlmutter's original work to try and analyse the 
human resource strategies of MNCs and construct typologies of them. Table 3.1 below 
shows the most important of these, as suggested by Harzing (2000a). 
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Table 3.10verview of Typologies of Multinational Companies 
Perlmutter 
Stepford and Wells 
Doz 
Porter 
Bartlett 
Prahalad and Doz 
Bartlett and Ghoshal 
Meffert 
Gerportt 
White and Poynter 
Adler and Ghadar 
Roth and Morrison 
Roth, Schweiger and Morrison 
Suridaram and Black 
Leong and Tan 
Ghoshal and Nohria 
Macharzina 
Welge 
Wolf 
1969 
1972 
1980 
1986 
1986 
1987 
1987 
1989 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1993 
1993 
1996 
1996 
Source: Harzing (2000a) 
In many of thèse studies Perlumutter's models have been explicitly used and found useful. 
Indeed, over the past thirty years Perlmutter's stratégies have been widely applied by a 
wide range of académies, scholars, and researchers (e.g. Marginson ei al, 1993; Kobrin, 
1994; Marginson and Sisson, 1994; Femer, 1994; Rosenzweig and Nohria, 1994; Caligiuri 
and Stroh, 1995; Ngo et al, 1998; Coller and Marginson, 1998; Belanger and Giles, 2001; 
Dorrenbacher, 2001; Myloni and Harzing, 2001). Nevertheless, a number of other 
alternative typologies have been put forward. For example, Adler and Ghadar (1990) 
classified the typologies of MNCs in terms of the M N C ' s Product Life Cycle, while m 
another study Bartlett and Ghoshal distinguished between four typologies: the 
multinational, the international, the global, and the transnational (see further below). 
Nevertheless, on a close reading, thèse typologies overlap considerably with those 
developed by Perlmutter and his colleagues (Caliguiri and Stroh, 1995). Indeed, Bartlett 
and Ghoshal, in relation to their own typology, which is the one most often utilised other 
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than Perlummer's (Harzing, 1999, 2000a; Edwards, 2000), make this exact observation as 
the quote below shows: 
'The concept closer to our view, and the one that has substantially 
influenced our approach and interpretation, is in the seminal work of 
Perlmutter (1969). He developed a typology of different multinational 
mentalities or cognitive orientations toward international business and 
this typology remains as valid today as it was when proposed over two 
decades ago. He classified multinationals as ethnocentric, polycentric, 
and regoecentric; The first refers to an approach of home country 
dominance that is central to the centralised lab model we have described; 
the second describes companies that treat each subsidiary on a country-
by-country basis, similar to our model of the decentralised federation; and 
the third identifies companies that develop a cosmopolitan and integrative 
style - an approach that is similar to the organisational form we described 
as the transnational' (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998: 355). 
Against this background, a number of authors have argued that Perlmutter's distinctions 
have stood the test of time. For example, Evans (1987) noted: 
'A review of research since the late 1960s shows that our understanding of 
the human resources strategies of multinational firms has advanced little 
since the pioneering studies of Perlmutter into the meaning of 
multinationalism that led to his Ethnocentric - Polycentric - Regiocentric 
- Geocentric typology' (Adler and Ghadar, 1990: 235) 
More recently, in a similar vein, Belanger and Giles (2001) have observed that: 
'Perlmutter's distinction between "ethnocentric", "polycentric" and 
"geocentric " orientations has stood the test of time and remains useful'. 
In light of the above assertions, it would seem that Perlumutter's typology remains 
relevant today and for this reason the present study uses it as an essential reference point. 
Nevertheless, in using this typology it is recognised that some authors have argued that it 
is difficult to classify M N C neatly into such a typology since factors, like the host country 
environment, limit the MNC' s freedom to choose among the strategies suggested by 
Perlmutter and force them to adopt hybrid strategies to meet the different specific local 
requirements of subsidiaries (Tayeb, 1998; Dowling and Schuler, 1990). Moreover, other 
authors have argued that Perlmutter's typology describes management practices of the 
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M N C in terms of an overall orientation, which may not take into account the internal 
differentiation of management practices within a M N C (Hedlund, 1986; Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989; Ghoshal and Noria, 1989 - cited in Rozenweig and Nohria, 1994). These 
authors consider that the organisation is made up of many sepárate practices, some of 
which may be more sensitive to pressures of local isomorphism than. As a result, it is 
claimed that Perlmutter's typologies may not be sufficient to capture the complexity 
within MNC-subsidiary relationship (Rozenweig and Nohria, 1994: 230). 
Determinants of MNCs' Strategies 
Research indicates that there are a number of factors which influence the multinational 
corporations' choice of H R M strategy (Beechler and Yang, 1994; Welch, 1994; Ngo et al, 
1998; Bae et al, 1998; Dowling el al., 1999). These factors fall under six broad headings: 
the home country of the M N C and factors related to it, such as national culture and the 
extent to which it affects the company's administrative heritage and philosophy; the 
characteristics of the industry in which the M N C operates and related international 
strategy and organisational structure; the stage of an M N C s intemationalisation; the 
characteristics of subsidiaries; and the host country's market conditions, culture and labour 
relations. 
The Country of Origin 
MNCs remain heavily 'nationally embedded' (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). In 1986, 
66.2% of MNCs ' employment was in their home nations (Dunning, 1993). Moreover, of 
the world's largest one hundred enterprises, only eighteen companies have the majority of 
their assets abroad, and only nineteen maintain at least half of their workers abroad 
(Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995). Furthermore, home country sales still domínate M N C 
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activity and between 70% and 75% of M N C valué added is produced in their home 
temtory (Hirst and Thompson, 1996). 
Evidence also shows that only a limited number of the largest one hundred ñrms in the 
world list their shares on foreign stock exchanges, and only a few of them maintain over 
10 % of their shares abroad (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995). Even Germán companies, 
which have a larger percentage of shares abroad, confine their possession to neighbouring 
German-speaking countries. In addition, a survey of the largest one hundred firms 
revealed that the management boards of MNCs rarely have foreigners. For example, it 
found that this was true of only five of the thirty US firms, two of the twenty Japanese 
companies, four of the fífteen Germán ñrms, one of the eight French companies, and two 
of the four Italian ñrms (Ruigrok and van Tulder, 1995). Finally, very few MNCs, if any, 
have moved their headquarters and decision-making outside their home country (Dicken, 
1998), and the majority of research and development (R&D) is still concentrated in their 
home nation (Dicken, 1998; Dunning, 1993). 
It seems, then, that the evidence given above súpports Porter's view that: 'the home base is 
the place from which competitive advantage ultimately emanates..., and that the role of 
¡ocation, particularly ofthe home base, isfar greater than once Porter supposed' (Porter, 
1998). 
This strong national base of MNCs has been claimed to have implications for H R M . 
Several studies have found US MNCs to be more centralised and formalised, and henee 
ethnocentric (Hedlund, 1981; Young et al., 1985), and to act therefore as 'innovators' by 
importing into host countries new practices, such as productivity bargaining, multi-year 
agreements and performance related-pay (Enderwick, 1985, cited in Ferner, 1994). The 
same has been noted in respect of Japanese MNCs (Oliver and Wilkinson, 1994). 
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By contrast, European multinational are claimed to be polycentric in that they tend to be 
less centralised and grant their affiliâtes a relatively high degree of autonomy, as they 
place more weight on the local environment. Accordingly, performance standards, 
incentives and training methods are différent frorn headquarters (Perlmutter, 1969), and 
industrial relations policy-making is more decentralised (Ferner, 1994). 
At the same time, and notwithstanding thèse différences, other research findings show that 
certain issues are more susceptible to the influence of the home country than others 
(Rosenweig and Nohria, 1994; Young et ai, 1985). In the área of HR/IR, for example, 
many basic issues are subject to strong legal or customary régulation in the host country in 
which a subsidiary opérâtes, such as policies on bargaining levéis, union récognition, 
forms of workplace représentation, employée participation, and working hours (Ferner and 
Quintanilla, 1998; Ferner, 1994). Conversely, some policy issues are less regulated by 
local laws and labour market institutions, such as compensation Systems, management 
development, work organisation, and employée communications and henee are more 
susceptible to country of origin influence (Ferner, 1994; Femer, 1997; Edwards, 1998a). 
A number of factors have been identified as contributing to this country of origin effect. 
The most important of thèse are encompassed in two theoretical approaches: the 
"culturalist" and the " institutionalisf'. 
The Culturaiist Approach 
Some researchers claim that corporate culture is often shaped by aspects of the national 
culture in which the M N C originated (Hofstede, 1980, 1991, 2001; Adler, 1991; Laurent 
1983; 1986; Ferner and Edwards, 1995). One of the most cited empirical studies is 
Hofstede's (1980) massive work on national culture which revealed major national 
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differences in such factors as 'power distance' (measuring autocratic versus democratic 
styles of management); 'uncertainty avoidance' (measuring the degree of tolerance for 
uncertainty in the future); 'individuality' (individualism versus collectivism); and 
'Muscularity/Femininity' (degree of masculine assertiveness). Hofstede's investigation is 
relevant to this study because both power distance and uncertainty avoidance are seen to 
nave strong implications for the manner in which organisations are structured and how 
power is distributed within them (Erramilli, 1996). 
Hofstede concluded that in countries, such as France, with a high Power Distance Index 
(PDI) the management style is autocratic and paternalistic. Decision-making is centralised, 
with tall hierarchical structures and a large proportion of supervisory personnel. By 
contrast, in low power distance index countries, such as the U K , USA and Austria, the 
management style is democratic, authority and decision-making is more decentralised, and 
there is more scope for consultation between managers and subordínales. 
As regards the Uncertainty Avoidance Index (UAI), Hofstede concluded that managers 
from high UAI countries, such as, France, certain Arab countries (Hickson and Pugh, 
1995), Belgium, Germany and Japan, attempt to avoid uncertainty and risk by developing 
rules, seeking standardisation and establishing more structured and hierarchical 
organisations. Conversely, managers from Iow-UAI countries, such as the UK, USA and 
Sweden, are more flexible, and more willing to take risks and to delégate responsibilities. 
As a result, they tend to nave less structured organisations and fewer written rules 
(Hofstede, 1991). 
Femer (1997), however, argües that Hofstede's approach to national culture should be 
treated with caution as it implies that national culture is an inherent immanent property of 
nations, which is static in nature. This note of caution does, moreover, receive some 
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empirical support. For example, Schmidt (1993) argües that the authoritarian and 
bureaucratic French management style has been transformed in recent years as their 
management practices have become more dynamic, less autocratic and less centralised. 
The Institutionalist Approach 
In light of the above weaknesses, other scholars (e.g. Whitley, 1999a) have adopted the 
institutional or structural approach of the national business systems (NBSs) in order to 
explain the ¡nfluence qf country of orígirt on multinationals' behaviour. According to 
Ferner and Quintanilla (1998), NBSs 'can be seen as "clusters" of interlocking 
institutional and business-cultural elements. Similarly, Whitley (1992) sees them to 
constitute a range of social institutional factors, such as labour and product market 
organisations, political systems and legislative frameworks, educational and training 
arrangements, and corporate govemance systems. 
Those who emphasise the influence of NBSs, therefore, argüe that the histórica! and 
economic institutional settings within which an M N C is embedded acts to shape its 
behaviour in terms of such things as work organisation and modes of control. 
Consequently, it is further argued that since these institutions continué to differ across 
countries, so too do the strategies and practices of companies (Edwards, 1998a). 
One particular stand of NBSs that has been particularly emphasised in terms of influence 
is that of their different systems of corporate governance (Edwards, 1998a). According to 
Marginson and Sisson (1994), companies from different countries of origin exhibit one of 
two forms of corporate ownership, labelled respectively, the 'insider' and 'outsider' 
systems of corporate governance. The insider system - associated with companies from 
continental Europe - is characterised by interlinked networks of shareholding, a long-term 
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bank credit financial system, a lower risk of hostile take-overs, a smaller role for stock 
markets and an emphasis on longer-term corporate performance. By contrast, the outsider 
system - associated with Anglo-American companies - is characterised by hostile take-
overs, highly developed stock markets, the primacy of shareholder interest, and an 
emphasis on short-term financial returns. 
Marginson and Sisson (1994) go on to argüe that insider and outsider systems. affect the 
management policies of MNCs. Within the insider system, employees are more likely to 
be regarded as possessing stakeholder rights and to constitute enduring assets who form a 
potential source of competitive advantage. Accordingly, companies m France and 
Germany tend to invest more in human resources and tend to have more stable and higher 
expenditures on training and development than Anglo-American companies. Conversely, 
companies from outsider systems tend to consider employees as a disposable cost to be 
minimised, and to offer them fewer stakeholder rights. Consequently, investment in 
human resources, in terms of expenditure on training and staff development, tends to be 
low and relatively unstable. 
The research evidence relating to the significance of corporate governance structures 
basically relates to two issues: systems of control, and training and development. This 
evidence tends to show that multinationals from different national origins do, in fact, differ 
in relation to these two issues (Egelhoff, 1994; Erramilli, 1996). For example, companies 
originating from outsider systems, such as the U K and the USA, where there is an 
emphasis on short-term shareholder valué, are more likely to have world-wide systems of 
performance management, and to exert tighter financial controls than Japanese, French, 
Germán or Italian MNCs (Femer and Quintanilla, 1998; Edwards et ai, 1996). By 
contrast, companies originating from insider systems, such as continental Europe, tend to 
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place more reliance on personal relationships and corporate culture to control subsidiary 
practices (Tregaski, 1998). For example, Germán MNCs, have been found to place more 
valué on production and commercial activities, and to rely more on informal feedback and 
Communications than on formal financial controls (Ferner, 1997; Femer and Quintanilla, 
1998). 
Comparative studies have similarly revealed that there are national differences in the way 
companies approach managerial careers and management development. Evans el ai, 
(1989), for example, have identified a number of national models - the Japanese, the Latin 
European, the Germanic, and the Anglo-Dutch. For instance, they have argued that 
Japanese and French companies rely on élite recruitment. Henee, the selection of potential 
top managers takes place at entry and firms place a great valué on academic qualifications, 
and the career progression of the new recruits is a 'tournament'. In contrast, entry is seen 
as less elitist in Anglo-Saxon counties, with career progression being based more on 
experience than qualifications. 
However, notwithstanding this evídence on the influence of systems of corporate 
governance and national business systems, more generally, in recent years there has been a 
growing argument that KBSs are becoming less important because of the convergence of 
many MNCs from different country of origins towards a single globally integrated model, 
whereby similar activities, strategies, structures and HR policies and practices have been 
adopted due to globalisation and new world political and economic orders (Dicken, 1998; 
Ferner, 1997; Sparrow et ai, 1994). 
This hypothesis of convergence is based on the assumption that changes in employment 
relations are influenced not only by national systems but also by wider global factors. For 
example, in the case of Europe, it is argued that there is a tendeney towards common 
62 
characteristics of empíoyment conditions as a consequence of the economic, technological 
and social integration of the European Union (Baldry, 1994; Andersen, 1997). Thus, 
Marginson (2000) argües that this has led to the creation of European regional structures at 
the European level (e.g. Coller, 1996), and the development of a regional dimensión to the 
management of the European operations of MNCs headquartered outside Europe (e.g. 
Mueller and Purcell, 1992; Martínez Lucio and Weston, 1994). 
In a similar vein, Ferner and Edwards (1995) argüe that differences between national 
institutions in Europe are being eliminated by the increasingly strong supra-national 
framework provided by E U regulations, thus increasing pressures towards the convergence 
of national systems of labour regulations. Consequently, it is argued that the resultant 
homogenisation of production, empíoyment and work practices is not only leading to 
lcorporate or organisational isomorphism^ (Ferner, 1997; Coller and Marginson, 1998), 
or Hnternal convergence' (Belanger et al, 1999), where, for example, the empíoyment 
practices of Ford in Germany, Spain or Britain increasingly resemble each other (Femer 
and Hyman, 1998), but also to a situation whereby different MNCs are adopting similar 
approaches. For example, evidence shows that MNCs from France, Germany, Italy and 
other European countries are trying to respond to competitive pressures by 'Anglo-
Saxonising' (Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998; Sparrow et al, 1994). Similarly, Andersen 
(1997), in his study of the restructuring of empíoyment in British and Danish banking 
concludes that there is considerable evidence of convergence between the two countries. 
Further evidence also supports the hypothests of convergence. For instance, a study of 
2,961 firms from twelve countries showed a convergence in the human resource policies 
and practices across borders (Sparrow et al, 1994). Accordingly, it is argued that MNCs 
are becoming a forcé of the homogenisation of labour practices (Coller, 1996; Reich, 
1991). 
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Stage in the Internationalisation Process 
The literature reveals that organisations go through a learning process as they move 
towards becoming international. This process might be long and very graduai or it might 
take place in stages (Welch, 1994; Harzing, 1995; Dowling et al., 1999). 
Researchers argue that the degree of an M N C s internationalisation and the related 
expérience of its managers, influence international human resource policies and practices, 
as well as the structures and control mechanisms used within multinationals (Schuler et 
al.t 1993; Dowling et al., 1999). For example, case study évidence from four Australian 
firms shows that firms in the early stage of internationalisation use standardised Systems 
and procédures, and adopt an ethnocentric Staffing policy to achieve a high level of 
centralised control. By contrast, mature firms are less centralised and are polycentric or 
moving to geocentric Staffing policies (Welch, 1994). In a similar vein, a study by 
Dowling (1989), which surveyed international HR directors, revealed that firms with more 
years of overseas expérience had a more diverse set of HR practices than those with less 
years of expérience (Schuler et ai, 1993). This suggests that firms with longer established 
international opérations are likely to change their HR practices to accommodate local or 
regional demands, while less experieneed MNCs will have a predominantly ethnocentric 
IHR orientation as they are likely to assume that a unified set of HR practices can be 
implemented everywhere (Schuler et ai, 1993). 
Research évidence also suggests that the stage of internationalisation impacts on the 
control Systems used by MNCs. For example, Hedlund's (1981) empirical study of six 
Swedish MNCs and twenty-four subsidiaries found a causal and positive relationship 
between the autonomy of the subsidiary and the international expérience of the parent 
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Company. In a similar vein, Prahalad and Doz (1981) argue that MNCs maintain central 
corporate control in the early stages of internationalisation, since subsidiaries dépend on 
headquarters for capital, technological know-how, and skilled managerial and technical 
resources. But as subsidiaries become established, they develop these capacities 
themselves, and the task of corporate stratégie control becomes more difficult and diffused 
(Evans et al, 1989). 
Industry Characteristics, Strategy and Structure 
The literature indicates that the international strategy and organisational structure of 
MNCs further influence their H R M approaches (e.g. Dowling and Schuler, 1990; 
Marginson, 1992; Marginson et al, 1994/95; Dowling et ai, 1999). At the same time, it is 
argued that these two factors are influenced and related to the sector in which MNCs 
operate, reflecting différences in patterns of international compétition (Porter, 1986; 
Ferner, 1994; Edwards et al, 1999). In particular, it is argued that the nature of produet 
compétition shapes both the extent to which MNCs integrate production in différent 
countries and also their international business structures (Edwards et al., 1999). Hence, 
Porter (1986; 1998) argues that where compétition is highly internationalised, MNCs 
attempt to 'capture the linkages across borders '. In contrast, where compétition is largely 
local or national, the MNCs make little attempt to generate linkages between opérations in 
différent countries. Thus, Schuler et al. (1993) argue that the type of business/industry is a 
major factor influencing international HRpolicies and practice. 
A number of authors have written about the environment, strategy and structure of MNCs. 
The most influential of these are Bartlett and Ghoshal (Harzing, 1999:36; Edwards, 
2000:121; Richey and Wally, 1998). These authors, as noted earlier, have delineated four 
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types of organisational models: the multinational/multi-domestic, the international, the 
global and the transnational, and linked the use of thèse models to industry characteristics. 
The multinational model was found to opérate in industries where compétition in each 
country is essentially independent of compétition in other countries (Porter, 1986), 
Accordingly, companies in thèse industries follow a multi-domestic strategy, which gives 
primary importance to national responsiveness. Thus, producís are differentiated to meet 
differing local demands and policies are differentiated to conform to differing 
governmental and market demands. The resulting organisational structure is described as 
a decentralised fédération in which control and co-ordination are primarily achieved 
through the personal relationships between top management and subsidiary managers, 
supplemented by some simple financial Systems. The reporting System is hierarchical. 
That is, the top manager in each subsidiary is in charge of opérations and reports to the 
head of an international division and/or product division of the parent firm. Consequently, 
the HR department's role in such a Company will most likely be more domestic in 
structure and orientation and thus, focus more on developing practices for local 
environments and Staffing the local opérations with local nationals (Dowling et al., 1999). 
Henee, generally speaking, the main role of the HR function would be to support the 
primary activities of the firm in each domestic market. 
Secondly, the international Company was found to adopt an innovation strategy under 
which innovations are created at headquarters to reduce costs, increase revenues, or both. 
In such companies, stratégie décisions and ideas are therefore developed at headquarters 
and subsidiarles implement them (Schuler et ai, 1993): although local subsidiaries may be 
free to adapt the new products or stratégies. The resulting organisational structure is what 
Bartlett and Ghoshal described as a co-ordinated fédération (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998), 
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in which the parent company makes greater use of formal systems and controls in 
headquarters-subsidiary links. Consequently, HR policies are more centralised than in 
multinational companies. 
Thirdly, the global company was found to opérate in global industries where standardised 
consumer needs and scalę efficiencies make central i sation and integration profitable. In 
this kind of industry, a fírm's competitive position in one country is significantly 
influenced by its position in other countries. Thus, ñrms in this type of industry are said to 
follow a global strategy which gives primary importance to effíciency, and requires a high 
level of integration, which, in tum, demands high levéis of coordination and control of 
activities across the M N C subsidiarles (Gupta & Govindarajan, 1991; Rosenzweig & 
Singh, 1991; Taylor et al, 1996). Thus, global companies intégrate and rationalise their 
production to produce standardised products in a very cost-effícient manner, and its 
structural configuration is described as a centralised hub. 
In a global industry the "imperative for coordination" noted by Porter therefore requires an 
H R M function structured to deliver the intemational support required by the primary 
activities of the multinational (Dowling, 1999). Consequently, strategie intemational 
human resource issues focus on operating the M N C as a singular global operation. Thus, 
global fírms are more likely to have formalised and centralised HR policies, as the units 
tend to be coordinated by directives from the centre and local managers have modest 
autonomy (Schuler et al, 1993: 747). Specifíc examples are worídwide policies on open-
door grievance procedurę, single status, unión recognition, performance evaluation, 
compensation, and the monitoring of human resource management through opinión 
surveys that compare the performance of business units and divisions. 
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The fourth organisational model proposed by Bartlett and Ghoshal is the transnational, 
which is seen as most appropriate for managing subsidiarles that face complex 
environments. Henee, companies in transnational industries must respond simultaneously 
to the diverse and often conflicting stratégie needs of global effïciency (as a characteristic 
of global industries), national responsiveness (as a characteristic of multi-domestic 
industries) and knowledge transer (as a characteristic of international industries). Thus, 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) advócate that the transnational strategy seeks to obtain global 
efficiency, national responsiveness and Worldwide learning at the same time (Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1987b). ïn order to do this the strategy must be very flexible. It demands a 
complex process of co-ordination and co-operation involving strong cross-unit integrating 
devices, a strong corporate identity, and a well-developed Worldwide management 
perspective. The authors claim that the transnational M N C is more of a mentality than a 
structure and therefore seeks sophisticated human resource management Systems and 
requires individuáis who are able to be concerned with local and global needs. Thus, it 
uses Systems of recruitment, training and development and career path management to 
help individuáis cope with its diversity and complexity. (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1991:70-1). 
Henee, normative control mechanisms, such as corporate culture and a widely shared 
awareness of central goals and stratégies become more important. 
To summarise, one can say that the multinational company involves no inter-subsidiary 
diffusion in any direction. The international and global are both concerned with the 
deployment of central expertise in the foreign units and henee the transfer of parent 
company H R M practices to subsidiarles. The transnational involves firms attempting to 
develop, transfer and diffuse specialist knowledge, skills and H R M practices from one part 
of the organisation to another, with no particular primacy being given to those used in the 
home country. 
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Bartlett and Ghoshal (1998) subsequently argue that as a resuit of major changes in the 
world economy, such as advances in information technology, some cross-national 
convergence in demand patterns and the intensification of international compétition. 
MNCs have in récent years adopted complex intégration stratégies, and hence it .is the 
transnational model that is becoming most important. This argument, moreover, fits with 
the arguments advanced by other authors that, against the backcloth of thèse forces, the 
trend is towards more decentralised, 'loosely coupled' political Systems, or 'network'-
based international opérations, or 'heterarchical* structures (e.g. Hedlund, 1986; 
Marginson and Coller, 1998; Fergeson et al, 1992 cited in Edwards, 2000; Femer, 2000; 
Femer and Varul, 2000a), where authority and control are difrused across the organisation 
to subsidiaries, with relationships between thèse units being bargained rather than 
hierarchical. This also implies that Perlmutter's (1969) geocentric typology is becoming 
more important as suggested by Perlmutter himself, who indicated that MNCs would 
eventually move from an ethnocentric or polycentric approach towards a geocentric one. 
At the same time, it is argued that this shift towards greater intégration and the 
development of more complex information flows does not necessarily mean the 
development of more centralised management structures. In other words, organisations 
can seek to acquire greater co-ordination while simultaneously trying to devolve some 
décision making down to lower levels of the organisation. For example, Femer and 
Hyman (1998) argue that MNCs are moving towards what they call 'centrally co-
ordinated décentralisation.' That is, décentralisation which takes the form of a controlled, 
co-ordmated, dévolution of functions from higher to lower levels of the System, in 
response to increased global compétition and internationalisation. In a similar vein, 
Marginson and Sisson (1994) argue that changes in the nature of the divisionalised 
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management structures include a decentralised yet co-ordinated approach. However, this 
trend should not be overstated since Femer and Hyman (1998) have noted that, in gênerai, 
firms have exerted little pressure for radical décentralisation. 
The Nature of the Subsidiary and ils Stratégie Importance 
Research mdicates that spécifie factors associated with the subsidiary influence the 
multinational companies' choice of H R M strategy (Tayeb, 1998). Four main variables 
have been identified: the mode of establishment and the location of the subsidiary; the 
économie performance of the subsidiary; the âge and size of the subsidiary; and the 
subsidiary's stratégie rôle. 
Evidence suggests that in a "greenfield" site, human resource and industrial relations 
issues tend to be more centralised, since the M N C has more scope to be innovative and to 
introduce country of origin practices (Femer, 1994; Hamill, 1984). The reason behind this 
is that, in a greenfield, the M N C is able to exert more influence over the sort of employée 
recruited, the terms and conditions of employment, and the nature of représentative 
structures (Edwards, 1998a). For example, the Japanese MNCs operating greenfield 
subsidiaries in the United Kingdom have been able to import many of their H R M practices 
(Tayeb, 1994), such as lean production techniques, single-union or non-union 
arrangements and employée participation practices to their new sites (Wilkinson and 
Oliver, 1994). 
In contrast, if the subsidiary is created by taking over an already existing local firm, 
through an acquisition or joint venture, it appears likely that labour issues will be more 
decentralised and local management will maintain a considérable degree of autonomy 
(Hamill, 1984). This is because the M N C will be more constrained by pre-existing 
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practices that may be difficult to change, and may face resentment in the acquired firm. 
Therefore, the new firm will, at least initially, continue to apply many local practices 
(Tayeb, 1998; Edwards, 1998a). 
1t also appears that the location of the subsidiary tends to influence the choice of strategy. 
Evidence suggests that MNCs tend to exert more control in developing countries. For 
example, Hedlund (1990) found that Swedish MNCs employ parent company nationals 
(PCNs) in countries where there is lack of qualified and experienced host country 
nationals (HCNs), and where subsidiaries have a lower operational intégration with the 
total M N C opérations (Welch, 1994). Similarly, Dunning (1993) notes that several studies 
have discovered that 'subsidiaries in developing countries tended to be allowed less 
autonomy than those in developed countries', while Perlmutter (1969) suggests that the 
there is a marked tendency toward ethnocentrism in relations with subsidiaries in 
developing countries. However, Welch (1994) argues that location affects the desirability 
of an expatriate assignment and hence may limit the company's ability to implement its 
favoured Staffing policy. 
Another factor that have been identified, in addition to the mode of entry and location of 
the subsidiary, is its economic performance and relative economic importance. Evidence 
shows that the higher the dependence of the subsidiary on the parent for financial 
resources and/or the weaker its financial performance, the more likely that the parent 
company will be heavily involved in the subsidiaries opérations. For example, Hamill's 
(1984) study revealed that poor performance in a U K subsidiary, or a high level of 
financial support from the parent company, tended to increase the corporate involvement 
in labour relations. Similarly, the study conducted by Young et al. (1985) concluded that 
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within individual subsidiaries in the U K , poor performance resulted in a higher degree of 
parent company involvement. 
Thirdly, research evidence indícales that smaller, younger and less experienced 
subsidiaries tend to be subject to more centralised control than their older counterparts 
(Dunning, 1993; Young et al, 1985). This is because younger and less experienced 
subsidiaries are more Iikely to depend on the headquarters for funds, technologícal know-
how, and skilled managerial and technical resources, which tend to increase the corporate 
control of the parent (Hamill, 1994). For example, in his comparative study, Egelhoff 
(1984) found that MNCs tended to exert more control over smaller and younger 
subsidiaries. Similarly, Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994), in their study of H R M practices 
in 294 US afñliates, concluded that MNCs tend to decentralise the management of labour 
in subsidiaries which depend more on the local environment rather than on the centre for 
inputs, such as raw materials and intermedíate parts. It must be noted, however, that 
according to Prahalad and Doz (1981), as subsidiaries become established they develop 
their own resources, and therefore tend to become more autonomous and more resístant to 
parent company influence. 
Finally, the strategic role of the subsidiary, defined in terms of the amount and direction of 
the resource flow between the subsidiary and the rest of the Corporation (Gupta and 
Govindarajan, 1991; Roth and Morrison, 1992; Birkinshaw and Morrison, 1995; Taylor et 
al, 1996; Tregaskis and Brewster, 2001), which has only recently received attention in the 
intemational management literature (Tregaskis, 2001), has also been found to influence 
the H R M strategies of MNCs. 
Gupta and Govindarajan (1991) distinguish four types of subsidiary roles based on 
knowledge flows: (a) global innovator with high outflow of resources to the rest of the 
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organisation and low inflow of resources to the subsidiary; (b) integrated player, with high 
outflow and high inflow; (c) implementer, with low outflow and high inflow; and (d) local 
innovator, with low outflow and low inflow. Thus, it is argued that subsidiarles require 
different co-ordination and control mechanisms according to their level of resources and 
the strategic importance of the local environment to the M N C (Femer, 2000; Bartlett and 
Ghoshal, 1989, 1998). Consequently, as the resource flows between the parent company 
and the subsidiaries increase, the resource dependence and henee the need for control will 
increase. Thus, global innovators and integrated players will be subject to higher levéis of 
control from the parent company. In contrast, the 'implementer' and 'local innovator' 
subsidiaries, with a limited role in non-strategic environments, are more likely to be 
subject to lower control and less attempts to transfer H R M practices to them. 
The Host Country Influence 
A number of studies suggest that the host country's legal, cultural, social, economic and 
political environment have an impact on MNCs ' approach to the management of labour 
(Muller-Camen et al, 2001; Dowling et al, 1999; As-Saber et al, 1998; McGaughey et 
al, 1997; Tung and Havlovic, 1996; Beechler and Yang, 1994). Accordingly, it has been 
argued that MNCs are faced with the "think global", "act local" paradox (Dowling et al, 
1999). That is, while multinationals are pursuing global expansión and integration which 
cali for worldwide consisteney in their H R M policies and practices, they are forced to be 
responsive to the demands in each of the countries and regions within which they opérate 
and to adapt to the cultural specific requirements of different nations (Doz, 1986; Laurent, 
1986). It has therefore been argued that some aspeets of the home business culture may 
not be transferable to the host country as they may be regarded as either unsuitable, or lack 
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the extra-firm supportive structures upon which they rely at home, such as a strong 
training infrastructure (Edwards, 1998a; Ferner, 1997). 
In particular, cultural différences (Child, 1981) between the host country and the parent 
Company may prevent, or limit, the diffusion of country-of-origin practices and work 
methods. For instance, Buckly and Cas son (1991) argue that U.S. and European MNCs 
operating in developing countries have offen failed in their attempts to do so because they 
have lacked an appréciation of culture-specifîc attitudes to work, rewards, authority and 
management-labour relations (cited in Dunning, 1993). In a similar vein, Tayeb (1994) 
claims that while Japanese MNCs have succeeded in transferring some practices, such as 
single-union agreements and zero-rate reject to their subsidiaries, they have not 
implemented successfully other practices like quality circles and just-in-time, especially in 
the West. 
For his part, Lorenz (1993) has argued that performance-related-pay is much more 
acceptable in Anglo-Saxon business culture, than in France, Germany or Italy, where there 
is résistance to the idea 'that individual members of the group should excel in a way that 
reveals the shortcomings of other members' (cited in Ferner, 1994). Thus, more generally, 
researchers suggest that the greater the cultural distance between the home and the host 
country, the harder it will be for the multinational to transfer home country philosophies 
and practices (Ferner, 1997). 
The Hterature also suggests that the type of government, and the legal and labour market 
conditions in the host country, tend to influence M N C s ' stratégies and policies by either 
encouraging or irnpeding certain HR practices. For example, a host government can 
dictate hiring procédures, as in the case of Malaysia in the 1970s, when the government 
made it mandatory for ail foreign firms to provide additional employment for the 
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indigenous Malays (Dowling et al, 1999). In a similar vein, Piórkowski and Nath (1993) 
argue that ethnocentric, regiocentric and geocentric staffing policies are inappropriate for 
host countries with high indigenous quotas. For example, Saudi Arabia and the Philippines 
have enacted indigenous employment quotas of 75 and 95 per cent respectively. 
Furthermore, the authors suggest that in developing countries human resource practices 
must be consistent with the national development plans that have been prepared by 
planning authorities (Florkowski and Nath, 1993; Florkowski and Schuler, 1994). 
However, although it is argued that host governments limit the integration and co-
ordination strategies of MNCs, they may also assist MNCs by offering incentives, such as 
export credit and/or tax allowances, and granting market access (Prahalad and Doz, 1987). 
In fact, evidence suggests that MNCs are generally good at respecting local employment 
practices and otten provide better working conditions than other firms in the same industry 
or other local firms (Dunning, 1993). At the same time, there is evidence that MNCs may 
use relatively deregulated economies, such as Britain, to introduce labour practices that are 
less acceptable in their country of origin. By way of illustration, Tregaskis (1998) has 
found that French and German MNCs invest significantly less on training in Britain than 
at home. In addition, the literaturę shows that MNCs can respond to host country 
constraints by taking proactive strategie initiatives such as negotiating with govemments 
to minimise such constraints, or locating operations in countries where labour regulation is 
less stringent. For example, Japanese firms operating in Thailand have negotiated 
exemptions from the Thai minimum wage law for new employees dunng extended 
training periods (Florkowski and Nath, 1993). 
Despite the debatę mentioned earlier about convergence, a number of writers still 
emphasise the importance of the host country effect and its role in the divergence between 
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different MNCs H R M practices. For example, Child (1981) concludes that although ñrms 
in different countries are converging, the behaviour of individuáis within these ñrms is 
maintaining its cultural specificity. Similarly, Poole (1986) argües that individuáis in a 
single industrial system are influenced by distinctive national traits, so that different 
instítutional solutions are devised to meet the requirements of the same market conditions 
or the same technologies (Hansen et al., 1997). 
Modes of ImplementatioD of the Strategies 
MNCs can adopt a variety of control methods and mechanisms to implement their 
strategies and monitor the actions of local subsidiarles (Purcell et al, 1987; Egelhoff, 1984; 
Martínez and Jarillo, 1989; 1991). Three main mechanisms of control can be identified in 
the literature: personal, bureaucratic and output, and social or cultural. 
Personal Centralised Control 
Personal centralised control (Child, 1984; 1973; 1972) is seen as 'personal' and 'direct' as 
it relies on the direct cióse personal supervisión of lower levéis by higher ones in the 
organisation. Centralisation (Young et al, 1985; Hamill, 1984; Child, 1973) and expatríate 
transfers have been commonly quoted as falling within the first of these categories (Baliga 
and Jaeger, 1984). For example, Ferner and Edwards (1995) have observed lat its crudest, 
the sending of home-country expatríales could be used as a form of gunboat diplomacy, an 
exercise of direct power relations by the parent in which the expatríate acts as enforcer of 
corporate policies'. The authors argüe that this type of control is extensively used by 
Japanese MNCs in order to implement lean production methods, incúlcate company-wide 
quality control standards and oversee 'high involvement' management systems 
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encompassing such innovations as team briefing, Information networks and company 
councils. 
Formalised Bureaucratic and Output Control 
In contrast to personal centralised control, bureaucratic formalised control is ' impersonal' 
and 'indirect'. It is seen to support the greater decentralisation of responsibility and 
decision-making thiough the use of formal and bureaucratic systems that are designed to 
ensure that those based in subsidiaries carry out their functions in a way that accords with 
corporate expectations. Thus, they are held to include, the creation of rules, regulations 
and procedures (Child, 1973) and to encompass the use of reporting mechanisms that 
provide a means for monitoring the financial and operational performance of subsidiaries 
(Edwards et al, 1996; Marginson et al, 1995; Hedlund, 1981). 
In fact, there is some evidence to indicate that the HQs of MNCs are making increasing 
use of labour productivity and performance comparisons in order to secure the compliance 
of subsidiary managers and workforces with the wishes of the HQ (Edwards, 1998b), and 
to implement desired HR policies and practices (Coller and Marginson, 1998; Belanger et 
al, 1999). This type of intemal competition exercised by MNCs has been termed 
'coercive comparisons', whereby cross-plants comparisons can be made and subsidiaries 
compete with one another for futurę investment (Edwards, 1998b; Femer and Edwards, 
1995). For example, in the automotive sector Martinez Lucio and Weston (1994:113) 
found that 'competitive relations were systematically established between plants across 
different countries over investment and therefore employment'. The authors argue that this 
strategy was used not only to embody the ideology of competition necessary for 
organisational survival but also to erode potential resistance to change. In a similar vein, 
Mueller and Purcell (1992) found that MNCs in the car industry were able to make 
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systematic productivity and labour cost comparisons between plants in different countries. 
They concluded that management had a powerful tool to promote convergence in work 
organisations, flexibility, team-working and so on. Similarly, Coller (1996) in a study of a 
multinational food company found that HQ collected information from the subsidiaries on 
production and labour costs, salaries, absenteeism and injuries which was then used to 
increase pressure on local managers and constrain their autonomy. For their part, Edwards 
et al, (1996) found that in two case study firms data was collected on various labour 
issues, including the head count and that this information was used to compare how 
efílciently resources were being used. 
The literature reveáis that American MNCs have been found to predominantly rely on 
formal systems, policies, written guidelines and standards, and reports and to do so to a 
greater extent than either European or Japanese MNCs. It has also been found that 
American MNCs are distinctive in terms of their reliance on financial control mechanisms 
and, in particular, their strong emphasis on quarterly financial performance (Egelhoff, 
1984; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989, 1998; Harzing, 1999; Martin and Beaumont, 1999; 
Ferner, 2000; Child et al, 2000; Femer et al, 2001; Edwards and Ferner, 2002). 
It should be noted, however, that many authors and studies do not distinguish between 
bureaucratic formalised control and output control (e.g. Martínez and Jarillo, 1989; Baliga 
and Jaeger, 1984; Ferner 2000). In contrast, Harzing (1999; 2000b) has drawn a distinction 
between these two control mechanisms on the basis that although both are considered 
impersonal and formalised, they differ in their object in the sense that the first is 
direct/explicít while the latter is indirect/implicit. In addítion, Harzing has also argued that 
the key element that distinguishes output control from centralised and formalised 
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bureaucratic controis is that, instead of particular courses of action being laid down, 
certain goals/results/outputs are specifíed and monitored. 
Social/Cultural Control 
Less formal mechanisms of control may also be employed to help develop norms and 
standards of behaviour, as well as personal objectives, that are consistent with the desired 
strategic direction. Henee, this informal approach seeks to 'socialise' (Edstrom and 
Galbriath, 1977) those working in subsidiarles into the '...valúes and behaviour expected 
of them' (Schneíder and Barsoux, 1997). Accordingly, this subtle approach has been 
termed, by Baliga and Jaeger (1984), the 'cultural model', whereby the organisational 
corporate culture implicitly dictates the rules and norms by means of direct personal 
control systems and the socialisation of staff. 
In broad terms, four maín types of socialisation processes have been identified. First, the 
training and development of corporate and subsidiary managers through the provisión of 
management education and training courses, attendance at seminars and international 
committees, and more generally, the creation of informal exchange networks and contaets 
(Komache, 1997; Coller, 1996; Schneider, 1991; Evans et al, 1989; Evans, 1992; Doz 
1986). IBM's policy of a minimum of one week training and development course 
annually, for example, is said to have contributed tremendously to its strong global culture 
(Laurent, 1989). In a similar vein, Edwards et al. (1996) have argued that worldwide 
personnel committees, or regular meetings of personnel managers across sites can be a 
way in which ideas are shared across the enterprise and policies are developed. 
Secondly, the making of frequent visits by corporate sénior managers (Welge, 1981). For 
example, Welge (1981) found that visits by executives to subsidiaries played a key role in 
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personnel coordination since they allowed insights into local operations and contact with 
local managers, and supported adjustment to parent company practices, as well as the 
strengthening of teamwork. Thirdíy, the creation of managerial career paths, reward 
packages and sanctions that aim to motívate managers, broaden their capabilities and 
strengthen their commitment to corporate visions and objectives (Femer and Edwards, 
1995; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1990; Doz and Prahalad, 1984). 
Fourthly, evídence also suggests that the transfer of managers and staff plays a critical role 
in integration and co-ordination (Dowling et ai, 1999; Huault, 1996; Welch et ai, 1994). 
For example, Edstrom and Galbraith (1977) found that extensive management transfers 
can be used to achieve a 'corporate control strategy1 based on 'socialisation', which results 
in control that is personal yet decentral i sed. Thus, transfers can be used to achieve open 
and positive altitudes toward other nationalities and cultures; créate commitment to the 
organisation as a whole; and créate verbal information network, which sustains 
decentralised interdependent subsidiaríes. Similarly, Doz (1986) argües that pattems of 
socialisation among executives may play a significant role in decreasing the need for tight 
formal means of administrative control, and others have argued that expatriates provide a 
key means of exporting the parent company's culture and national culture (Edstrom and 
Galbraith, 1977). 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the above forms of control are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. For example, a number of researchers have examined the linkages that 
exist between the above types of control mechanisms. The general picture to emerge is 
that MNCs generally use all three forms of control, but that they differ in the weight 
attached to them (Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1998). For example, in his empirical study, 
Hedlund (1981) found a clear relationship between centralisation and formalisation, which 
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are différent control mechanisms used to meet the needs of control and co-ordination. He 
concluded that formai control instruments in thèse firms were not a substitute for directlv 
influencing décisions in the subsidiaries, but a means to exercise such influence. In a 
similar vein, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) stress that ail the Japanese, American and 
European MNCs, in their study used ail three mechanisms but to varying degrees. They 
give an example of Matsushita's practice of sending thoroughly indoctrinated company 
managers overseas and maintaining intensive communication links with them in part to 
support a centralised co-ordination process, but the intensive corporate training and the 
close personal contacts with headquarters managers indicate that the mechanism also has 
strong éléments of socialisation. 
Not only is it agued that the différent control methods are used together and should not be 
viewed as alternatives but that they tend to émerge cumulatively as the overseas activities 
of MNCs expand and environmental complexity increases (Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977; 
Martinez and Jarillo, 1989; Welch, 1994). Thus, Edstrom and Galbraith (1977) and 
Martinez and Jarillo (1989), who produced a comprehensive study of the development of 
the M N C control literature, emphasise that thèse mechanisms or stratégies are not 
alternatives but cumulative stages, thus the informai mechanisms are added to the formai 
ones and do not replace them. In a similar vein, and more recently, Ferner (2000) 
'concludes that MNCs rely on complex combinations of formai bureaucratie control and 
other mechanisms that not only coexist but also are mutually dépendent '. Thus, the author 
claims that his approach contrasts with that of the 'structural evolutionist' school, which 
sees a shift in the focus of control occurring from bureaucratie to social (e.g. Bartlett and 
Ghoshal (1989; 1993). 
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More specifically, i l has been suggested that control mechanisms develop from simple 
formai mechanisms to subtler and more sophisticated ones. For example, Marchan et al., 
(1997) argue that in the global fîrm, bureaucratie and output-based control becomes less 
important than control through socialisation, since informal controls become more 
important as management tasks become more uncertain and unstructured. Similarly, 
Ferner (2000) has argued that from the 1980s, the conflicting demands of global strategy 
and local responsiveness have prompted more cross-cutting, responsive and subtle control 
mechanisms. 
Other évidence also suggests that the need for co-ordination increases and becomes more 
complex, as firms grow and pursue intégration stratégies. For example, Leksell (1981) 
maintains that in more diversified firms HQ is faced with more complex information 
requirements, as a resuit of more complex interdependence among entities, in the form of 
compétitive pressures and intra-organisational flows of goods and technology. 
Consequently, a standardised reporting System is less likely to be viewed as adéquate. 
Leksell reported that MNCs use the financia! reporting system as an integral part of their 
international information and control System. Thus, in six intensive case studies of 
Swedish companies he found that most of the senior headquarters executives they did not 
rely extensively on the formai reports to extract information about subsidiary opérations. 
Instead, informai communication channels were used, such as téléphone conversations and 
personal visits. The formai reports thereby became more of a confirmation of information 
already known, and were used merely for routine control. 
More generally, Scullion and Starkey (2000) maintain that as structural forms of control 
defer to culturally- based social control, the HR strategy emerges as the primary device for 
stratégie implementation and control in the multinational firm. 
82 
As regards the inter-relationships between control through socialisation and the other 
forms of control mentioned, it appears that personal direct control through centrahsed 
decision-making and the use of expatriâtes, as well as the establishment of bureaucratie 
modes of control, can act to create 'infrastructures' that impact on the culture that prevails 
within subsidiaries (Baddar Alhusan and James, 2001). In particular, work by Baliga and 
Jaeger (1984) has shown that methods of socialisation and personal control can overlap 
through the rôle that expatriâtes may play as both voices of centralised décision making 
and as cultural change agents. They have consequently identified a 'cultural model' of 
control which encompasses both expatriâtes and other forms of socialisation, such as the 
training and development of corporate and subsidiary managers, the establishment of 
information networks and the transfer of managers across différent international units. 
Conclusions 
This concluding section initially draws out the key flndings of the literature review. 
Following this, the key implications of the review for the design of the présent study are 
discussed. 
Key Findings 
Multinational are becoming an increasingly important part of the global economy. As a 
resuit, their human resource stratégies are exerting an important influence over 
employment practices in the overseas countries in which they operate. 
Four main types of stratégies that can be adopted by multinational corporations have been 
identified: ethnocentric, polycentric, regiocentnc and geocentne. However, a M N C may 
be pursuing différent stratégies or a hybrid of stratégies at the same time depending on a 
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number of contingency factors. These include: its country of origin; its stage of 
internationalisation; the characteristics of its industry and the implications this has for its 
business strategy and structure; the nature of particular subsidiaries and their strategic role; 
and a range of host country effects. 
Evidence suggests that MNCs of different national origins behave in signiñcantly different 
ways in respect of the eross-national management of human resources. Thus, it.is argued 
that MNCs are embedded in a set of nationally-specific characteristics that together make 
up national business systems and which influence the way in which MNCs manage human 
resources internationally. For example, it has been found that MNCs from insider 
systems, such as French and Germán MNCs, regard employees as enduring assets who 
form a potential source of competitive advantage and tend to invest more in human 
resources and encourage training and the acquisition of skills. In contrast, it has been 
found that MNCs from outsider systems, such as USA and Britain, consider employees 
more as a disposable cost to be minimised and tend to invest Iess on the training and 
development of staff. 
However, there appear to be Iimits to the influence of NBSs . Three main reasons for this 
have been identified in the literature. The first is that not all HR practices are 
'transferable', being too rooted in inherent national cultural assumptions. The second is 
that the varying legal, political, economic and cultural characteristics of host countries 
impede the 'imporf of elements of foreign business systems, and tend to modify the 
operation in practice of those which are transferred. The third is that the forces of 
globalisation and intensified international competition are leading to an increasing 
convergence between MNCs of different origin and thus, an erosión of country-of-origin 
differences. Indeed, it is argued that MNCs by transrnitting practices across national 
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borders, may be seen as key actors in the homogenisation of national systems and, thus, 
the erosión of country-of-origin differences. 
At the same time, there are also grounds for anticipating the persistence of national 
differences in M N C human resource behaviour, since the characteristics of the national 
systems in which they are based reflect long historical processes of cultural and economic 
development. As a result, some authors (e.g. Sparrow et al, 1994) argüe that, despite a 
clear convergence in H R M policies and practises, some differences remain due to 
differences in national systems. For example, Belanger et al (1999) have argued that: 
leven in an extreme case of an integrated global firm, differences of national context 
influence relations with subsidiarles' (1999). In a similar vein, Femer and Quintanilla 
(1998) have concluded that the Anglo-Saxonisation of international H R M in Germany is 
occurring in a ldistinctly Germán manner', that is, the Anglo-Saxonisation is occurring in 
ways that are ' nationally specific1. 
In addition to the country of origin and host country effects, a plethora of other factors 
have been found to influence the way in which MNCs approach the management of 
human resources. Thus, an M N C has been noted to be more likely to centralise the 
management of human resources and disseminate home country policies and practices 
when it is at the early stage of internationalisaüon; its production is highly integrated; it 
operates in a global industry; and the subsidiary concerned is inexperienced, economically 
inefficient, dependent on the parent company for resources, located in a developíng 
country and is a greenfield site. 
Finally, MNCs can use a number of formal and informal control systems: personal; 
bureaucratic and output; and social or cultural, to implement their strategies. These control 
systems can be used in different combinations, and there is evidence to indícate that they 
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are not mutually excusive and that MNCs generally use all three of them. It is therefore 
argued that the different forms of control should be viewed as complements rather than 
alternatives. In addition, it is further suggested that these control mechanisms emerge 
cumulatively and that, as the environment becomes more complex, the need for more 
sophisticated and subtle control mechanism increases. At the same time, evidence 
indicates that these control methods play an important role in creating infrastructures that 
influence the prevailing culture within subsidiaries. 
Implications for the Study 
At a general level, the literature review conñrmed the central rationale underlying the 
present study, namely the lack of attention that has been paid to date to how MNCs 
approach the management of human resources in subsidiaries based in developing 
economies and acquired through privatisation. At the same time, it also served to highlight 
a number of issues that nave important implications for its design. In brief, these are the 
complex array of factors that can influence how MNCs manage human resources in their 
overseas subsidiaries, the gap that can occur between parent company philosophies and 
policies and the actual H R M practices utilised by subsidiaries, the way in which parent 
company-subsidiary relationships can change over time as a result of a variety of intemal 
and extemal influences, the broad range of human resource issues that MNCs can seek to 
influence and the way in which they differ in terms of those they do attempt to shape, and 
the inability of culture- and structuralist-based approaches to fully explain the way in 
which human resources are managed within MNCs. 
As regards the first of these issues, the review revealed, as noted above, that a host of 
intemal and extemal factors have been identified as exerting an influence over how human 
resource issues are managed within the subsidiaries of MNCs. These include, the country 
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of origin of trie parent company, the characteristics of the industries within which it 
operates and its experience of managing overseas operations, the strategic importance of a 
subsidiary and the way in which it was established and a number of social, economic and 
political features of the host country. In addition, the líterature review identified that the 
relative importance of these various influences can vary and that the precise way in which 
they ímpact on parent company-subsidiary relations is shaped, in part, by intemal political 
dynamics. 
An important implication of the review is therefore that in order to gain a real 
understanding of the nature of human resource management in the subsidiarles of MNCs, 
as well as the factors that have served to determine it, a detailed examination is needed of 
the surrounding decision-making processes and the factors that influence them. As a result, 
its fíndings suggest that a qualítative, case study, research methodology is needed which 
will enable the researcher to gain in-depth insights into the structure and operation of these 
processes, including the differing motivations and inter-personal relationships that impact 
on the decisions made. 
The fact that existing evidence suggests that a gap can occur between parent company 
philosophies and policies, on the one hand, and subsidiary practices, on the other, in turn, 
suggests that exclusive reliance on data gathered at either 'headquarters* or subsidiary 
level is unlikely to provide an accurate picture of parent company-subsidiary relationships. 
In doing so, it consequently highlights the importance of collecting data at both of these 
levéis so that not only can such gaps be identified, but an understanding can be gained as 
to why they exist. Furthermore, given that the líterature review suggests that these 
relationships can change over time in response to a range of internal and external factors, it 
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further points to the value of adopting a research strategy that encompasses a longitudinal 
element. 
Meanwhile, the literature review's findings that MNCs can attempt to exert an influence 
over the way in which subsidiaries manage a wide range of human resource and that such 
corporations can vary with regard to those that they do seek to so also have two important 
implications for the present study. The first is that they reinforce the point made above 
concerning the need to adopt a qualitative methodology that can facilitate an 
understanding of decision-making processes. The second is that they indicate that data 
needs to be collected on a broad spread of such issues, including recruitment and selection, 
payment systems and performance management arrangements, staff training and 
development, the distribution of HR responsibilities between different layers of 
management, and methods of workforce communication and representation. 
Finally, at the more conceptual level, the weaknesses identified in the literature review 
with regard to the ability of cultural- and institutional-based approaches to provide a full 
understanding of the behaviour of MNCs with regard to the management of human 
resources is important. For it suggests that the adoption of either of them runs the risk that 
crucial explanatory variables will be missed and that the two approaches are better viewed 
as providing complementary modes of analysis. In other words, in line with Edwards 
(2004), it points to the need to adopt an integrative approach that combines all the 
potential structural, cultural, environmental and internal political factors that can influence 
the way in which human resources are managed within MNCs and which embodies a 
recognition that behaviours and social structures are reciprocally related (Edwards et al, 
1999; Sorge, 2004). 
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Notes 
' The transnational terminology was adopted by the United Nations Centre on Transnational 
Corporations (UNCTC) in 1974, at the request of some Latin American Countries who 
wished to distinguish between companies domiciled in one country of Latin America, which 
might invest in another, from those originating from outside the région (Dunning, 1993). 
2 Most countries consider foreign investment as direct whether a single investing firm is able 
to exercise a significant control or influence over décision taking in a foreign enterprise. 
Although there is no international consensus on the minimum equity shareholding deemed 
necessary to gain control, for the majority of countries it varies between 10% and 25% of the 
total equity stake of an enterprise. The OECD (1991), has recommended to ils member 
countries that 10% be the minimum equity stake deemed to classify an investment as 'direct' 
(Dunning, 1993; U N , 1997). 
3 It should further be noted that the concept of footlooseness is difficult to apply to 
companies with bi-nationality, such as Unilever (Britain'Netherlands) and Assea Brown 
Boveri (Sweden/Switzerland). 
4 Isomorphism is the extent to which organizations adopt the same structures and 
processes as other organizations within their environment (Zucjer, 1977 - cited in Ferner 
and Quintanilla, 1998). 
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CHAPTER FOUR: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
Research strategy, design and availability of data are of prime importance for a successful 
research study. In this chapter, the rationale for and nature of the présent study's 
methodology is therefore considered. Initially, the possible research stratégies that could 
have been utilised in the study are outlined. This is followed by an analysis of the chosen 
strategy and the rationale behind selecting it. Attention then turns to a considération of the 
issues invölved in designing a case study and the factors that prompted the particular 
design to be adopted. Next, the main features of both qualitative and quantitative research 
methods, and their associated data collection tactics are described, along with a 
justification for the particular data collection methods utilised in the présent study. Finally, 
the operationalisation of the research strategy and design in terms of the sélection of the 
case studies and the field work conducted is outlined. 
Research Strategy: Possible Options 
A research strategy can be defined as 'the gênerai broad orientation taken in addressing 
research questions in an enquiry' (Robson, 1993). The literature indicates that there are 
several ways to classify research stratégies (Yin, 1984; Gi l l and Johnson, 1997). One 
approach distinguishes three main traditional stratégies: experiments, surveys and case 
studies (Robson, 1993). Each of thèse stratégies is described below, along with their 
associated strengths and weaknesses. 
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The Experiment 
According to McMillan and Schumchler (1989), an experiment tests cause-and-effect 
relationships in which the researcher randomly assigns subjects to groups, usually in a 
laboratory setting. The researcher manipulâtes one or more independent variables and 
détermines whether thèse manipulations cause an outcome (Creswell, 1994; Sproull, 
1988). 
In experiments, the researcher attempts to control as much as possible to rule out the 
influence of extraneous variables. That is variables which might cause some variation in 
the dépendent variable and thus provide rival explanations for any observed variability in 
the dépendent variable (Tull and Hawkinks, 1993; Gi l l and Johnsons, 1997). Thus, the 
experiment works best when the focus is on one or rwo variables, in isolation from the 
broader environment or context (Yin, 1993). 
The typical features of experiments identified by the literature are therefore: sélection of 
samples of individuals from known populations; allocation of samples to différent 
expérimental conditions; introduction of planned change in one or more independent 
variables; measurement of the impact of this change on a small.number of dépendent 
variables; and control of ail other extraneous variables, possibly by the use of a control 
group. In addition, they usually involve hypothesis testing (Robson, 1993). 
The main strength of experiments is that they produce strong inferences about cause and 
effect. The high degree of control and the physical removal of extraneous variables 
provide them with a high degree of replicability (ascertaining reliablility) and validity. 
However, there are several problems associated with experiments. In particular, 
experiments are impractical for most social science research problems as it is often 
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difficult to obtain a matching control group or randomly sample the subjects. Furthermore, 
it is generally very difficult to identify or control all the possible extraneous variables. In 
addition, in many situations it is difficult to nave repeated measures of the same group, 
and in some cases, the artificial nature of the settings weakens the generalisability of the 
results to 'non-laboratory' environments (Sproull, 1988; De Vaus, 1996; Tull and 
Hawkins, 1993). 
The Survey 
The survey can be defined as 'a methodological technique that requires the systematic 
collection of data from populations or samples through the use of the interview or the self-
adrninistered questionnaire' (Denzin, 1989). The reported typical features of a survey are: 
the selection of samples of individuáis from known populations; the collection of a 
relatively small amount of data in standardised form from each individual; and the use of 
questionnaires or structured interviews for data collection with the intent of generalising 
from a sample to apopulation (Robson, 1993; Creswell, 1994). 
Surveys can be cross-sectional or longitudinal (De Vaus, 1996), and are considered to be 
well suited to descriptive studies (Tull and Hawkins, 1993). There are a number of 
advantages that are said to be associated with surveys. Some researchers (e.g. Creswell, 
1994; Robson, 1993) consider that surveys provide confidence in the results, as they are 
based on hard data and statistical analysis. In addition, they are relatively economic to 
conduct and can provide a relatively straightforward approach to the study of altitudes, 
valúes and motives. They can also potentially provide an ability to identify the attributes 
of a population of a relatively small group of individuáis which can be generalisable to a 
larger population, and may also achieve reliability due to a high degree of data 
standardisation. 
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However, surveys have a number of weaknesses and limitations. For example, May (1997) 
criticises the survey approach as it 'rules out the possibility of understanding the process 
by which people corne to adopt particular values or behaviours' (May 1997: 104). Another 
associated concern is the introduction of biases in question formulation, which will 
inevitably hinder the validity of the process undertaken. Furthermore, it is claimed (e.g. 
De Vaus, 1996; Sproull, 1988; Tüll and Hawkins, 1993) that surveys do not take into 
considération the context in which particular aspects of people's beliefs and actions occur, 
and cannot adequately establish causal connections between variables. 
A further limitation relating to the use of surveys, particularly analytical ones, according to 
Gil l and Johnson (1997), concems the need to control for all extraneous variables. Hence, 
a failure to identify such extraneous variables, which is itself a problematic process, will 
tremendously threaten the internal validity of any subséquent findings. 
The Case Study 
A case study is defmed as 'an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and 
context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of évidence are used' (Yin, 
1984). The typical features of a case study are considered to be: sélection of a single case 
(or a small number of related cases) concerned with a particular type of situation; study of 
the case in its context; and the collection of information via a range of data collection 
techniques including observation, interview and documentary analysis (Robson, 1993). In 
gênerai, researchers tend to recommend the conduct of a case study when the researchers' 
main interest is on understanding what is happening in a specific context; when there is 
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little known, or not all the explanatory variables are known; and when it is possible to get 
access and co-operation from the people involved (Yin, 1994; Robson, 1993). 
More specifically, case studies are seen to have a number of potential advantages. These 
include providing a means of identifying and clarifying specific responses, especially 
those related to the attitudes and behaviour of the respondents, and providing a deep 
understanding of their surrounding organisational climate. Thus, the case study may allow 
an investigation to retain the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events; 
help to understand complex social phenomena and provide flexibility, in the sensé that the 
investigator can change the design and select différent cases from those initially identified, 
while not changing the purpose or objectives of the study. In addition, the use of multiple 
methods of collecting data can contribute to a high degree of validity. 
On the other hand, the case study is claimed to have a number of weaknesses. For 
example, Miles (1997) criticises the case study approach on the grounds that the analysis 
is 'essentially intuitive, primitive, and unmanageable'. He also suggests that cross-case 
analysis is less well formulated than within site analysis, and that without renewed 
methodological inquiry, qualitative research on organisations cannot be expected to 
transcehd story-telling'1. Other common criticisms (Yin, 1981; 1994) include the dangers 
of overt and covert bias from respondents; the risk that researchers may influence the 
direction of the fmdings and conclusions; the long time period needed to complète the 
study, and the difficulty of généralisation (Yin, 1981; 1994). Thus, Bryman states that: 
' A major reason for the loss of faith in case studies was a prevailing view that it was not 
possible to généralise the results of research deriving from just or two cases' (1989). 
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The Chosen Research Strategy 
It is commonly suggested that there is a hierarchical relationship between the three above 
stratégies in that: experiments are appropriate for explanatory studies; surveys are 
appropriate for descriptive studies; and case studies are appropriate for exploratory studies 
(e.g. Robson, 1993; Zikmund, 2000). In contrast, Yin (1994) argues that each of the above 
stratégies can be used for any or ail of the above three purposes. 
More generally, the crucial point made in the literature is that the researcher should choose 
the strategy which is most advantageous. Three main factors have been identified as 
exerting a crucial influence over the choice made. First, the type of the research question. 
Secondly, the degree of control that the investigator has, or wishes to have, over events. 
Thirdîy, whether the focus is on current or past events. The relevance of thèse factors has 
been highlighted by Y i n (1994) as replicated in Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1 Relevant Situations for Différent Research Stratégies 
Strategy Form of research 
question 
Requires control over 
behavioural events? 
Focuses on 
contemporary 
issues? 
Experiment how, why Yes Yes 
Survey 
who, what, where, how 
many, how much No Yes 
Archivai analysis 
who, what, where, how 
many, how much No yes/no 
Hîstory how, why No No 
Case study how, why No Yes 
Source: Yin , 1994, p.6 
According to Yin's analysis, as shows in the Table 4.1 above, an experiment can be used 
to answer a "how" or "why" question when the researcher can manipulate and control the 
behaviour of events, and is investigating contemporary events. A survey can be suited to 
answer "who", "what", "where", "how many", and "how much" questions when the 
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researcher doesn't have control over behavioural events, and is investigating contemporary 
events. In contrast, the case study will be appropriate to answer "how" or "why" questions 
when the researcher has no control over events and focuses on contemporary events. 
In light of Yin 's analysis, experiments were consequently excluded from this study 
because it was considered to be extremely difficult to divide organisations into 
expérimental and control groups, and the researcher had no control over events. 
Furthermore, the contextual factors in this study are considered to be so numerous and rich 
that an expérimental design could not be feasibly applied, particularly as the experiment 
deliberately divorces the context from the phenomenon in order to focus attention only on 
few variables (Yin, 1994: 13). 
Similarly, it was also decided that a survey methodology was not appropriate for four main 
reasons. First, the need to widerstand the context within which MNCs decision-making 
takes place casts doubt on the use of surveys because of the methods1 limited ability to 
provide such insights. Secondly, ail the explanatory variables influencing multinational 
companies' behaviour are not known, with the resuit that the survey would not be suitable 
for drawing inferences about causality. Furthermore, many of the contextual variables 
likely to influence decision-making within MNCs were not considered amenable to précise 
quantitative measurement. Thirdly, in practice, surveys are problematic and not suitable 
for carrying out exploratory work. Thus, while the use of open-ended questions can be 
used to qualitativen explore an area, the use of such questionnaire in a survey will be 
insufficient and ineffective procédure because data analysis and interprétation become 
very difficult and time consuming. Fourthly, obtaining a représentative sample which 
would be adéquate to generate population validity and généralisation was difficult for this 
study due to the small number of companies privatised. 
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In contrast, the case study was considered to constitute an appropriate strategy to achieve 
the objectives of the research study. This is for six main reasons. First, the topic is 
complex in that it is concerned with understanding the underlying factors which inñuence 
the international human resource management (IHRM) strategies and policies of 
multinational companies. Secondly, the context within which the decision-making process 
takes place is vital to the study. Thirdly, there is lack of empirical evidence about MNCs ' 
behaviour, particularly in developing countries. Thus, there is a need to collect data about 
both the phenomenon and the contextual factors. Fourthly, the study focused on "how" 
and "why" questions about a contemporary set of events and addressed a process not yet 
thoroughly researched and thus a case study was the logical methodology (Leonard-
Barton, 1990). Fitthly, the causal links in real-life interventions are too complex to explain 
via the use of survey or experimental strategies. Finally, the researcher has no control over 
the events and cannot manipúlate the relevant variables. 
Further support for this decisión is given by Welch and Ferner. For example, Welch 
(1994: 140) argües that 'there is a need for qualitative studies which explore possible 
underlying relationships, and broaden the focus of examination to include the context in 
which IHRM activities occur'. In a similar vein, Ferner (1997: 31) calis for 'qualitative 
case study research to follow through complex linkages, explore processes and uncover 
how decisions are really made' within multinational companies. 
Research Design 
Research design is broadly defmed as 'a plan for conducting research which usually 
includes the specification of the elements to be examined and the procedures to be used' 
(Sprouli, 1988). Or in Yin's terms, a research design is 'the logic that links the data to be 
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collected, and the conclusions to be drawn to the initial questions of a study' (1994). Thus, 
the research design is the structure that provides a framework within which data is 
collected and analysed (Bryman, 1989; Miller, 1991). 
An initial review of the literature contributed to formulating the research questions. Thèse 
research questions provided the research parameters and helped the investigator to specify 
the kind of organisations to be approached and the kind of data to be collected. The 
research questions were: 
a) Whal has been the nature and scale of récent privatisation policies in Jordan? 
b) Whal are the HRM stratégies of multinational corporations? 
c) How has foreign ownership/control arising from privatisation affected the HRM 
policies andpractices of Jordanian companies? 
d) Why has the change in thèse HR policies occurred? 
Based on the above research questions, a longitudinal, holistic, multiple-case design was 
considered to be most appropriate for the study. In this section, the rationales for each 
élément in this design are now considered in turn under the following three sub-headings: 
multiple-case design; the holistic approach; and the longitudinal nature of the study. 
Multiple-Case Design 
According to Y i n (1994), the main distinction in designing case studies is between single 
and multiple case studies. He describes three main reasons for conducting a single case 
study: the case represents a critical test of existing theory; the case is a unique or rare 
event; and the case represents a revelatory purpose. However, single-case designs need to 
be carefully considered as the case may subsequently not represent what it was perceived 
to be at the outset. Furthermore, they are subject to limits in generalisability and a number 
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of biases, such as misjudging the representativeness of a single event or biasing estimâtes 
because of'unconscious anchoring' (Leonard-Barton, 1990). As a resuit, many researchers 
advocate the use of a multiple-case design in order to: enhance generalisability (external 
validity); deepen understanding and explanation; and help guard against observer biases. 
External validity refers to the ability to généralise a study's findings to some broader 
theory and/or social contexts (analytical généralisation) other than those in which data 
have been collected (Gill and Johnson, 1997; Yin, 1994: 36). For example, Yin (1984; 
1994; 1998) maintains that, through the "replication logic", that is comparing the 
organisations under study in a systematic way (Jahkowicz, 2000:219), i f similar results are 
obtained from the différent cases in a study, then replication is said to have occurred, and 
the results might be accepted for a much larger number of similar cases (Yin, 1994: 45). In 
relation to this, Yin goes on to distinguish between "literal" and "theoretical" replication. 
The first refers to obtaining similar results from ail cases, while the latter refers to 
contrasting results from the cases but for predictable reasons. 
The second advantage is that multiple-case design can be used to deepen understanding 
and explanation since, by comparing différent sites, the researcher can not only have the 
opportunity to fïnd out the spécifie conditions under which a finding might occur but can 
also potentially form more gênerai catégories of how those conditions may be related. In 
addition, multiple case design may help the researcher to find négative cases to strengthen 
theory, by comparing and examining similarities and différences across cases (Miles and 
Huberman, 1994). The above strengths of multiple case studies, in tum, lead on to a third 
advantage. That is the findings are likely to be more compelling, since replicated results 
from cases would lead to greater confidence in the robustness and rigour of the whole 
study (Yin, 1993). 
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In light of the above, the multiple-case design was chosen for this study on two main 
grounds. First, the criteria for a single case study namely: the case represents a critica! test 
of existing theory; the case is a unique or rare event; and the case represents a revelatory 
purpose, are not present in terms of the nature of this study. Secondly, and relatedly, 
multiple-case design is imperative to obtain the benefits detailed above. 
The Holistic Approach 
Single and multiple-cases can be holistic or embedded in design. For example, if a case 
study examined only the global nature of an organisation as a main unit of analysis, then a 
holistic design would have been used. However, if sub-units in the organisation (within the 
main unit) were also examined, then an embedded case study design would have been 
used (Yin, 1993, 1994). 
Researchers consider the holistic design to be appropriate when logical sub-units are not 
identífied or when the relevant theory is of a holistic nature. In light of this, it was 
therefore decided that in the case of this study, to adopt a "holistic", rather than 
"embedded" approach. This was informed by two, related, considerations. The fírst was 
that much of the existing theoretical and empirical literature in the fíeld of international 
human resource management operates at the organisation al level. Consequently, in order 
to contribute to the existing literature on a like for like basis it seemed appropriate to 
lócate the present study at this level. The second was the fact that this focus in the 
literature was, in turn, reflected in the study's specific aim and objectives. 
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The Longitudinal Nature of the Study 
Another aspect of designing case studies is whether to use cross-sectional or longitudinal 
case-study design. In cross-sectional designs, data are collected at a single point of time in 
the study (De Vaus, 1996; Yin 1993). By contrast, longitudinal designs refer to the 
collection of data from the same cases at two or more points of time (De Vaus, 1996). Or 
in Sproull's (1988) terms, longitudinal research 'examines characteristics of the same 
subjects over an extended period of time in order to assess changes ', Longitudinal studies 
are useful to analyse a continuing process, where data can be collected to measure each 
stage in the process. They also allow the researcher to fol low up the changes and 
developments occurring in the organisation over time (Pettigrew, 1979), and trace the real 
factors iniluencing thèse changes (Hedlund, 1981). Consequently, longitudinal studies can 
be seen to enhance the validity and reliability of the study (Gill and Johnson, 1997; 
Leonard-Barton, 1990). 
In support of this, Bryman (1989) argues that longitudinal case studies are 'particularly 
adept at bringing ont how organisations change and the causes and conséquences of 
change '. A view that has been supported by a number of other researchers investigating 
change (e.g. Miller and Friesen, 1982; Galliers, 1985; Vitalari, 1985, cited in Gil l and 
Johnson, 1997; Pettigrew, 1979). For example, Pettigrew (1990: 269) advocates a 
longitudinal approach when it cornes to developing a more 'holistic' and 'dynamic' 
analysis of a process such as change. 
In support of this view, some researchers have advocated the use of longitudinal design 
due to complexity and interdependence between the factors, which affect headquarters-
subsidiary relationship. For example Hedlund (1981) states that: " In order really to 
investigate thèse matters, one would best use longitudinal in-depth studies over long time 
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period". In a similar vein, Pettigrew (1985) argues that longitudinal research, which 
focuses on a small number of organisations over long periods of time can explain why 
correlation exists between variables and can take into consideration all external variables 
that could possibly have caused the observed correlation, which cross-sectional designs 
fail to do (Easterby-Smith, et ai, 1991). 
Given the aim and objectives of this study, it was concluded that these virtues associated 
with longitudinal analysis would contribute greatly to the present study. This was, in part, 
because it was important, for the purposes of fulfilling the study's aim and objectives, to 
understand not only the nature of the changes introduced but also the processes through 
which they were implemented. It was also, in part, because a key objective of the study 
was to gain an understanding of the factors that influenced these changes and processes. 
Consequently, it was seen as important to gain an in-depth understanding of the decision­
making processes that contributed to them. 
Data Collection: The Research Methods 
As noted earlier, the selection of methods is driven by the kind of research questions the 
investigator is seeking to answer, and is moderated by what is feasible in terms of time, 
skills and resources (Robson, 1993). Research indicates that case studies typically 
combine such data collection methods as archives, artefacts, documents, interviews and 
questionnaires. As a result, the evidence collected may be qualitative (e.g., words), 
quantitative (e.g., numbers), or both (Yin, 1994; Eisendhart, 1989). 
Qualitative Methods 
Van Maanen (1979) defines qualitative methods as "an array of interpretative techniques 
which seek to describe, decode, translate, and otherwise come to terms with the meaning, 
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not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena in the social 
world". Therefore, qualitative data are useful for understanding what and how things 
happen, and how they are related, rather than merely measuring the relationship between 
variables. As Eisenhardt (1989) has suggested: 'qualitative data are particularly useful for 
understanding why or why not émergent relationships hold. When a relationship is 
supported, the qualitative data often provide a good understanding of the dynamics 
underlying the relationship, that is, "the why" of what is happening. Similarly, Gordon 
and Langmaid (1988) argue that qualitative research 'is centrally concerned with 
understanding things rather than with measuring them. The pursuit of understanding is a 
complex "searching" type of procédure which cannot be rigid'. 
Qualitative methods are described as "rieh", "füll", "holistic", "real", and "thick" (Van 
Maanen, 1982; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Thus, researchers are attracted to qualitative 
data for six main reasons (Miles, 1979; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Bryman, 1989; 
Easterby-Smith et ai, 1991; van Maanen, 1982). First, because they have a strong 
potential for revealing complexity, and their thick descriptions provide a vivid picture of 
the natural context in which the phenomenon is embedded, leading to a stronger and 
"deeper" understanding of latent, underlying issues. Secondly, as a resuit of the fact that 
they are often collected over a sustaíned period of time, which makes them powerful for 
studying change processes over time. Thirdly, because they can contribute to the 
évolution of new théories and offer a more precise way for assessing causality in 
organisational affairs (how and why things happen as they do). Fourthly, they enable the 
meaning people put on events, attitudes and their own behaviours to be identified. Fifthly, 
because they are flexible, as data collection times and methods can be varied as a study 
proceeds. For example, the researcher is able to capitalise on chance remarks or 
unexpected events that provoke a new line of investigation. Finally, they tend to rely on 
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multiple sources of évidence, which not only allows data in relation to a number of 
différent topics to be addressed, but can serve the function of reducing a researcher's 
trained incapacity, bias, narrowness and arrogance. 
However, the literature reveals that there are weaknesses associated with qualitative data. 
One problem is that data collection and analysis is highly labour intensive, time 
consuming. and costly. This is due to the fact that qualitative methods tend to generate 
huge amounts of data that can overload the researchers. Another problem is that data are 
often untidy because it is harder to control the pace, progress and end-points of the data 
collection process. Moreover, the methods of analysis are not well formulated and there 
are limitations placed on the possibilities of Statistical analysis. Thus, the analysis and 
interprétation of data may be very difficult and lack both reliability and validity. 
Furthermore, the subjectivity and bias of the researcher may influence the findings. Lastly, 
the external validity of qualitative methods is threatened since the small sample makes it 
difficult to généralise the findings. (Easterby-Smith, 1991; Miles and Huberman, 1994; 
McClintock et al., 1979). 
Quantitative Methods 
Research shows that quantitative methods are concerned with explaining the relationship 
between variables and/or testing hypothèses. One important characteristic of quantitative 
techniques is that the process of data collection is distinct frorn analysis (Easterby-Smith, 
1991). Researchers claim that the main strengths of quantitative methods are: they can 
provide wide coverage of the range of situations; they can be fast and economical; 
findings are generalisable; they provide hard data as they involve Statistical and numerical 
measurements; and they are less dépendent on researcher's skills or orientation (Easterby-
Smith, 1991; Gordon and Langmaid, 1988). By contrast, researchers claim that there are a 
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number of problems associâtes with quantitative methods (Easterby-Smith, 1991; Bryman, 
1989). Thèse include the fact that they give little attention to context, put less emphasis on 
interprétation, do not provide effective means of understanding processes or the 
significance people attach to actions, and are not very helpful in generating théories. 
Triangulation 
As demonstrated above, no research method is perfect. Accordingly, researchers have 
suggested "triangulation" stratégies and techniques to neutralise the flaws in each research 
method, with the aim of increasing the validity and reliability of the investigation (Denzin, 
1989). The concept of triangulation is based upon the premise that the weaknesses (e.g. 
bias) in each single method will be compensated by the counter-balancing strengths of 
another (Jick, 1979). Thus, Denzin argues that the deftciencies of one method are often the 
strengths of another, and by combining methods, researchers can achieve the best of each 
while eliminating their unique flaws (1989). 
Triangulation is broadly defined by Denzin as 'the combination of méthodologies in the 
study of the same phenomenon1 (1989). Or in Marshall's and Rossman's (1995) terms 1 it is 
the act of bringing more than one source of data to bear on a single point'. Four main 
catégories of triangulation are identified by the literature: theoretical, data, investigator 
and methodological (Denzin, 1989; Easterby-Smith et al., 1991; Yin, 1994; Jick, 1979). 
Theoretical triangulation involves bringing in a variety of models and interprétations from 
one of more disciplines and using them to explain situations with a view of gaining 
insights into data which had previously been neglected. Data triangulation refers to the 
collection of data upon the same phenomenon over différent time frames, places or from 
différent sources within the same study. For example, Miller and Friesen (1982) advocate 
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the use of longitudinal designs to analyse organisations as a means of triangulation (Gill 
and Johnson, 1997). Investigator triangulation refers to the collection of data upon the 
same phenomenon from différent investigators and hence enables the researchers to 
compare, develop and refîne thèmes and remove the potential bias that cornes from a 
single investigator. Methodological triangulation refers to the use of différent research 
methods in the same study to collect data so as to check the validity of the fmdings. 
Denzin (1989) suggests two forms of methodological triangulation: "within-method" and 
"between method" or "across method" triangulation. The 'Vithin-method" is where 
multiple techniques are used within a given method to collect and interpret data. This 
basically involves cross-checking for internai consistency or reliability. For example, a 
survey questionnaire may be constructed that contains several différent scales measuring 
the same empirical unit. The "between-method" (or multi-method) incorporâtes the use of 
différent methods to collect data on the same empirical units, such as the use of surveys, 
semi-structured interviews, observation, and experiments in the same study. Thus, Jick 
(1979) claims that the validity and reliability of the study will be enhanced i f thèse 
différent methods produced convergent results. In contrast, if divergent results émerge 
then this should lead to alternative, as well as possibly more complex, explanations. 
However, it is argued that the triangulation strategy has some flaws. One shortcoming is 
that triangulation tends to be expensive and time-consuming (Robson, 1993; Denzin, 
1989). In addition, Jick (1979) argues that replicating a mixed-methods package is 
extremely difficult, especially in the case of qualitative data. He also argues that multi-
methods are of no use i f the research is not clearly focused theoretically or conceptually. 
Other authors and researchers have also criticised triangulation. Denzin (1989) has 
reported five prime cnticisms. First, comparison of multiple data sources will seldom lead 
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to a single, totally constant picture (Patton, 1980). Secondly, no two investigators ever 
observe the same phenomenon in exactly the same way. Thus, it is a mistake to expect 
corroboration of one investigator by another (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Thirdly, the same 
unit, behaviour or experience can never be observed twice (Silverman, 1985). Fourthly, 
the use of multiple theories as a triangulation technique seems to be both 
epistemologically unsound and empirically empty (Lincoln and Guba, 1985). Finally, 
Fielding and Fielding (1986) provide a critical interpretation of multiple triangulation 
strategy as follows (Denzin, 1989): 
'Multiple triangulation, as Denzin expounded it, is the equivalent for 
research methods of "correlation" in data analysis. They both represent 
extreme forms of eclecticism,. Theoretical triangulation does not... reduce 
bias, nor does methodological triangulation necessarily increase 
validity...In other words, there is a case for triangulation, but not the one 
Denzin makes. We should combine theories and methods carefully and 
purposefully with the intention of adding breadth and depth to our 
analysis, but not for the purpose ofpursuing "objective " truth. ' 
Data Collection and Tactics used in the Study 
It was decided that the case studies would be based on multiple sources of evidence, but 
that the principal research tool would be the use of in-depth semi-structured interviews 
(Fontana and Frey, 1998; Tull and Hawkins, 1993; Robson, 1993). This decision was 
taken for both positive and negative reasons. On the positive side, such interviews are 
seen to have five main benefits. First, the privatisation operation in Jordan is a sensitive 
issue and there is a consequent likelihood that many managers would be reluctant to reveal 
information or disclose their opinions or feelings freely. Therefore, face-to-face, one-to-
one, interviews were considered appropriate to overcome this problem. Secondly, the case 
companies were at different stages of privatisation and differed considerably in terms of 
their organisational structure and activities. As a result, it was considered that the wording, 
sequence and content of questions might have to be adjusted according to each situation. 
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Thirdly, semi-structured interviews were considered appropriate because the study is 
concerned with assessing the developments and changes in human resource stratégies and 
policies in the companies arising from foreign control due to privatisation. Thus, it was 
feit that such issues could be best explored in détail using semi-structured interviews as 
they allow the investigator to clarify information, ask for élaboration on the answers given, 
follow up responses and investigate underlying issues, in a way that cannot be done via 
self-administered questionnaires or structured interviews. In addition, this type of 
interview allows the respondents to answer more on their own terms than the standardised 
interview permits, but still provides a reasonable structure for comparability, which is 
important as this is a comparative study. Fourthly, the décision making process within 
multinational companies is highly complex, and the factors influencing thèse décisions are 
interdependent and interrelated. Therefore, it was considered that semi-structured 
interviews would provide comprehensive interprétations of thèse complex processes and 
would allow detailed explanations of them, a view which accords with those of other 
researchers. In addition, some variables that have not been considered before might 
émerge from thèse interviews. In support of this view, (Hedlund, 1981; Ferner and 
Quintanilla, 1998) advocate that the in-depth interview 'is seen as the most appropriate 
tool for getting at the complex processes of mutual influence between headquarters and 
subsidiary, and between thèse and their home and host country environments 
respectively'. Fifthly, as this is a longitudinal study, semi-structured interviews were 
perceived to be well suited to follow up developments and adjust questions according to 
new events taking place within their context. 
Thèse virtues of semi-structured interviews were further strengthened by the 
inappropriateness of the other alternative data collection tactics. Consequently, participant 
observation (Whyte, 1981; Gill and Johnson, 1997) and mail questionnaires (May, 1997; 
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Bryman, 1989) were discounted from this study on the basis of the following. Participant 
observation dépends on the high skills and training of the observer in this field. It also 
requires spécial permission, which could be quite difficult to obtain especially under the 
circumstances of privatisation and new management. Participant observation also requires 
that the researcher spends quite a long time in the organisation, which is quite difficult 
when the researcher is based in another country. 
Similarîy, mail questionnaires were discarded for the following. First, as mentioned 
earlier, it was considered that it would be difficult to obtain the co-operation from the case 
company managers as they would be reluctant to reveal any information about their 
companies due to the sensitivity of the privatisation issue in Jordan. The situation is even 
more difficult when they have to disclose this information in writing. Secondly, it was 
predicted that the response rate would be very low. The researcher is familiar with the 
country's culture and knows that spécial contacts and arrangements should be made to 
obtain the co-operation of the respondents. Meeting the respondentsand building trust and 
rapport with them would therefore enhance their co-operation. Thirdly, the mai] 
questionnaires would not allow the researcher to probe or ask for explanations, which 
were considered to be of prime importance to this study due to the complexity of the 
issues involved in understanding organisational decision-making process. 
The information gathered from the semi-structured interviews was, however, 
supplemented by documentary évidence (Yin, 1994; Mintzberg and McHugh, 1985) such 
as annual reports, in-house journals, officiai company histories, organisational charts, 
officiai documents, policy statements as well as newspaper and journal articles. The 
purpose of using this documentary évidence was two fold. First, to crosscheck data 
obtained from the interviews, in accordance with Yin's (1998: 246) argument that 
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'documents are extremely important for corroborating and augmenting évidence from 
other sources'. Secondly, to use any discrepancies in the information to identify any 
possible new Unes of inquiry. Thus, reliance on multiple sources of évidence was utiiised 
to develop converging lines of inquiry, and enhance the validity and reliability of the 
study. 
Operationalisation of the Research Strategy and Design 
în this section, the detailed fieldwork carried out is outlined. The fieldwork was carried 
out in two stages. First, interviews were conducted with government officiais. Secondly, 
the three case studies were carried out. 
Stage (1): Interviews with Government Officiais 
The Jordanian Government is the architect of the privatisation opération in Jordan. 
Therefore, in order to contextualise the case studies it was considered important to 
interview government officiais. Accordingly, semi-structured face-to-face interviews were 
held in December 1998 and July/August 1999 with thirteen government officiais (See 
Table 4.2 below) who were directly involved in the privatisation process. The interviews 
were aimed at gathering data on the following issues: the reasons for the privatisation; the 
rôle of foreign international companies in the privatisation process; the methods of 
privatisation used and the reasons for their use; the difficulties encountered in the 
privatisation process; the rôles of the Word Bank and the IMF in the privatisation 
programme; and likely future developments. 
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Table 4.2 Government Officiais Interviewed 
Head of the Executive Privatisation Unit 
(EPU) at the Prime Ministry 
Managing Director of the Executive 
Privatisarion Unit (EPU) 
Three Transaction Managers, responsable 
for différent sectors at the E P U 
Two Transaction Managers at the EPU 
Govemor of the Central Bank/Member 
of the Privatisation Higher Committee 
Director of Technical Support Unit, 
Ministry of Planning 
Director of the Aid Competitiveness 
Unit and the EU-Jordan Technical Support 
Member of the Privatisation Committee 
of Jordan Télécommunications 
Unit, Ministry of Planning. 
Head of Research Unit, Central Bank 
Director General, Institute of Public 
Administration 
To supplément and triangulate thèse interviews, documentary évidence was also collected. 
This évidence included items such as company records, policy documents, newsletters, 
annual reports, govemment and World Bank documents and reports, législation, journal 
articles, newspaper materials, conférence papers, reports, published statistics, archives, 
and transcripts of broadcasts. 
Stage (2): Field Work 
Sélection of Case Companies 
As noted in chapter 2, under Jordan's current privatisation programme in 1997, eight 
major privatisation transactions were identified in its first phase (Gupta, 2000). As a 
reminder, the companies concemed are listed below in Table 4.3. 
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Table 43 Major Privatisée! Companies in Jordan 
Transaction Nature of 
privatisation 
Progress Future 
developments 
Jordan Cernent 
Faetones (JCF) 
Divestment of33%to 
an investor with 
technical agreement 
Shares sold to the 
Lafarge, a French 
M N C 
Deal closed. 
Shares sold on 
14 December 
1998 
Water Authority of 
Jordan (WAJ) 
Performance based 
Management Contract 
Agreement signed 
with Sues Lyonnaise 
Des Eaux - French 
M N C 
Transaction 
completed. 
Contract signed 
on 19 April 
1999 
Jordan Telecom 
Company (JTC) 
Sale of 40% of shares 
to a strategic partner 
with five-year 
management contract 
The contract was 
awarded to France 
Telecom 
Deal closed on 
23 January 
2000 
Ma'in Spa A 30-year concession 
agreement with 
management contract 
Agreement signed 
and management, 
transferred to a 
consortium led by 
French MNC-Accor 
Deal closed. 
Agreement 
signed on 19 
October 1989 
Royal Jordanian 
Airlines (RJ) 
RJ mother company to 
be restructured and 
transferred into an 
investment company. 
A subsidiary will be 
established with a 
strategic partner to run 
the core operations 
Non-core business to 
be sold to the private 
Sector. 
49% of core 
business will be sold 
to a stratégie partner 
Bid process and 
negotiations -
early to mid 
2000. 
Core activity 
divesrurc 
by early 2000 
Public Transportation 
Corporation (PTC) 
15-year concession Contraéis signed 
with local Operators 
Deal closed on 
19 November 
1998 
Aqaba Railway 
Corporation (ARC) 
Awarding BTO and 
operaring agreement to 
upgrade and opérate 
raiíway and to build 
two extensions 
Contract signed with 
4 international 
bidders 
(Rayteon/W inconson 
Central Consortium) 
Deal closed, 
A lease 
agreement was 
signed in 18 
August 1999 
National Electric 
Power Company 
(NEPCO) 
NEPCO unbundled 
into three companies 
Sector restructuring 
Completed 
Privatisation 
was expected 
by 2002, was 
delayed. 
In order to select the case companies, four sélection criteria were distinguished. First, the 
companies were/would be owned/controlled by a multinational company. Secondly, the 
companies would be privatised within the time frame of the study. That is, the date of the 
privatisation would be early enough to enable changes in the H R M stratégies and policies 
of the privatised companies to be traced over a suffïcient period of time. Thirdly, the 
privatised companies were located in Amman, in order to facilitate access to key staff and 
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Company records, and allow multiple visits to the companies. Fourthly, access and co­
opération of the companies could be arranged through the personal contacts of the 
researcher and the support of the Executive Privatisation Unit at the Prime Ministry in 
Jordan. 
In the light of these criteria the following companies were therefore excluded from the 
study for the following reasons: 
1. Public Transportation Corporation: this Company was considered inappropriate 
because it did not meet the sélection criteria of foreign ownership/control as the 
agreements were signed with local Operators. 
2. Ma'in Spa: this Company was excluded from the study because it would take at 
least a year before the investment and works programme to be undertaken by the 
new Operators have been completed and parts of the complex might be shut down 
during this period. In addition, the Company was not located in Amman. 
3. Aqaba Railway Corporation: this Company was excluded because the main 
function of the new Company was to Build-Operate and Transfer (BTO) a new 
project. As a resuit, it would not allow the examination of changes in H R M 
stratégies and policies. In addition, the Company was not located in Amman. 
4. National Electric Power Company: this Company was discarded since it was still in 
the early stages of privatisation and would not be fully privatised for another two 
years. However, in July and August 1999 interviews were held with three senior 
managers in the Company: two personnel/HRM directors (General Manager 
Assistants for Administration); and the Institutional Planning Manager, since at 
that point it was not clear that the privatisation process would take so long. 
5. Royal Jordanian: The privatisation was not feasible within the study's time 
framework and the privatisation process was taking Ionger than expected. 
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However, two interviews were held with the H R M director of the company in 
December 1998 and July 1999 respectively, since at that point it was not clear that 
the privatisation process would be so drawn out. 
The exclusion of thèse companies therefore left three possible case study organisations 
which fulfïlled the sélection criteria. Thèse were Jordan Cément Factories, The Water 
Authority of Jordan, and Jordan Telecom Corporation. By coincidence, this combination 
of companies had.a further advantage in that they ail involved French multinational and 
therefore, enabled the country of origin to be held constant. 
Subsequently, access to thèse companies was sought. In the Jordanian context, this initially 
involved contacting the Prime Ministry, which had overall responsibility for the 
privatisation process, via family contacts in order to gain its support for the project and to 
get it to insfruct the companies to take part. This approach reflected the rôle that family 
connections play in Jordanian society and its previously mentioned hierarchical nature, as 
well as the fact that civil servants in Jordan are prohibited from getting involved in 
political issues - considérations which were compounded by the more gênerai political 
sensitivity surrounding the privatisation programme. Fortunately, the Prime Ministry was 
happy to support the project and to issue such instructions to the General Managers of each 
of the companies. Following the issuing of thèse instructions, the three General Managers 
were contacted and they, again because of the hierarchical nature of Jordanian 
organisations, then, made it clear to other managers that they should fully co-operate with 
the project. 
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Conduct of the Case Sîudies 
In total, 67 semi-structUTed, face-to-face interviews, were conducted with Company 
managers. The number of interviews carried out in each Company ranged from 16 to 30 
interviews per Company. Details of those interviewed from the companies are given in 
Tables 4.1.a, 4.1 .b and 4.1.c in Appendix 4.1. The conduct of the case studies spanned 
around three years during which time data was collected continuously from the companies. 
In addition to the total number of interviews reported above, some follow up téléphone 
interviews were conducted with managers and informants to gather information on 
specific issues and to corroborate information received from other sources. 
More specifically, the actual interview phase of the case studies essentially encompassed 
five éléments. These are discussed below under the following headings: baseline 
interviews, initial follow up interviews, interviews at corporate headquarters, and follow 
up interviews, and triangulation. 
Baseline Interviews (1989 /1999) 
To achieve the aims of the study it was considered imperative to gather data on the human 
resource policies of the selected companies that were in place before, or immediately after, 
privatisation to establish a baseline for tracing any subséquent changes. Accordingly, an 
interview schedule was developed and interviews conducted with senior managers and 
human resource directors in each of the selected companies. 
The décision to interview both senior managers and H R M directors was made in order to 
corroborate data to ensure the validity of the study. Thus, interviews with case Company 
senior managers and HRM/Personnel directors were seen as likely to yield différent 
perceptions of the same phenomenon as well as provide multiple sources of évidence: that 
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is, data triangulation. The senior managerial interviewées were selected on the basis of 
availability and information provided by the company as to those who were best 
positioned to address the relevant issues. Détails of those interviewed are given in 
Appendix 4.2. As regards the contents of the interviews, information was gathered on the 
following issues: the link between business strategy and H R M stratégies; key areas of 
change in H R M stratégies and policies; organisational structure; management style; 
communication channels; and planned or predicted changes in the organisation (see 
Appendix 4.3). 
As regards the interviews conducted with HRM/Personnel directors, thèse were used to 
gather data on H R M stratégies and policies before privatisation, récent changes in 
préparation for privatisation, and their prédictions about potential changes after 
privatisation (see Appendix 4.4). More specifically, in addition to seeking information on 
existing H R M fonctions and general stratégies, the study in line with Wright and 
McMahan (1992), Dowiing and Schuler (1990), and Schuler et aï. (1993), the interviews 
focused on the changes introduced in the three case study organisations in respect of six 
areas of H R M practices: staffmg levéis and composition; recruitment and sélection; 
performance appraisal; training and development; rewards; and employée communication 
and consultation. 
The above décision to focus the interviews on managerial personnel, a focus that was also 
adopted in the other phases of data collection detailed below, was taken for two main 
reasons. The first was that the study was concemed with examining stratégies and policies 
that were either in the process of development or were in their early stages of 
implementation. As a resuit, it was felt that only managerial personnel based at corporate 
headquarters and the Jordanian subsidiary would be able to provide detailed information 
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on not only their nature, but also the factors that had informed their development and the 
progress that had been made in implementing them. The second was that, even if this was 
not the case, access to more junior staff was likely to be problematic because of the 
hierarchical nature of Jordanian organisations and the associated unwillingness of 
managers to expose themselves to criticism from subordinates. Indeed, it should be noted 
that managerial participation in the study was only obtained through high level political 
connections and instructions which reassured local Jordanian managers that they would 
not be breaching existing organisational rules by taking part 
initial Follow Up Interviews (1999/2000) 
The second phase of the case studies' interviews encompassed the collection of 
information on the changes which had been, or were in the process of being, introduced in 
the area of H R M , the factors which had influenced thèse changes and any planned future 
changes. The information in question was gathered primarily through interviews 
conducted with company directors, senior line and finance managers, and human resource 
staff. Accordingly, différent interview schedules were prepared for each one of them as 
shown in Appendices 4.5, 4.6, 4.7and 4.8. Différent interviews enabled the triangulation of 
the information gathered and provided différent perceptions of how the changes were 
implemented and why, as well as the process of implementing them. The data gathered 
also provided spécifie information relevant to each company that needed to be followed up 
and clarified with corporate headquarters. 
Interviews at Corporate Headquarters (June 2001) 
Face-to-face semi structured interviews were conducted mainly with HR directors/senior 
HR staff based at corporate headquarters in France to gather data on: the H R M stratégies 
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and policies of the MNCs globally and in Jordan; and the factors influencing thèse 
stratégies and policies, again both generally and in respect of Jordan in particular. A new 
interview Schedule was developed which covered seven broad areas (see Appendix 4.9): 
parent company influence over subsidiary HR policies; HR reporting and performance 
monitoring; mechanisms of information sharing; use and role of expatriâtes; training and 
development; corporate culture; and generał business information that covered issues, such 
as the parent's international corporate strategy and structure, the range and type of its 
activities and its future expansion plans. 
The above information also helped to triangulate data collected from the operating units. 
Although interviews with expatriate managers in the operating units in Jordan provided 
important information about both corporate headquarters and the local levels, interviews at 
headquarters provided even deeper insights into the parent company's philosophy, how it 
manages it human resources across borders, and the factors affecting its approach. 
Follow Up Interviews (July/August 2001) 
Further face-to-face semi-structured interviews were held in Jordan with case companies' 
senior managers, H R M directors and managers, as well as employée représentatives, to 
follow up the changes in H R M policies and practices, the process of their implementation 
and the factors influencing them. For example, interviews with department and plant 
managers, and employée représentatives helped to follow in more détail how the new 
policies were perceived and implemented within the subsidiary. Thèse interviews further 
helped to complément and corroborate information received from the earlier phases, 
follow up important émergent issues, establish the difficulties encountered in 
implementing the desired changes and identify the changes that were still in the process of 
completion. 
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Triangulation 
Throughout the previous interviews and visits the findings of the interviews, which were 
mainly taped and, on average, lasted one and a half hours, were supplemented by 
documentary évidence in order to facilitate data triangulation. The documents included 
Company annual reports, organisational charts, policy statements, mémos, in-house 
Journals and newsletters, mémos, administrative records, newspaper articles and corporate 
Web sites. 
Data Analysis and Write Up 
At the outset of the study an initial list of catégories was designed based on the findings of 
the literature review and the study's related aim and objectives. Then, during the process 
of data collection, thèse initial catégories were expanded or reduced and sub-categories 
were created to permit systematic analysis (Miles and Hubermann, 1994: 65; Miles, 1979). 
At the same time, a database was created for each case study and évidence from them was 
organised under thèse catégories and sub-categories. Throughout this process, évidence 
from the multiple sources of information on the same topic, such as interview transcripts 
and internai documents, was synthesised and a chain of évidence maintained (Yin, 1998). 
Subsequently, thèse catégories were developed into three main thèmes (Miles, 1979). The 
first of thèse focused on the IHRM stratégies of the companies globally and in Jordan. In 
doing so, it encompassed a considération of four issues. These were: the parent 
companies' HR philosophies and the rôle of corporate HR; the HR changes that the 
companies typically made when they acquired subsidiaries; the way in which thèse 
reforms were implemented; and the obstacles the companies commonly faced during the 
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process of reform and the methods they used to overeóme them, both generally and in the 
case of Jordán. 
The second theme focused upon the firms' internal structures of power and control, as well 
as their corporate structures. Issues encompassed by this theme included the degree of 
autonomy granted to subsidiarles, decision-making structures, the modes of control 
utilised to control subsidiarles, including the use of expatriates, formal procedures, 
reporting requirements and processes of socialisation and networking, and the way in 
which corporate structures were changing in the face of growing global competition. 
The third theme focused on a range of wider contextuaí factors that the existing internal 
human resource management literature suggests can exert an important influence over 
MNCs HR strategies and policies. These included the international management 
experience of the three parent companies, their mode of entry strategies, the characteristics 
of the industries in which they operated, and their broader business strategies, both 
generally and in respect of Jordán. 
The gathered data upon the above themes was the subject of three main levéis of analysis. 
The first level comprised 'within-case' analysis. During this level of analysis, sequence 
analysis (Eisendhart, 1989) was used to organise the longitudinal data and identify 
changes over time. Thus, at the end of each of the three phases of field work, data was 
synthesised, corroborated and analysed, and a report subsequently written. This process 
allowed the researcher in the following phase to investígate any discrepancies and the 
reasons for them and, more generally, to probé emergent themes. It also supported data 
triangulation by, for example, enabling data gathered from the subsidiaries in one phase of 
the research to be cross-checked in a later one with information obtained from corporate 
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headquarters. The outcorne of this first level of analysis was the production of a detailed 
narrative description of the salient features of each case study. 
The second level of analysis involved cross-case analysis, where évidence from ail the 
cases was utilised to identify similarities and différences between them and to develop 
tentative explanations through a 'replica logic' (Yin, 1994, 1998; Eisenhardt, 1989), a 
process which helped to verify the identified émergent relationships and pattems 
(Eisendhardt, 1989: 542), helped to increase the internai validity of the findings, and 
provided a good understanding of the dynamics underlying the relationships between the 
variables. Finally, in the third level, the results of the above analysis were used to shed 
light on the original research questions and to compare the findings obtained with the 
extant literature, and in this way enhance the generalisability to theory of the research 
findings (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
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Notes 
In this context, it is worth mentioning that some writers (Bryman, 1989; Miles, 1979; 
Miles and Huberman, 1984) treat the case study and qualitative research as synonyms. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: WATER CO 
Introduction 
This chapter reports the first case study, which concerns a water company taken over by 
the French M N C Suez Lyonnaise Des Eaux. Initially, information is provided on the 
Jordanian company and the nature of its privatisation. This is followed by the provision of 
background information on the acquiring French M N C and its approach towards the 
management of its overseas operations. Following this, attention turns to the findings 
obtained from the case study by considering, in turn, the changes made following 
privatisation in respect of the following issues: the structure and role of human resource 
(HR) function; staffing levels and composition; recruitment and selection; performance 
appraisal; training and development; rewards; and communication and consultation. 
Finally, a concluding section draws together the key points emerging from the case study. 
The Privatisation 
The Water Authority of Jordan (WAJ) is the main body responsible for the supply and 
distribution of water and wastewater services to the Kingdom of Jordan and consists of 
twelve geographic water divisions. Each division is headed by an administrator who 
reports directly to the secretary general of WAJ, who, in turn, reports to the Minister of 
Water and Irrigation. 
On 19 April 1999 the Jordanian government signed a water management and wastewater 
treatment contract for the city of Amman and its outskirts, a part of the organisation 
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known as A G W A , with a consortium led by the French Company "Suez Lyonnaise Des 
Eaux". Under this contract the operator was granted a four-year license, with effect front 
31 July 1999, to manage the distribution of water without the loss of govemment 
ownership or controî. 
The four-year license made the operator responsible for running and managing the water 
network in the Amman area, which serves 37% of the total population of Jordan - around 
1.6 million inhabitants, and 9% of the total area of the country. Subsequently, if the 
contract succeeds, the govemment intends to adopt similar contractual arrangements in 
other parts of the water industry (Mansur, 1998). 
Under the financial agreement between the govemment and the operator, the operator is 
paid a fixed fee of US S8.8 million, which is paid from a World Bank (WB) Loan of US 
$55 million to the Water Authority. In addition, the operator will be paid 5% of any 
financial improvement achieved by reducing expenses and/or increasing revenues. The 
operator's costs are fïnanced through two especially created funds. First, an Opération 
Investment Fund (OIF), again fïnanced from the WB loan, of US $24 million which 
covers the procurement of equipment and vehicles, water meters, pipes and other supplies. 
Secondly, an operating Expenditure Account (OEA), which represents the annual 
approved budget for the Service area and covers ail the operating and maintenance 
expenses, including the salaries of the seconded staff, electricity, and consumables. This 
fund, which is fïnanced by WAJ, currently amounts to JD 18 million and is distributed via 
monthly payments to the operator. 
More specificalty, under the contract the operator is required to achieve a number of 
specified outeomes (Ministry of Water and Irrigation, 1998). Thèse are: 
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• Improve the cash flow and financial sustainability of the sector; 
• Reduce the scale of unaccounted water (UFW) and increase operational 
effectiveness; 
• Improve the constancy of supply to all subscribers in the service area; 
• Attract capital for improving and refurbishing the water infrastructure serving the 
service area; 
• Improve water quality; 
• Reduce average response times for dealing with customer complaints; and 
• Improve the training and development of the staff working in the contract area. 
The Acquiring Company 
This section provides background information on the French M N C . It does so by initially 
describing the origins, activities and size of the parent Company, and then by exploring the 
way in which it seeks to manage its human resources within overseas subsidiaries. 
The Company: A Brief Profile 
As mentioned earlier, the operator is a joint venture led by the French M N C Sues 
Lyonnaise des Eaux, which was founded in June 1997 through the merger of the 
Campagnie de Suez and Lyonnaise des Eaux. Despite its récent formation, the key 
constituent parts of the Company have existed since the nineteenth century, during which 
time both companies have pursued an international growth strategy through a séries of 
mergers, acquisitions and takeovers. 
The newly merged company has a wide range of businesses consisting of energy, water, 
waste services, construction activities and associated services, and financial services. It 
has a matrix structure under which its opérations are managed via product/functional 
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divisions, rather than along territoriai lines. In 1999, íhe company employed 220,000 
employees, of whom 150,000 were based outside France in 120 comunes, and achieved a 
tumover of 31.5 billion euros. 
However, the core businesses of the company are: energy, water, waste services, and 
communicatión, which between them accounted for 75% of revenues and 85% of the 
company's net income in 1999. In water, Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux is the world leader in 
water services, with activities in more than 60 countries around the world, and has 
extensive involvement in the fmancing, design and construction of installations, 
concession management, water conditioning and associated services, as well as water 
resource management. These activities are united in a single integrated división. 
Water is considered to be a major área of potential intemational growth for Suez 
Lyonnaise des Eaux, this being reflected in the fact that during the period 1997-2000, the 
company's strategy was to double its revenue from this business from countries outside of 
France and Belgium. More particularly, the company sees great growth opportunities in 
the Middle East. Its involvement in Jordán is consequently seen as an important stage in 
the development of the company's activities in the región, which have already spread to 
Egypt and Gaza. 
The Parent Company-Subsidiary Relationship 
At the corporate level of the M N C there is a small HR team, which consists of flfteen 
members of staff. These staff are ínvolved in three main áreas of activity. First, a limited 
range of HR functions relating to the recruitment, career management, mobility and 
succession planning of the top slice of 500-1000 sénior executives in the whole 
organisation. Secondly, managing the Corporation's stock options and employee share 
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schemes. Thirdly, institutional relations, partieularly, with social partners - trade unions. 
However, the corporate management is currently having a debate internally about whether 
this last issue is something that should in future be dealt with at the business unit level. 
Apart from the above three key areas of activity, the central corporate HR leaves 
operational HR management décisions to the divisions. Thus, for example, the HR issues 
in the Water Division are dealt with from the Division's head Office at the parent 
Company in Paris. 
The parent Company's Water Division adopts a flexible approach towards the management 
of its overseas opérations within the área of H R M because of a belief that HR policies 
should be, while internationally acceptable, tailored to each country's spécifies. For 
example, the international HR director for Water noted: 
We are a fédération of local businesses operating in quite a sensitive área 
of public services.... Each country and each business unit is specific to its 
local environment. We should not and do not want to change that. What 
we do want is for people to be able to see that the ñame of the parent 
Company stands for certain things and they are consistent Worldwide. We 
don 't want everybody to look the same and everybody to be the same and 
everybody to do the same. Il is this balance between being a local 
community business but bringing everybody to the same standard of 
behaviour and performance - 'think local act global '. 
Accordingly, the Water Division does not apply company-wide HR policies across its 
subsidiarles worldwide. Instead, central direction is limited to a booklet which only détails 
general guidelines. Moreover, subsidiarles have the freedom to decide whether to 
implement thèse guidelines or not. Thus, the HR international director observed that: 
'Our view in the centre is that I manage a global network of HR 
Professionals. I have regional HR directors in 5 or 6 zones in the world 
and they report to me. I don 't care whether they use as guidance whaî we 
use in Argentina, the UK or France. What matters is good professional 
practice and that it Works for the job they are trying to do. I am confident 
that what happens in the UK is up to the standard and 1 know what 
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happens in Argentina is up to the standard. So we have to take what 
works '. 
Consequently, the Water Division insists that its subsidiaries ail over the world apply 
common principies, rather than cornrnon policies, in the following areas: recruitment to 
managerial positions; performance management Systems; training and development; career 
management; succession planning; compensation and benefits; and trade unions relations 
and social partnership. In relation to this, the international HR director noted: 
wouldn't say common policies but consistent policies based upon 
common principies...So what we do in each country may not be always the 
same but the principies that underpin it will be the same and hopefully the 
way in which we apply it will be the same...Thèse things are not optional 
and they have to do them. How they do them should fît with the local 
culture... '. 
According to the international HR director, the MNC's approach too its overseas 
opérations was driven by four main considérations towards the management of its 
international opérations. First, a belief that its business stands for certain values and beliefs 
in the marketplace. Thus, it insists that ail of its operating units Worldwide respect those 
values and beliefs. Secondly, a désire to protëct its commercial image by avoiding the 
mistreatment of its employées. Thirdly, an aim to get a better performance from the 
employées by treating them justly and equitably. Finally, a view that water is a local 
business which touches peoples1 lives in local communities and a related belief that the 
people working in this sector, whether prívate or public, should take pride in serving their 
local communities. 
At the same time, this decentralised approach, embodying, as it did, 'guidance1 rather than 
'prescription', was supported by Systems of Financial control which incorporated the 
settîng up of financial performance targets, such as retum on investment, cost control and 
profits, and the related collation of information from subsidiaries to enable performance 
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against thèse targets to be assessed. Accordingly, the Output of the HR policies adopted by 
the subsidiaries is assessed in terms of the business performance of the subsidiary as a 
whole. 
The Nature and Process of HRM Reform in the Acquired Company 
This section initially examines the changes made to the structure and role of the H R M 
department, including the way in which the various policy initiatives that were developed 
under the function's umbrella. Following this, an examination is provided of the reforms 
in the following areas: Staffing levéis and composition; recruitment and sélection; 
performance appraisal; training and development; rewards; and communication and 
consultation. 
The HRM Function and its Activities 
In the former A G W A civil service régulations were applied. The personnel section head 
was responsible for personnel issues and was assisted by three clerks, who mainly 
performed administrative Jobs. The personnel section head reported to the administration 
manager who, in turn, reported to the administration and finance director, then to the 
A G W A administrator, then to the secretary general and finally to the minister. 
Decision-making was very centralised and everything had to be referred to the Secretary 
General of the Water Authority at the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. Thus, the new 
personnel manager (a former A G W A employée) observed: 'Before we had to refer 
everything to the secretary general, even if we wanted to punish an employée or give him 
permission to drive a car, Tfie administrator only made recommendations to the Secretary 
General '. Similarly, the HR manager (another former A G W A manager) stated that: 
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'There was nothing calleé HR in AGWA befare. There was no health and 
safety, no training, no payroll, and no datábase. The personnel section 
was very weak and it was totally dependent on the centre.' 
When the new management took over H R M became part of the company's overall 
strategic plans and an experienced British sénior director from the parent company, who is 
a member of Water Co's executíve board, was appointed head of the HR división. By 
August 2000, the number of people working in HR had increased from four to eleven, 
personnel and payroll databases had been set up, and a number of sections within the HR 
división had been created covering issues such as health and safety, training, payroll, and 
personnel. 
The managers of these sections reported to the HR manager, who was appointed internally 
to be the line manager in charge of HR, and who, in tum, was Une managed by the HR 
director. However, HR remained locationally centralised in that there were no 
personnel/HR sections on any of the fíve main and 150 smaller sites operated by the 
company. 
In addition to the above changes, a comprehensive employment policy, which 
incorporated a range of new HR policies, was prepared and submitted to WAJ by the HR 
director. The main HR policies covered in this policy íncluded recruitment and selection, 
training and development, performance appraisal, rewards and benefíts. Thus, the HR 
director observed the following: 
'HRM did not exist in the organisation befare privatisation. They didn 't 
have a HR department and HR was not pracüced in AGWA. Thus, it was 
important for me to make the role of HR clear and show the difference 
between personnel and HR, at least in the tasks'. 
The new management argued that it had introduced these changes, only some of which, as 
shall be seen, had been implemented at the time of the research, in order to apply modern 
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HR and because of a belief that HR needed to play a more central role in the organisation. 
Thus, the HR director further observed: 
'These changes were introduced to apply modern HR. We believe HR is an 
important function and had to exist and it didn 't exist... Allyou see now is 
changed, as previously there were only a few administrative tasks, which 
were and still are being done by the personnel department...The role of 
the HR department is to manage the people in the organization to ensure 
that they get the best people in the organisation.' 
However, it needs to be recognised that WAJ, as a condition of the privatisation process, 
imposed a number of conditions about the management of human resources. In particular, 
it required the company to establish an HR división, a computerised personnel/HR 
datábase, and a payroll datábase and to further submit a comprehensive employment 
policy. On the other hand, from the company's point of view, these changes were 
necessary and had to be done in any case. 
An important objective of the new HR policies was to change the culture of the 
organisation, reform the previously bureaucratic system of management and, more 
generally, to enhance the HR Division's contribution to the achievement of organisational 
objectives. Nevertheless, the new management, in recognition that the whole philosophy 
of work in Water Co was different from that typically found in a western company, took 
the view that a relatively gradualist approach to change was required. For example, the HR 
director noted: 
'Our strategy in terms of the organisation is not to try and change 
everything overnight...But we will certainly change the culture of the 
organisation because the culture of this organisation has been a 
bureaucratic civil service culture and we need to make it more customer 
and finance oriented'. 
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At the same time, the new management in Water Co chose to adopt an approach which 
placed an emphasis on developing arrangements that would work in the local context. For 
example, the HR director noted: 
'...// is not feasible to have a single corporate culture between the UK and 
France, so the chances of getting a single corporate culture between 
Jordan and France is less... '. 
Indeed, the HR director considered himself to have the full freedom to apply the policies 
he thought to be suitable to the organisation, as the following quote rurther illustrâtes: 
7 don 't necessarily have to apply the French parent company 's policies 
here in Jordan...In Jordan I apply British policies from my expérience in 
the VK...There isn 't a single policy that exists in the MNC although they 
have certain things and we can rely on the standards if we want to...We 
develop our own policy and clearly il is based on the expériences we 've 
had...' 
The scale of this local discrétion therefore confirmed the points made earlier about how 
the parent approached the control of its subsidiaries, namely through financial Systems 
under which the M N C was primarily concemed to establish budgetary parameters within 
which the HR décisions are taken. The role of the French finance director appointed from 
headquarters in Paris to head the finance division in Water Co illustrated this clearly. 
This finance director, who reported to the executive director and the executive team in 
Jordan, as well as the financial controller at headquarters in Paris, had to prepare monthly 
financial reports utilising standard forms that are used by ail subsidiaries Worldwide. 
Thèse reports include profit and loss, balance sheet and cash flow statements, as well as 
information on such matters as movements in pay, labour costs and numbers employed. 
Furthermore, this department was required to prepare a yearly. budget and quarterly 
updates, along with a médium term plan which showed how management saw the 
company developing over the next four years. 
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In addition to this financial reporting, a continuous dialogue was maintained between the 
finance director and headquarters. For example, the subsidiary's finance director called 
HQ once or twice a week and corporate fmance personnel made annual visits. Thus, the 
financial reporting system that had been set up was basically one that monitored 
performance, not day-to-day management. In fact, financial control was effectively used 
as a substitute for hands on management. 
Consequently, subsidiary managers were left largely free to manage the subsidiary's daily 
operations in the way that they wíshed, providing that everything was covered by an 
approved budget. As a result, the new accounting system at Water Co could be seen to 
support a more decentralised and performance-based approach to management. For 
example, in commenting on the degree of centralisation of the parent company and the 
freedom given to subsidiary managers, the finance director explained the following: 
'The parent company is largely decentralised, even though everything is 
reponed. Apart from the budget, subsidiarles have a lot of power. They 
submit the budget and around it action plans and comments and if they 
are approved, it is OK Then it is up to the subsidiary managers to run the 
day-to-day business of the company. Now if you spend less you are 
rewarded and if you spend more you may be punished for bad 
management, especially if you do not report the excess spending. 
However, if you spend you must explain why because we need to analyse 
this Information and we may have to take these things into account... They 
need to monitor this and monitoring takes place through the monlhly 
reports sent to corporate headquarters ...Everything should be reported to 
headquarters in Paris where it is important. For example, an increase in 
salaries by 15% should be reported because it has big implications'. 
In a similar vein, the intemational HR director commented that: 
'We believe that we are decentralised and we try to behave in a 
decentralised way. 1 would be foolish to say we always succeed but you 
can 't manage the local water supply in López in Bolivia from Paris. We 
believe it is right to adopt a decentralised approach...It is the naturę of 
the business. It is a community business and it is a local business.' 
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However, care must be taken not to exaggeraíe the degree of freedom given in the área of 
HR due to a number of elements that acted to place limitations on how subsidiarles 
exercised this autonomy. For example, the HR policies had to be designed according to 
the general principies and guideíines of the parent company about the management of 
human resources, as shall be seen more clearly in the following sections which discuss the 
changes made in relation to the HR activities. In addition, it seemed likely that some of the 
new HR policies had in reality been developed bilaterally given the responses by the 
intemational HR director at headquarters in Paris, the HR and finance directors in Jordán, 
to interview cards which sought information on the locus of decision-making in respect of 
a number of issues. These responses are detailed in Tables 5.1.a, 5.1.b, and 5.1.c in 
Appendix 5.1. 
The reporting systems and informal Communications between the subsidiary and the 
parent company also acted as a source of constraint on the subsidiary. Thus, while the HR 
director in Water Co stated that there was no direct reporting relationship between the 
corporate HR department and the subsidiary, he did report to the executive director in 
Jordán who, in turn, submitted a monthly report to the chair of the Jordanian company in 
Paris, and maintained almost daily telephone contract with him. 
More specifically, the HR director submitted detailed monthly reports to the executive 
director, which included information on such matters as numbers recruited, number of 
employees retumed to WAJ, training delivered, and health and safety. He also, as shown 
in Table 5.2.b in Appendix 5.2, provided information to a group from corporate 
headquarter that visited Water Co once every year and collected data on overall labour 
costs, labour productivity, and numbers employed. 
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Moreover, this approach towards HR reporting was at the time of the research being 
revised following the appointment of a new international HR director of the Water 
Division. Thus, according to this new director, a new formal reporting System was to be 
introduced at the end of July 2001. In this new reporting System, HR in the subsidiaries 
would report indirectly and quarterly to corporate HR through the regional HR directors. 
In relation to this, the international HR director stated: 
'Currently, there is no formal reporting mechanism, just a quarterly 
summary report. However, I am about to introduce one...At the moment 
they are not required to provide anything other than what we ask for. 
Once I have introduced my formal reporting they will be. Well collect 
basic statistics such as numbers of employées, new hires, leavers, 
movement of the senior population and high potenüals.... These are the 
ones I am interested in.... Then it is the narrative stuff...The information 
will be collected indirectly through the regional HR directors quarterly or 
as andwhen necessary... Standard reporting forms will be used'. 
On the other hand, it seems that while this information had not previously been collected 
by corporate HR, it had been collected by corporate Operations division. This is bome out 
by the responses of the HR and finance directors in Jordan and the international HR 
director to interview cards, which sought information on the collection of data on issues 
relating to the performance of the subsidiary (See Tables 5.2.a, 5.2.b and 5.2.c in 
Appendix 5.2). In broad terms, the responses obtained showed that corporate HR at the 
Water Division collected information on such issues as managerial pay packages, strikes 
and other forms of industrial action, numbers of résignations and numbers recruited, and 
trainmg given. In addition, other HR related information such as overall labour costs, 
numbers employed and labour productivity was collected, by the opérations division, 
through a small group of corporate staff who visited the subsidiaries once a year to collect 
it for benchmarking purposes. 
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In addition to the above, periodic visits were made by corporate staff to monitor the 
performance of expatriâtes and to get a clear picture on the ground of how the subsidiary 
was managed in gênerai. For example, the chair of Water Co, who was based in France, as 
well as other board members, visited the subsidiary every two months to attend board 
meetings. Similarly, the international HR director visited Jordan twice and the HR 
régional director also visited the subsidiary in Jordan in March and May 2001. On 
commenting on thèse visits, the international HR director observed that: 
'...We prefer people from headquarters to go to the ground rather the 
other direction... When Igo visiting some of our business units Igo to see 
how the business is performing, how the individuals are performing, to 
feel how things are working on the ground where I get a much better 
feeling, and to monitor the performance of our expatriâtes and so on. You 
can 't do that sitting here in Paris '. 
Thèse periodic visits also helped in networking and served to pass on and share 
information among the subsidiaries. For example, the HR director observed that: 
'In the job I used to have, I travelled ail over. I might corne to Jordan to 
visit the HR manager after just visiting South Africa, so VU say they've 
just had the same problem and this is what they did. I'U pass on bits of 
information... '. 
Thèse visits were furthermore, supported by regular meetings held by the régional HR 
directors. Thus, régional HR directors met every three months to share information and 
develop policies. Subsequently, HR régional directors visited the subsidiaries every two 
months to transfer the outcome of thèse meetings to the subsidiaries. After thèse visits, HR 
régional directors reported back to corporate HR about the business units in their régions. 
For example, the HR director in the Jordanian subsidiary noted: 
7 don 't attend meetings. Only régional HR directors have regular 
meetings. For example, the HR director in the UK meets wiîh the HR 
director of France andmeet the HR director of the Far East...Buî Iam not 
part of it They share policy initiatives '. 
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Furthermore, the regional HR directors, in addition to submitting a formal report every 
quarter to corporate HR, maintained an almost daily dialogue with corporate HR. Thus, 
the international HR director at the Water Division observed that: 
'There is a formal report every quarter. But we speak everyday Over the 
phone, We speak regularly. For example, almost everyday I speak with the 
HR regional director in Casablanca - we speak regularly '. 
Line Managers and HRM 
As mentioned earlier, decision-making was very centralised before privatisation. After 
privatisation, expatriate managers tried to change this situation by devolving more 
responsibility. For example, the previous personnel manager, who formerly worked for the 
HR director, used to send bundles of paper to the general manager everyday for signature, 
and this practice was stopped. In relation to this, the HR director observed: 
'After a few days I was sending all forms in Arabie back to the personnel 
manager for things such as one employée needed a holiday. So ï said I 
don 7 want to see this to the manager, you deal with it '. 
Similarly, in the finance area, the création of a more performance-based accounting 
System was designed to support more decentralised management by encouraging the 
empowerment and accountability of individual managers. For example, the finance 
director noted: 
'The décision making process was extremely centralised especially in the 
area of finance and there was no délégation at ail as everything was 
reported to WAJ headquarters for décisions. People are not used to taking 
responsibility nor taking action. We made some changes such as more 
délégation, more freedom, more flexibility and the ability to take action 
faster. We train people to take responsibility, at least to be authorised to 
make some mistakes, to act and to be forgiven if small mistakes happen 
but to act ', 
However, despite the desire to devolve authority and decentralise decision-making, in 
terms of HR, by August 2000, the devolution of authority to managers was still limited. 
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This is borne out by the responses of the HR director to interview cards which sought 
information on the changes of responsibility and authority of line managers in relation to a 
number of issues. The fmdings are detailed in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. 
Table 5.1 The Degree of Change in the Responsibility in Line Managers Rôle 
* Area of change The deeree o f change 
Control of absence 'More control. The responsibility 
hasn't changed but we forced them to 
do it more than they did before'. 
Discipline of subordinates Yes 
Appraisal of subordinates Tt is not introduced yet for everybody'. 
Communication with subordinates 'It hasn't changed formally. They don't 
formally communicate on our behalf. 
We send notices out to employees. We 
haven't really cascaded the systcm. 
We've communicated the policies 
ourselves. The supervisors are not 
trained yet and until we get a good 
management supervisory training, I 
think we have to do that ourselves'. 
Training of subordinates No 
Recruitment No 
Planning manpower requirements No 
Paying attention to budgets 'Yes. We started training them on that1. 
Control of costs Yes 
As can be seen from Table 5.1, no change had been introduced in a number of áreas in 
terms of the responsibility given to line managers. Thus, Table 5.1 shows that line 
managers had been given more responsibility only with regard to paying more attention to 
budgets, and Controlling and reporting on absence more formally and regularly. 
In addition, as can also be seen from Table 5.2, the Supervisors' authority to make final 
décisions in relation to a number of issues followed a rather similar path. Thus, Table 5.2 
below shows that no changes had been introduced in a number of areas regarding the 
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authority of line managers to make final décisions except for deciding the level of bonus 
paid to their subordinates, and conducting investigations concerning disciplinara issues. 
Table 5.2 Supervisors Authority to Make Final Décisions 
fc . ' HR/Persounel Issues -• A " ~r* Authority toirnakefinafdecisions -;rV*ri r , ^ 
Taking on people who work for them No 
Deciding on pay rises for people who 
work for them 
No 
Dismissing workers for 
unsatisfactory performance 
No. 
Attend ance/Absence 'They don't have any influence, but 
they should repon i f . 
Disciplinary issues 'Yes. They conduct the investigation 
but décisions are not taken by them. 
They report to senior line managers'. 
Other HR/Personnel issues 'Yes. Bonus, as they decide the level of 
bonus pay of their subordínales'. 
With regards to the relative amount of small change that the above responses indícate, this 
appeared to reflect the organisation's gradualist approach to change and two further 
considerations. First, an awareness that local line managers were not yet used to more 
westem ways of working whereby people at lower levéis are allowed to make decisions. 
Secondly, a belief that line managers first needed to be trained in people management 
skills. Thus, the HR director explained: 
"Diere is more delegation than befare. We haven 't solved many issues as 
there is still too much centralised decision-making and we haven 't 
managed to empower the people as much as we would liked to have 
done... We devolved on a minor scale so far, and we'll devolve further in 
the future. It is good to allow supervisors to have input but we have to 
train them first. That's the problem because we haven't trained 
supervisors yet as we concentrated on the vital training issues...None of 
the supervisors have been trained in people management skills. We want 
to introduce it but absolutely none has been done yet. Thisyear we have to 
concéntrate on the management and supervisors training.' 
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Nevertheless, the three line department managers interviewed considered that their 
responsibilities had, in general, increased. More speciñcally, they did consider that they 
had more responsibilities in the following six áreas. First, the training of their 
subordinates, because they now identified the training needs of their subordinates and 
could recommend training for them. Secondly, the use of performance appraisal to 
determine the bonus pay, which was seen to involve more risk and responsibility since, in 
the past, the appraisal was only a formality and was not linked to pay. Thirdly, recruitment 
and selection because departmental managers could now be part of selection committees. 
Fourthly, paying attention to the budget and the control of costs, as now the managers 
were required to estímate the relevant costs in order to draw up each division's budget. 
Fifthly, planning staff requirements because managers were now involved in determiníng 
their staffing needs and were able to suggest ways to increase or decrease the numbers of 
staff required. Finally, communication as a result of the need, following the holding of 
regular meetings with sénior management, to subsequently relay the outcomes of such 
meetings to their subordinates. 
This sense of increased accountability and responsibility on the part of line managers also 
seemed to have been accompanied by a greater degree of self-confidence and a reduced 
fear of making mistakes. For example, the project manager stated: 
'Now there is accountability. Now you are given a job and if you do not 
perform you are questioned and there is an evaluation of the work. We 
were also given self-confidence as now we work without fear. Before, if 
you made a mistake, then this was considered unsatisfactory and you were 
punished. Now we are not punished directly and we are asked about the 
reasons for the unsatisfactory performance... We didn't have the authority 
that we have now. Now we discuss and share in decisions. Now we discuss 
the decisions andgive them to the director and sometimes I sign instead of 
the director. 
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Stafjlng Levéis and Composition 
Under the terms of the management contract, three different categories of staff were 
identified: the management staff; the existing staff; and the newly employed staff. 
Subsequent developments in relation to each of the three categories are outlined below. 
Management Staff 
Following the award of the management contract to Water Co, a board of directors was 
formed and a Frenen director, who is based at the M N C ' s headquarters in Paris, was made 
chair of it. Subsequently, in the period following the takeover, some restructuring of the 
organisation took place. This restructuring entailed the creation or amalgamation of some 
divisions in the company, which increased the number of divisions and the levéis of 
management from five to six and four to five respectively. 
Expatríate managers were appointed to head the new divisions and form an executive 
board responsible for the day-to-day management of operations. More specifically, the 
executive board consisted of three British directors: the executive director, the HR director 
and the technical director, two French directors: the fínance and the customer services 
directors, one Germán director responsible for operations, and two Jordanian sénior 
managers, namely the deputy executive director (former A G W A administrator) and Zai 
División director (former A G W A sénior manager). 
More generally, a total of 50-60 expatríales were appointed. Six of these, each of them 
directors, were appointed for periods of between two and four years. As to the remainder, 
some of the middle management positions were for more than one year, and the rest 
(around 40) were short-term appointments of between one to three months, These short-
term expatríales were experts and specialists who were used to solve specific problems 
141 
relating to such technical matters as the opération of the treatment works, and the storage 
of water in the canal, and to deliver training. For example, some consultants were 
appointed for two months to provide advice on crisis management, while others, like 
health and safety experts, were brought in to deliver training in the company. 
This policy of using expatriâtes was seen to stem from two considérations. First, assigning 
expatriâtes to subsidiaries was considered to be the quickest and most effective way to 
transfer know-how and develop local people to the standards that the parent company 
believed to be appropriate. Secondly, because of the verbal culture of the parent company 
and its rehance on *socialised staff rather than formai wrirten instructions. 
More specifically, according to the international HR director, in the case of a true 
concession contract in a major city, the parent company would typically put in a team of 
30-40 expatriâtes for the first twelve months, including some lower level staff, such as 
supervisors. Then gradually the number of expatriâtes would be reduced, so that, in the 
second year, ten or fifteen expatriâtes would be withdrawn and by the end of the third or 
fourth year, the number of expatriâtes might have been reduced to a dozen or so. Thus, 
the international HR director noted: 
'Now the ones who have gone would be replaced by local people and little 
by little we reduce the number because what we are really is our "savoir 
faire " - our knowledge, competency and skills and il is in our interest to 
transfer that knowledge..., When we started in Jordan we put in around a 
dozen of expatriâtes... Now there are 3 or 4 left today and most of the 
ones who have left have been replaced either by a local or by new hires '. 
On the other hand, at Water Co, some of the expatriâtes were appointed as a resuit of 
contractual requirements laid down by the Jordanian govemment which specified that 
expatriâtes should occupy ail key management positions - requirements that reflected a 
récognition that the organisation lacked much needed technical and managerial skills. 
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Indeed, in assessing bids to undertake the contract, the government allocated a large 
number of the points on the basis of the curriculurn vitas of proposed expatríate 
appointments. For example, the HR director noted: 
'It was a government condition to use expatríate managers. A large 
number of the points of the bid were awarded on the quality of the CVs of 
the experts who would come here. In fact 50% of the marks were awarded 
on that. So the bid said you musí bring in expatriates and key positions 
had to be filled by expatriates. So the parent company had to gather CVs 
for each ofthese key Jobs and put them as parí of the bid and they were 
assessed as to the quality. And based on that the MNC was awarded points 
as well as competitors and we got the most points overall and the CVs 
contributed50% to thosepoints. It is a very importantfactor'. 
It should also be noted that although the government wanted sénior positions to be fílled 
with expatriates, at the same time, it was also imposing conditions about the eventual 
substitution of those expatriates by local managers. As will be seen in the training and 
development section, this process of developing staff had been occurring. However, in 
negotiations with the company, it was agreed that three of the expatríate directors would 
be replaced after a two-year period. This, to some extent, reflected the company* s concern 
about the costs of using expatriates, but more importantly, reflected the significant role 
played by a local HR director in the process of change management. Thus, the 
international HR director stated: 
'...At the beginning when we wanted to very quickly put in place policies, 
procedures and progress it was quicker to achieve this by appointing an 
expatríate HR director. But it comes to a point in time when you need 
local culture and the local knowledge, particularly in the process of 
change management - you need a local particularly in HR'. 
Existing staff 
When the operator took over there were around 1600 employees. This workforce 
comprised of a combination of permanent employees, those people who had been 
employed under civil service terms and conditions, and a group of daily workers, who as 
143 
the term implies, were people hired on a casual daily basis. Developments in relation to 
thèse différent catégories of staff varied. 
With regard to the permanent employées, under the terms of the contract, the Operator was 
obliged to retain at least 50% of the A G W A ' s existing workforce on a secondment basis 
for four years. These were to be seconded to the Operator under Article 63 of the 1998 
civil service régulations. As to the remainder, thèse were to be returned to A G W A 
periodically on an annual basis. With regard to daily workers, initially they were to resign 
frorn W A J and then be employed immediately by the Operator. However, as a resuit of 
some difficulties with their health insurance arrangements, it was later agreed that they 
would also remain as WAJ employées, but work for the new Company. Consequently, 
under thèse arrangements the Operator was unable to dismiss any of the staff. Furthermore, 
because of the seconded nature of their employment, the Company was restricted in its 
ability to promote daily workers to become permanent employées. Thus, the HR director 
explained the following: 
Under the contract we cannot dismiss any employée even daily workers at 
the moment. What we can do is, if we don't want an employée we send 
that employée to WAJ and WAJ decides what to do with him. They hâve 
adopted an early retirement programme. They haven 't had any dismissals 
because the people who were sent back were moved to other parts of 
WAJ... We still have daily workers but may be we 'Il be tied on what we 're 
going to do with that. I don 't think we 11 be able to promote daily workers 
to become regular employées. WAJ will not allow us to do that '. 
Within the first month of its opérations, the Operator had to decide quickly on the 
employées it wanted to retum to WAJ. Thus, initial Screening of existing employées was 
conducted and employées were selected for retum to WAJ on the basis of their 
qualifications, age, and interviews. In addition, according to the W A J director of the 
management contract, the Company during this process, more generally, decided to mostly 
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retain young employées, as thèse were considered to be easier to train and less likely to 
leave because of retirement. 
By the end of August 1999, the Company had sent back around 130 employées. 
Subsequently, the Operator negotiated with the govemment to send the employées back on 
a quarterly basis, and by September 2000, the number of employées had fallen to 1200. 
This number comprised 800 permanent full-time regulär employées and 400 daily 
workers. This réduction reflected Water Co.'s désire to reach international^ accepted 
level of Staffing - as well as the govemment's and the World Bank's expectations. The 
following quote by the HR director demonstrates this: 
'Clearly we 're going îo need less employées than they did, this is part of 
our strategy which is also part of WAJ's strategy. They want the level of 
employment for the industry to be normal and right, as there are fairly 
solid figures about how many people you need to employ in the water 
industry. Based on the number of connections, we estimate there were 
twice many people in AGWA as we would employ. ' 
The issue of how many people to dismiss or retain in the Company was nevertheless 
problematic. Thus, on the one hand, there weren't any great financial incentives to reduce 
the number of employées, as the Company would only get a small bonus per employée sent 
back, which amounted to 5% of his/her salary (average salary 200 JD per month) in the 
first year. On the other hand, by retaining existing staff, there was a possibility that the 
Company might get better standards of service, particularly if it trained more people to a 
higher standard. 
The relative strengths of the arguments for and against reducing staff numbers were 
therefore extensively debated. In the event, the view was taken that, given the longer-term 
objectives of the Company, staff numbers should continue to be eut. Furthermore, the HR 
director stated that: 
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'In reaiity we know that the right thing to do is to reduce the Company to 
the optimum level. That is what we're going to do regardless of what 
financiai incentives exist. That 's what we 're here for and if this contract is 
going to be a success that 's what people are going to look for... '. 
In June 2000, however, a new govemment came to power and a new Minister of Water 
and Irrigation was appointed. He decided that the return of employées had to stop and that 
Water Co had to find a way to downsize by more commercial methods. So if Water Co 
needed to reduce any further, they would have to find a way of losing those employées. 
This view was later confirmed by the HR manager who noted: 
'When the govemment changea and the new minister came he stopped the 
transfer of employées to WAJ every three months. He even refuses to take 
anybody back annually. Before, we could send people back but the new 
minister said no one can go back, neither yearly nor quarterly'. 
This inevitably raised the question of what to do about the remaining employées and how 
to continue to reduce staff numbers. A number of options to achieve a continued réduction 
in staff were therefore explored, such as the introduction of an early retirement scheme 
and the design of a redundancy scheme. However, no final décision on thèse could be 
taken as negotiations were continuing between the govemment and the Company about 
what to do. As a resuit, during this period, Water Co had to find ways to effectively utilise 
those people whom they couldn't send back to WAJ. It consequently had to consider 
undesired alternatives, such as the replacement of subcontractors with their own staff until 
an agreement was reached. 
This inability to return the employées to WAJ had important implications for the 
company's ability to recruit new employées to bring in much needed skills. For example, 
the opérations director noted: '...Due to the government's restrictions we were unable to 
recruit many of the needed staff. Thus, according to the HR manager, the company's 
target number of employées by the end of 2001 was to be 1336 employées. This consisted 
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of the number of people who should have been sent to WAJ plus the new recruits with 
much needed skills. As a resuit, the company had to recruit fewer new employées, and the 
number of employées by mid-August 2001 felJ short of the target number, as can be seen 
in Table 5.3 which provides a summary of the composition of staff. In relation to this, the 
HR manager stated: 'We were expecting to appoint new people. However, many of the 
employées were temporary and many were appointed through the contractors and they 
were not subject to the contract agreement '. 
Table 5.3 Staff Composition: July 2000 - July 2001 
" YmdMooZ ™:"r~ 
Permanent / Seconded 863 827 
Daily Workers/ Seconded 360 338 
Full-time company 
contracts 57 94 
Total 1280 1259 
Temporary employees 64 57 
Another implication of the inability to return staff to WAJ was a decrease in the level of 
bonus paid to the employees. This was because the average percentage of bonus set to be 
payable each year was based on the expected reduction in the number of employees. 
Consequently, as many employees who should have been returned to WAJ continued to be 
on the pay bill of the company, the average percentage of bonus paid in the second year 
decreased from 11.4% in the first year to 9.8% in the second, rather than increasing, as 
planned, to 13.3%. 
The returnees' problem remained unresolved for a year as WAJ continued to refuse to take 
back any returnees, except for a few individual cases where the seconded employees 
requested to return to W A J for personal reasons. Eventually, however, the problem was 
resolved when a new Minister of Water and Irrigation was appointed in June 2001 and he 
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approved the return of the seconded employées annually according to the contract. Thus 
the HR manager stated in interview in August 2001 : 
'Now the new minister has allowed the return of the employées according 
to the contract as he is not willing to breach the contact. Ne allowed it 
annually according to the contract. But this will be done according to a 
mémorandum of understanding, which the minister suggested in order to 
solve ail the hanging problems and issues. Thèse problems include the 
returnees, the bonus scheme, the overtime pay, the organisational 
structure, changes in the contract and many other issues. The 
mémorandum has not been prepared yeî. We had a meeting with the new 
minister and he said that we want to solve ail of our hanging problems 
through a mémorandum of understanding and accordingly we shall 
continue our work according to the contract. ' 
Newly Recruited Staff 
By August 2000, the operator had employed 60 new employées on fixed-term contraéis 
and another 32 'short-term' temporary staff. Those appointed included engineers, 
professional managers and specialists, such as a procurement manager, a training manager 
and a customer services manager. In addition, the company also employed a number of 
outside contractors and leased cars with their drivers. 
The new staff were appointed to fill vacancies created by the new organisational structure 
and, more generally, to address identifïed weaknesses in the organisation's existing skills 
base. However, their recruitment, at a time when staff were being returned to WAJ, 
created political problems with the government. In particular, the company faced problems 
conceming the use of temporary workers on fixed contracts. 
WAJ was hésitant about too greater use of such contracts because it was perceived to be 
circumventing the role of WAJ employées in filling vacant posts. Indeed, WAJ argued that 
the company didn't have the right to make such appointments, as the use of temporary 
workers was not included within the terms of the management contract. 
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At the time of the research, the company was unhappy about these restrictions including 
the appointment of fixed-term staff only for a máximum period of four years - until the 
end of the four-year management contract. This unhappiness reflected the concern about 
losing valuable new members of staff. For example, the HR director observed that: 
'According to the contract, these people have to leave. For example, I 
have employed a training manager. He has been here for 6-7 months and 
he is on a four-year contract and at the end of the contract he knows he 
has to leave, unless changes take place in the contract between now and 
then. We are trying to convince WAJ that this is not a goodpolicy because 
we are going to lose the best people and the organisation mil suffer 
because of the fixed term contract.' 
Against this background, in the second year of the contract, the company proposed some 
amendments to the recruitment and staffing policy. More specifically, and according to the 
HR manager, the new management sought to negotiate with WAJ the freedom to recruit 
and dismiss employees without its prior approval, and the ability to haye temporary 
recruits. However, it was adopting a cautious approach in these negotiations since it did 
not wish to push the issue to the point where it threatened its broader business objectives 
in the country and the región in general. 
Eventually, in February 2001, WAJ did approve the appointment of temporary employees. 
In relation to this the HR manager said: 'WAJ has sent us an official letter in February 
2001, after the negotiations, informing us that they have approved the use of temporary 
employees on the condition that the salary of each employee should not exceed 250 JD per 
month'. He further added that until 2001 the company had in total employed around sixty 
temporary workers on contraéis that were renewed every two months and that some of 
these workers had been with the company for two years. 
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Further developments with regards to the recruitment and selection of new staff included 
the appointment, in December 2000, of eight potential managers who were to be trained 
and prepared to become the second generation of managers in the company. These 
managers were selected on the basis of interviews, presentations and group exercises held 
at the company's assessment centre. This approach corresponded to some extent with the 
parent company's common principies on recruitment and selection as, according to the 
intemational HR director, the parent company insists that, when recruiting at the local 
level for managerial or professional positions, the recruits should be young people with 
potential and speak at least three íanguages. These high potentials should be trained and 
developed and should be incorporated in each business unit's formal succession plan, 
which should be prepared for at least the top three layers of management in the 
organisation. 
Recruitment and Selection 
Prior to privatisation, recruitment was centralised and conducted through the civil service 
office. Applications were made to the Water Authority, which then sent them to the civil 
service office. Subsequently, candidates were sent to A G W A to be interviewed, and where 
appropriate, to undergo written and practical tests. A committee that consisted of a civil 
service representan ve, the administrative assistant manager, the personnel section head 
and a specialised person from the department would conduct the interviews and select the 
candidates, and then made recommendations to the secretary general for approval by him 
or the Minister of Water and Irrigation. 
After privatisation, the operator became, as already mentioned, responsible for the 
employment of new staff. Under the new arrangements, the company tried to recruit the 
types of employees it considered appropriate to the jobs to be carried out. The main 
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criteria used when recruiting new employées were their educational qualifications, 
expérience and personaî qualities. Under such criteria, the appointments were now to be 
made on the basis of ability, rather than, as was previously the case before privatisation, 
connections or cronyism - "Wasta" Indeed, this was one of the reasons why the 
government wanted to appoint an expatriate HR director. Thus, the HR manager noted: 
'...The major policy change is that the righî person is appointée in the rightplace. Wasta 
has been reduced. ' 
By August 2000, only new posts had job descriptions, as job descriptions did not exist 
before in the organisation. Existing posts continued not to have job descriptions because 
the HR director preferred to see how the jobs should be done first. Thus, the HR director 
noted: 
'Personally, I have a debate with myself about job description. I am not 
really ail that keen on job description. But to do the appraisal System you 
have to know what your duties are, so it has to be done. I shall not be 
trying too hard in the early days to improve job descriptions. ï'd rather 
look and see how the job should be done, rather than currently what they 
are doing at the moment. ' 
In August 2001 the HR manager was in the process of preparing job descriptions for the 
HR division based on instructions from the executive director. Job descriptions for the rest 
of the organisation were to follow at a later date, subject to further instructions from the 
executive director. It should be noted, however, that according to the HR and training 
managers, the company was required to prépare job descriptions for ail the jobs as a resuit 
of a request from the World Bank's and WAJ's auditor, who reviewed the company in 
May 2001. In relation to this, the training manager stated: 'The auditor, who speaks in the 
name of WAJ, requested the job descriptions '. This was confirmed by the HR manager, 
who was also présent during the interview with the training manager. Thus, the HR 
manager added: 
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'In iîs proposai the parent company said that it would provide job 
descriptions. Thus, the auditor referred to the technical proposai and he 
concentrated on this point because it was included in the proposai and 
therefore it became part of the contract. So when he came this year he 
concentrated on it '. 
In terms of new posts, a spécial form had to be filled in by the concemed director and sent 
to the HR department which, in turn, made comments on whether the budget allowed for 
the appointment and whether the proposed appointment was sensible and then sent it to the 
executive director to make the final décision on whether to recruit someone for a new post 
or not. This action was felt to be necessary because of the political sensitivity of the issue 
and the need to avoid future confrontation with WAJ. 
The HR department was not involved in the sélection process until April 2001, when a 
new procédure was implemented, under which a committee headed by the relevant 
department manager or director and a représentative from HR interviewed and selected the 
candidate jointly. However, it needs to be recognised that in applying this new system the 
company had to take cognisance of some contractual requirements. First, under the terms 
of the contract, the recruitment of the new staff and the terms on which they were 
employed had to be approved by WAJ. Secondly, the company had to give priority to 
internai recruitment. Thus, to fill needed positions the company had to first try to recruit 
internally from its own staff. Thirdly, i f suitable candidates were not found, it was then 
required to try and acquire them from WAJ - a situation that had led the company to 
sometimes, according to the HR manager, accept candidates from WAJ, even if they were 
not suitable for a particular post. 
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Performance Appraisal 
Prior to privatisation, A G W A used spécial performance appraisal forms which were 
provided by the govemment and were distributed to all govemment departments by the 
civil service office. The appraisal process was also mainly subjective in the sense that it 
did not include targets or agreed objectives and while the outcomes of the appraisal 
process were linked to promotion they were not linked to pay. 
Under this previous system, appraisal was considered to be a formality and managers 
didn't discuss or explain to the employées how they had been rated. For example, the HR 
manager stated: 
'The annual appraisal was done just for the sake of doing appraisal and it 
was also done for promotion purposes. When it is confidential the 
manager can be unfair to the employée. The problem is that managers 
don 't discuss or explain why they gave certain rating to the employées. 
The problem is that the manager puts the rating and doesn 7 care. It is just 
a formality or duty to ful the appraisal form when it was confidential. The 
employée had no right to find out his rating unless it was less than 60%. If 
you were promoted you know thatyou had over 90. ' 
Nevertheless, after privatisation, and as part of the management contract conditions, the 
company was required to continue to use the govemment's appraisal scheme and to submit 
thèse appraisals to WAJ. However, the new management wanted to use its own appraisal 
scheme, which corresponded to its desired standards and criteria. Accordingly, the HR 
director designed a new appraisal scheme for managerial and non-managerial staff. This 
new appraisal scheme was designed for three main purposes, First, to enable training 
needs to be identified. Secondly, to set objectives and review performance against these 
set objectives. Thirdly, to provide a method for linking pay to individual performance. 
The new appraisal scheme was to be open - not confidential - and to be conducted 
annually by the immédiate supervisors. It consisted of one part similar to that of the 
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govemment's scheme in compliance with the contractual agreement, and other parts of the 
one which was applied in the U K headquarters, as there was not a corporate policy for ail 
subsidiaries to follow. In relation to this, the HR director explained the following: 
'There is a group-wide appraisal System which appiies for some of the 
expatriâtes and that 's ail. Tfie appraisal system is being applied 
separately in each subsidiary. lhave prepared mine. ' 
Under the new appraisal scheme, a quarterly performance review was to be carried out for 
the purposes of determining bonus payments based on the employee's performance. At the 
same time, a limit was imposed on the proportion of employées who could receive certain 
levels of bonus, as shown in Table 5.4 below. 
Table 5.4 Performance Grading and Limits 
iLeveï, vf&wUnah x ~*Z.. Pr<tyortiMpfE7ttpioyw 
Top Bonus Top 12.5% 
Mi d die Bonus Next 50% 
Lower Bonus The remainder of those retained by Water Co 
No Bonus Those returned to W A J 
Subsequently, and in the first year of the contract, the new appraisal scheme was applied 
to senior managers. However, as of the end of August 2001, a new and différent appraisal 
scheme was to be implemented not only for senior managers but also for the Company's 
executive directors to measure their performance and détermine their bonus pay. In 
relation to this, the HR manager stated: 
'Now there is a new appraisal form which was given to me by the 
executive director. I think this is because the board insisted on having a 
new appraisal to measure the performance of the senior managers and the 
directors. The previous one was only for senior managers but now the new 
one will be for both senior managers and directors. This appraisal form 
will be implemented at the end of this month (August 2001) '. 
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This corresponded with what was indicated by the intemational HR director regarding the 
importance of applying performance management systems in their operating units. Thus, 
he noted the following: 
'In the área of remuneration and compensation we also have some actions 
that we manage from here and that is particularly for the management 
team in our operating business units where we are now in the process of 
putting in place a more truly results and performance related systems of 
payment, certainly for executives and managers'. 
The situation was.different regarding the appraisal of middle and lower management and 
non-managerial staff, as until September 2001 the new appraisal system had still not been 
implemented. This delay in the implementation of the new appraisal scheme was attributed 
to two main reasons by both the HR and training managers. First, the departure of the 
British director, who was strongly in favour of applying the new appraisal system. 
Secondly, the delay in training of all the supervisors and managers who were to use the 
new system. 
Training and development 
ín the former A G W A there was no training department. What existed was a central 
training centre for the whole of the Water Authority that provided some technical, 
language and computer training. In addition, there was some external training provided by 
local institutes and some staff were provided with an opportunity to undergo training 
overseas. However, the training expenditure was only around £3.00 per employee, and 
overseas training was linked to the availabiíity of extemal fundmg in the form of 
donations and aid from other countries and was limited to a very few sénior managers. 
Thus, the HR manager said: 'almost no training existed in the organisation '. A view later 
confirmed by the training manager. 
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After privatisation, significant changes occurred in the company's training and 
development activities. Thèse are considered below under two headings: subsidiary level 
training and overseas training and networking. 
Subsidiary Level Training 
When Water Co took over the management of the company it had a number of contractual 
obligations relating to staff training and development. Under thèse, in the first year, it was 
obliged to deliver the following: to train 50% of the employées on safety; to train 100% of 
customer service employées; to familiarise ail senior managers with modem European 
management techniques and send them at least once, over the four year period of the 
contract, overseas; to select replacements for the expatríate managers at a very early stage 
and to inform WAJ of the training the replacements would receive; to submit a 
comprehensive training and development plan by the end of the first month of the 
contract; and to submit a monthly report which included détails of ail the training 
provided, such as the number of staff trained, the number of training hours delivered, the 
number and types of training courses provided, the training spending against the budget, 
and the estimated costs and détails of the training to be held in the subséquent months. 
To fulfil its training obligations, Water Co created a training department, appointed a new 
training manager, established a training centre that cost around £11,000 and set up a 
sepárate training budget amounting to, approximately, £84,000 in the first year. As a 
resuit, both the training and HR managers confirmed that training had increased 
dramatically under the new management and that training expenditure had increased from 
£3.00 to £65.00 per employée in the first year. 
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80% of local training consistée! of externa! training delivered by local consultants, and 
20% comprised internai training. Some of the internal training, however, was provided by 
experts and training specialists from overseas, including from the parent Company, in 
relation to this issue the HR director noted: 
'This organisation did no training at ail. Overseas training was limited to 
very senior managers. Ordinary people up to middle management had no 
training at ail. We have done so much training since we came, even that is 
not good enough as it only amounts to one day's training for every 
member of staff. 
The HR director and the HR and training managers reponed that the Company intended to 
provide substantial amounts of training over the four years of the contract. For example, 
référence was made to the intention to introduce an induction process for new employées, 
to develop a fast track programme to train people who were capable of becoming top 
managers in the future, to provide training to ail managers and Supervisors, and provide 
courses on customer service, team working, empowerment, and the parent company's 
culture. Indeed, in the second year of the contract the Company implemented most of thèse 
training programmes. Thus, for example, in February 2001, newly recruited "potential" 
managers underwent a one-year fast track training programme, which included training on 
managerial related skills, such as leadership and flexibility. 
A further change that was reported by the training manager was that a more systematic 
approach was now adopted towards the identification and assessment of training needs, 
with the objectives of providing greater professional development and motivation to the 
employées. Nevertheless, care needs to be taken not to exaggerate the degree to which the 
présent training activities were now strategically oriented because the same training 
manager subsequently went on to observe that: 
'There is no stratégie planning as we take it year by year because Water 
Co. has a four year contract. However, the change will dépend on the 
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performance of the company, which will be evaluated by the auditors in 
August 2000. Water Co. might extend the contract but that will depend on 
their performance.' 
Generaliy speaking, this importance attached to training potentially reflected both 
governmental and company influences. On the one hand, for the government, the training 
of managers and employees was very crucial due to the lack of local managerial expertise 
and a desire that local people should be able to run the company at the end of the contract. 
On the other hand, it appeared that this expansión in Water Co's training activities had, in 
part, stemmed from the parent company's policy on training and development. For 
example, the HR director stated: 
'...Theparent company is very training oriented. We believe that training 
is the success of the organisation and it is going to be a good part of my 
job... Training and development will be a major part of our appraisal 
system. 
This view was conñrmed by the international HR director at the parent company, who 
emphasised the significance of training and development to the parent company. Thus, he 
observed that: 
'We believe in training and development.... Training and development is a 
very important part ofour service offering to our customers because when 
we go to a government or a municipality one of the key things that 
differentiates us is the fací that we do invest heavily particularly in 
operator training, health and safety standards and technical skills'. 
According to the international HR director, the company would therefore nave provided 
the necessary training irrespective of whether it was a condition laid down in the contract 
or not. However, he pointed out that the company would nave invested more in training 
and development in the fields of changing the management's culture and technical training 
if it was a concession and not just a four-year management contract. In relation to this, he 
observed: 
158 
7 would say that we know what we have to do íhrough experience and 
we'll do what we have to do irrespective of whether the contract requires 
it. However, given that Jordán is a four-year contract we wouldn 't have 
done as much as if it was a 20-year concession. We would like to do more 
than what we have done Weprobably have done quite a lot... But in 
terms of customer services and management skills and changing the way 
we do things we would have probably invested more In terms of trxdy 
changing the culture of the organisation to a more customer service 
oriented one, now we are not going as far as we would like because we 
only have four years ahead of it. But if we could, we would have certainly 
gone further than what we have done so far '. 
Overseas Training and Networking 
It was apparent that the company's training activities were not only focussed on the 
provisión of 'technical skills', but also on supporting the broader process of management 
and cultural reform. In pursuit of these objectives, the company sent a number of staff 
overseas for training. For example, the deputy executive director (AGWA former 
administrator) was sent to the U K and France for three months for training. In France he 
was trained at the corporate headquarters and in the U K he worked with British managers 
at the parent company's U K headquarters to see the differences between British, French 
and Jordanian operations. Furthermore, the safety manager was sent to the U K to attend a 
training course for three weeks which contributed towards an international qualification 
and then was sent to the parent company's U K subsidiary for one week's training to see 
what was implemented there and what he could implement in Jordán; two staff members, 
who were not sénior managers, went to the USA, one to attend a training course and 
another to attend a conference; and fíve sénior managers attended an international 
conference held by the parent company at which managers from all the parent's 
subsidiaries met to hear about the company's policies and strategies, and to establish a 
network of contacts within the organisation. 
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The parent company was keen to provide opportunities for managers to establish networks 
for two main purposes. First, networking was seen to contribute to the intégration of the 
MNC's différent units Worldwide. Secondly, to provide channels of communication that 
enhanced the diffusion of important information among the subsidiaries. Thus, the HR 
director in Jordan observed that: 
'One of the things that we build here is a network. So the person who 
replaces me, if he doesn 't know what to do, will know there are people, 
probably in the VK rather than France, because of the language, whom he 
can ask...l wouldn't say that there is any formai intégration. Àny 
intégration tends to be on a personal network basis. I think what the 
parent company encourages more than anything is networking'. 
More generally, the international HR director at the headquarters in Paris noted that 
managerial training was very important for the parent company. In particular, he noted that 
the company always tried to provide training on cultural sensitivity and invested heavily in 
language training and management skills' development, particularly in the context of 
trying to créate and reinforce the parent company's culture. For example, in 2001 the 
parent company's water division ran a programme called the "Global Player1', where thirty 
young potential high fliers from at least twelve différent cultures - a condition that the 
parent company always insisted on when running a training programme - received training 
for three sepárate weeks over a nine-month period. The aim of this programme was to 
créate a network of 'tomorrow's executives'; to impart the parent company's culture and 
its way of doing thmgs; to provide information on the international dimension of the group 
and associated cultural sensitivities; and to improve managerial skills. 
However, although the parent company attached such great importance to training and 
development, in general, it adopted a decentralised approach towards training and 
development. As a resuit, subsidiaries had the main responsibility to train and develop 
their staff and were free to assess, design and implement required training programmes as 
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they saw suitable. This decentralised policy reflected the local nature of the business and 
thus, the need to design programmes spécifie to each country's needs. For example, the 
opérations director observed that: 
'We have a mission and a general policy which states that we have to 
develop and train our staff... There is no precise policy on how to do it but 
the expériences show that we have so many contracts that each contract 
has to consider the local cultures and spécifies '. 
This approach was évident in Water Co.'s freedom to assess, design and implement the 
required training programmes without any direct influence from the parent company. In 
relation to this, the training manager noted: 
"The level of coordination with the training department at the parent is 
very low level. We should have at least four times what we have now. For 
example, once I have asked for some training material officially unàer 
customer care title and I received some material in French so it was no 
use. The other one was by chance when the parent company sent the 
customer director a CD including a training package one for customer 
care and the other for customer focus and he decided that a copy should 
be forwarded to the training manager. So I believe that the coordination 
should be more... '. 
It should be noted, however, that if subsidiarles wished to make use of training at the 
parent company and/or its university in Paris, they had to pay for it out of their own 
budgets. For example, the HR director explained the following: 
"They have available across the group training and there are training 
courses at headquarters. I pay for my people to go and have training in 
the parent company, which has a university in Paris and I can sendpeople 
there. ît is purely choice and Ifî don 't want to use them I don 't. They ring 
me up occasionally and ask me ifî want to put people in. To be honest it is 
very expensive and we have to be very choosy about what we use and what 
we don 't. So it is not a policy across the Group but there is a Group 
training section '. 
Nevertheless, the international HR director indicated that the parent company did play an 
active role in the development of potential high fliers who could ultimately become 
expatríate managers. In relation to this the international HR director noted: 
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Tn terms of management skills we do a lot of it but we are very 
selective...There isn 't a clear Une but you can say that each business unit 
is responsible for re-sourcing or developing its own local talents and 
creating its own new managers and some managers of that population, 
who could go ultimately outside their business units to other countries will 
then particípate in training and development activities at our level at 
headquarters'. 
Rewards 
This section provides an overview of the changes introduced in respect of the pay 
structure. Initially the pay structure before privatisation and the changes made to it are 
outlined. This is follovved by a description of the operational problems faced by the 
company during the implementation of the new arrangements. 
Pay Structure 
In the former A G W A , employees' basic salaries, allowances and benefíts were set by civil 
service regulations and the average salary of an employee was around 200 JD per month. 
In terms of the structure of salaries, this was based on an incremental grading structure 
under which movements up to the grade máximum were acquired on the basis of service. 
Promotion was mainly based on seniority and length of service, followed by qualiñcations 
and performance. However, a promotion could only be made with permission from the 
central management in the Ministry of Water and Irrigation. 
In an effort by the govemment to maintain social justice, faimess and equity among 
employees who would work for the new company and their counterparts in the rest of the 
industry, WAJ imposed conditions in the management contract which hmited the salary 
increases of the seconded employees to 10% and specified that this increase could not be 
Consolidated into the employees' salaries. At the same time, the seconded employees 
would continué to receive their annual increments and allowances from the government. 
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This limit on the size of salary increases created unhappiness within the company. For 
example, the HR director made the following the observation: 
'What it says in the contract is a maximum of 10% increase per employee. 
Tfiis means that even if you want to promote a particular employee vou 
can 't because we can only give 10% and this 10% will be in the form of an 
allowance, it is not consolidated in his salary as he loses this 10% when 
he goes back to WAJ. ' 
As a result of these concerns, the company proposed two revised pay schemes to the 
government and subsequently one of these was approved. Under this scheme, provision 
was made for three forms of bonus: a fixed bonus of 10% to all of the employees, which 
would be dependent on the company's performance and paid monthly; a quarterly variable 
bonus of up to 25%o which depended on an individual's performance as determined by his 
manager; and a fixed monthly bonus for senior managers of 25%-65%. 
According to the HR director, these allowances were proposed in order to motivate 
employees and ensure that equity existed between seconded employees1 salaries, 
particularly senior managers, and those recruited externally from the labour market. 
Nevertheless, the HR director drew attention to remaining problems that existed with 
regard to the maintenance of appropriate relativities between existing and new recruited 
staff: 
'Paying higher salaries to these people is a big difficulty and it is a major 
problem for us... We had to pay them more, so that the average employee 
we brought in is probably paid more than double the average employee in 
the organisation The Water Authority recognized that we had to pay 
higher salaries to attract people on what is really a fixed-term contract 
because after that period is finished, according to the contract... '. 
The new bonus schemes to some extent fell in line with the parent company's common 
principles with regard to compensation and benefits as it insists upon a remuneration 
policy that is results based. At the same time, according to the international HR director, 
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the schemes adopted in Water Co did not fully implement thèse principies because of the 
restrictions placed on them. Thus, the international HR director observed the following: 
Tf we owned the Company in Jordan and they were our employées we 
would certainly treat them differently to the way they are treated 
today... We don 't own the Company and we don 't have a concession. We 
are not truly in control. If we were in control we would certainly change 
some éléments of the rémunération package and would certainly put in 
place a policy that is more results based, where we 'II be offering people 
incentives for achieving improved customer service, improved 
productivity, improved water quality, faster repair time for leaks, and 
faster response time to customers, rather than paying them effectively for 
attendance. We want to pay for results We have a bonus scheme which 
we 've introduced and the évidence suggests that il had some impact and 
had been appreciated but we would still have gone further if we could '. 
In accepting such a scheme in Jordan, the international HR director alluded to the fact that 
the parent Company was responding to two sensitive issues. First, the cultural différences 
that exist between the Arab World and other countries and the conséquent need for the 
parent Company to adopt a graduai approach to implementing its desired policies. 
Secondly, the parent company's wider business objectives of acquiring more business in 
Jordan and the région in general. Thus, the international HR director noted: 
'We have to recognise that our ambition at the end of this four-year 
management contract is to have a füll concession contract. Subsequently, 
we are not going to do everything we want to do immediately. We 'Il give a 
littleprize today and we'll gel a bigger prize tomorrow-we must keep the 
government happy '. 
Rewards: Operational Difficulties 
Initially, according to the company's bonus pay plan, the average variable bonus paid to 
the employées would increase at the end of each year over the four years of the contract 
from 11.4%; to 13.3%; to 16%; and then to 20%. This was based upon the expected 
réduction in the number of employées and the intended improvement in the company's 
performance, as defined in the management contract. In accordance with this plan, 
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employees did, on average, receive an 11.4% bonus in the first year. However, contrary to 
the initial plan, in the second year, due to setbacks in the company's performance the 
bonus was reduced to 9.8%, as noted earlier. 
The decrease in the bonus rate in the second year caused concern and dissatisfaction 
among the employees. It also served to compound discontent with the new individual 
performance-reíated bonus scheme mainly due to the limit put on each rating, which was 
considered to be subjective and unfair. Thus, the personnel manger explained the 
following: 
'....For example, the percentaje of the bonus will be an average of 5% or 
20%. This average is divided by the number of employees, such as fifty 
employees. In practice, it is different as in order to give someone a bonus 
you may deprive another from it. Thus, in order to give someone 20%, the 
percentage for the other employee will be reduced'. 
In response to this dissatisfaction, the company was reviewing its bonus scheme and was 
keen to introduce the proposed new appraisal scheme in order to engender a greater sense 
of fairness into the rewards arrangements. Meanwhile, it was also grappling with problems 
in the areaof overtimepay. 
In the former A G W A , overtime pay was limited to a very small number of employees and 
was mainly given to inspectors. It was also limited to a fixed amount of 20 JD, even if the 
person worked for 100 hours. As a result of this situation and the relatively low pay rate 
more generally, many employees had second jobs outside A G W A . 
Being aware of this situation, overtime pay was seen by the new management to be a very 
important factor that could be used to motivate the employees and genérate their ful] 
commitment to the company by giving them the opportunity to eam more money inside 
the company. Accordingly, Water Co calculated overtime pay as a percentage of the 
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employee's total salary, rather than just the basic salary. In relation to this, the network 
opération manager stated: 
Tn the past people used to work overtime but they would not get paid. 
Now the person who works overtime is paid but I determine who would 
work overtime. The management does not mind and any person I nomínate 
theypay him....Now if anyone works overtime Ipay him but previously in 
WAJI was unable to give anyone overtime pay '. 
However, in February 2001, WAJ officially informed the company that the payment of 
overtime should be changed and paid as a percentage of the basic salary instead of total 
salary. As a resuit, the overtime pay decreased to less than a third of what the company 
was paying, which led employées to refuse to work overtime. This situation was 
explained, as follows, by the Opérations director: 
'Overtime is a very important issue... and I think we implemented a very 
good procédure regarding the overtime. Unfortunately, the govemment 
has changed payment from total salary to basic salary with the resuit that 
overtime payment is very Utile based on the basic salary so our staff are 
getting 240 fils (1/4 of JD) per hour. So nobody, since a couple of months 
ago, is willing or motivated to work overtime so the positive changes are 
being reversed now. This is a very big problem now because we deeply 
dépend on at least some overtime, parîicularly, with regard to water 
network maintenance '. 
Subsequently, the company engaged in negotiations with WAJ to reverse this décision, or 
reach a compromise. Thèse negotiations led the minister to ask for a new overtime 
proposai to be prepared, which was under préparation at the time of the completion of the 
field research. 
Communication and Consultation 
Before privatisation, communication between top management and the employées was 
through the formai management hierarchy and mainly consisted of instructions from the 
top levéis to the lower levéis of the organisation. As a resuit, little opportunity was given 
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to employées to express their views on any matters regarding the organisation and its 
opérations. For example, the HR manager stated: 
'They did not listen to anybody 's opinion about the policies. Central 
management set them and implemented them. They did not consult with or 
îake the employées' opinion into account in anything. In the past the 
employée was a receiver and did not feel that he/she was participating in 
anything '. 
When Water Co took over the management of the company it wanted to communicate its 
policies to the staff through newsletters. However, the company was unable to 
communicate with the staff until this was approved by the council of ministers. To some 
extent, this lack of communication had a négative effect on the employées who were not 
aware of the new managements policy and its impact on them. Thus, the HR director 
observed the following: 
'We have been very bad in communication with our staff, particularly in 
this contract..,WAJ has absolutely stopped us from communicating with 
the staff That means although we have been here since March we didn 'i 
start working actually until 31 July...Wliat we planned to do is to issue 
newsletters to the staff in June...It is clear to the employées that they have 
to work harder and we have reasonable offers to make to them financially. 
But WAJ wouldn 't let us tell them about the changes. It has been agreed 
with WAJ but it has to go to the council of ministers for confirmation. The 
minister said we can't make any announcements about pay until it has 
been approved by the council of ministers. We are getting requests from 
about 40 people who want to go back to WAJ. This is because they don V 
know what is happening, they are in a vacuum. ' 
Steps were subsequently taken to improve communications and employée participation 
through such means as the introduction of e-mail, the launch of regular newsletters, the 
establishment of regular morning meetings between supervisors and staff, the holding of 
meetings between senior managers and employées to discuss customer service problems, 
and the introduction of regular weekly meetings between division directors and 
department managers, and between départaient managers and section heads. For example, 
the health and safety manager stated: 
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'There are periodic meetings for health and safety and there are weekly 
meetings for the departments. Each department has a weekly meeting to 
discuss ail the problems, and this is a policy now. Also there is 
communication between différent departments. If I have relations with 
other departments such as opérations and technical they send me the 
minutes of their meetings and I send them an email. The managers can 
gather their employées and ask them to do thèse tasks....Now 
communication has improved because there is email and it is possible to 
contact any manager and it is officiai. I can also communicate with the 
executive director and I can send a mémo to Zai through the email '. 
In a similar vein, the project manager noted: 
'Now there is new communication by e-mail and now communication is 
better through computers. Now we can communicate horizontally and 
vertically. For example, I can communicate with the chief executive 
directly and send a copy of the e-mail to my director. Before, I couldn V do 
that. We were given the authority to talk and communicate directly and 
openly...Before, there was no communication and we did not have the 
authorities we have now. Now we discuss and share in décisions '. 
For the new management, the establishment and encouragement of open and two-way 
communication at ail levéis in the organisation was not only important to improve 
communication but also to support the cultural change process. Thus, it also formed part 
of the new managements efforts to change the culture of the organisation and ils 
management style from "management by fear" to "management by leadership and 
training", as claimed by the HR director. Moreover, the interviews conducted with 
department managers tended to suggest that they no longer stopped their employées from 
communicating with senior managers and that their employées can now discuss and speak 
openly and freely. For example, the project manager stated: 
'Now I don V stop my employées from going to senior managers while 
before the employée had to go through his/her immédiate supervisor. 
...Now the new director will sit beside me and listen to me and he is more 
friendly. He gives us time and self-confidence and if he can help he will. 
Now this unfair transfer of employées does not exist... Before, the manager 
would not accept criticism. He might say that he has no time and may not 
really pay attention to what you want to say. But the new managers give 
us time, listen and give us responsibility'. 
168 
In a similar vein, the health safety manager noted: 
'Now it is possible to say everylhing. The executive director attends the 
HR meetings because we don 't have a HR director and it is possible to 
discuss and speak frankly about anything and he would accept any 
criticism and he discusses with us ', 
In general, according to the opérations director, the Company provided information to the 
employées on major issues such as changes in the bonus pay, safety issues and work 
quality. However, communication continued to be individually based since no formai 
employée représentation existed in the Company. This point is detailed in the following 
section. 
Trade Unions and Employée Consultation 
In the former A G W A there were no unions, no officiai forms of employée représentation 
and no system of consultation with employées. This was mainly because, by law, 
govemment employées were not allowed to engage in political activity or to join political 
parties. This situation continued after privatisation and appeared likely to continue to do 
so. Thus, the HR director noted: 
'Currently, there is no staff représentation because there are no trade 
unions and no work Councils. There is no représentation ai ail and this is 
what the staff are used to... We have talked about staff représentation and 
employée Councils. Maybe because they don 't even know that such things 
exist, there doesn 't seem to be a need for it because the staff don 't seem to 
want it, particularly nobody has asked for it.... I think ifpus h ed we will be 
Willing to do something along this line and have a staff council. But there 
are no real plans to do so / was advised from the beginning that the 
unions don 't real play a big part or any part in this organisation. I believe 
some people are members of a union but the unions don V represent them 
with this Company or our predecessors. So the unions don 't play a part '. 
It should be noted, however, that the HR director personally expressed his désire to have 
staff représentation because he feit that it was désirable to take the views of the staff into 
considération when writing the policies. Thus, he observed that: 
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'On a personal view not company view, I would like to do it because I am 
not sure of the right policies and without some reaction I would write them 
in the dark. We oflen have gol quite a big margin in terms of what we 
could do without causing any harm to the company. So if there are any 
preferences from staff, why not take them into account? ' 
Conclusión 
This chapter on Water Co sought to detail the changes which had taken place in the área of 
human resources, following its privatisation, and the factors which had influenced them. 
These changes consisted of both major revisions to the structure and role of the human 
resource management function, and considerable reforms in a number of specific áreas of 
human resource practice. 
A new HR división was created and this accorded an enhanced strategic role through the 
appointment of an expatríate sénior HR director who was a member of the executive board 
of the company. As regards the other changes made, these affected each of the specific 
áreas of HR activity investigated: the people management responsibilities of line 
managers; recruitment and selection; staffing; training and development; performance 
appraisal; rewards; and communication and employee participaron. In summary, these 
changes included, among other things, the following: 
• extensive use of both short-term and long-term expatríate appointments, with a number 
of the former being appointed to sénior management positions; 
• action to devolve HR responsibilities to line managers; 
• the establishment of recruitment and selection criteria which stressed the need for 
candidates to possess relevant qualifications and competencies, and facilitated the 
identiñcation of high potentials; 
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• development of a new objectives-based appraisal scheme which encouraged a greater 
emphasis on the identification of training and development needs and was linked to an 
individual performance-related pay system; 
• the raising of salary levéis and the introduction of a variable bonus scheme based on 
company performance; 
• a significant increase in training expenditure and activities that encompassed a much 
greater use of overseas, as well as locally-based, training; and 
• the introduction of better Systems of both upward and downward internai 
communication. 
Thèse reforms were essentially aimed at generating a more efficient and business oriented 
organisation and re-shaping the existing organisâtional culture. However, within thèse 
overall objectives, there were a number of spécifie factors that shaped both the speed and 
the nature of the changes introduced. Thèse factors included the philosophy of the parent 
company, its management style and its general approach towards the management of 
human resources overseas. 
The parent company management style was relatively informai in that it did not entail the 
utilisation of detailed written policies/instructions pertaining to the HR policies and 
practices to be pursued by subsidiaries. Instead, considerable local discrétion was given to 
subsidiarles with regard to the HR policies they developed. However, this autonomy was 
constrained by the use of a number of formal and less formal methods of influence and 
control. For example, in addition to a detailed system of financial monitoring, the 
company specified a number of guiding principies that subsidiaries were expected to 
comply with in such areas as recruitment to managerial positions, performance 
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management, training and development, career management, succession planning, and 
compensation and benefits. 
The role of these guidelines was supported by a number of other mechanisms. These 
mechanisms included the extensive use, on both a long- and short-term basis, of 
expatriates to execute and disseminate central decisions and policies and to inculcate the 
MNC's culture within the subsidiary. They also included regular visits by corporate and 
regional staff, the holding of international seminars, and the despatch of subsidiary 
managers for training at headquarters, and other subsidiaries. 
Nevertheless, both the parent's and the subsidiary's actions were, to a degree, being 
shaped by a number of situational and local influences mainly stemming from government 
policy and regulations, and cultural factors. 
The government exerted a great influence over the management of the company because it 
had to approve all its policies and continuously, in cooperation with the World Bank, 
monitored the performance of the company. It also laid down a number of contractual 
conditions. These included requirements that an HR division be established, that a new 
employment policy be submitted that covered all aspects of human resource management, 
and that a comprehensive training plan be developed within the first month of the contract. 
In addition, the company was required to retain 50% of the existing staff. 
The government also imposed a limit on the salary increases of seconded employees and 
retained the right to approve the recruitment and salaries of new, locally recruited, 
employees. More generally, seconded employees continued to be subject to the civil 
service laws and the company was unable to dismiss them, and instead had to return them 
to WAJ. 
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However, the return of the employées was interrupted by changes of ministers who 
adopted différent policies and views in respect of this issue. This resulted in delays in the 
recruitment of new employées with desired qualifications, the recruitment of temporary 
staff, which initially was not permitted under the contract, and the redeployment of 
unwanted staff. It also, in part, led to a réduction in the level of bonus paid to the 
employées since the numbers of staff exceeded the planned level of staffing. Furthermore, 
WAJ's réduction of the overtime pay premium set by the company led to opposition from 
staff which affected the company's strategy to motívate them through pay. In addition, the 
establishment of better Systems of communication with staff was initially delayed due to 
government restrictions. 
The short-term nature of the management contract also influenced developments by 
encouraging a relatively rapid change process. At the same time, internai problems acted 
to delay the introduction of some of the desired changes. In particular, the departure of the 
expatríate HR director afier two years contributed to a delay in the introduction of the 
proposed appraisal scheme and new job descriptions and delays in providing training to 
line managers led to a limited dévolution of HR responsibilities to them. 
At the same time, it appeared that thèse governmental conditions were the subject of 
ongoing negotiations between the government and the new company. The outcomes of 
thèse were, in tum, influenced by the two parties relative bargaining power. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CEMENT CO 
Introduction 
This chapter reports the second case study, which concems a cément company taken over 
by Lafarge. In terms of organisation, the chapter follows broadly the same format as the 
previous chapter. 
In the first section information is provided on the Jordanian company and the nature of its 
privatisation process. This is followed by an overview of the acquiring French M N C and 
its approach towards the management of subsidiaries. The third section then détails the 
findings obtained from the case study by considering, in turn, the post-privatisation 
changes made in respect of the following issues: the structure and role of the human 
resource (HR) function; staffing levéis and composition; recruitment and sélection; 
performance appraisal; training and development; rewards; and communication and 
consultation. Finally, the key points emerging from the case study are drawn together in 
the concluding section. 
The Privatisation 
Jordan Cernent Factories (JCF) was incorporated in Jordan in 1951. Since that time, its 
main activities, which are based at two production plants, have been the manufacturing, 
production and trading of cernent and its by-products. Until 2001, the company had 
possessed a monopoly over the supply of cernent within Jordan. 
Historically, the Jordanian government and its institutions had owned around 58% of the 
company's capital. In November 1998, however, the Jordanian government sold 33% of 
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its shares to Lafarge and made available for purchase by employées a rurther 2.1% of 
shares. Subsequently, in 1999, the French M N C increased its shareholding to 43% and 
then to 48% in July 2001. In addition, the govemment signed a two-year technical 
agreement with the M N C covering the transfer of know-how; the training of staff; and the 
sharing of expérience through professional exchanges and visits. 
The Acquiring Company 
This section provides background information on the French M N C . Initially the origins, 
activities and size of the company are described. Information is then provided on the way 
in which the company seeks to manage human resources within its subsidiary companies. 
The Company: A Brief Profile 
Lafarge which was founded in France in 1833, is engaged in activities concerned with 
construction materials in a wide range of countries. The company's international growth 
began in 1914, with the opening up of North African markets. Since 1956 it has been 
implementing a strategy of international deveïopment through mergers and acquisitions in 
growth markets. After consolidating its position in the Americas, Cernent Co turned its 
attention to Western Europe in the 1980s and then to Eastem Europe in the 1990s. 
Subsequently, the company moved to expand in the newly emerging markets in Asia. 
Thus, in 1994, the company took a foothold in China and since 1995 it has engaged in 
numerous further acquisitions and joint ventures in the région. 
Cernent Co adopts a matrix structure based on product and area divisions. In 2001, it 
employed around 83,000 people Worldwide, of whom 89.2% were employed outside 
France, and operated in 75 countries through its main divisions: Cernent, Aggregates and 
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Concrète, Roofing, and Gypsum. In the same year, the company generated annual sales of 
13.7 billion euros. 
In 2001, Cernent Co became the world's largest producer of cernent following the 
acquisition of a large cement company in the UK. The cernent division, which represents 
the largest division in the company, accounting for 67% of the group's total assets, boasts 
113 cernent plants and 30 grinding plants in 46 countries. In 2001, the cernent division 
generated 44% of the group's total sales and employed around 50.47% of its staff (41, 832 
employées). 
Currently, the Cernent Division is concentrating on consolidating its positions, with the 
aim of becoming a market leader in terms of growth and profitability. More specifically, 
the company has been seeking new growth opportunités in the Middle East. The acquired 
Jordanian company was therefore seen as a foothold in the Middle East and a base from 
which to expand to other countries in the region. For example, the gênerai manager of 
Jordan Cernent noted: \..In terms of strategie importance, Jordan Cement has high 
importance because it is thefîrst opération in the Middle East. Therefore, it could be the 
basis for market access and further opérations and developments in the area '. Indeed, 
since the acquisition, the parent company has already spread to Morocco and Egypt in the 
M E N A (Middle East and North Africa) region. 
The importance of the Jordanian company was also reflected in the following quote made 
by the Chairman and the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the parent company during his 
visit to Jordan in March 2000: 'Clearly it is in our interest for Jordan to become a centre 
in the region, as things develop over three or four years, some countries aren 't yet open to 
foreign Investment and Jordan will have a role there [when they are openedj '. 
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The Parent Company-Subsidiary Relationship 
The parent company has adopted a management style known as the " Lafarge Way". 
Under this, the organisation seeks to encourage the personal initiative and involvement of 
everyone in the implementation of Group strategy in order to enable people close to where 
problems exist to make the greatest possible contribution to resolving them. At the same 
time, this management philosophy is applied within a relatively centralised business 
structure, due to the parent company's désire to be globally compétitive. 
Although cernent has been traditionally a multi-domestic industry that called for local 
responsiveness and differentiation, globalisation and technological developments have 
pushed the M N C to move to opérate along global lines. The following quote made by the 
senior vice président of HR and intégration at headquarters clearly demónstrate this point: 
'Our strategy is to give autonomy to local businesses because our sector 
has two characteristics. One is that it is a very local one. In addition to 
that, globalisation has a lot of influence in this sector '. 
This was further highlighted by the expatríate general manager of the Jordanian company, 
who observed that: 
'The parent company is structured along both multi-domestic and global 
lines. The cernent industry is mainly a local business. It is something you 
cannot transport, there are barriers...! consider cernent to be more multi-
domestic but because of the nature of the developments and évolution now 
il is becoming more global. ... So cernent is more multi-domestic but 
moving towards global '. 
As a resuit of thèse developments and the désire to be a global player, the parent company 
attaches great importance to the issue of intégration. In terms of HR, this is reflected in a 
fairly prescriptive approach to H R M policies and practices under which company-wide 
HR policies are applied in respect of a number of issues, as the following quote from the 
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senior vice président for human resources and intégration in the Cernent Division at 
corporate headquarters in Paris illustrâtes: 
'The parent company has its own polïcies which represent a kind of a 
frame and the local policies should be developed taking into considération 
this gênerai frame...There are what we call group policies which we try to 
use in ail of the companies...The same policies for everybody in ail the 
subsidiaries...we have a set of policies and we insist mainly on three 
subjects. First, performance management and how to develop people. 
Secondly, a kind leadership profile. Thirdly, internationalisation. The 
other one which is important is learning and developmenî '. 
In a similar vein, the Middle East director for HR related issues noted: 
'We apply the same HR policies on everything. On ail HR related issues 
and on ail other activities such as training and developmenî, etc. There 
are company-wide policies which will apply as much as the local culture 
and the law allows us...We apply the same policies because the parent 
company has its own internai culture - a culture of its own and we aim to 
achieve intégration. This means doing the same everywhere in the world. 
It is part of our culture. Each function should have the same methods of 
doing things, same understandings, and same ejfïciency. ' 
The same interviewée went on to state that the parent company applied the same HR 
policies for three main reasons. First, a belief that they were internationally accepted and 
proven policies. Secondly, a view that the application of measurable and parallel policies 
helped internationalisation and expatriation. Thirdly, a view that the implementation of 
common policies facilitated intégration. 
The reasons behind this désire for intégration were further highlighted by the expatriate 
gênerai manager at the Jordanian company who noted that intégration means 'learning to 
talk the same language' and thus, becoming 'part of the club'. Joining the club would 
allow the subsidiary to benefit from the resources owned by other club members and also 
facilitate benchmarking. 
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This centralised approach to policy is reinforced by a variety of mechanisms that are used 
to support cultural integration. At the most general level, a 'methodological guide' is used 
to intégrate new subsidiaries. Under this, teams from different functional áreas are sent to 
the subsidiary to identify priority actions that have to be undertaken within the first 100 
days. This action programme is, in tum, accompanied by the development of a longer 
term, 2-3 year, programme of actions aimed at making the changes needed to fully 
intégrate the new subsidiary. The phases and tools defined in the guide are based on a 
number of principies, including the importance of showing respect for the Unit's culture 
and of ensuring that all actions and decisions are fully transparent. 
Other activities used to intégrate subsidiaries and créate a common culture include the 
development of training tools, such as 'Meet the Group' seminars which are held by the 
parent company for new managers (see page 197 for details) and the implementation of an 
intranet portal which foster the sharing of experience and the development of working 
methods. 
Against the background of this relatively centralised policy framework, recognition is 
nevertheless accorded to the need and the importance of local responsiveness. This local 
discretion, however, is constrained by strict financial controls and the laying down of 
performance targets, which are used to make comparisons between the different operating 
units worldwide. Such targets included financial indicators, such as operating profit per 
tonne produced; return on investment; overall cost; and productivity. Furthermore, in 
2000, an important concept called Economic Valué Added (EVA) was introduced by the 
parent company as a performance management indicator in order to reward performance, 
encourage the creation of valué over the long term and support greater local autonomy. At 
various levéis of management, E V A is calculated by subtracting the weighted average cost 
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of capital employée! from operating income after tax . Thus, by explicitly comparing 
income with the capital used to generate it, E V A provides managers with an economic 
performance indicator to be taken into account when making décisions. At the same rime, 
the system enables the évaluation of individual managerial performance, both in relation to 
annual targets and multi-year objectives. More specifîcally, the parent Company sets multi-
annual E V A improvement targets for each Division and Business Unit and then assesses 
performance against thèse multi-year targets. 
The Nature and Process of HRM Reform in the Acquired Company 
This section initially examines the changes made to the structure and rôle of the H R M 
department, including the way in which the various policy initiatives that were developed 
under the function's umbrella. Following this, an examination is provided of the reforms 
in the following areas: Staffing levels and composition; recruitment and sélection; 
performance appraisal; training and development; rewards; and communication and 
consultation. 
The HRM Function and its Activities 
Prior to privatisation, the personnel départaient was part of the Administration Division. 
This Division was headed by the Assistant General Manager (AGM) for Administration, 
employed 55 people and consisted of four departments namely, personnel, public 
relations, administration and services, and IT. More specifîcally, the personnel function 
consisted of a personnel department at the company's head office and two personnel 
sections - one at each plant. 
The personnel function was very centralised in that ail personnel related issues were 
effectively performed by the central personnel department at the company's head office. 
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However, the role of the central personnel function was mainly administran've and the 
personnel policies were similar to those of other government departments. In addition, 
personnel had no representation at board level and its participation ¡n planning was very 
weak. In relation to this, the A G M for adrninistration noted: 
'Befare privatisation, it was all centralised and we dealí with personnel 
from the head office. The role of HR was mainly administrative befare 
privatisation.... Our problem was that the personnel function was run as a 
government department. It was just looking after the fües of the employees 
and promotions at the end of theyear'. 
Initially, after privatisation, no real changes were introduced and the existing structure and 
policies, such as those conceming recruitment and selection, performance appraisal, and 
rewards and benefits, remained in place. This situation, in part, reflected the more general 
gradualist approach that the MNC adopted towards the reform of its operations in Jordán, 
which is discussed later in the chapter. It also, however, reflected three other 
considerations. First, a desire to only introduce reforms after an appropriate management 
infrastructure had been developed. Secondly, a recognition that cultural change is a slow 
process and thirdly, and relatedly, a felt need to adequately prepare employees for change. 
For example, the Middle East director for HR related issues stated: 
Tn the HR domain, we need to implement changes...But first we musí 
prepare the infrastructure .... With a well established company operating 
for almostfifty yearsyou cannot make change over night...So it takes time 
in the parent company 's culture to start and implement the change process 
because we do not want the individuáis and employees to suffer as a result 
ofthe changes which are going to be conducted within the company.' 
Gradually, however, the momentum of reform started to accelerate as a result of a number 
of factors - an HR audit that was conducted in February 1999 by the parent company, the 
appointment of a Middle East director for HR related issues, and the creation of a change 
project known as the JCF Horizon 2001 project (for more details see pages 173 & 181). 
Thus, between them, these developments led to a series of recommendations for reform in 
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the área of H R M . In particular, a range of new HR policies and procédures were 
proposed. Thèse policies included the establishment of a new career management and 
succession planning System, the implementation of revised job descriptions and a new job 
évaluation scheme, and the development of improved policies relating to performance 
appraisal, recruitment and sélection, and training and development. 
Thèse new policies were applied, as of 1 January 2001, in parallel with the implementation 
of a new organisational structure. Under this structure, a new HR division was created -
the "HR and Administration Division" - which was led by an HR and Administration Vice 
Président (HR & Admin/VP), who reported to the General Manager. Furthermore, HR 
gained greater stratégie importance and became part of the company's overall stratégie 
planning process. Thus, the HR and Admin/VP became a member of the higher 
management committee which was established to run the company and whose other 
members consisted of the General Manager and ail Divisions heads. In relation to this, the 
HR & Admin/VP noted: 
'Now HR has a stratégie role. Now there is délégation of power and we 
consider this to be stratégie. In the committee we discuss things like how 
to deal with the unions, the annual appraisal, the bonus System and any 
change in thèse is taken by the committee... Now the concentration on HR 
has increased and HR has become the first priority of the company. For 
example, now there is concentration on HR more than production or 
technical issues and HR has become more essential than other things '. 
Subsequently, by August 2001, the HR and administration division came to consist of four 
departments: compensation; career management; skills development; and administration 
and reporting, and employed 39 people. Although this represented a staff réduction, in the 
company's view it was consistent with the according of a greater stratégie priority to HR 
because of the employment of more specialist rather than clerical staff. In addition, some 
of the HR fonction's responsibilities regarding 'non-cadre employées' were decentralised 
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to the HR sections at the plant level. Thèse sections kept ail personnel files on non-cadre 
employées and dealt with HR issues relating to such matters as leave and attendance 
reports, promotion below managerial level, and the annual appraisal of such staff. 
Thèse reforms were introduced to facilitate the intégration of Jordan Cernent into the 
parent company's Group and were centrally driven in accordance with the parent 
company's approach detailed above. For example, the Middle East director for HR related 
issues stated that: 
'...We are going to apply the same policies on everything. On ail HR 
related issues and on ail other acîivities such as training and development, 
etc. there are company-wide policies which we will apply in Jordan as 
much as the local culture and the law allows us...Tltepolicies in Jordan 
will be similar to ail other subsidiaries '. 
This view was confirmed by the HR and Admin VP , who in discussing the current 
development of new human resources policies, observed that he expected '90% to corne 
front them '. 
However, the parent company's involvement in HR was found to be stronger in some 
areas than in others. This was évident by the responses given by the senior vice président 
of HR and intégration in Paris, as well as the General Manager, the HR and Admin VP, 
and the A G M for finance in Jordan, to interview cards which sought information on the 
allocation of decision-making responsibilities in respect of a number of issues. Thèse 
responses are detailed in Tables 6.1.a, 6.1.b, 6.1.c and 6.1.d in Appendix 6.1. 
In addition to company-wide policies, the influence of the parent company was further 
supported via the establishment of direct reporting Systems. Hence, local HR submitted 
standardised monthïy reports to corporate HR covering a range of issues. This was borne 
out by the responses obtained from the senior vice président of HR and intégration in 
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Paris, and the General Manager, the HR and Admin V P and A G M for finance in Jordan to 
interview cards that sought information on the collection of data on issues relating to the 
performance of the subsidiaries. Thus, the responses obtained, which are detailed in 
Tables 6.2.a, 6.2.b, 6.2.c and 6.2.d in Appendix 6.2 suggest, albeit with some variations 
between respondents, that corporate HR collected information on such issues as 
movements in rates of pay, managerial pay packages at high managerial levels, overall 
labour costs, strikes and other forms of industrial action, numbers employed, nurnbers of 
résignations, numbers recruited, labour productivity, accidents and injuries, and training 
received. 
The interviewées also suggested that this information was collected for three main 
purposes: As part of the évaluation of the performance of business unit managers; as part 
of the évaluation of the performance of the human resource function; and to make 
comparisons between operating sites. 
The parent Company also collected HR related issues through the "HR Reviews" that were 
held annually. The significance and rôle of the HR review was highlighted and explained 
by the Middle East director for HR related issues, who noted that: 
'...For every country we have separate HR review sessions once a year. 
HR plans are préparée, by the operating units and with the HR at the 
Corporate Head Office it is discussed in a meeting with the regional 
director or the regional président... The country prépares an HR report 
and in this HR report you have a SWOT analysis and then you have the 
HR priorities, which are going to be parallel with the stratégie priorities 
of the operating unit. And then you have tratning programmes and 
succession plans for the operating unit... and then of course if you want to 
bring expatriâtes or send people abroad thèse are also discussed and then 
ail the central HR merges ail thèse HR plans from ail the countries and 
they make Lafarge central HR plan... '. 
Furthermore, according to the HR and Admin VP, and the training manager, annual audits 
of all functions, including HR, were conducted by parent Company staff. It was also noted 
184 
that during thèse audits corporate HR staff interviewed the company's managers and 
collected information on them. In relation to this, the training manager noted: 
'They make audits on continuons basis and there are continuous 
Visits...They have a list with the names of the managers. The HR people 
from the parent Company interviewed the managers in the Company many 
times. During the acquisition, some managers from HR from the parent 
Company came from Paris and they interviewed ail the managers starting 
from department managers and above and they took an idea aboui each 
one of them and they recommended some things. They also have the CVs 
of each of thèse managers '. 
In addition to the above, continuous visits to and from corporate headquarters, 
conférences, seminars and meetings were also used by the parent Company to influence 
and monitor the subsidiary's policies. For example, the work carried out by the fîve 
working parties on the JCF Horizon 2001 project was supported, not to say shaped, by the 
extensive use of short-and longer-term visits from corporate personnel. Thus, the training 
manager noted: 
'Ail of them corne to visit us...They corne from différent locations -from 
Paris, Lyon and other locations...Even the CEO of the parent Company 
came to visit us lastyear. From HR also many corne to visit and there is a 
consultant now in the Company and they are in continuous contact with 
their people at corporate HQ and they send them regulär reports '. 
These visits were supported by regulär annual meetings, seminars and conférences, which 
were held for ail subsidiary managers from the différent functional areas such as HR, 
finance and production. Thus, within the HR area, the Middle East director for HR related 
issues reported that such meetings of human resources specialists were held six times a 
year in différent parent Company locations, and that there were separate annual meetings 
for training, communication, career development and so on. Such meetings were held to 
share information and best practice, lay down guidelines and policies, and promote 
networking. This is best illustrated by the following quote made by the training manager 
regarding the purpose of thèse meetings: 
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'First, to implement new ideas, they discuss thèse ideas with us. For 
example, they want to make intégration and exchange of expérience 
between the différent business units of the parent company. Secondly, ifwe 
have problems we discuss them. Thirdly, networking. A training manager 
in a différent country might help me in solving my problems. They try to 
establish good relations between the training managers for synergy and 
networking. Fourthly, they try to ensure that we ail work with the same 
policy...It is important for them that ail subsidiarles work with one policy. 
Line Managers and HRM 
Before privatisation, decision-making was very centralised and everything had to be 
reported to the general manager and the board of directors, which consisted of five 
members representing the government, ñve members representing the private sector, and 
one member representing the social security corporation. After privatisation, the new 
management attempted to change the management style in the company by gradually 
devolving authority and responsibility, and introducing organisational restructuring in 
order to improve communication lines and efficiency. 
According to the Middle East director for HR related issues, prior to its privatisation, the 
organisational structure of Jordan Cernent had too many layers of management, as there 
were vice présidents, advisors, managers, assistant managers and section heads. Thus, in 
order to simplify the organisation and to have a leaner organisation, many positions were 
merged to reduce the number of layers of management and créate a structure where there 
were only vice présidents and then the managers and the engineers. 
More generally, décentralisation and délégation were seen as important changes that 
needed to be introduced in order to créate a management style that was in line with the 
parent company's best practice. In relation to this, the General manager noted: 
'We are restructuring the management structure of the company because 
our feeling is that it is not the ideal situation. The décision makingprocess 
was very centralised and this leads to slow actions. The direction now in 
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the new management style is to be more decentralised and more business 
oriented. lí is important alsofor us that the decision-making process and 
management style be in Une with the Group 's best practice. 1 
Consequently, greater authority was devolved to line martagers. For example, the IT 
department manager noted: 
'Now decisions have become more flexible, faster and better... Befare it 
was difficult for the manager lo take a decisión, as he had to go to the 
plant manager. Now the decisión is taken within the group and the plant 
manager is only informed...Now the department manager is responsible 
for his department and he decides...Now things are better and the 
managers have more authority and there is development and improvement 
because at the end of the day each person will be responsible for his 
accomplishments and performance. At the end of the day it is management 
by objectives'. 
In a similar vein, the production department manager noted: 
'...Now the plant manager respects the decisión of the department 
manager as he will be responsible. Currently, because of the devolution of 
authorities and decentralisation, it is much easier than befare. Now they 
would résped the manager 's decisión and his point of view'. 
This process of decentralisation was supported by the creation of more performance-based 
accounting systems and through new budgetary controls. Thus, each department was 
allocated a budget and was made responsible for it and all managers were trained on how 
to prepare budgets. This was different from the situation previously where there was a 
general budget for the whole company. For example, the production department manager 
observed that: 
'We concéntrate now on the budget and the big things that affect the costs 
and then we look at the small things. They are giving us training on costs 
and budgets'. 
In a similar vein, the HR and Admin V P noted: 
'...Now each VP has a budget and each department manager has a 
budget. The VP is responsible for the budget in front of the management 
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commiîtee and the board, and the departmenî managers are responsïble 
for their budgets in front of their VPs '. 
Despite the attempt to devolve authority and decision-making, in terms of HR, by August 
2000, the dévolution of authority to managers was still relatively restricted. This is 
illustrated by the following quote from one of the department managers: 
'Until now the application in this field with regard to HR is still weak. The 
subject is noî easy, as we hâve to change the System. Vsually 1 coordinate 
with central HR at the head office in Jordan with regard to private things 
for myself and for my subordinates. We only make recommendations. They 
are responsible for recruitment, promotion and légal matters. They take 
action on everything. The relationship is that we only make 
recommendations '. 
However, the dévolution of authority subsequently increased in 2001. Thus, according to 
the new company régulations and policies, which were issued on 5 February 2001, the 
authority to make final décisions regarding such issues as recruitment, termination of 
service, promotion, salary adjustment and/or grade, classification, change of job title, 
disciplinary issues, and the secondment of employées now belonged with the 
plantsVdepartmental managers, the HR and Admin VP, and the VP of the relevant 
department, with validation by the gênerai manager in respect of managerial positions. 
Thèse developments were reflected in the responses of the HR and Admin VP to interview 
cards which sought information on the changes in the responsibility and authority of line 
managers in respect of a number of issues. The findings are outlined below in Tables 6.1 
and 6.2. 
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Table 6.1 The degree of change in the responsibiiity in line managers' rôle 
Area of change The degree of change w the ^* 
responsibiiity in. Une managers 
.. rôle - ' 
Control of absence 'Yes. More responsibiiity. He is 
responsible for everything now'. 
Discipline of subordinates 'Yes. More responsibiiity' 
Appraisal of subordinates 'Yes. With control frorn us'. 
Communication with 
Subordinates 
lIt should be better. It depends on 
the manager himself. He should 
make communication with his 
subordinates. We gave them 
authorities and we are watching 
them but we have not evaluated it 
yet.' 
Training of subordinates 'Yes. More responsibiiity and 
more control from the training 
department'. 
Recruitment 'He has more roles but he can't 
recruit'. 
Planning manpower 
requirements 
lYes. Now he has more roles. He 
has to put it in a füll format and 
has to put his budget and 
planning his manpower for the 
second year in füll. Nothing like 
this was before'. 
Pay attention to the budget 'Yes. . .Now each department 
manager has a budget. 
Department managers are now 
responsible for their budgets in 
front of their V P s \ 
Control of costs 'Yes of course. Now they have to 
control costs'. 
As can be seen from Table 6.1, the responsibilities of line managers had increased in ail of 
the areas listed, namely, the control of absence, the disciplining of subordinates, 
communication with subordinates, the training of subordinates, planning manpower 
requirements, and paying attention to budgets and costs. Thèse increases in responsibility 
were, as Table 6.2 shows, accompanied by an increase in the authority given to line 
managers to make final décisions in relation to a number of thèse issues. 
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Table 6.2 Supervisors' authority to make final décisions 
• HR/Persomief issues. 
Taking on people to work for 
them 
Deciding on pay rises for people 
work for them 
Dismissing workers for 
Unsatisfactorv Performance 
Attendance / Absence 
Disciplinary issues 
Other HR/Personnel issues 
~Authoriî)> tojyiakefinai décisions" 
'No. He cannot. But he has the 
right to refuse or accept. We ask 
him and consult with him and he 
says I want the employée or not. 
This consultation is new'. 
'He recommends to his VP and 
his V P talks to me and we agrée 
on the pay rise and apply i t \ 
'No be cannot. But he should 
follow the régulations. He can 
give him up to 3 waming then he 
can be dismissed and in the 
annual appraisal i f the employée 
gets for two years weak then he 
can be dismissed'. 
'Yes' . 
'He makes recommendations to 
the HR dcpartment but he cannot 
take the final décision'. 
'He can specify the bonus of his 
subordinates based on the annual 
appraisal. He can recommend 
promotions, he can recommend 
dismissals, he can transfer the 
work place of his subordinates 
internally within his department 
without referring to anybody. He 
has financial authority within his 
budget'. 
This picture provided by the HR and Admin VP was borne out by the responses given by 
department managers to the same issues covered in Tables 6.1 and 6.2. In particular, in 
common with the HR and Admin VP, the line managers identified eight areas where their 
responsibilities and authority had, in gênerai, increased. Thèse were: 
• Communication with subordinates 
• The training of subordinates 
• Planning manpower requirements 
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• The use of performance appraisal to determine the level of bonus pay and the 
objectives of subordinates 
• Pay rises and the promotion of subordinates 
• The dismissal and disciplining of subordinates 
• Paying attention to the budget and control of costs 
• Recruitment and sélection 
According to the interviewées, this increased responsibility with respect to recruitment and 
sélection was an élément that reduced ' Wasta' - appointments by connections - and made 
the managers directly accountable for their décisions. In relation to this, the production 
department management noted: 
7 interview the person and select him and tell them î want this person... 
Now Ihave more roles because Iam responsible now. ...The responsibility 
has now increased. For example, if i want to appoint Operators they say to 
the department manager it isyour responsibility you have to appoint them. 
So, iflater some problems take place, they will say you have chosen them. 
This now reduces the WÀSTA and connections. Now this is what has 
changea. So I choose the person and it is my responsibility because I 
selected him and they have agreed accordingly '. 
It should further be noted that, whether or not line managers had the authority to make 
final décisions, in general, line managers reported that they now shared and took part in ail 
thèse décisions and that thèse décisions were being made collectively, contrary to the 
situation previously where décisions were made centrally. For example, the marketing 
department manager noted: 
'Now the manager shares in ail décisions ...previously many décisions 
were taken centrally without the knowledge of the manager but now he 
shares and has an opinion and his voice is heard'. 
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Staffing Levéis and Composition 
In considering the changes made to staffing levéis and composition, the developments that 
took place in relation to existing managerial and non-managerial staff, and the recrüitment 
and selection of new staff are considered, in tum, below. 
Management Staff 
Before privatisation, Cement Co had four divisions, each headed by an Assistant General 
Manager (AGM), dealing with technical, financial, administrative, and planning issues 
respectively. Overall, there were four levéis of management: the general manager, 
assistant general managers, department managers, and section heads respectively. 
Afier privatisation, a new board of directors was formed that consisted of four members 
representing the M N C and seven Jordanian members representing the govemment, the 
Jordanian prívate sector and the social securíty Corporation. However, local managers 
continued to manage the company. As a result, the M N C ' s influence was restricted to 
having an input into the formulation of general policies through its board leve! 
representation. Partly because of this situation and partly because of the MNC's desire to 
learn more about the laws of the country, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of 
Cement Co, little initially changed with regard to how the company was structured and 
operated. For example, the general manager noted: 
'The MNC is a minority shareholder, so in this position we cannot take 
any decisión without discussing it and getting the consent of the 
shareholders and oiher board members. And it takes time to convince 
people, especially with regard to human resources, as it is usually a 
sensitive matter'. 
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This relatively gradualist approach reîlected the political situation in the country. Cément 
Co was the first company to be privatised with the involvement of a foreign Company and 
the transaction only occurred after several years of delay due to pressures on the 
govemment from interested parties such as politicians, employées and the public -
pressures which stemmed from fears about passing control to an overseas investor, 
potential loss of national wealth and the possibility of higher priées and job losses. For 
example, there was internal opposition from within Cernent Co itself, as exemplified by a 
letter sent by the board of directors to the Minister of Industry and Commerce in which 
they rejected the idea of a foreign stratégie partner and demanded that the company be 
sold to employées, and Jordanians and other Arab investors. 
However, by the end of 1999 the change process had been stepped up following the 
appointment, as part of the technical agreement, of two expatriâtes as Assistant General 
Managers (AGM) for production and manufacturing, and for information and budget 
control respectively. For example, following the former's appointment, a three year 
technical plan, spanning the years 1999-2001, was put in place which involved the 
création of working parties charged with reducing costs and improving technical 
standards. 
The scale of change further increased as a resuit of two further expatriate appointments: 
the appointment, in June 2000, of a new gênerai manager from the parent company who 
was also a board member; and the secondment for a two-year period, in July 2000, of the 
Middle East director for HR related issues. In particular, shortly after the gênerai 
manager's appointment the JCF Horizon project was established, in co-ordination with the 
parent company, with the main aims of raising customer service levels, improving 
competitiveness through cost réduction, and enhancing managerial performance. 
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Interestingly, however, neither the general manager nor the HR regional director 
appointments was provided for in the technical agreement. In fact, the advent of the 
expatríate general manager came after the appointaient of the former local general 
manager, in May 2000, as the Minister of Planning. Following this appointaient, the 
M N C engaged in new negotiations with the govemment and insisted on the appointment 
of the expatriate general manager, as the following quote from the Middle East director for 
HR related issues illustrâtes: 
Tt was the board s décision to appoint a GM from the parent Company 
and it was pushed by the parent Company.. Jt was very politicai. Usuaiiy, 
in developing countries such positions are used as springboards and when 
they are used as springboards, externa! objectives are more prominent 
than internai objectives. So I think the reason why the MNC wanted to 
have a parent Company assigned GM is to improve and have a Company 
working like an internationally compétitive Company. ' 
As mentioned earlier, thèse permanent or long-term appointments were accompanied by 
extensive visits of corporate staff from the parent Company. Thus, teams of experts and 
specialists made short-and long-term visits to all the functions in the Company to work on 
reforms, or to solve problems and to conduct training. Thus, the changes introduced were 
shaped by the parent Company expatriâtes. This view was confirmed by the HR and 
Admin VP who noted that one of the reasons for the changes introduced in the Company 
was the transfer of know-how in management from the parent Company to Cernent Co and 
that this transfer of know-how was through the parent company's expatriâtes who visited 
or took assignments in the Company in Jordan. 
By August 2001, three more expatriâtes had been appointed on permanent or long term-
employment and were paid expatriate salaries, namely, the maintenance development 
manager, the project manager, and another expatriate who was employed in the marketing 
départaient for training purposes. 
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Non-Manager ial Staff 
When Cernent Co was privatiser] at the end of 1998, there were around 2, 578 employées. 
This workforce was subject to the social security scheme and comprised permanent staff, 
employées on temporary contracts of year or more, and daily workers. Subsequently, a 
freeze was placed on new appointments as a resuit of the new owner's belief that the 
company was significantly overstaffed. At the same time, however, little action was taken 
to reduce the size of the workforce. As a resuit, by the end of 2000 staff numbers had 
fallen by less than 100 - to 2,489. This limited action stemmed from a désire by the 
company to proceed gradually and in a way, which did not generate bad publicity and 
involve the breaching of undertakings that had been given to the government concerning 
the avoidance of job losses: a désire that reflected the political sensitivity of the 
company's privatisation. For example, the A G M for finance, in commenting on 
developments with regard to staffmg, observed that: 
'They promised the government not to touch any of the employées and they 
have kept their word. In the negotiations the government told them not to 
lay off the employées, continue with training, abide with the country 's 
laws and régulations, and préserve the environment. ' 
However, this also, in part, reflected the parent company's approach of not laying off 
employées and compensating them generously i f they were to be laid off, as well as its 
more gênerai approach of implementing changes slowly, as the following quote by the 
régional HR director demonstrates: 
'During the take over, the parent company has guaranteed that there is 
not going to be extensive lay offs so it is one of the reasons. On the other 
hand, it is not the MNC's policy to lay off people. The parent company is 
not an American company. We are not wild capitalists and we say that the 
employées are at the heart of the organisation. So it takes time in the 
MNC's culture to start and implement the changeprocess... '. 
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The new management also introduced a policy of employing only on permanent basis and 
terminating contract employment and daily workers. In doing so, it respected and 
honoured an agreement that had been made earlier, in the preparation for privatisation, 
between the previous local management and the trade unión. In relation to this, the plant 
manager explained: 
'This was an agreement between the unión and the company two or three 
years ago...This was a governmental company and the general managers 
were concerned about reducing unemployment in the country...the unión 
interfered to make the daily workers permanent and it became one oftheir 
rights...The company took this burden and responsibility and respected 
this agreement and made them permanent.' 
In January 2001, a voluntary early retirement scheme was implemented in the company, 
after lengthy negotiations with the trade unión that lasted eleven months. Subsequently, 
by 15 July 2001, 546 people had left the company through the early retirement scheme and 
another 750 people were expected to leave by the end of 2001. Thus, it was expected that 
by the end of 2001 a total of 1,100 employees would have left the company. 
It seems that most of the retired people carne from the áreas that were subcontracted by 
Jordán Cement after privatisation. For example, the union's president noted: 
'They restructured many secíors like the security and transpon and gave 
them to other companies and they transferred the employees to early 
retirement. Thus, the company s services sector went to other prívate 
companies. Similarly, we had doctors and clinics in the company bul they 
rented the clinics to other companies and transferred the employees to 
early retirement because they wanted to reduce the numbers.' 
Recruitment and Selection 
Before privatisation, vacancies were ñlled from the local extemal market by the personnel 
department through advertising in the national newspapers and reviewing previous 
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application forms. The main recruitment criteria used were educational qualifications and 
expérience. 
The recruitment and sélection process was very centralised and was done through two 
personnel committees. The first committee, from the financial department, conducted tests 
and interviews with the candidates and then made recommendations to the second 
personnel committee through the personnel department. The second personnel committee 
consisted a chair nominated by the general manager, the assistant general manager for 
administration and HR, the personnel manager, the planning and research manager, and 
the two factory managers. This personnel committee selected the candidates and made 
recommendations to the general manager for approval. However, according to the A G M 
for administration and HR, thèse committees were only a formality and recruitment and 
sélection was based, in large part, on favouritism and connections. 
After privatisation, initially no changes were introduced to the existing policy. However, 
in 2001, a new system of recruitment and sélection was established. As a resuit, the 
personnel committees were abolished, and objective oriented and simpler recruitment and 
sélection procédures were put in place. For example, the Middle East director for HR 
related issues noted: 
'What we should try to do here is to simplify the processes and work in a 
target oriented and objective oriented environment for any function which 
we have '. 
Subsequently, under the new system, recruitment and sélection was decentralised to a 
committee comprising of the relevant department manager, other specialists in the 
department and a représentative from HR, usually the career manager. This committee 
interviewed and selected the candidates, although their décisions were then validated by 
both the HR VP and the relevant department's VP. However, in the case of managerial 
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position, both the HR VP and the relevant department's V P were involved in the 
interviewing and selection process and their decision had to be validated by the general 
manager. In commenting on the new recruitment and selection policy and procedures, the 
HR and Admin. VP noted: 
'Now there is a new policy and we are following it.... First, we evaluate 
the needs of the jobs in comparison with the organisational structure. 
Then we advertise it in the newspapers and after that we screen the 
applications in the HR department. Then we form a shared committee 
between us and the requiring department and then for the final selection of 
the people I sit with the relevant department VP and then we make the 
final selection of the candidates '. 
According to the HR and Admin. VP, the main policy change was that only employees 
with the required qualifications were employed. This picture was clearly illustrated by the 
following comment made by the HR and Admin. VP: 
'The main policy change is that "wasta" is finished. The selection of 
people is fair and we don't appoint if we do not need the employ ees....Now 
the criteria of recruitment is specifically decided... Thus, now for each job 
there are requirements which are specified by the VP. For example, the 
budgetary control VP might specify that he wants someone with 10 years 
of experience in finance, has banking experience, very good 
communication skills...Now this is the change. Before, if we needed an 
employee we used to see who has brought wasta with a degree in 
accounting. If someone's connection is stronger, we'll employ him and at 
the end the employee will fail and we both sink in the company. 
Linked to this, was the introduction of new recruitment criteria. The new criteria were the 
recruitment of young, qualified, and well educated people with the potential to progress in 
the company. Thus, applicants with less than a bachelors degree were rarely considered. In 
relation to this, the acting personnel manager noted: 
'In the past applicants with different qualifications were considered and 
given a chance starting from high school or college graduated people to 
PhD holders. Now if a person has less than a bachelors degree then he 
would not be considered. Now 90% of the recruits have at least a 
bachelors degree, except for one person who was appointed recently 
because he showed very high potential. Now the main criteria are 
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educational qualification, expérience and âge, as they prefer young 
people '. 
In a similar vein, the career manager observed that: 
'Now we are interested in hiring good people and only good people and 
high potentials. High potentials is another policy. Managing high 
potentials, especially young high potentials, is one of the main HR policies 
ofthe parent Company. So they identify certain young high potentials who 
have the potential to move up the ladder much faster than others. They 
provide them with the necessary training, exposure and skills to prépare 
them for the envisagea positions...It is a Company policy and it is the 
parent Company policy... the policy is going to be an integral part of the 
whole system because many of the leading Company 's managers are young 
people, so we believe in young people 
Consequently, the recruitment policy in Jordan Cernent can be seen to have fallen in line 
with the parent company's strategy of internationalisation and growth. This is best 
described by the following quote made by the Middle East director for HR related issues 
We would like to employ the best, youngest high fliers in the Company so 
that we will be able to fight with thèse resources within the international 
environment Our recruitment policy is going to be localising high flier 
Jordanians to recruit for senior posts in the company and we want to train 
them in other locations, it can be the USA or France or Turkey, wherever 
is relevant and then we make them merge their knowledge with our 
company's culture and corne back and implement here. But we want to 
target high-flier, well educaîed Jordanian individuals and we want to 
breed them for the high positions in the company '. 
In addition to the above, the tendency was to prioritise internai recruitment and to prépare 
existing staff for filling vacancies. However, in 2001, some of the vacant positions were 
filled externally due to the lack of qualified staff to fill some of the positions. In relation to 
this, the career manager observed that: 
'The policy which we are going to have is that the priority will be for 
internai recruitment,... and then hire from outside. Perhaps for the time 
being we don 't really have enough high potentials for internai 
recruitment, this is why we are going to newspaper advertisements. ' 
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It should be further noted, that the company initially employed a local recruitment agency 
to find the required people, However, according to the HR and Admin VP, the services of 
the extemal recruitment agency might be terminated. It appeared that this was influenced 
by the trade union, as there was opposition from the union to the recruitment agency and 
the fact that many of the new recruits were not Jordanians and not from the provinces with 
high unemployment. 
Performance Appraisal 
Before privatisation, performance appraisal did not include any targets or objectives and 
was conducted annually by the employee's immédiate line manager and was validated by 
the relevant department manager. 
Two différent appraisal systems were used. One was used to evaluate managerial positions 
from section heads and upwards and included such items as work knowledge, planning, 
problem solving, communication skills, creativity and innovation, team work, attendance, 
ability to evaluate subordinates, cost controls, and the application of safety procédures. 
The other form was used for lower positions and included such items as work knowledge, 
organisation of work, accuracy, teamwork, attendance, application of safety procédures, 
and implementation of rules and régulations. 
Under thèse System, each performance criterion was marked out of 10 and the levels of 
performance were rated according to the total marks obtained as follows: excellent: 90% 
and above; very good: 80%-89%; good: 70%-79%; acceptable: 60%-69%; and weak: up to 
59%. Thèse ratings were then linked to an annual pay increase of between JD 3.5 to JD 5.5 
for employées who received a rating of good and above, while the employées who were 
rated acceptable or weak did not receive an increase. However, appraisal was considered 
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a formality and most of the employees were rated excellent. For example, the HR and 
Admin. VP noted: 'the appraisal was general and there was no weight for each evaluation 
or criteria of appraisal and each ítem was out of 10. ..and everyone was rated excellent'. 
By August 2000, no change had taken place with regards to the above. However, in 2001 a 
new performance appraisal scheme was introduced in the company based on management 
by objectives and the assessment of employees according to the achievement of these 
objectives. At the same time, performance appraisal was integrated and linked with career 
development, succession píanning, training, and pay. In relation to this, the career 
manager noted: 
'Performance appraisal is basically management by objectives as we are 
moving towards a policy and a concept of management by objectives. So 
each department and each one in this company has to have his/her 
objectives for the whole year at the beginning of each year...The career 
plan, the pay structure, and performance appraisal are all integrated and 
linked together. For example, the annual appraisal will greatly serve us in 
planning the career plan for our employees. One very important thing. 
which is going to be implemented is succession planning, especially for 
key positions. We cannot go any more in chaos if someone in a key 
position leaves. 
Management by objectives was considered to be a major change in the company. 
However, in 2001, appraisal by objectives had been introduced only for department 
managers and above due to the difficulty in setting objectives for all the employees. In 
relation to this, the career manager noted: 
'The main change introduced in performance appraisal was the 
introduction of management by objectives and the assessment of 
employees based on the achievement of these objectives. ...For this year, 
the VPs and plant managers and department managers are going to be 
assessed using the new appraisal system. The rest of the people are going 
to be assessed using a more stereotype kind of evaluation form but we 
have included some other things that are included in the performance 
appraisal. The reason for that is that we couldn V really ask everyone in 
the company to have their objectives for this year. We are piloting this 
system and we don 't want anyfailures - we cannot afford any failures. So 
we wanted to start implementing it with the élite of the company, with 
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those who are involved in forming the future of the company. But later on 
we are going to move downwards with the section heads and all other 
employees. But we wanted to start this year with middle and upper 
management'. 
Under the new appraísal scheme, the levéis of performance were to be rated as excellent, 
very good, good, acceptable and weak according to the marks obtained. These ratings 
were to be linked to rewards and a limit was also introduced on the proportions of 
employees who could obtain these ratings. These ratings and limits are summarised in 
Table 6.3 below. 
Table 6. 3 Appraísal Ratings and Limits 
Raling Mark in each category as a 
percentage (%) 
Percentage of employées in 
each category (Limit) 
Excellent 90% and above 5% of employees 
Very good 80% - 89% 10% 
Good 69% - 79% 50% 
Acceptable 48% - 68% 30% 
Weak 47% and below 5% 
In relation to the above, the HR and Admin VP noted: 
'We have a Bell curve so that there will be a limit in each 
category...because before all the company was excellent. This year we are 
implementing this change and hopefully we shall succeed with the 
department managers and their evaluation and appraísal will be closer to 
the reality and they will be responsible and accountable for ií... We also 
linked the appraísal with the bonus'. 
According to this system, which was to be applied by the end of 2001, the average mark to 
be obtained in the company would be between 72% to 75% - Good. However, the unión 
was opposed to this and threatened to take industrial action i f the average grade was not 
increased to 86% - very good. Thus, after negotiations, the management made concessions 
and an agreement was reached that the average mark would be 84%. In relation to this, the 
career manager noted: 
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'The main obstacle is the union. The annual appraisal is linked to the 
annual increase, the old grading system, and the bonus. Thus, the unions 
argued that this affected the employees' income and demanded an 
increase in the average mark from 75% to 86%. At the end, the company 
had to make concessions and we reached an agreement to have an 
average mark of 84%'. 
Promotion was also linked to performance rather than length of service, as was previously 
the case. Thus, decisions to promote an employee were based on the employee's 
performance and achievement of objectives. These decisions were devolved to HR and the 
VP of the relevant department. In relation to this, the acting personnel manager noted: 
'Previously, promotions were based on the length of service. Now the 
change is that promotion is made according to the recommendations of 
the employee's line manager and the approval of the relevant VP. The 
employee is promoted or given an incentive of his/her salary in modified 
based on his/her performance and not the years of service. 
Training and Development 
In terms of developments in the area of training and development attention is initially paid 
to the changes made with regard to the training infrastructure and budgets and the training 
delivered to employees in general. Following this, more specific attention is paid to 
managerial overseas training and networking. 
Subsidiary Level Training 
Before privatisation there was a separate training department headed by a training 
manager who reported to the technical division. This department prepared an annual 
training plan, based on the training needs identified by the employees and departmental 
managers, and was responsible for the company's two training centres. The training given 
mainly focussed on technical skills and qualifications and was for the most part provided 
through the two training centres, on-the-job training, equipment suppliers and local 
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educational and training institutions. In contrast, relatively little attention was paid to 
managerial training and employees were rarely sent abroad to undergo training. 
According to the training manager, during this period 'the training had many weakpoints'. 
His view was based on the foUowing four factors. First, the management did not take 
training seriously since it was widely believed that there was no benefit from it. Secondly, 
there was no implementation and evaluation of the training received. Thirdly, the 
identification of training needs was inaccurate and was not realistic because it was not 
linked to the work of the employee. Fourthly, training, particularly overseas training, was 
used to please or reward an employee, whether it was related to his/her job or not. For 
example, the Middle East director for HR related issued noted: 
Training was not usedproperly for trainingpurposes. It was used as a 
way of rewarding people, as a way of providing something to let off sieam 
and Idon't think that the training selectedfor individuáis wasparallel to 
their careers and the expectations of the company for them ', 
After prívatisation, training and development activities were substantially increased to 
improve the skills of the employees and to change their culture and mindsets. This 
increased focus on training encompassed two elements. First, a dramatic increase in 
locally-based technical and managerial training. Secondly, the extensive use of overseas 
training and development activities. 
This expansión in training was reflected in the training budget. Thus, this budget increased 
from JD 166,874 in 1998 to JD 423,942 JD in 1999, and then went down, in 2000, to JD 
245,426 before increasing again to around JD 400,000 in 2001. In 2001, further steps were 
taken to implement the desired changes in training and development. 
First, a new corporate wide training and development policy was implemented which 
sought to ensure that subsidiarles adopted a more organised and systematic approach that 
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accorded with central business objectives and philosophies, and linked training with 
succession planning and career development. In relation to this, the HR regional director 
observed that: 
'Training should be in line with succession planning and career 
management policies What we are trying to do here is also going to be 
in line with the overall internationally accepted standards. It will be to 
improve the skills of the individual and to change the culture and the 
mindset of the people so that they can perform their duties in a more 
efficient way....The major policy change is that the training selected for 
the individuáis will be parallel to their careers and the expectations of the 
Company... ' 
Secondly, a new training manager was appointed intemally to head the training 
department and two training committees were established. The first was the 'Training 
Steering Committee' (T.S.C.), which consisted of the General Manager, the VPs and the 
training manager, was established to approve the general training policy, the training 
budget, the training plan, and the training management system. The second committee, 
the 'Technical Committee ,, consisted of the training manager, plant managers, plant-
training managers and specialists frotn différent ñelds, such as processes, safety, finance, 
Computing and administration. The objectives of this committee were to implement the 
training policy, continually improve the training management Systems, support the 
delivery of internal training, modernise training with new procédures and techniques, and 
discuss training plans, reports and évaluations. In relation to this, the HR and Admin VP 
noted: 
'For the new training policy, every three months they will meet and will 
revise the training policy and the training priorities and what they have 
achieved and the budget.... These committees are the working groups 
which are working in the company '. 
Thirdly, a greater emphasis was placed on internal training in the training centres in the 
company in Jordan, particularly for shop-floor employées. The company's target was to 
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have 75% of training courses delivered inside the Company within two years. This was to 
reduce costs and to deliver training that was more specific and better fulfilled the needs 
and objectives of the employées. In relation to this, the training manager reported: 
'In the past, there was a littie bit of on-job-training, some internai courses 
on the computers and safety. But as of now, the concentration will be on 
internai training'. 
Fourthly, a new main training centre was established in the company's old head office 
building and four f\ill-time experienced trainers were appointed. In addition, 30-40 current 
employées were also appointed as part-time trainers and were given incentives to deliver 
training in their areas of speciality to other Company employées. 
Fifthly, the training department became responsable for both internai and extemal training, 
contrary to the situation before privatisation where the plants were responsible for internai 
training while the training department was responsible for extemal training, with the 
resuit, according to the training manager, that: 'the authorities and responsibilities were 
divided and this created problems as each one of them was working separately and this 
made the objectives unclear and there was no intégration '. 
Finally, financial incentives were introduced to successful trainees based on their 
performance after the training. Thus, as the training manager explained: 
We can say that so and so went on such training course and ihen came 
back and implemented and improved productivity or not and thus we 
recommend that this person takes JD 20 increase on his basic salary.... 
Always the person above the department manager makes the évaluation so 
that the training gains the necessary importance and seriousness '. 
In addition, at the time of the interview, the training department was preparing a training 
package for each of the 250 jobs in the Company. The purpose of this procédure was to 
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make training more systematic and to facilitate the training planning. At the same time, 
each employée would be aware of the training that he/she should receive. 
Overseas Training and Networking 
According to the senior vice président of HR and intégration at headquarters, the parent 
Company considered managerial training and development to be the responsibility of both 
the parent Company and the subsidiary. Thus, the parent Company took a more active and 
direct rôle in the training and development activities of the cadre people of professional, 
engineers and managers. This active rôle was reflected in the existence of training 
programmes designed by the parent Company and the associated requirement that 
subsidiary managers and engineers attend thèse training courses. For example, the IT 
department manager in interview in 2000 reported: 
'Now we have a lot of training courses Coming directly from the parent 
Company, which we have not included or accounted for in our training 
plan. For example, sometimes I receive instructions for a training course 
directly from the parent Company for a specific purpose and thus we have 
to go to Paris for five daysfor training...! went on a short financial course 
(EVA course) for two days in Paris. But a loi of my colleagues went on 
training courses in their fields '. 
This central rôle played by the parent Company was clearly illustrated by the introduction, 
in 2001, of two new programmes of Coaching at Jordan Cernent, namely, Cernent 
Professionals (CP) and Cernent Master (CM), for new engineers and new plant managers, 
based on instructions from the parent Company. In addition to the above, the parent 
Company had organised specially tailored managerial training courses at INSEAD and 
Duke universities. 
More generally, overseas training and development activities increased tremendously after 
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privatisation . A large number of Company employées and technical staff visited the parent 
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company plants to observe and to get acquainted with the latest techniques in the areas of 
finance, administration and production. In addition, ail senior and middte management 
attended training courses, as well as seminars, meetings and conférences, at corporate 
headquarters and other parent company locations. In relation to this, the training manager 
noted: 
'...Continuousiy there are conférences, seminars, meetings and training 
courses. Sometimes there are meetings for one day.... There are aiso 
annual conférences so the meetings are continuous and extensive.... And 
our people continuousiy go overseas at least each one of them goes once 
or twice a year.... Mutual visits are continuous '. 
In the training manageres view, there would be even more concentration on managerial 
training and he noted that since 2000, almost 50% of the training had been conducted 
overseas and that 60%-70% of this training was for managers. This point was further 
explained by the Middle East director for HR related issues who pointed out that: 
'The focus of training is going to he for managers, engineers and the 
cadre people. Shop floor people are going to be internally trained. Thus, 
the budget will cover mainly managerial training and the external training 
will be mainly for managerial positions 
The stratégie significance of managerial training was also highlighted by the training 
manager, who noted that the parent company concentrated on managerial training because 
'they have the ability to implement and exécute the stratégies and policies '. The reasons 
for overseas training were further explained by the Middle East director for HR related 
issues, who noted that for the parent company overseas training served four main 
purposes: to widen the managers' expérience; to provide an opportunity to form networks; 
to incúlcate the company's corporate culture, and, more specifically, to internationalise 
Jordan Cernent (JC). Thus, the Middle East director for human resources related issues 
went on to observe: 
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'Overseas training is looked upon not only as an improvement of the 
individual, but also a factor thaï will créate a common culture and 
improve the standards of doing business and improving the efficiency of 
the Company.... We are sending people abroad especially for technical 
training. But managerial training is going to corne at a later date because 
that's the change process and you change the culture by managerial 
training... ïn order to internationalise the JC we should concéntrate on 
external training where they will have exposure and form networks '. 
In a similar vein, the newly appointée! career manager within Cernent Co's personnel 
department observed, in relation to a human resources intégration seminar he had 
attended, that its main objective was to 'not only bring people together to establish 
contacts with each other ', but also to provide new human resource staff 'with the basics of 
[the parent Company 's] way of doing human resources '. 
Such formal training was, in turn, supported by the provision of a range of other 
'networking' opportunities. For example, the A G M for finance, and the A G M for HR and 
Administration made référence to regular meetings held intemationally for both finance 
and human resources staff Similarly, the training manager noted: 
'They gather them. For example, the finance funetion has a course and 
annual meetings, the same with career development and also HR and so 
on... Training managers have meetings twice a year in différent locations... 
AU department managers are gathered together ...One of the objectives of 
thèse meetings is to establish networking. For example, a training 
manager in a différent country might help me in solving my problems. So 
they try establish good relations between the training managers for 
synergy and networking '. 
These attempts to engender networking were supported by the parent company's poticy of 
transferring managers among subsidiarles and HQ to learn the company's way of doing 
things, to increase their expérience, and to build an intemationally qualified cadre of staff. 
The transfer policy applied to senior managers across the whole group, including Jordan. 
For example, the parent Company appointed one of Jordan's Cement's (JC) engineers to 
manage its subsidiary in Egypt and made a further seven appointments from Jordan to the 
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same subsidiary, while some other of JC's employées were placed at the parent company's 
International Technical Centre (CTI) in Lyon. Thus, by 2001, a total of 12 Jordanians had 
been sent to other locations of the parent Company and another eight had been seconded to 
a Company in Saudi Arabia, although this was not part of the M N C ' s Group. 
Rewards 
Prior to privatisation, pay was determined according to the qualifications and expérience 
of the individual and was made up of a number of éléments: basic salary, various 
allowances, including inflation-linked payments and an additional production bonus, and 
annual performance-based increases of between 3.5 and 4.75 JD, which was considered to 
be automatic as almost everybody received it. In addition, ail of the company's 2,600 
employées enjoyed several occupational privilèges, such as family health insurance, 
housing loans, a savings fund, and transportation. 
The basic salary élément had not been increased for many years. However, shortly after 
privatisation, with effect from 1 January 1999, it was agreed to raise the basic salary by 
the relatively small amount of JD 2.5 per month, and JD 8.00 for every employée 
employed before 31 December 1998. In addition, the existing production bonus was 
doubled and 4% of the company's annual profits were distributed equally to ail the 
company's employées as a bonus. Hence, in 1999 each employée received a 200 JD bonus 
for the company's performance - a total of JD 500,000 - and another JD 250,000 were 
distributed equally in 2000. These payments were made in response to forceful union 
claims, which were made against the background of an increase in union influence 
stemming from the délicate political nature of the privatisation and the désire of both the 
government and the Company to avoid any bad publicity during the early days of 
privatisation. 
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The unión obtained further gains during the appointment of the expatríate general 
manager. Thus, the basic salaries of the employees were ftirther increased by JD15 per 
month as of 1 December 2000. The unión also obtained an increase of 5% in the 
company's contribution to the saving fund from 10% to 15%. In relation to this, the HR 
and Admin VP observed: 
'Basic salaries were also increased by JD 15 for everybody as of 1 
December 2000. They took it after privatisation, ai the peak of 
privatisation and especially during the change of management to external 
management when the new general manager replaced the oíd general 
manager - they took JD 15. They also took 5% increase on the saving 
fund'. 
At the same time, during this period, the new management was more flexible with respect 
to paying higher salaries that matched the private sector pay in order to attract staff with 
the required qualifications. In relation to this, the HR and Admin V P noted: 
'...Before we were giving according to the company s salary scale which 
are not good and now we can give the employee the salary outside this 
scale so that we can take better employees. For example, previously 
according to the pay scale, for one year s experience I gave him 1.5 JD or 
2 JD. Now 1 evalúate where the employee was and what salary he used to 
get and what his job was and I give him more to work in the company ifl 
have chosen him for a specific position in the company'. 
During this period, the pay and incentives package were also being revised by the 
company. Under the proposed new pay system, all the fixed allowances would in future be 
included in the salary of the employee and the salary and grading structure would be based 
on a job evaluation scheme used by all the M N C ' s subsidiarles worldwide. According to 
the HR and Admin VP, the íntention was to implement this new job evaluation system by 
the beginning of 2002 and it would be applied first to middle management and above 
(grade 13 and above) because their new job descriptions were completed. 
211 
As regards the salaries the employées would receive under this new pay structure, this was 
to be directed by the market considérations, The médian salary for each grade was to be 
informed by a salary survey of the Jordanian market, which would be carried out with the 
participation of the leading companies in the country, including Telecom Co. According to 
the career manager, the salaries would be around 20% more than the market médian for 
each job. In relation to this, the career manager noted: 
Tt is the parent company's policy to use this System for evaluating the 
jobs.. They. have a policy for the pay structure. For example, this is the 
médian for the market - so the parent company would place its salary 
scale usually at +20% of the médian '. 
The Cadre Bonus 
More specifically, under the new bonus scheme a certain maximum percentage of bonus 
pay was to be set for each level/position in the company. This was to be divided into two 
equal portions, so that 50% of it was based on the company's performance and the other 
50% on the personal performance of the employée (see Table 6.4 below). 
Table 6.4 Structure of Bonus Scheme 
Position % of annual 
income as 
bonus pay 
Company 
Performance 
(8% x Co Perf.) 
Personal 
Performance 
(8% x PA mark) 
Location 
VPs & Top 
Managers 
16% 8% 8% 
Plant manager 14% 7% 7% Plant 1 
Plant manager 12% 6% 6% Plant 2 
Dept. Manager 10% 5% 5% Plant 1 
Dept. Manager 8% 4% 4% Plant 2 
Section Head 6% 3% 3% Plant 1 
Section Head 4% 2% 2% Plant 2 
Thus, for example, a VP was to get up to 16% of bis annual income (salary) as a bonus: 
8% from the company's performance and the other 8% from his/her personal performance. 
This second élément was, in tum, to be linked to his/her performance appraisal resuit. 
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Thus, i f his appraisal resuit were 90%, then he would receive 90% of the 8% for personal 
performance. This is best illustrated by the following quote made by the career manager: 
'...For example, for a VP position he can get up to 16% of his annual 
income as a bonus.... 50% of that cornes from the company 'sperformance 
and 50% cornes from the personal performance. This translates to up to 
8% which cornes from the company's performance.... and a maximum of 
8% of their annual income which cornes from their personal 
performance...If as a resuit of the performance appraisal interview...he 
gets 80% depending on how well he achieved his objectives, then 80% of 
the 8% annual income will corne from the personal performance...If the 
company's performance was 50% then he receives 50% of the 8% of his 
annual income for the company 's performance '. 
Non-Cadre Bonus 
In 2001, the new bonus arrangements were only applied to the cadre people, contrary to 
what the company had planned. Thus, the company decided to implement a différent way 
to pay the bonus to the non-cadre employées. Thus, rather than linking ail the bonus pay to 
performance, the company decided to link only half of the bonus to performance due to 
the union's opposition and the political sensitivity of the issue. Accordingly, a décision 
was made to distribute 50% of the 4% annual profit (2% of net profit) equally among the 
1,800 non-cadre employées while the other 50%» (or 2% of net profit) was to be distributed 
according to their personal performance. The following quote made by the HR and Admin 
VP clearly demonstrates this point: 
'We have two forms of bonus...The non-cadre people have their own 
bonus. They will have 4% of the company 's profits which is distributed 
within a formula.... 50% they will get equally because the trade union 
insisted on this and because we are in the first year of change and this is 
also a change in the culture so we agreed. Next year hopefully it will be 
100% linked to appraisal and within the formula which we made'... Now 
we are saying that this does not help justice and we tried to change it this 
year. Thus, from section head and below 4% will be linked to the annual 
appraisal within a formula '. 
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Communication and Consultation 
Prior to privatisation, there was a basic and minimal monthly company bulletin and a 
complaints box, which could be used by staff to raise issues of concern to the second 
personnel committee in the management chain. The most common means of 
communication, however, was through moming meetings between departmental managers 
and section heads, and meetings between departmental and plant managers. 
Existing communication channels were considered to be very weak and for the most to be 
mainly used to issue orders and instructions. More generally, according to the HR and 
Admin VP, thèse weaknesses were compounded by the fact that managers did not care 
about the employées' problems and views. As a resuit, the employées resorted to the union 
to get the information they needed, and this was considered to be a big problem in the 
company because it opened room for gossip and rumours. In relation to this, the HR and 
Admin V P noted: 
'Previously, there was no communication. The management and factory 
managers were in a valley and the workers in anoiher valley and the 
beneficiarles were in another valley. The beneficiarles are the people who 
transfer the news and the information.... Unfortunately, lower levéis did 
not communicate their views because their managers were always absent 
from the picture - not involved and did not care about their views and 
problems and therefore, any information they needed from us they 
resorted to the trade union and took it from them and this is the big 
problem '. 
Immediately after privatisation, steps were taken to improve communications and team 
working, change the attitude of the management, and encourage the employées to 
communicate their views. Thus, lectures were given in the company to encourage the 
employées to communicate their ideas directly, without going through the management 
hierarchy and to stress that they were considered valuable assets. In addition, a new 
bulletin, called Horizon 2001, was produced monthly with information about the 
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company's objectives and the changes that were taking place in the company and how 
employées could improve their performance. At the same time, management received 
training and guidelines from the parent company on how to have open communication 
lines with the employées. For example, the A G M for finance indicated that the attitude of 
management had changed due to the parent company's influence and noted that: 
'Things have changed and are not the same as befare where the higher 
levéis gave orders to the lower levéis. Now I may receive an idea from one 
of the section heads and 1 shall adopt il Befare I would have told him off 
and would have told him not to give me this kind of information. Now the 
information could corne from top to bottom, horizontally, and from bottom 
to top. Now there is more interaction. Now the small employée has the 
courage to speak and give information because many lectures were given 
telling the employées that every one is valuable and each one shoidd give 
his/her opinion, each one should be créative 
Further steps were taken to improve communications through the clearer définition of 
responsibilities and the amalgamation and intégration of departments with similar 
functions which, subsequently, led to less bureaucracy and a réduction in hierarchical 
lines. For example, according to the production department manager, there were now four 
managers responsible for ail the departments in the plant instead of 17, and as a resuit, 
'communication had become easier'. In a similar vein, one department manager noted: 
'The good things now are better communication with the employées. The 
team-work and coopération has improved and the way of working has 
become better and less bureaucratie, less hiérarchie... ' 
This point was further reinforced by the following quote made by the plant manager: 
Tn the past, each one was an emperor in his department and they did not 
communicate to each other. They sent memos and letters which were not 
read. When a problem happened each one tried to get out of it - the 
responsibilities were not clear. Now this is something of the past. Now 
each one learns about what changes are happening and particípate in the 
décisions taken at the plant level with the VP even if it is not his 
specialised area. The communication now is not through writing memos to 
protect the person... Now no one is independent in his work or his 
department because ail departments are working togeiher and the work 
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now is complementary - each one compléments the other. The work is 
integrated and the managers now feel that without other departments they 
can 't reach their objectives which are part of the company 's objectives... '. 
In 2001, further changes took place which refîected the importance the parent company 
attached to communication. Thus, a new communication division was created and was 
headed by the corporate VP for extemal and intemal communication. According to the 
communication VP, guidelines were issued by the parent company, which basically 
emphasised 'open communication channels between top management and each and 
everyone in the company '. For example, the plant manager reported that he was asked to 
hold meetings with the employées: 
'Meetings with employées had been requiredfrom me - I was asked to do 
that. I don 't know how I shall do it may be every month or every two 
months to gather the largest number of employées so that we can 
communicate the information and the policies and the changes taking 
place to the lower levels...lt is required from the managers to 
communicate the policies and the changes '. 
Trade Unions and Consultation 
Unlike the other two companies, Cernent Co had a well-established and powerful union. 
The company's employées were members of the General Trade Union of Construction 
Workers. This union had over 100,000 members, and was a member of the wider General 
Union of Workers Syndicate that was established in 1953 and consisted of 17 
unions/syndicates. 
A key objective of the new management was to involve the trade union in the changes 
being made. Hence, représentatives from the trade union were involved in the various 
change working parties, previously mentioned. This involvement of the trade union 
refîected the parent company's participative culture. For example, the Middle East 
director for HR related issues noted: ''the parent company 's culture is very humanistic and 
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works with the individuals. It is a consensus seeking culture rather than a confrontation 
culture.... and that employées are at the heart of the organisation'. He went on to 
explain: 
"You cannot force change. Change must corne indigenously. I mean people 
should be Willing, people should be participating in change otherwise, for 
example, you can make the perfect organisation on the table but you 
cannot implement it because the unions are going to resist it and because 
the individuals are going to resist. So you must have ownership and 
participation to change and I think what Cernent Co is trying to do is to 
create participation to change.... You cannot change the culture 
overnight. You need to convince the people that what you are bringing 
them is going to serve them better... '. 
The HR and Admin VP reported that consultation was done through the trade union łs 
représentatives in the company and he stated: 'now anything we want to make in the 
company, I consult with the union 's représentatives in the company '. He further noted that 
the company consulted with the union on issues such as health arrangements, major 
changes in work methods and working hours, and changes regarding subcontracting and 
health insurance. Thus, the union's président observed that: 
'Frankly they consult with us but this is done unwillingly because if they 
want to do something and we are against it, then we can make it fall. They 
consult with us because it is for their benefit so they consult with us and 
refer everything to us. They saw that in anything they tried they failed 
because the union was not pari of it '. 
The trade unions, as noted earlier, gained power during the privatisation process due to the 
délicate political situation in the country and its power continued to grow after 
privatisation. For example, the HR and Admin VP noted: 
"The trade union became stronger after privatisation.... Their power 
increased during the privatisation process and they have become even 
stronger now.... Their leaders are still here and they can destroy many 
things in 24 hours '. 
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The union's power grew during and after the privatisation process not only at the company 
level but also at the national level, since the Cement Syndicate's president was also the 
president of the General Trade Union for Construction and Workers and all of the General 
Union's 17 unions had collaborated and joined forces to deal with the govemmenfs 
privatisation programme. Thus, the union's president noted; 
'The cement 's power stems from the power of the General Union so when 
we carne together and all the unión 's branches collaborated all the 
branches became more powerful as we announced in the General Union 
that we shall support each other in everything.... The union's power 
evolved and stemmed from working collectively and not individually and 
this started in 1998'. 
This growth in power was reflected in the fact that the unión took several actions which 
threatened the stability of the company and the country, and, at the same time, gained the 
support of the public and the press. For example, according to the union's president, 
during the period when the company was considering a restructuring based on the 
Jordanian Labour Law No. 31 article 33, which gave the firm's owner the right to 
termínate the services of the employees without compensating them, the unión 'declared 
war on the company' and announced strikes and sits which were widely supported within 
the Jordanian society, and by national figures and political parties. At the same time, for 
the government this was a very sensitive situation since many of the company's employees 
carne from high unemployment and low income regions and the company was considered 
to serve the national interest by employing these people. The following quote by the 
union's president demonstrates this point: 
'The unión announced strikes and sit ins and the management was stopped 
from crossing the Une.... We are able to stop the faetones and production 
easily because the employees have no other source of income and thus, we 
were all prepared to defend our jobs sírongly and they can 't do this to us 
- not now and not in ten year 's time'. 
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The union's growing influence was also enhanced by the establishment of international 
networks and undertaking some important positions/tasks in international unions, as was 
the case with the Union of Arab Workers. For example, the union became a member of 
several international unions, and participated in several international meetings and 
conférences. Thus, this was seen as a source of pressure that could be used to harm the 
company's réputation intemationally. For example, the union's président noted: '...We 
have international relations and we can reveal all the wrong practices of the Company 
intemationally '. 
As a resuit of the growing influence of the union, it succeeded in obtaining several gains. 
These gains, some of which were mentioned earlier, can be summarised as follows: 
> The govemment donated, on average, 450 shares per employée at a reduced price of 
JD 1.5 per share. 
> The Company increased its contribution to the employées saving fund from 10% to 
15%. 
> The employées and their families were included in the post-retirement médical 
insurance within a new System, the application of which started in the first quarter of 
the year 2000. 
> The distribution of 4% of the company's annual profits to ail company's staff. This 
was introduced in 1999 and 2000. 
> A pay increase of JD 15 on the basic salaries for ail the employées in the Company as 
of 1 December 2000, in addition to the JD 10 increase m 1998/1999. Thus, between 
the period 1998 - 2001 the union managed to get a total of around JD 5 million in pay 
increases for the employées. 
> The union changed some of the terms of the early revirement scheme and gained more 
favourable terms and incentives for the employées. 
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> The allocation of the amounts of JD 16,000, ID 32,000, JD 48,000, and JD 64,000 for 
the fírst, second, third and fourth years respectively to cover the expenses of 
scholarships and studentships to the employees selected to study at the Jordanian 
University to acquire qualiñcations. Competitions were held for the candidates and the 
criteria set by the unión depended on the income and the length of service. Thus, lower 
income employees and those with longer service had to get the scholarships and the 
funding, and 
> The making of contract and daily workers permanent staff. 
The increase in the union's influence is reflected in the following observation made by the 
HRandAdminVP: 
'Trade unions now play a greater role. For example, in the early 
retiremeni they had a very big impact and have changed some of the 
terms. They have become stronger than beforeprivatisation...Theproblem 
was the early retirement incentives,... We introduced the early retiremeni 
system which was humble but the unión achieved many gains through it.... 
The negotiations took eleven months before we signed an agreement with 
the unión. We were careful to have a balance between the company s 
benefit and the employees' benefits'. 
At the time of the interview in August 2001, the trade unión had also managed to change 
the management^ decisión regarding working hours. The management wanted to change 
the working hours from 7.30 a.m. - 4.00 p.m. to 7.30 - 4.30 p.m. with half hour break and 
a free lunch meal to the employees. However, the unión rejected this and after negotiations 
with the management the decisión was reversed and the working hours stayed as they 
were. In relation to this, the union's president noted: 
'Yesterday we had a problem with the general management about the 
working hours of the employees. The working hours were until 4.30 so 
they were working more than eight hours and the management was going 
to give them a free lunch meal. So as a unión we managed, by negotiating 
with the management, to reverse this decisión and make the working hours 
until 4.00 p.m. These negotiations were between me and the general 
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manager and the HR VP....We reversed the decisión and made it 
according to îhe labour law of eighî working hours per day '. 
On the other hand, the growing conflicting relationship was problematic. For example, the 
fíR and Admin VP noted: 
'The union is a partner which is imposed or enforced. It is not a desired 
partner it is enforced before and now. The direction is to continue with the 
trade union and to determine the future relationship - whether to consider 
the trade union as a partner or to weaken the union's strength ...The 
picture is still not clear and there is informal talk about it.... Any capital 
and business owner aims to get rid of the unions...In France the unions 
have power and are respected by force '. 
Conclusion 
The Cernent Co case study described in this chapter demonstrated that a wide variety of 
changes had been made in the human resources area, These changes encompassed both 
signifïcant revisions to the structure and role of the human resource management function, 
and substantial reforms to a number of specific áreas of human resource practice, 
A new, and better staffed, HR division was created and this accorded a more stratégie 
place and role, notably through linking it directly to the operating committee of the 
Company. As regards the other changes made, thèse affected, as in Water Co, each of the 
specific áreas of HR activity investigated, and entailed, among other things, the following: 
• the appointment of expatríate managers to key managerial positions, along with the 
extensive use of short-term expatríate appointments; 
• the dévolution and the planned further dévolution, of HR responsibilities to line 
managers; 
• the development of new job descriptions and the associated establishment of 
recruitment and sélection criteria which stressed the need for candidates to possess 
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relevant and laid down qualifications and competencies, and in relation to candidates 
for managerial positions, that they were young, well educated and had high potential; 
• the introduction of a policy of employing only on a permanent basis and the conséquent 
terminating of the use of contract employment and daily workers; 
• the introduction of a revised appraisal scheme which placed a greater emphasis, both in 
theory and practice, on the identification of training and development needs, the 
identification of 'high potential' staff and the achievement of specified objectives; 
• the linking of this appraisal scheme to the provision of individual performance-related 
pay; 
• the taking of other action to increase salary levéis and to encourage, via the introduction 
of a variable bonus scheme, enhanced company performance; 
• a significant increase in training expenditure and activities that encompassed a much 
greater use of overseas, as well as locally-based, training, and which was supported by 
the adoption of a much more systematic approach to individual staff development; and 
• the introduction of more extensive Systems of both upward and downward intemal 
communication. 
As in Water Co, thèse reforms were basically aimed at creating a more efficient and 
business oriented organisation and re-shaping the existing organisational culture. They 
also, in tenus of their nature and manner of introduction, reflected the influence of a 
number of factors. 
The parent's management style was relatively formalised in that it involved the utilisation 
of detailed written policies/instructions concerning the HR policies and practices to be 
pursued by subsidiarles. The subsidiary's autonomy was further constrained by the use of 
a number of less formai methods of influence and control. For example, in addition to a 
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detailed system of finaneial monitoring, direct reporting relationships and regular HR 
audits and reviews, a number of other channels of influence were utilised. These channels 
included the intensive use of expatriates on a long- and short-term basis to implement the 
required changes and incúlcate the parent company's corporate culture; the holding of 
regular meetings between corporate and subsidiary managers to discuss developments 
within particular divisions; and the delivery of a wide rangę of intemational seminars, 
conferences and training programmes, all of which sought not only to develop local staffs' 
skills but to also socialise them into the parent company's 'way of doing things'. 
The parent company's approach to the management of human resources in its subsidiarles 
influenced both the direction and naturę of reforms introduced in Cement Co. This was 
clearly evident in two aspects of the change process. First, its gradual naturę, which 
echoed the parent's belief that reform within subsidiaries, would typically take place over 
a period of two to three years. Secondly, the emphasis placed within it on the utilisation of 
a participative approach to change, which was central to the parent company's corporate 
culture. 
Notwithstanding the parent company's apparent and direct influence over the reform 
process and decisions undertaken, a number of local factors acted to mediate this 
influence, namely government policy, public opinión, trade unión activity, and wider 
cultural considerations. 
The government exerted an influence in two ways. First, the government continued to 
nave influence over the running of the company through its golden share and the shares 
held by other governmental institutions, which granted them a number of positions on the 
board of directors. Secondly, during the privatisation process the government signed a 
technical agreement with the M N C and laid down a number of conditions in respect of the 
223 
provision of training and development, the transfer of Technical and managerial know-how 
from the parent Company to the subsidiary, the appointment of long-term expatriate staff 
and the use of exchange visits, the avoidance of large-scale redundancies, and the 
protection of the environment. 
As regards the rôle of public opinion and the trade union, it was found that the union had 
become more powerful both during and after the privatisation process. This rise.in union 
power had stemmed. from the govemment's and the M N C ' s désire, in the face of political 
opposition to the privatisation of public assets, to avoid taking action that would endanger 
public opinion and instigate media backlashes and hence damage their image and 
réputation. 
The nature and speed with which the reforms were introduced were not only influenced by 
the above factors but also by other internai factors related to the Company itself. These 
included the readiness stage of Cernent Co itself in terms of the availability of necessary 
infrastructures and Systems. For example, the delay in preparing the new job descriptions 
led to difficulty in setting objectives for lower positions in the organisation with the resuit 
that initially appraisal by objective could only be applied to senior managerial positions. 
The introduction of the desired reforms was also the subject of ongoing negotiations 
between the company and two relevant stakeholders - the union and the government. For 
example, allowances were not Consolidated in the salaries because of objections from local 
board members. Similarly, the early retirement scheme was delayed due to prolongea 
negotiations with the union, and the company also agreed, after negotiations with the 
union, to link only 50% of the bonus for the non-cadre to performance in the first year of 
the implementation of the new policy. In addition, the inability to introduce différent 
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working hours reflected the prevailing cultural barrier whereby employées went home to 
their farrùlies for lunch. 
Similarly, that the introduction of the new changes was also influenced by the company's 
ability to negotiate and use its bargaining power in relation to the Jordanian govemment. 
For example, initially, it was agreed with the govemment to appoint a local general 
manager to head the company. However, when this general manager was appointed as a 
govemment minister, the company threatened to withdraw unless an expatríate general 
manager was appointed to replace the previous local one. As a resuit, and after 
negotiations with the govemment, an expatríate general manager was appointed by the 
parent company, which was followed by a noticeable increase in the speed of the reforms. 
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Notes 
1 E V A = Operating profit after tax - the cost of capital 
2 As mentioned earlier, in relation to this issue, there was a technical agreement between 
the M N C and the government in which the govemment required training to be provided. 
On balance, however, it seems that this training would have been carried out regardless of 
the technical agreement. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: T E L E C O M CO 
Introduction 
This chapter reports the third case study, which concerns a télécommunications company 
taken over by France Telecom (FT). In terms of organisation, the chapter, again, follows 
broadly the same format as the previous chapters. 
In the first section information is provided on the Jordanian company and the nature of its 
privatisation process. This is followed by an overview of the acquiring French M N C and 
its approach towards the management of subsidiaries. The third section then détails the 
findings obtained from the case study by considering, in tum, the post-privatisation 
changes made in respect of the following issues: the structure and role of the human 
resource (HR) function; staffing levéis and composition; recruitment and sélection; 
performance appraisal; training and development; rewards; and communication and 
consulation. Finally, the key points emerging from the case study are drawn together in the 
concluding section. 
The Privatisation 
The Télécommunications Corporation (TCC) was a state department, headed by the 
Minister of Télécommunications, which had a monopoly in the Télécommunications 
industry until the end of 1996. In 1995, the government implemented a 
telecommunication's restructuring programme and, as part of this, introduced a new 
télécommunications law (Law No. 13), which led to the establishment of a regulatory 
body to monitor the industry and provided for the corporatisation of the TCC, as a first 
step towards its privatisation and the création of compétition in the sector. Subsequently, 
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on 1 January 1997, the TCC was registered as a public limited company, under the name 
of Jordan Télécommunications Company (JTC), that was wholly owned by the 
governrnent and worked on commercial basis. However, JTC retained the exclusivity of 
the fixed Unes services until the end of 2003. 
In 1997/98 the governrnent adopted a strategy to sell 26% of Telecom Co.'s shares to a 
stratégie investor. However, the privatisation of the company was delayed for almost three 
years during which time the governrnent changed its sale's strategy in two ways. First, the 
governrnent increased the percentage of shares to be sold to 40%, when it found that the 
originally proposed 26% ownership was insufficient to attract foreign investors. Secondly, 
the governrnent decided to sell to a consortium that consisted of a foreign partner, as well 
as a local partner, due to parliamentary opposition to total foreign control. 
Eventually, on 23 January 2000, the governrnent sold 49% of Telecom Co as follows: 40% 
to a consortium led by a France Telecom as the technical/strategic partner (35.2% to the 
Frenen M N C and 4.8% to a local partner); 8% to the Social Security Corporation; and 1% 
to the Savings Fund of the company's employées. In addition, the stratégie partner was 
awarded a five-year renewable fee-based management contract to manage the company, as 
a means of securing the transfer of the parent company's know-how. 
The Acquiring Company 
This section provides background information on the French M N C . It does so by initially 
describing the origins, activities and size of the parent company, and then by exploring 
the way in which it seeks to manage human resources within its subsidiary companies. 
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The Company: A Brief Profile 
France Telecom (FT) is a multinational company which is the principal provider of 
télécommunications services in France and the world's fourth largest télécom operator. FT 
dates its origins back to 1878 with the création of the Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs in 
France. However, due to the growing récognition of the importance of the 
télécommunications sector to the French economy, FT was founded in 1988 as a non-
governmental stand-alone organisation and became a public independent operator on l 
January 1991. This change was, in turn, followed by the commencement of the 
privatisation of FT, which started with the transformation of FT into a corporation on 31 
December 1996, and then, in 1997, by completing an initial public offering which was 
followed by the listing of the company's shares on the New York and Paris stock 
exchanges. Meanwhile, the French State continued to have a monopoly over the 
télécommunications sector until 1998, when full compétition was introduced into the 
market. In 1999, the French State owned around 63% of the company's capital and 
although this decreased to 54% in 2001, it remains the major shareholder of the company. 
The newly formed company has activities in over 75 countries and offers global services 
from phones to multimédia. It provides individual consumers, businesses and 
télécommunication carriers with a wide range of télécommunication services, including 
local, long distance and international telephony, mobile télécommunications, Internet and 
multimédia, cable télévision, broadcast and other value added services. Thus, the main 
activities of the company can be listed as: wireless communications, fixed-line telephony, 
Internet access, and cable networks. 
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In 2000, the company employed 188,866 employées, of whom 148,846 were based in 
France, and achieved a turnover of 33.7 billion euros, of which 8.7 billion euros were 
generated frorn business outside of France. This represented an increase of 149.7% in 
revenues from outside of France over the previous year. Accordingly, in 2000, 
international business accounted for 25.8% of Consolidated revenues. This share of 
international business is, moreover, expected to climb to about 55% in 2003. 
The above figures reflect the accelerated international growth strategy that the company 
has pursued since 1997 through acquisitions, stratégie alliances, joint ventures, new 
licenses to operate fixed and mobile services, and investments through, either minority or 
controlling interests, in existing or start-up companies that it believes have substantial 
growth potential. Thus, in 2000, FT became number two in Europe and number three 
Worldwide in the wireless market and became number two in the Internet segment in 
Europe. 
In support of its international growth strategy, the company has sought to take advantage 
of the opportunities created by the privatisation and deregulation of the 
télécommunications market Worldwide. In particular, the company sees vast growth 
opportunities in the Middle East and its activities in Jordan are therefore seen as a vital 
stage in the development of its foothold in the région, which has already spread to Egypt 
and Lebanon. 
The Parent Company-Subsidiary Relationship 
The parent company adopts a flexible approach towards the way in which H R M is 
managed in its overseas subsidiaries. For example, the vice director of the HR Group at 
corporate headquarter in Paris noted: 
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'You must understand that the first leveî must be local. HR will be local 
and ifthey need advice then they will go up to HQ but the initiative will be 
tafeen locally. They 'Il ask what do you think? Do you have expérience 
somewhere eise in the world? ' 
This decentralised approach represented a change frorn the previous command and control 
one that the parent Company had used and which it now felt had been unsuccessful 
because of the failure of the subsidiarles to appïy central rules. However, this current 
approach, at the time of the interview in June 2001, was also under review and there was 
an ongoing debate on whether there should be more central guidance and direction. For 
example, the vice director of the HR Group at corporate headquarter in Paris noted: 
'We are building a kind of common approach of processes. Formerly we 
had rules and we were applying the same rules from top to bottom. What 
happened is that it did not apply at all in the subsidiarles. We are in a very 
reactive market, so the idea is to make a simpler process for the Group 
and say how are we going to impose on the subsidiarles a minimum ? What 
is the minimum that we are going to ask of the subsidiarles? We are trying 
to work this out '. 
The parent Company did not therefore, at the time of the research, try to apply its French 
policies in its subsidiaries, particularly because it recognised that an acquired Company 
had its own organisation, policies and culture, and that the laws and culture of each 
country had to be respected. In short, the parent Company considered that the HR policies 
had to be adapted to the needs of the subsidiary. On the other hand, the parent Company 
did try to influence the subsidiary's management style and insist that it respect labour 
rights. The following quote by the senior vice président of human resources and 
Communications at headquarters in Paris illustrâtes this picture most clearly: 
'...We do not try to apply French policies ...We influence the subsidiaries 
in the way they manage people more than any other type of influence. 
From our point ofview, when we enter a company and become a new 
shareholder, and often we enter in a company with its own organisation, 
with its own policies and with its own culture, it is very important befare 
we organise or do something to first better understand what the company 
is and what it is possible todo.... We consider that the HR policies have to 
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be adapied to the company.... The most important thing is that we 
consider the rights of labour, the rights of the workers have to be 
respected and that is the first thing that we make clear right ai the 
beginning and say it to our people in the subsidiary. We think it is very 
important to respect the law and respect the workers '. 
Nevertheless, the parent company did strongly recommend that certain common principies 
be applied by its subsidiarles worldwide. These common principies related to the áreas of 
recnntment and sélection; job descriptions; training and development; Systems of 
évaluations connected to compensation; career management; succession planning; 
employée benefits, such as health insurance and retirement Systems; and employée 
relations. At the same time, it was pointed oui that the parent company interfered more 
directly in the management of high potential people who would be developed to become 
expatriâtes and assume international careers. 
The common principies pursued by the parent company seemed, therefore, to be driven by 
values and a culture which reflected a belief that human resources were a valuable 
resource and had to be treated with respect. In relation to this, the senior vice président of 
HR and communications noted: 
We are an international Group and it is multicultural but we think 
that because we belong to the FT Group, some basic and common items 
will be in the culture. For example, the respect of the people, a customer 
oriented company, a company in which people are happy to corne to 
....People are very important to the company ...because if people are not 
happy in your company in the next few years you will decrease your 
market share and the climate in the company and you will have problems 
and strikes. For us it is very important that people enrich themselves.. and 
work happily. We think that it is very important that ail the people in the 
company want to reach the same objectives. ' 
Against this philosophical background, it appeared that the M N C adopted a graduai 
approach to change when it took over subsidiarles. Thus, before it introduced any changes 
to HR policies, the M N C first analysed the structure of HR in the company and then 
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recommended the changes needed and provided expertise to help implement those 
changes. For example, the senior vice président of HR and communications further noted: 
'We introduce changes gradually and sometimes it takes more than one 
year, between 18 months and two and a half years, may be three....We 
prefer to follow the évolution of the Company in a way to become a 
business company, a customer oriented Company and to organise the 
company to be customer oriented and when we decide this type of 
évolution this has an impact on the HR policies and then we introduce a 
style of management. We recommend to have job descriptions for the 
range of différent types ofjobs in the company and so on and we introduce 
new benefits for the workers but we don 't take our French policy as a 
model. We consider that the HR policies have to be adapted to the 
company. But our expatríate managers have expérience and a way to 
manage and spirit, and we have a way to manage the people, so we 
introduce this style but we take the time to introduce our new style '. 
The Nature and Process of HRM Reform in the Acquired Company 
This section initially examines the changes made to the structure and role of the H R M 
department, including the way in which the various policy initiatives that were developed 
under the function's umbrella. Following this, an examination is provided of the reforms 
in the following areas: Staffing levéis and composition; recruitment and sélection; 
performance appraisal; training and development; rewards; and communication and 
consultation. 
The HRM Function and its Activities 
Before 1997, when Telecom Co was a State Department, its personnel policies were 
mostly those applicable to Government Departments, which were Civil Service 
régulations. These were written instructions, which were mainly concerned with the issues 
of recruitment and sélection, training and development, performance appraisal, and 
rewards and benefits. Decision-making was very centralised and the personnel function 
mainly performed administrative tasks. 
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In 1995/96 and in préparation for privatisation, a new organisational structure was 
introduced and the H R M function was placed within the corporate services division and 
represented by a deputy director general, who reported to the Director General. However, 
HR had no direct représentation on the board of directors. Later, the corporate services 
division came to consist of seven departments, including the HR function, which itself was 
split into two departments, namely, manpower and training, with a manager heading each 
department and reporting to the corporate services deputy Director General. The 
Manpower Department dealt with recruitment; appraisal; salary administration; manpower 
and succession planning; promotions and transfers; disciplinary matters; the administration 
of employment tenus and conditions; liaison with operational units; and the maintenance 
of the employée datábase. The training department was responsable for the design, 
delivery and évaluation of technical, management and computer training for ail the 
employées. 
To support the change process in the pre-privatisation transition period, new policies and 
Systems were designed with the aid of an extemal British consultancy. Thèse included a 
new salary structure, revised recruitment and sélection and performance appraisal Systems, 
a new career development programme, and the introduction of revised jobs description. 
However, by 1997, not ail the new policies, such as the performance appraisal System and 
revised salary structure, had been implemented. 
The central objective of thèse human resource changes was to increase efficiency by 
reducing the number of employées employed per 1,000 fixed lines. For example, in 1996 
there were 13 employées for every 1,000 lines and in 1999 this figure decreased to 9 
employées for every 1,000 lines and it was planned to reduce this number further to 8 and 
eventually to 6.5 employées for every 1,000 lines by the years 2000 and 2005 respectively. 
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Thèse efficiency objectives therefore forrned the core of the HR function's role. 
Nevertheless, despite the changes that had taken place, the HR function continued to 
mainly opérate as an administrative. Thus, the former adviser to the Director General and 
a member of the board of directors observed that: ' ...There is no HR department in the 
modem sensé...It is running employée affairs, it is still the same, it hasn 't changea'. 
In 2000, after privatisation, the H R M function was strengthened and became part of the 
company's overall stratégie planning process. An HR division replaced the corporate 
services division and was headed by a Human Resources Officer, who was a member of 
the executive operating committee and reported directly to the chief executive officer 
(CEO). In commenting on this increased stratégie role, the human resources officer noted 
the following: 
'Now we are involved in ail the business strategy, even in the technical 
business. Because in the technical sector we need competencies and thèse 
will be provided by HR. We are an anchor in the operating committee and 
stratégie décision- making. Before, they would say you are HR and you 
don 't understand technical issues '. 
Under the new structure, the HR division consisted of eight departments: manpower, 
training, training centre, administration, payroll, legal, building and property, and transport 
and maintenance. Each department was headed by a manager who reported to the human 
resources officer. By August 2001, the number of staff employed in the HR division had 
increased from 375 to 403. 
The changes introduced had strong implications for human resources management. Thus, 
the Human Resources Officer said: 'we are trying to update HR to be compatible with the 
prívate sector and modem HR. In particular, we seek the development and mobilisation of 
HR. Now the customer is our manager. We have to develop the company and prepare 
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ourselves for compétition. ' More specifically, a range of new HR policies were introduced 
and others were under development at the time of the interviews. 
Thèse policies were initially prepared by the subsidiary's HR function and then presented 
to the operating committee. The policies were then discussed and modified by the 
operating committee and subsequently referred to the board of directors for approval. 
Consequently, the HR chief officer considered that subsidiary managers had full authority 
in deciding the subsidiary's HR policies and in adopting the policies that most suited the 
company's culture. Thus, in commenting on the extent of the parent company's influence 
on the subsidiary's HR policies, the HR chief officer commented: 
'We have full authority in deciding our HR policies...The HR policies 
were prepared by us, by the HR sector in the company.... They transfer 
ideas but it is up to the subsidiary to adapt thèse ideas to the culture of the 
company. They cannot force and they are not forcing. They have ideas and 
they are applying them. For example, as a resuit of our visits to France 
and their visits here we take thèse ideas if they suit us and we customise 
them. ...Sometimes we need help so they support us. Sometimes they need 
explanations, so we explain to them. Instructions are not there. ' 
In a similar vein, the sales and marketing chief officer noted: 
7 think the parent company is still quite centralised. However, outside of 
France, the parent company is managing ils subsidiaries with a lot of 
flexibility '. 
The scale of this local discrétion was found, more generally, to reflect the broader issue of 
how the corporation approached the control of its subsidiaries, namely by financial 
Systems under which the M N C was primarily concerned to establish budgetary parameters 
within which H R décisions are taken. Consequently, subsidiary managers were largely 
free to run the subsidiary's daily opérations in the way they saw appropriate, providing 
that they were in line with the budget. For example, in commenting on the degree of 
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freedom given to subsidiary managers, the sales and marketing chief officer explained the 
following: 
'In Jordan, for instance, we are doing our reporting but... as soon as we 
are on line with the budget we don 't have any problems and we don 't have 
to give any justification and we don't lose any time in meetings.... They 
want to follow, in comparison with the budget and with the business plan, 
what is going on in each country. The base for us is always to work with a 
budget and once the budget is approved, what we discuss and what is in 
our reporting is basically the différence with the budget '. 
The importance of the financial accounting and reporting Systems was reflected in the 
appointment to the subsidiary of the financial controller from H Q in France to establish 
the financial and reporting Systems that accorded with the parent company's principies. In 
addition, this fmancial controller monitored the company's budget and sent standardised 
monthly reports to headquarters in France. These standardised monthly reports, which 
were used by ail subsidiarles, included income statements, balance sheet and financial 
performance indicators, as well as measures of labour productivity. This information was 
then Consolidated into the parent company's accounts and monitored by corporate 
headquarters. It must be noted, however, that the appointment of the financial controller 
corresponded with the parent company's policy of sending its own staff when a local 
finance director had been recruited. In relation to this, the senior vice président of human 
resources and communications noted: 
'We control from a financial point of view and it is very important but it is 
not only financial control that we use....Finance is very important. But for 
example, in Brazil, El-Salvador and Argentina we have local financial 
directors but we have one financial expatríate to show them how to use 
standardised financial reporting and so on...It is more to make a transfer 
ofknow-how rather than control '. 
Care must, nevertheless, be taken not to exaggerate the degree of autonomy given in the 
area of HR because there were a number of sources of influence that acted to place 
constraints around how subsidiarles exercised their discrétion. As a resuit, it was 
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questionable whether the Jordanian company had as much freedom in deciding HR 
policies as was suggested by the HR chief officer. For example, the HR policies had been 
developed against the backcloth of the common principies, detailed earlier, about how 
human resources should be managed, as shall be seen further in the following sections 
which discuss other areas of HR change in Telecom Co. This issue was explained by the 
senior vice président of human resources and communications as follows: 
'Subsidiary managers are very auîonomous in deciding the HR policies. 
But we are connected with the company through our management and 
through the board of directors in Jordan. We have information about that, 
so if the shareholders or the members of the board consider that it is not 
good for the company in terms of development and in terms of respect for 
our principies they don 't accept. So we have the power to modify it but at 
the beginning they are very autonomous '. 
In addition, the HR policies had also been developed against the background of 
organisational rules that acted to limit the ability of the subsidiary to take unilateral 
décisions in respect of certain matters. This was borne out by the responses given by the 
senior vice président of HR and communications and the vice director of the HR group at 
corporate headquarters in Paris, as well as the HR and finance directors at Telecom Co, to 
interview cards which sought information on the distribution of decision-making 
responsibility in respect of a number of issues. Thèse responses are detailed in Tables 
7.1 .a, 7.1 .b, 7.1 .c and 7.1 .d in Appendix 7.1. 
This influence from central head office was further borne out by the following quote from 
the senior vice président of HR and communications: 
At the beginning, the sîrategy is studied and proposed locally and after we 
have meetings with the CEOs and chief officers and with people from HR. 
For example, in July we organised a meeting of ail chief officers from ail 
ofour subsidiarles and you find opération, finance and HR and we spoke 
about the development strategy of the company and then we acted. For 
strategy and main décisions the CEOs refer to HQ but we have meetings 
with and seminars for ail managers from ail domains...You can say that 
strategy is proposed locally and then approved by HQ. But sometimes we 
238 
recommend strongly because we know the market better, we know the 
technoiogy évolution. For certain issues we décide. For example, for IT or 
choice of equipment '. 
The reporting System that was established in the subsidiary also potentially, at least, acted 
as a form of constraint on the subsidiary. Thus, while there was no direct relationship 
between corporate HR and the subsidiary, the HR chief officer submitted monthly reports 
to the CEO and, at the same time, sent copies of thèse monthly reports to corporate HR. 
Thus, the senior vice président of HR and communications further observed that: 
7 receive the reports from the HR chief officer in Jordan... but he doesn 't 
report to me because I have no direct relationship with him because I am 
not his chief officer. But he sends me monthly reports to inform me so that 
! have information... They report to the CEOs locally and they report to me 
only to inform me and to ask me for advice and it is easier to give advice 
when you know the Company. But they report to the CEO '. 
In broad tenns, the responses obtained from the senior vice président of HR and 
communications in Paris, the HR and Finance chief officers in Jordan to interview cards 
that sought information on the collection of data relating to the performance of the 
subsidiaries, (See Tables 7.2.a, 7.2.b and 7.2.c in Appendix 7.2) bore this picture out. 
Thus, corporate HR collected information on such issues as managerial pay packages, 
overall labour costs, overtime working, strikes and other forms of industrial action, 
numbers employed, numbers of résignations and numbers recruited, absenteeism, 
dismissals and disciplinary cases, labour productivity, accidents and injuries, occupational 
health, training received, and the gender and âge composition of the workforce. 
The significance of thèse reporting Unes and approval lines was illustrated by the fact that 
when the company did develop its HR policies and passed them up to corporate 
headquarters in September 2001, the parent company informed the subsidiary that the 
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policies should not be implemented until they had been checked for bottom-up support. In 
relation to this, the manpower planning and recruitment section head noted: 
'What we sent to headquarîers in France was half way through. They said 
keep them aside for now and bring the policies and the change from the 
bottom...Ask the employées what changes they wish to be made to make 
them more satisfied. They said take the employées ' opinions and feedback 
from the fîeid and then turn them into policies, rules and régulations '. 
In addition to the above, an ongoing process of visits to and from corporate headquarters, 
as well as conférences and meetings, acted as other channels that the parent company used 
to influence and monitor the subsidiary's policies. For example, the opérations director, 
who was based in Paris and responsible for the subsidiary, visited the subsidiary every 
month. In relation to this, the senior vice président of HR and communications noted: 
'We control not only from here ai HQ...We have regular travel to the 
subsidiarles...because each subsidiary is connected to a director of 
opérations based in Paris and we have members of the board of 
directors...So we control andget information very frequently '. 
Furthermore, regular meetings were held between each director from the subsidiary and 
his/her counterpart at corporate headquarters. For example, the senior vice président of HR 
and communications visited the subsidiary in Jordan twice a year and similarly, the HR 
chief officer from Jordan visited corporate HR twice a year. He also attended the annual 
HR meeting held by corporate HR for ail the subsidiaries Worldwide. The purpose of thèse 
meetings was to gather information from business units; to share policy initiatives between 
subsidiaries; and to provide information on corporate policy. Furthermore, they were also 
used for benchmarking and collaborative work on spécifie issues such as high potentials 
career management, and human resource exchanges between the subsidiaries. 
Continuous dialogue was also maintained between the subsidiary and the parent company 
through informai methods of communication, téléphone calis and e-mails. Thus, for 
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example, several calis during a week could be made between the HR chief ofñcer and HQ. 
In addition to these meetings, experts and consultants and other corporate staff from the 
parent company visited the subsidiaries. These were seen by the subsidiaries as a form of 
control as well. For example, the administradon manager noted: 
'The French also come here to provide consultation and to see how things 
are in the company, so indirectly partly this is control but it is not 
obvious'. 
Line Managers and HRM 
According to Hakooz (1997), who worked in JTC for twelve years as a sénior officer in 
the HR department, the company had a role culture that was based on structure, order, 
stability and control. Thus, JTC had a formal hierarchy of authority and an authoritative 
management style in which it was considered a sin to bypass one's supervisors and seniors 
were looked to for advice. People were rewarded for obedience and compliance with rules 
and they were punished for disobedience and those who participated in risk taking 
activities were penalised rather than rewarded. A l l HR related issues, as mentioned 
earlier, were dealt with by the civil service office and the personnel department. 
During the transition to privatisation, many attempts were made to shift towards a more 
adaptable, flexible and responsive culture vía the promotion of decentralisation and the 
delegation of authority. As a result, line managers were expected to take on full 
responsibility for day-to-day tasks and for carrying out many of the H R M functions, such 
as selection and recruitment, performance appraisal and career development. However, 
Hakooz claimed that line managers found it difficult to take full responsibility and 
accountability, as they lacked the necessary skills and confidence. Furthermore, she went 
on to note that some managers, particularly sénior managers, were reluctant to delégate 
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authority to line managers because they did not trust the skills and abilities of line 
managers to make effective decisions. 
The departmental managers interviewed confirmed that there was a limited increase in 
their HR responsibilities during the transition period in áreas like the appraisal of their 
subordinates, the nominating of people for training, and the recruitment and selection of 
staff Indeed, even where formally the responsibilities had been increased, this. often did 
not actually happen for two reasons. First, the managers themselves were often hesitant 
about doing it. Secondly, their seniors often resisted the devolution of responsibility. For 
example, the budget and tenders managers noted that: 
'...For example, regarding appraisal, previously the manager used to 
write what he wanted and they did not abide by the instructions. The 
section head also used to appraise. However, in the past the manager used 
to interfere a lot and would not allow much spacefor the section head'. 
After privatisation, the new management attempted to change the management style in the 
company by increasing the devolution of authority and decisión-making. For example, 
after the first six months of privatisation, the administration department manager noted: 
'So far, the most important changes made by the French is the devolution of 
responsibilities'. 
These changes were essentially implemented to give line managers a managerial role, 
make them responsible for the achievement of their objectives and to equip them with the 
authority to be able to meet their targets. At the same time, they were also seen as an 
important means of changing the attitudes of the employees. In relation to this, the HR 
chief offlcer observed that: 
'The attitude ofthe employees had to change. The parent company helped 
us to come out with our potentials. The oíd management was scared and 
the áoor was closed. But when the parent company carne they encouraged 
us to take decisions, so now we take the decisions and we see the results 
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because in theparent company they were used to this.... Now the manager 
has a position and the work has more flavour. The manager now has 
authority and responsibility and accountability. Now the managers are the 
décision makers. For example, I wouldn 't accept a décision to be referred 
to me if the manager can take this décision.... '. 
This process of decentralised management was supported by the création of more 
performance-based accounting Systems under which department managers became 
responsible and accountable for their budgets. Similarly, the dévolution of authority was 
also reflected in the HR policies, Systems and processes as more HR responsibilities were 
delegated to line managers. Subsequently, the HR function came to play a supportive role 
rather than an instructive one. Thus, the HR chief officer noted the following: 
"They specified in the HR policy that you have to be close to your 
employées and know what they are doing, not to do their work but to be 
able to support them as management. Tliey promote authority, 
accountability and responsibility. Those are the things in the HR 
policies....HR has a supportive role to line managers, not an instructive 
one. We give them the policies and line mangers are responsible for 
implementing them. Each line manager is a HR manager in his line but we 
support him '. 
Thèse developments were, in turn, echoed in the responses of the HR officer to interview 
cards which sought information on the changes of responsibility and authority of line 
managers in relation to a number of issues. The findings are detailed below in Tables 7.1 
and 7.2. 
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Table 7.1 The Degree of Change in the Responsibility in Line Managers Role 
Control of absence Increased 
Discipline of subordinates Increased 
Appraisal of subordinates Increased 
Communication with subordinates Increased. 'Internai communication has 
increased" 
Increased Training of subordinates 
Recruitment 'They join. In the past fhey did not. It 
was the HR manager and the civil 
service manager' 
Planning manpower requirements Increased 
Paying attention to budgets Absolutely 
Control of costs Absolutely 
As can be seen from Table 7.1, the responsibilities ofline managers had increased in ail of 
the areas listed, namely, the control of absence, the disciplining of subordinates, 
communication with subordinates, training of subordinates, planning manpower 
requirements, paying attention to the budgets and controlling costs. As can also be seen 
from Table 7.2, thèse increases in responsibility were accompanied by an increase in the 
authority given to line managers to make final décisions in relation to a number of issues. 
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Table 7.2 Supervisors Authority to Make Final Décisions 
m . , r .HR/PersonnelIssues _ Authority to make final décisions t ¿123 ] 
Taking on people who work for them 'Really you could say yes but through 
the system. If he wants an employée in 
his department he is the chairman of 
the committee. Thus, it is his décision 
but through the System. He has to 
recommend to the employment 
committee. Thus, he can impose it. We 
did not have this befbre 2000'. 
Deciding on pay rises for people who 
work for them 
'Yes. They can take the final décision 
according to the new scheme from 0% -
10%. This is new in 2000'. 
Dismissing workers for 
unsatisfactory performance 
'They can do it but through the System. 
For example, i f he gives someone poor 
rating. He will not say to the employée 
you are dismissed but according to this 
manager's recommendation it is 
decided'. 
Attendante/ Absence 'It is his décision. Before he used to 
send to HR and the HR was managing 
this....But now he has complète 
rreedom1. 
Disciplinary issues 'Through his authorities as he has 
authority. He can décide a waming or 
eut of pay. But to decrease an 
employee's salary this will need a legal 
committee. So let us say through the 
system. He has authority and 
responsibility'. 
Other HR/Personnel issues 'The overtime. He décides whether to 
give overtime or not; the training, he 
décides what training the employée 
should take according to the generic 
plan; the appraisal; the promotion; 
salary rises and bonus'. 
Thus, Table 7.2 shows that clear changes were made regarding the authority of line 
managers to make final-décisions. For example, it indicates that line managers now had 
the authority to take on people to work for them, décide their subordinates' annual pay 
increases through annual appraisals détermine overtime and bonus payments and 
ultimately décide on promotions. The table also further indicates that they now took a 
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more active role in dismissal and disciplinary issues and the determination of their 
subordinates' training needs. 
The picture provided by the HR chief ofíicer was borne out by the responses provided by 
line managers themselves. In particular, in common with the HR chief officer, the line 
managers identified eight áreas where their responsibilities and authorities had, in general, 
increased. First, the training of subordinates because managers had to plan their training 
schedules and budget for them. Secondly, the use of performance appraisal to determine 
the annual increase of subordinates within specified limits. Thirdly, the disciplining of 
subordinates, as the line manager could now recommend that such action be taken and also 
undertake the preliminary procedural stages. Fourthly, attendance and absence 
management, where managers now had full responsibility and decision-making powers. 
Fifthly, communication with subordinates because line managers now had the 
responsibility to communicate the company policies and objectives to their subordinates. 
Sixthly, paying attention to the budget and the control of costs, as now each departmental 
manager had to prepare his/her departmenfs budget, and explain and justify it. Seventhly, 
planning manpower requirements since managers now had the full responsibility to 
determine these. Finally, recruitment and selection as managers were now involved 
directly in the short-listing of candidates, interviewing and the selection of the individuáis 
to be appointed. 
Staffing Levéis and Composition 
In considering the changes made to staffing levéis and composition, the developments that 
took place in relation to managerial and non-managerial staff are considered, in turn, 
below. 
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Management Staff 
In January 1997, and in préparation for privatisation, JTC reorganised its opérations in 
order to improve the interaction between departments and to créate an environment where 
technical and business considérations were integrated. The reorganisation established four 
layers of management and eight divisions headed by deputy directors general (DDGs). 
Thèse divisions comprised Residential Business Services, Corporate Business Unit, 
Corporate Stratégie Planning and Corporate Relations, Information Services, Corporate 
Services, Finance, Planning and Development, and Opérations and Maintenance. A i l 
division heads reported to the Director General, who in tum, reported to the board 6f 
directors. The four layers of management that were set up consisted of the director 
general, deputy directors general, departmental managers and section heads. 
After privatisation, in January 2000, a new board of directors was formed that consisted of 
four members representing the government and three members representing the 
consortium. Subsequently, in the period following the takeover, some restructuring of the 
organisation took place. This organisational restructuring involved the création or 
amalgamation of some divisions in the company, which decreased the number of divisions 
from eight to five. The layers of management, however, remained the same. 
Expatríate managers were appointed to head the new divisions and became part of the 
executive operating committee which was responsible for managing the company and 
setting its stratégies and policies. More specifically, the operating committee consisted of 
four French executives - the chief executive officer (CEO), who is also a board member, 
the chief sales and marketing officer, the chief technical officer, and the chief information 
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System offícer - and two Jordanians, namely, the chief fmancial officer, and the head of 
human resources (the HR chief officer). 
Four other expatriâtes were also appointed for more than one year, namely, the quality and 
support manager, the financial controller, the marketing and sales coordination manager, 
and the Internet project manager. In addition, on average, berween 20-30 short-term 
expatríate appointments of berween two weeks and six months were made monthly. Thèse 
short-term expatriâtes were experts and specialists who were used to work on spécifie 
projects in the différent sectors of the company. In relation to this, the HR chief officer 
noted: 
'We have eightpermanent expatriâtes....Consultation is needed whenever 
there is lack of competencies...For example, now 1 need consultation to 
build the career planning so I asked the parent company and they have 
sent me a consultant for six months. Ifl need an expert for 10, days I bring 
him '. 
This use of expatriâtes, in part, reflected the parent company's general approach of 
bringing in its own teams to manage the subsidiaries and to transfer the know-how of the 
parent company and thereby enhance the competencies of local staff. Thus, the Senior 
Vice Président of Human Resources and Communications stated: 
'We use expatríate managers for the transfer of know-how and control. 
We always have a CEO or a deputy because we put in a lot of money and 
we want to know what happens with our money.... We also send some 
expatriâtes to manage the company in sectors where it is necessary. So 
sometimes in our subsidiaries we have ten or more expatriâtes and 
sometimes when it is not necessary we only have two or three people. It 
dépends on the company ...and on the number of sectors where we 
consider that we have to transfer the know-how ...It is a company policy to 
appoint expatriâtes because the type of opération is télécommunication 
activity and it is very spécifie and you have to know the sector. ' 
In a similar view, the sales and marketing chief officer noted that: 
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"The company's policy is to have permanent people from the parent 
company working in Jordan, Others with special expertise come on short-
term basis from one to six months.' 
On the other hand, at Telecom Co, some of the expatríales were appointed as a result of 
the management contract laid down by the Jordanian government. For example, the former 
director of the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission stated: 
'...A condition was made to guarantee that the French will run the 
company Thus, the government asked for the management contract and 
they gave the French an annual fee for running the company for five 
years....The French did not object. To have a management contract for 
five years means that they can run their investment the way they want'. 
Thus, the agreement to transfer know-how in a way coincided with the parent company's 
approach to appoint expatriates to run the subsidiaries. In relation to this, the Senior Vice 
President of Human Resources and Communications observed that: 
'When we sign a contract with a country, for example, when we signecl a 
contract with the Jordanian government we signed to transfer know-how. 
This means we have to take people from the parent company 's Group to 
Jordan to make a transfer of know-how'. 
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the use of expatríate staff was limited in two ways. 
First, concems about political and media backlashes acted to restrict the number of 
expatriates that could be employed. For example, the media manager observed: 
'They take care about the public opinión and they take into account the 
criticisms. Thus, they say we shouldn 't have large numbers of the French in 
the company. The people should not feel that we are going to take their 
positions and jobs.' 
Secondly, the government required that at least two members of the executive operating 
committee be Jordanian. Accordingly, as already noted, two Jordanians were appointed to 
the operating committee, namely, the human resources officer and the financial chief 
officer. Thus, the former director of the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission 
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noted that: '...During the negotiations the Jordanians insisted on having two Jordanians 
on the operating committee '. 
The Senior Vice Président of Human Resources and Communications also confirmed that 
during the negotiations the government asked for two Jordanians to fil] senior positions. 
However, she indicated that, in terms of Human Resources (HR), the parent company's 
gênerai approach was to appoint a local HR director in its subsidiaries. This was because 
the parent company believed that it was very important to have a HR person who knew the 
culture and the laws of the country, as thèse varied from one country to another. 
Non- Manageriai Staff 
Before its corporatisation, employées in the TCC were divided into four main catégories in 
terms of their employment conditions, namely: classified, unclassified, contract, and daily 
workers. 
Classified employées were permanent employées who had considérable security of 
employment and belonged to the Government rs pension scheme and therefore received a 
civil service pension when they reached the âge of revirement. This was 60 years for men 
and 55 for women, or when they finished the length of service required, namely 20 years 
for men and 15 years for women. In addition, thèse employées were entitled to other 
benefits, such as paid sick leave. 
Unclassified employées received a salary approximately équivalent to that of the classified 
employées doing the same job. However, thèse employées did not belong to the 
government's pension scheme but received a terminal gratuity after one or more years of 
service and were subject to the social security pension scheme. 
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Contract employées were appointée! when staff were required on a short-term basis or 
where the TCC salary scales were not attractive enough to obtain the required labour. 
Thèse were employed on a fixed contract basis for a minimum of one year and they 
negotiated their salaries personally. They did not belong to the governmenfs pension 
scheme but received a gratuity after any length of service and were also subject to the 
social security pension scheme. Regarding daily workers, thèse were hired on a short-term 
or daily basis according to the company's needs and were also subject to the social 
security scheme. 
On 1 January 1997, and in préparation for privatisation, daily workers, and unclassified 
and contract employées were transferred directly to JTC and were made company 
employées with new contracts. JTC had no problems in dealing with thèse three catégories 
since they had already been under the social security umbrella. Subsequently, thèse 
employées' terms and conditions were made in accordance with parameters established for 
JTC employées. 
However, the situation regarding classified employées was problematic. JTC had some 
diffîculties in dealing with this category because some of the employées had not reached 
the retirement âge or did not have the length of service required to obtain a pension. Thus, 
JTC had to find ways to persuade thèse employées to transfer their pension benefits to the 
less favourable social security scheme. In addition to this, finding a suitable reward 
package that fïtted with the civil service by-laws and employment législation was also 
problematic. 
Accordingly, on 31 December 1996, the classified employées were transferred to the 
Ministry of Post and Communications and, on 1 January 1997, they were seconded from 
the Ministry to JTC. As a resuit, they remained civil servants until a décision was reached 
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as to how their future employment status should be handled. Eventually, after leugthy 
discussions and negotiations, on 1 January 1998, the government adopted three solutions 
regarding classified employées, depending on the employées' length of service and their 
entitlements to pensions under the government's scheme. These solutions were as follows: 
a) 362 employées with more than 20 years of service were retired and hired by JTC as of 
I January 1998 as employées with new contracts. 
b) 382 employées, who were unable to retire under the government scheme but had a 
substantial length of service ranging between 15-20 years, remained civil servants until 
they qualified for retirement and then once again they would be rehired by JTC on 
completion of their 20 t h year of service. 
c) 983 employées, who had been employed for less than 15 years of service, remained 
civil servants on secondment arrangements with JTC until they reached retirement. 
Subsequently, the new JTC terms and conditions of employment were implemented during 
the préparation for privatisation in accordance with a grading structure under which the 
employées were divided, according to their qualifications, into four catégories. The first 
category consisted of higher management jobs, such as deputy directors, consultants, 
experts, district managers and department managers. The second included specialist jobs, 
section heads, engineers and employées with a university degree and above. The third 
encompassed technical and clerical jobs in administration and finance, and employées 
with a diploma or a general certificate of éducation (GCE). The fourth category consisted 
of employées in the support services, such as daily workers, security guards, and drivers. 
After privatisation, the employment of daily workers was subsequently terminated and 
they were made permanent staff, as of 1 August 1998 and, at the same time, were 
transferred/promoted to the third Staffing category. These changes reflected the new 
252 
management's view that, since thèse workers had received required training and possessed 
valuable skills, they constituted an important resource that needed to be retained. At the 
same time, according to the HR chief officer, this process also helped to eliminate the 
différences in salaries and status between the employées and in doing so made the 
employées happier. For example, the HR chief officer noted: 'so we normalised their 
situation and now we are more comfortable as we don 't have such catégories. Now 
everybody has become a complete corporate permanent employée...this is better for the 
Company and the employées equally'. 
As regards Staffing level, on 31 December 1999, the total number of staff was 4,891, 
including 617 daily workers1. As mentioned above, after the new management took over 
ail employées in Company became full-time permanent staff, and by 23 July 2001, the 
number of employées had decreased to 4,841 through normal attrition, retirements and 
résignations. This limited decline in the number of staff reflected a two- year prohibition 
on redundancies imposed by the government. 
As regards future trends, the position was less clear. On the one hand, the earlier 
observation made about the désire to enhance productivity in the core Telecom business 
implied a further réduction in Staffing levéis. On the other hand, the Company was 
envisaging and was engaged in, developing activities in other parts of the business where 
staff could be transferred. For example, a large number of employées had already been 
transferred to marketing and customer services departments in the Company. In addition, 
222 employées were subcontracted through a private Company to work on special projects, 
such as a call centre. 
As a resuit, the prevailing view of senior and middle managers was that there would not be 
any marked réductions in staff numbers. This point is further borne by the following quote 
253 
by the HR Chief officer: ' . . .oui policy is not to reduce the numbers of employées but also 
not to bring in unneeded employées as was done before'. It is further supportée! by the 
following observations of the training départaient manager: 
'In JTC the major policy now is thaï we are training our employées and 
we are providing our employées with comprehensive training. This is a 
clear policy in the Company because it balances with the parent 
Company 's policy that they don 't want to fire the employées and 
conséquent!)', we have to train the employées '. 
Interesttngly, returning to the point about the parent Company influence, this was exactly 
the same strategy that the French parent Company adopted when it was privatised. Thus, in 
relation to this, the chief sales and marketing officer noted: 
We are facing here a situation similar to what we faced in France twenty 
years ago. So what we are doing here is like what we did in France.. We 
have the same issues to solve...First, for the technical part we need to 
improve the networks...and then we need to move people from a technical 
orientation to a sales orientation to be able to face the compétition.... One 
ofthe main strategy décisions of the parent Company is not to decrease the 
staff of the Company. The parent company before and after privatisation in 
France retained the same staff....in fact we added staff.... We didn 't make 
plans to reduce people, we made plans to move people from one sector to 
another, from technical to sales and we have the same objective here...In 
France it was a political issue. In Jordan, the condition is to retain the 
employées for two years but thèse things you plan themfor more than two 
years. So in the first two years we do not have a choice but after thaï we 
can choose. We are going to follow the same direction after two years as 
in France, not to divide the number of staff by two but to develop the 
business and to adapt the people to be able to face différent challenges. 
We have this principle that we can train the people and improve their 
skills ' 
Recruitment and Sélection 
Before 1997, recruitment was centralised and conducted through the civil service office 
and the organisation impleménted the instructions laid down by the civil service 
régulations. The personnel départaient consequently handled ail recruitment procédures in 
conjunction with the civil service office. For example, the D D G of corporate services 
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noted: 'recruitment in the company was the sole responsibility of HR...Recruitment 
décisions were made jointly by the personnel manager and îhe civil service manager '. 
In 1997, in préparation for privatisation, a new recruitment policy was implemented based 
on revised job spécifications for ail the employées. Thèse job descriptions were developed 
utilising a new format which identified key results areas, performance indicators, and 
essential and désirable employée characteristics. 
For sélection and recruitment purposes, two employment committees were formed. The 
first committee, which consisted of five board members and was headed by the gênerai 
director, was responsible for the sélection and recruitment of positions above section 
heads, although its rôle was limited to referring its recommendations to the board of 
directors for approval. The second conimittee consisted of five members, including a 
représentative from HR, and was formed to select and recruit candidates below section 
head level. In this case, recommendations were referred to the director gênerai for 
approval. 
However, in gênerai during this period, the company placed a freeze on recruitment and 
only a few recruits, notably engineers, were appointed. It should also be noted that in 
reality recruitment continued to be based on personal préférences and connections, not on 
qualifications and job descriptions. For example, the former adviser to the director gênerai 
and a member of the board of directors, noted: 'Job descriptions are on paper. Something 
they use but many times they don 't. For the HR department this is a big problem '. 
In 2000, after privatisation, the recruitment and sélection policy was modified and 
according to the HR officer, 'a more sound policy was implemented to recruit based on 
competency not on favouritism'. The jobs descriptions, which were introduced in 1997, 
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were refined and new ones were introduced to cover jobs which previously did not exist in 
the organisation. Thus, new employées were recruited according to the job descriptions 
and the main criteria used for recruitment purposes were qualifications, expérience and 
skills. Thus, the HR officer noted: 'we have become heavy on the recruitment of qualified 
people who have the capabilities to run ourprojects... '. 
Recruitment procédures were, as already noted, also further decentralised from HR to 
relevant department and line managers. More specifically, a sélection committee would 
now consist of the relevant department manager and other specialists in the department, as 
well as HR représentatives. Once again, however, the committee could only make 
recommendations: this time to the employment committee, a smaller version of the 
operating committee. In the case of posts below managerial levels, the final décision was 
made by the employment committee. However, for higher level appointments, the 
employment committee would refer its recommendations to the operating committee for 
final approval. In commenting on thèse new procédures, the HR officer noted: 
'Recruitment is not as centralised as before.... Now there isn 't a chair of 
the board of directors to décide oh recruitment. Now there is one 
employment committee and the operating committee. Now, the gênerai 
manger/CEO is one member of the operating committee '. 
It should be noted, however, that both the new job descriptions and the type of employées 
recruited were influenced by the parent company and reflected its gênerai approach 
regarding recruitment and sélection. For example, the senior vice président of human 
resources and communications noted that: 
'We recommend that subsidiaries have job descriptions for the range of 
différent types of jobs in the company...We show to our subsidiaries the 
types and profiles of employées a Telecom Operator needs, in terms of the 
levels of educational studies and skills... So we explain to them how the 
parent company evolved and what the future needs are for us, in terms of 
the profiles and activities that we have to cover. So we give them advice 
in terms of the profiles they need and the type of jobs they need.... This 
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also helps them to plan and arrange with schools and collèges in the 
country the type of people they need in two or threeyears time '. 
Another important feature of the new recruitment policy was its emphasis on internal 
recruitment, either from the subsidiary or the wider parent Company, to the point where the 
organisation would only recruit from the extemal market i f no suitable candidates were 
found intemally. The following quote made by the Human Resources officer illustrâtes 
this: 
'Now we are very hard on internal recruitment. So, for example, when the 
marketing people tell me they want people, we launch advertisements 
internally to find the competency. We don't go outside In the 
recruitment policy, really, they have specified one important thing: 
whenever it is possible, internal recruitment should be used and if we 
don 't find- the competency internally then we go outside. They have 
specified this in the HR policy '. 
This emphasis on internal recruitment echoed the parent Company's policy regarding 
internal recruitment. Thus, to overcome the problem of overstaffmg, the parent Company 
was advising its subsidiaries to first seek internal recruits and only employ from the 
external market i f the competency was not found internally. In relation to this policy, the 
vice HR director at corporate headquarters observed that: 
'In recruitment we are overstaffed in the main branch so we'll say to the 
subsidiaries please make sure thaï there is no one in the Group who can 
do the job. If you have equality in competency between someone Coming 
from outside and someone Coming from inside, please take the one from 
inside '. 
Performance Appraisal 
Before 1997, performance appraisal was implemented in the organisation according to the 
civil service régulations and did not include any targets or objectives. Appraisal was 
considered to be a formality and was carried out by department managers. It was also 
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based on relations and favouritism, and almost every one was rated excellent, as there 
were no limits on the number of employees who obtained the different ratings. 
In 1997, and in preparation for privatisation, the company's employees, an external 
consultancy and the HR department worked on a new appraisal system. The main 
objectives of this new scheme were to identify employees1 training needs, to strcngthen 
the relationship between the managers and their subordinates, and to incorpórate a 
management by objectives system, and reinforce career development and succession 
planning, However, the board of directors decided to link performance to pay, which 
according to the former assistant personnel manager, was not originally intended. Thus, in 
commenting on this, the former assistant personnel manager, noted: 
'The main áreas that we worked on in preparation for privatisation were: 
performance appraisal, career development, succession planning, and 
training needs. The main aim was to develop the employees through 
performance appraisal and to recognise their needs. But the top 
management changed this and linked it to annual increments, this 
distorted the objective of the performance appraisal because it was 
intended that the employees would come to the interview and be prepared 
to talk about their needs so that we can help them, not only because I want 
to give them an increment or punish them, it is not a punishment tool. But 
the board linked it with the annual increment and it became performance 
relatedpay. We didn V want it to be directly related to pay'. 
As a result, when introduced, the new appraisal scheme served four main purposes. First, 
to provide an evaluation of the skills and competencies of the employees. Secondly, to set 
objectives and review performance against these objectives. Thirdly, to enable training 
needs to be identifíed. Fourthly, to provide a method for linking pay to individual 
performance. 
The introduction of management by objectives was consídered to be a major change in the 
organisation. Thus, the HR chief officer observed that: 
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'A performance appraisal system was suggested, then was adopted and 
implemented by the company. It was completely different from the one 
which existed befare during the civil service system, as the company's 
objectives were stated as well as the employees' objectives... '. 
However, although management by objectives was introduced in 1997, the process was 
not really used, since many people did not understand it and were not convinced about its 
valué. In a similar vein, the arrangements proposed for career and succession planning 
were not applied. In part, for very similar reasons, but also because of their impractibility 
against the backcloth of uncertainty about whether privatisation was going to occur and 
therefore, what the future needs of the organisation were. 
However, after privatisation, in 2000/2001, management by objectives was activated and 
people were appraised according to the achievement of their targets. For example, the 
outside planning and development manager noted: 
'The appraisal is based on objectives ...This was applied since 1997 but it 
was not effective or the people were not really held accountable for their 
appraisal until the French carne. When the French carne targets became 
clearer and functional and people are now appraised according to the 
achievement of these targets'. 
Similarly, career management, high-flier and succession planning policies were applied 
when the new management took over and these were linked to appraisal and training and 
development. Thus, the HR chief officer observed that: 
'Appraisal by objectives is now more functional....Succession planning 
was an idea. Now there is a written policy and we started to apply this 
idea in 2000.... Career management was an idea. Now we improving it 
through a new career management system and a generic training plan. So 
now the policy is progressing and may be it will be finalised by the first 
quarter of 2002. We started early this year (2001).... for high fliers...now 
it is applied'. 
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These changes were in line with the common principies that the parent company 
impíemented in its subsidiarles. For example, the sénior vice president of human resources 
and Communications at corporate headquarters stated: 
'...¡Ve recommend to our subsidiarles to introduce a real system of 
evaluation connected lo compensation.... But there is one domain where 
we interfere more — it is about the high potential people. We want to 
develop with our subsidiarles the Identification and deveiopment of high 
potentials (HPs). For example, in Jordán the detection of high potential 
people in Jordán Telecom. Because we think that sometimes it will be very 
important for HP people to go to another subsidiary and we may send one 
Jordanian to France to learn how to do marketing or IT So we interfere 
but it is more on the management of high potential people than anyihing 
else. ...Also career management and succession planning are other things 
that we introduce in the subsidiarles...'. 
Training and deveiopment 
Before 1997 there was a training department and the Télécommunications Training 
College, which was non-residential and located some 12 kms from TCC headquarters. The 
télécommunications collège was a training centre and catered mainly for engineering and 
technician training. 
Overall, the training delivered in the company was engineering oriented and there was an 
apparent lack of commercial and financia! type courses. In addition, overseas training was 
very limited and was linked to the availability of scholarships and external fundmg in the 
form of aid from other countries or international companies. 
Düring the préparation for, as well as after privatisation, significant changes were made to 
these training and deveiopment arrangements. In this section, these changes are detailed 
through an exploration of the reforms introduced with regards to the training undertaken at 
the subsidiary level and the use made of overseas training. 
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Subsidiary Level Training 
In preparation for privatisation, it was decided that the telecommunications college should 
become part of the training department. During this period, new training policies and 
programmes were also developed to change the empioyees' mentahty and attitudes to 
work. As a result, the training budget was increased and a wide range of intensive training 
courses were developed, particularly in the customer care and customer services áreas, ln 
addition, a process to involve line managers in the design, delivery and evaluation of 
training was introduced, and the scope and responsibilities of the training college were 
redefined to include management and computer applications training. 
The majority of the training was held at the training centre. More specifically, 80% of the 
training was held in the centre while 20% was extemally delivered domestically by local 
Jordanian institutions, and overseas. However, according to the adviser to the chairman 
and a member of the board, there was no coordination and training was not compulsory. 
As a result, only 20% of the empioyees generally attended the courses voluntarily. Thus, 
he noted: 
'The training department prepares the training programme. They will 
make a general inquiry and get feed back and then announce the training 
programme. No more than 20% will go to the course unless top 
management clearly instructs it'. 
After privatisation, on 1 August 2000, it was decided to again sepárate the training 
department from the training centre and, as a result, two sepárate departments were 
formed, each headed by a manager. Subsequently, the training department employed ten 
people and the training centre consisted of 48 people. The training department dealt with 
training planning and evaluation, and the provisión of external training. Meanwhile, the 
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training centre continued to carry out the same function of providing intemal training to 
the employees. 
Al l respondents interviewed confirmed that since privatisation the training in the company 
had increased and that it was available to all employees. For example, the administration 
department managers observed that: 'We see them training everybody in the company -
the technicians, the managers and the administration...'. In a similar vein, the HR chief 
ofñcernoted: 
They give training to all categories...Group four needed minimal 
training. As for group two this represenís the potential for higher 
management and there is a lot of concentration on them. The first and 
third groups they also concéntrate on them. So they really concéntrate on 
the first three categories '. 
This expansión in training was reflected in the training budget. The actual budget 
increased from JD 259,000 in 1999 to JD 832,000 in 2000, and the estimated training 
budget for 2001 was JD 1,200,000. This increase in training reflected the sigmficance of 
training to both the govemment and the parent company2. On the one hand, according to 
the former deputy director general for strategic planning and corporate relations, in line 
with the agreement with the govemment, the strategic partner was required to provide 
training to employees, especially in management áreas such as administration, fmancial 
systems, customer services, sales and marketing and business planning. On the other hand, 
the parent company viewed training as an essential component of its strategy. Thus, every 
member of the Group was expected to spend at least nine days a year undergoing training. 
For example, the training and development coordinator of international programmes in 
France noted: 
'We spend around 7% of our total expenses on training. We spend a lot of 
money on training and it is really an important parí of the strategy of the 
company...The new employees alsogetspecific training when theyjoin the 
parent company. We put a lot of effort into training'. 
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In addition to the increase in training expenditure, a more systematic approach was also 
adopted towards the identification and assessment of training needs and the new training 
policy was linked to career planning and promotion. Thus, for a person to be promoted 
from one position to another, he/she had first to undertake a set of training courses, either 
managerial or technical, depending on the job. However, later on, in 2001, the training 
policy was refined and a new training system was put in place. 
Under the new system, generic training plans, based on the job descriptions of the 
employees, were designed for each of the around 250 posts in the company. The generic 
plan therefore detailed the necessary training courses for each of the company's 
employees. Subsequently, each department matched the generic plan for each position 
with the training records of individuals and accordingly decided on the training courses 
that should be undertaken by each employee. In relation to these recent changes, the 
training department manager noted: 'now there is procedure not like before. Now we have 
a training plan and this plan is based on the training needs of the employees. In a similar 
vein, the HR chief officer observed that: '...Training has changed tremendously. It turned 
from black to white. Before there were no plans and no objectives'. 
It must also be noted that the implementation of these changes was facilitated by the 
introduction of departmental budgets, which allowed flexibility and freedom of decision­
making. Thus, the training department manager observed that: 
'If the training courses are internal or local then they are within the 
training plan. For every department there is a budget and so it is possible 
to train the employee without referring to anyone...The training 
department arranges for internal and local training courses within the 
training plan and chooses the provider'. 
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Overseas Training and Networking 
During the transitiori period for privatisation, overseas training increased but conünued to 
be at a low level, since it only amounted to 2% of total training received. For example, the 
training department manager observed in relation to this, that: 'overseas training was a 
tragedy and most of it was scholarships/aid'. 
After privatisation, overseas training increased tremendously and this was reflected ín the 
increase in the proportion of training expenditure spent on such training. For example, at 
the time of the interview in August 2001, out of the JD 1,200,000 estimated training 
budget, the company had already spent JD 550,000 on training. Out of this JD 550,000, 
the company had spent JD 300,000 on overseas training and this figure was expected to 
reach JD 500,000 by the end of the year. Consequently, the HR chief officer noted: 
¡Ve have never sent people for training abroad as much as we have in 
theyears 2000 and 2001, in terms ofbulkand money.... Overseas training 
has increased by 500% more than befare. They are very open with regard 
to this and they consider that any training given to any employee in the 
company is a gain to the company...'. 
Against this background of expansión, overseas training in the company carne to consist of 
three components. First, training on new equipment that had been purchased from abroad, 
which involved employees being sent to the source company. Secondly, participation in 
workshops, seminars and conferences held overseas. Thirdly, attendance at specialised 
training courses to leam about modem technical, managerial, and financial techniques. 
Consequently, the company's overseas training activities were not only focussed on the 
provisión of 'technical skills', but also on supporting the broader process of management 
and cultural reform, and the company's objectives of preparing local staff to take over in 
the future. As a result, most of the overseas training was provided to the first and second 
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catégories of the employées who had potential to progress in the company and assume 
managerial positions and, to a lesser extent, to the technicians from the third category. 
Thus, the administration department manager noted: 'In overseas iraining they usually 
concentrate on the managers and section heads and some technicians '. 
The use of overseas training was also and relatedly, used to give participants an 
opportunity to form networks, share information and develop a multi-cultural mentality. 
For example, spécial development courses were held for managers from différent 
functions and areas to share information and learn from each other. Thèse programmes 
were run in English in order to internationalise the Group. In relation to this, the training 
and development coordinator of international programmes at corporate headquarters 
noted: 
'The aim is to put people together and mix the participants from différent 
areas so at the end it is for them to share information and learn from each 
other. So it is based on the learning community principle... The company is 
international but now we have to make the people international and make 
them feel they belong to an international company, so we have thèse 
programmes to open their minds on this international activity...It is to 
develop a multi-cultural environment which is not yet very much obvious 
within the parent company '. 
However, despite the significant importance that the parent company attached to training 
and development, it had developed a decentralised approach towards it. As a resuit, the 
subsidiaries were free to plan and design their training programmes as they saw suitable 
and were able to décide their own training expenditure and budgets locally. Thus, the 
training and development coordinator of the international programmes at headquarters 
observed that: 
"There is no gênerai policy regarding subsidiaries and Jordan Telecom is 
not différent to the other subsidiaries...Acquiring new companies is quite 
new and things are done on an individual basis as far as training and the 
movement of personnel are concerned, so far. The subsidiaries are free to 
train their staff the way they think is most appropriate, either using the 
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parent company's trainingprogrammes or other trainingprogrammes. If 
there are exchanges of managers, it is done on an individual basis again '. 
This decentraüsed approach to training and development was also illustrated by the sales 
and marketing chief executive, who confirmed that the subsidiary in Jordán was very 
autonomous in deciding on its training programmes. For example, he noted: 
'...The management here have a large autonomy. So if we need training in 
France, we ask for training in France. If we need somebody from the 
parent company, we ask for them. If we need to train somebody in 
Switzerland, we go to Switzerland. Here we have a very large autonomy'. 
However, despite this perceived autonomy and decentralised approach towards training 
and development, the nature of the training activities in the subsidiarles was influenced by 
the parent company through its advice on the type of qualifications, competencies and 
profiles needed in the subsidiaries. In relation to this, the sénior vice president of HR and 
Communications observed that: 
' ...We influence the training and development in the subsidiaries because 
we give them advice in terms of the profiles they need or the type of jobs 
they need. This means that we influence the type of training they organise 
but they decide directly. But we give advice before'. 
It seemed that this advice was partly transferred through the exchange of visits between 
subsidiary and parent company staff. For example, in September 2001, a training expert 
was brought in from headquarters in France in order to help design a new training policy 
and to develop new mechanisms for training in the company. Similarly, consultants from 
different ñelds were sent to identify the company's needs and the changes required and 
this influenced the training implemented. The following quote by the outside planning and 
development managers reflected this: 
"Through consultants the parent company transfers know-how....In 
outside planning now we have new criteria so people have to be trained. 
Now we have tools that we need to use more efficiently. We geí consultants 
from the parent company and they come to us and help us to identify the 
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weak points that we have to improve. Accordingly, we plan our training 
schedules and we budget for them and then we execute such training '. 
Rewards 
Before 1997, the employees were subject to civil service pay scales. Annual increments 
were automatic and promotions were based on length of service and seniority. On 1 
January 1997, and in preparation for privatisation, all the employees received a 10% 
increase in their salaries and they became entitled to 13 t h and 14 lh months' salaries, as of 1 
January 1998. At the same time, there was a move away from the payment of annual 
increases on the basis of length of service and seniority and towards performance-related 
increases. 
Under this new system, the levels of performance were rated as excellent, very good, 
good, acceptable, and weak. These ratings were then linked to annual pay increases 
ranging from 5% to 3% to 2% to 0% and 0% respectively. The employees who received an 
acceptable or weak rating were therefore, not given an increase. In addition, a warning was 
given to the person with a weak rating. At the same time, a limit was put on the numbers 
of employees who were able to receive particular levels of annual increase. Thus, in each 
department a maximum of 7.5% of the employees were entitled to receive an excellent 
rating, a maximum of 30% of employees could receive a very good rating and a maximum 
of 45% could receive a good rating. These ratings and limits are summarised in Table 7.3 
below. 
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Table 7.3 Appraisal Ratings, Limits and Related Pay Increases 
Leveh of 
Evaluation 
l \' ' ' 
% ' . 
of employées 
in each levé! 
of animal increase 
Excellent 7.5% 5% 
Very Good 30% 3% 
Cood 45% 2% 
Acceptable/Weak 0% 
After privatisation, initially the limits on the number of employées in each department 
who could receive a particular rating were changed as shown below in Table 7.4. But the 
percentage of annual increases remained the same. 
Table 7.4 Annual Increase, Ratings and Limits: 1998 and 2000. 
Levels of évaluation 
(Ratings) 
% of employées in 
each dept. in 
1998 
% of employées in 
each dept. in 
2000 
% of annual 
increase 
Excellent Max. 7.5 % Max. 5% 5% 
Very good Max. 30% Max. 25% 3% 
Good Max. 45% Max. 70% 2% 
Acceptable/fair 0% 
Weak 0% 
Subsequently, in March 2000, a new pay scale was introduced which was based on 
matching salary scales with job descriptions. The main criteria used for this purpose were 
educational qualifications and expérience. Thus, the HR Chief Officer stated: 
'The pay scale and incréments have been determined based on the job. 
Also they were based on the marketing survey conducted...Based on the 
gênerai situation of the Jordanian market...and according îo the gênerai 
économie situation in Jordan.... Expérience and éducation are the only 
parameters '. 
Consequently, the pay levels were set according to the degree of importance of each post 
and its worth in the market if the employée went to another company. For example, it was 
noted that some engineers were leaving the company because of higher salaries offered 
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elsewhere (See former détails on page 264). Thus, the health insurance section head and a 
member of the trade union noted that: 
'...in fact the engineers in the Company started to resign to go to other 
companies in the private sector. So if I have an engineer with 10 years 
expérience he must be rewarded andgiven the salary he deserves...So the 
salaries of some of the engineers were improved and we are still seeking , 
to increase the salaries of some other engineers '. 
The new pay scale was applied in three stages. First, in April 2000, all Company 
employées received a 3% increase in their gross salaries. Secondly, on 1 June 2000, the 
new salaries of the third and fourth catégories - technical and supportive jobs - were 
introduced. Finally, on 1 August 2000, the pay scales for the fïrst and second groups -
managerial and specialist jobs - were introduced. If, according to the new pay scale, an 
employée would receive a lower salary than before, it was provided that he or she would 
continue to receive the higher salary. In addition, ail employées continued to be entitled to 
the 13 l h and 14th months' salaries. 
In 2001, further changes occurred in both the limits placed on the proportion of employées 
who could receive a given performance rating and the pay increases that were associated 
with thèse changes. As can be seen from Table 7.5 below, the effects of thèse changes 
were to further restrict the number of employées who could get excellent and very good 
ratings and to increase the pay increases that could be awarded in respect of the top three 
levels of performance. These changes were intended to provide employées with a greater 
motivation to improve performance. 
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Table 7.5 Revised Appraisal Ratings, Limits and Related Pay Increases 
Excellent 3% 10-15% 
Very Good 25% 5-10% 
Good 62% 3-5% 
Fair & Weak 10% 0% 
The above objective was, moreover, to be fiirther pursued via the future introduction of a 
variable bonus scheme. The new bonus scheme would be based on the company's 
performance and involve a lump sum percentage of profits being distributed to all the 
employées once a year, according to their performance. 
These changes to pay arrangements were accompanied by the adoption of a more 
systematic approach to promotion. This involved the introduction of a new point System 
under which the employées were given points according to the level of their performance 
appraisal. Thus, Excellent, very good, and good ratings were awarded 4,3, and 2 points 
respectively, while acceptable and weak received zéro points. Once an employée had 
received 12 points, he/she then qualified to be promoted i f a vacancy was available, a 
process that could take three years, instead of five as previously was the case. 
Consequently, this System enabled the organisation to detect high fliers and employées 
with high potential and promote them over a shorter period of time to the required 
positions in the Company. Thus, according to the HR chief officer, as the following quote 
shows, promotion was linked not only to appraisal but also to career development and 
succession planning. He noted: 
'Before promotion was based on seniority and the number of years of 
service. There wasn 't a career plan or anything Now the person does 
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not have to complete a certain mimber of years lo be promoted. This is 
because you have high fliers who wül be promoted within three years'. 
Benefits 
With regard to benefits, when the new management took over a number of new benefits 
were introduced. These benefits included the implementation of an employees' saving 
fund under which employees could choose to pay 5% of their salaries into the fund, with 
the company matching this payment; a death compensation fund to which the company 
contributed monthly 3.5JD for each employee and the employee contributed 2.33JD; and 
an end of year service compensation scheme, where every employee would take a month's 
salary for every year he/she had served in the company. Prívate health insurance was also 
improved so that it included not only the employee but also hís/her family. Furthermore, 
the transportation alíowance, which was given to those who undertook certain jobs, 
became more flexible, so that employees could take a company car instead of a financial 
alíowance. 
Other new benefits included free subscriptions to fixed line phones, according to the 
length of service and the employee's position in the company, and free mobile phones and 
other special offers. For example, mobile phone line rentáis were free up to JD 25.00 a 
month for section heads and up to JD 50.00 for the managers. In addition, used computers 
were sold to the employees at very low prices. Furthermore, according to the payroll and 
funds manager, new benefits were also under preparation, including loans for employees 
and a housing fund that could be used to provide 'mortgages'. 
It should be noted that this increase in the benefits to the employees reflected the parent 
company's approach towards providing new benefits and financial assistance to 
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employées. For example, the senior vice président of HR and communications at corporate 
headquarters noted: 
'...We introduce new benefits for the workers....We insist on heaîth 
insurance and retirement pensions because we believe thaï the company 
has to organise a System to help employées to get money to be able to pay 
the bilis ' 
This view was confirmed by the HR chief officer in Jordan who commented: 'The French 
are very easy and they would like to give every possible needed benefit for the employées, 
wherever it is possible \ 
Communication and Consultation 
Before 1997, communication was very weak in the organisation and constituted mainly of 
instructions from higher levéis to lower levéis. In préparation for privatisation, the 
management made some greater efforts to keep the employées informed about 
developments in the company. However, during the latter part of 1997 and throughout 
1998, communication with the employées took a downward tum due to the uncertainties 
surrounding the privatisation opération. For example, the former general director noted: 
'...During this period it was dijfïcult to communicate to our employées 
something which was not clear to us actually. So how are we going to 
explain to our employées what is going to happen, when we are ourselves 
uncertain. Thaï affected the employées in various ways andforms. In fact, 
it had a négative effect '. 
By the end of 1999, communication became the responsibility of the public relations 
section, which was part of the HR department. However, communication continued to be 
weak in the company as employées continued to receive merely instructions from upper 
management, without being given much opportunity to express their own views. Thus, 
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meetings were ad hoc and the monthly newsletter was not regularly produced. Thus; the 
internai and communication section head noted: 
Ti was ail problematic because we didn 't have communication - it was 
one way, there wasn 't any echo or feed back. Just instructions from the 
management from the top...The employées did not know anything and 
what was happening to approve or disapprove or to express their views. 
They might learn about things through roumers only and what is 
transferred from one person to the other '. 
After privatisation, internai communication became the responsibility of the 
administration department, which was part of the HR division, and a new communication 
policy was introduced. Subsequently, several steps were taken to improve communications 
through such means as the use of electronic mail and mobile phones, and the launch of 
regular weekly news bulletins, which were distributed to ail of the employées and were 
also sent by electronic mail. 
Other new communications methods included the introduction of an internai Internet, 
"Intra-JTC", which was used to provide the employées with updated news and 
information. In addition, meetings between top management and ail employées were 
introduced in the company, and supervisors and managers became responsible for 
communicating the company's news and policies to their employées. Thus, seminars were 
held for managers and section heads to inform them about the new policies, who, in tum, 
communicated thèse policies and objectives to their employées. 
Thèse changes were borne out by the responses of a number of the interviewées. For 
example, the internai communication section head noted: 
'Before there were no meetings between the higher management and the 
employées. Now there are. For example, last year the CEO had a meeting 
with ail of the employées and îhis meeting was arrangea by the 
administrative department... Also the HR executive director went to the 
régions and he met ail the employées and saw their problems and ihis is 
something new. ' 
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In a similar vein, the budget and tenders manager noted: 
'Communication has changea, as I don 7 recall in the past that a meeting 
was heid between the higher management and the employées and not even 
with the managers. Now meetings are held more than one time a year with 
the employées... Now I have more responsibility to communicate the 
policies and objectives of the company to the employées...There is a 
hierarchy. There are weekly meetings between each chief officer and his 
managers and the managers are asked to meet with their subordinates to 
explain the relevant things '. 
A further step was also taken to improve communication through the introduction of 
surveys to measure employées' job satisfaction. Thus, in July 2001, a comprehensive 
employée job satisfaction survey was prepared by the marketing intelligence department, 
in coopération with the HR department, and distributed to ail the employées. According to 
the HR chief officer, the job satisfaction survey included questions about ail the HR 
policies, including pay and annual increases, promotions, performance appraisal, and 
internai communication. Similarly, the marketing intelligence department manager 
commented: 
'The survey was about the satisfaction of everything that related to the 
employées and the employées are happy about the survey because it 
indicates that the management cares about the employées. We expect thls 
survey to be conducted on a regular basis and we will see how much the 
management will improve things '. 
More generally, in commenting on the changes that occurred in the communication field 
in the company, the HR chief officer noted the following: 
"There is a révolution here. Befare there wasn 7 communication. Now we 
have bulletins and magazines, we have intranet communication, and we 
have weekly scheduled meetings between the management and employées. 
We also have social and sportive activities for the employées... We have 
présents for the employées and we have meetings for the employées and 
we have tours for the employées in the country. Thèse are arrangea by HR 
and the communication department Now there is more communication '. 
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These improvements in communicatión can be seen to reflect the emphasis the parent 
company placed on these issues. For example, the administration department manager 
noted: They concéntrate a lot on communication'. In a similar vein, the HR chief officer 
noted: 'They specified this in the HR policy, you have to be cióse to your employees, to 
know what they are doing'. 
The parent company's influence can also be seen by the management style adopted by the 
expatríate managers, who acted as the 'voice of the parent company'. This was reflected 
by the following quote made by the market intelligence manager, when commenting on 
the changes in the company: 
7feel that there are many changes. If you have an idea or suggestion the 
French accept them and possibly, if they feel that the idea is good, they 
apply it. We give many suggestions and they say good - go ahead. So we 
feel that they respect our ideas and our feedback and we find a listening 
ear to our views and ideas. In the past they would take them and throw 
them away. In the past if the person did not find any personal benefit for 
him from the suggested idea, he would not support it or adopt it. In the 
meetings they say to us we respect your ideas and we feel this'. 
Trade Unions and Employee Consultation 
Before privatisation, there were no unions and no official forms of employee 
representation. After privatisation, the JTC employees wanted to form an independent 
Telecommunications Union that would aim to represent all of the companies in the 
telecommunications sector. However, the government rejected this request and asked them 
to join an existing unión 3. Subsequently, the JTC employees wanted to join the Electricity 
unión but this request was also rejected and they were told to join the "General Trade 
Union of Workers in Public Services and Free Occupations". As a result, at the beginning 
of 2000, JTC employees joined this unión and formed a committee of eight representatives 
to represent employees. 
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According to the JTC trade union représentative and health insurance section head, the 
relationship between the union and the management was good. However, there was no 
direct contact berween the French managers and the union, as the following quote from the 
JTC union représentative and health insurance section head illustrâtes: 
'Until now the communication between the French and us are not open. 
Our line of communication now is with the HR chief officer. fie is a 
member of the operating commutée and he represents the management 
and at the same time he tries to cover the gap between the French and 
us... '. 
Nevertheless, it appeared that the union had managed to secure some changes in 
management policies. For example, when the new pay scale was impïemented, some 
employées did not benefit from the new System and remained on low salaries. The union 
consequently negotiated and agreed with the management a programme to increase the 
salaries of thèse employées in the fourth category by transferring them to the third 
category. In addition, at the time of the interview, the union représentatives were 
negotiating the position of 39 employées who were university graduâtes and had studied 
history, geography, and Arabie literarure and as a conséquence had not benefited from the 
new pay system, because they were not considered to possess the suitable qualifications 
required by the company. Furthermore, the union, together with the engineers' association, 
had negotiated with the management over the position of the new engineers in the 
company. As a resuit, the salaries of thèse staff had been increased and made compatible 
with those working in the private sector. Furthermore, at the time of the interview, the 
union and the engineers association were still seeking to increase the salaries of some 
other engineers. 
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It should be noted, however, that the management had not consulted the unión over any of 
the new policies that had been introduced. For example, the JTC trade unión representative 
noted: 
'Until now the management has not discussed with the unión any issue 
that relates to the employees....When the newpay system was introduced 
we were completely absent. Anyway at the beginning of the formation of 
the unión, the management did not know what they wanted and we didn 't 
fcnow what we wanted. So until now the unión has not shared in any 
decisión taken in JTC. There is no consultation at all....Regarding the 
policies, they have workshops and involve the section heads and the 
managers and they provide some ideas and discuss them. However, us as 
a unión, they don 't involve us at all '. 
This view was confirmed by the management who claimed that there was no reason to 
consult the unión as no real changes had been introduced in the company. The following 
quote by the HR chief officer reflects this point of view: 
'We didn 't have things or changes that necessitated consultation with 
them. We should consult them but we didn 't have real changes....If we had 
changes that would affect the nature of the work and the workers' rights 
andfeelings we would have consulted the unión.... I expect that there will 
be cooperatlon between us'. 
At the same time, other developments were taking place which were acting to increase the 
level of workforce consultation. For example, a number of new committees were formed, 
such the death and compensation committee, and the saving fund committee, which had 
unión representation. Nevertheless, despite these changes, according to the unión 
representative and administration department manager, the JTC employees still felt that 
their position vis-a-vis management was weak and that the only way to improve their 
bargaíning power was through joining the telecommunications unión and henee belonging 
to an organisation whose interests focussed exclusively on the industry rather, than one 
that sought to represent workers employed in a diverse range of sectors of employment. 
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Consequently, this issue was to be raised at a meeting with the govemment, which was 
scheduled to take place in September 2001. Thus, the JTC union représentative noted: 
'Our position with the management remains weak because we belong to 
the Occupations Union and this does not give us the power to interfère or 
take action in all matters.... Until now we are still suffering from this and 
we are continuously demanding to have our union and next month we have 
a meeting with the ministry to gain our independence because now, just 
from our Company, we have over 1400 members and the numbers. are 
increasing as currently we have 250 applications from JTC to join the 
union... '. 
Conclusion 
The Telecom Co case study described in this chapter demonstrated that a wide variety of 
changes had been made in the human resources area. A new, and better staffed, HR 
division was created which was linked directly to the operating committee of the 
Company. As regards the other changes made, thèse, as in the two other case study 
organisations, affected each of the specific areas of HR activity investigated. These 
changes included: 
• an increased use of expatriate managers and the use of a variety of short-term expatriate 
appointments; 
• the décentralisation of a number of HR responsibilities to line managers; 
• the development of new job descriptions and the associated establishment of 
recruitment and sélection criteria which stressed the need for candidates to possess 
relevant qualifications and competencies; 
• the adoption of a revised appraisal scheme that placed a greater emphasis on the 
identification of training and development needs, the identification of 'high potential' 
staff and the achievement of specified objectives; 
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• the linking of this appraisal scheme to the provision of individual performance-related 
pay and the establishment of a bonus scheme linked to company performance; 
• the taking of other action to increase salary levels; 
• a significant increase in training expenditure and activities which was supported by the 
adoption of a much more systematic approach to individual staff development; and 
• the introduction of more extensive Systems of both upward and downward internai 
communication. 
Once again, thèse reforms were basically aimed at creating a more efficient and business 
oriented organisation and re-shaping the existing organisational culture. As in Water Co 
and Cernent Co, they had also been shaped by a number of influences. 
The parent's management style, as in Water Co, did not rely heavily on the utilisation of 
detailed written policies/instructions. Instead, a number of less formai methods of 
influence and control were used. Thèse included, in addition to a detailed system of 
financial monitoring, the spécification of a number of guiding principles that subsidiaries 
were expected to comply with in such areas as recruitment and sélection, training and 
development, performance appraisal and compensation, career management, and labour 
relations. 
The function of thèse guidelines was, in tum, apparently supported by a variety of other 
channels of influence. Thèse channels included the extensive use of expatriâtes, on both a 
long- and short-term basis, to propagate central décisions and to transmit the Group's 
culture within the subsidiary. They also encompassed the extensive use of exchange visits 
between corporate head office and subsidiary staff; the holding of regular meetings 
between corporate and subsidiary managers; and the delivery of a wide range of 
international seminars and training programmes. A i l of thèse channels of information 
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exchange were aimed at not only developing local staffs' skills but also at socialising them 
into the parent company's 'way of doing things'. 
Not only were the nature of the reforms made influenced by the parent company's 
approach to the management of human resources in its subsidiaries but the same was true 
of the way in which the changes were introduced. Essentially, two aspects of the change 
process appeared to bear the halhnark of the parent company. First, its incremental and 
gradual nature, in line with parent company's view that reforms within subsidiaries would 
typically take place over a period of 18 months to three years. Secondly, the adoption of a 
participative approach to change, that reflected the parent company's general philosophy 
towards the way in which change should be introduced. 
Nevertheless, although the parent company seemed to be the driving forcé behind the 
reforms and the key shaper of the process of change, both the parent's and the subsidiary's 
actions were, to some extent, being affected by a number of local influences stemming 
from government policy, public opinión and trade unión activity. 
In the case of the government, this influence encompassed two dimensions. First, at the 
general level, the government continued to have an important influence over the running 
of the company because of the fact that it was a majority shareholder and held a number of 
positions on the board of directors. Thus, negotiations over the reforms to be introduced 
took place at board level between the parent company and government 
representatives/board members. Secondly, and more specifically, the government, as part 
of the privatisation process, laid down a number of requirements in respect of the 
provisión of training and development, the transfer of know-how from the parent company 
to the subsidiary, the long-term appointment of expatríate staff, and the avoidance of 
redundancies and lay offs during the first two years. 
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As regards the role of public opinion and the trade union, the latter, despite its recent 
formation, was found to have prompted changes to proposed policies in several areas, 
including the salaries to be paid to engineers, and some daily workers and others who did 
not benefit from the new pay structure. Similarly, in the face of political opposition to the 
privatisation of public assets, both the subsidiary and the parent company were sensitive to 
the need to avoid taking action that would endanger public opinion and hence damage 
their image and reputation. For example, this concern about political and media backlashes 
led the company to restrict the number of expatriates employed so that local citizens didn't 
feel that their national assets and employment opportunities were being taken over by 
foreigners. 
Internally, it seemed that there was little opposition from employees to the reforms being 
introduced. This appeared to be due to three main reasons. First, in preparation for 
privatisation, many of the desired changes were identified, and in part, implemented by a 
British consultant who, to a large extent, laid down the foundation for the changes desired 
by the French. As a result, many of the proposed changes were familiar to the local staff. 
Secondly, the French paid considerable attention to generating commitment to the changes 
by communicating the need for them and highlighting how they could benefit the 
employees. Thirdly, financial incentives, as already noted, were provided to the employees 
and, more generally, the company made efforts to convey to staff that it cared and 
respected them and thus added a 'humanistic touch' that had been lacking in the 
organisation previously. 
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Notes 
1 Following the completion of the fieldwork, it was reported, in a subséquent téléphone 
conversation, that the Company had implemented the bonus system and also embarked on 
an optional early retirement scheme. Information regarding this retirement scheme was 
also published in the local press on 17 January 2002 (Jordan Times, cited in EPC 2002). 
2 It should be noted that, by law, companies in Jordan have to spend at least 1% of their 
profits on training and development, otherwise this money is be given away as donation to 
local schools and universities. 
3 It may seem stränge that the employées sought the permission of the government rather 
than the 'company' to form a union. However, this reflects the more gênerai political 
situation in Jordan, together with the fact that the government remains the majority 
shareholder in the Company. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: OVERVIEW AND COMPARISON OF THE CASE STUDIES 
Introduction 
The previous three chapters provided separate detailed descriptions of the findings from 
each of case study organisations. This chapter aims to compare thèse findings in relation to 
the two key empirical objectives of the thesis, namely to investigate the H R M changes 
introduced after privatisation and to identify the factors that influenced thèse changes. 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. In the first, the changes introduced in each 
of the organisations are reviewed and compared. This is then followed by a discussion of 
the factors that acted to shape the changes and serve to explain the similarities and 
différences between them. Finally, a concluding section summarises the preceding two 
sections. 
The Changes: Their Similarities and Différences 
This section initially détails the main HR changes introduced in the three case study 
organisations after privatisation and highlights their similarities and différences in terms of 
the types of changes made and the way in which they were introduced. The changes 
concerned are summarised in Table 8.1 below. 
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Table 8.1 Reforms in the HR Function and Policies 
Water Co Telecom Co Cernent Co 
HR Function HR Division created & 
accorded more stratégie 
rôle. New HR director 
appointed and made 
member of executive 
board. 
Indirect quarterly 
monthly reports to 
corporate HR at HQ. 
New HR policies based 
on parent's common 
principles introduced. 
More décentralisation to 
line managers, 
supported by budgetary 
controls and targets. 
HR Division created & 
accorded more stratégie 
rôle. HR director 
appointed and made . 
member of Executive 
Committee. 
Indirect monthly reports 
to corporate HR at HQ. 
New H R policies based 
on parent's common 
principles introduced. 
More dévolution to line 
managers, supported by 
budgetary controls and 
targets 
HR Division created & 
accorded more stratégie 
rôle. HR director 
appointed and made 
member of Executive 
Committee. 
Direct monthly reports 
to corporate HR at HQ. 
New company-wide HR 
policies introduced. 
Annual HR review and 
action plan discussed 
with corporate HR. 
Subsidiary's career & 
succession plan 
integrated into central 
HR plan at HQ. 
More dévolution to line 
managers, supported by 
budgetary controls and 
targets 
Staffing 
Expatriâtes 6 directors of différent 
nationalities (including 
executive director), . 
appointed as members 
of executive board and 
heads of divisions. 
3 middle managers 
Extensive shott-term 
visits 
3 board members 
(including CEO) 
4 French chief officers 
(including CEO) 
appointed as members 
of operating committee 
and heads of divisions. 
4 middle managers 
Extensive short-term 
visits 
4 board members 
(including GM/CEO). 
3 directors two of Arab 
origin (including 
CEO/GM) appointed as 
members of executive 
committee and heads of 
divisions. 
2 middle managers 
HR consultant 
Extensive short-term 
Visits 
Existing Stoff At least 50% of staff 
retained 
Staff made permanent 
1" and 2ni catégories of 
staff considered people 
with high potential. 
Daily workers ended 
Staff made permanent. 
Staff divided into cadre 
& non-cadre 
Daily workers ended 
Staff 
Réduction 
Schemes 
Retumed to W A J No réduction for two 
years. (Optional early 
(retirement). 
Freeze on employment 
Voluntary early 
retirement 
Freeze on employment 
Recruirment 
& 
Sélection 
New Criteria 
Priority to W A J staff 
New recruits maximum 
of four year contracts 
Qualifications and 
Expérience - (with 
potential) 
Priority to internai staff. 
Revised job descrip­
tions. Few needed new 
recruits. 
Qualifications, 
expérience and with 
potential. 
Priority to internai staff 
Revised job descriptions 
Few needed new recruits 
Qualifications, young 
with potential 
Performance 
Appraisal 
Target setting 
Limits put on the % of 
staff per performance 
Rating 
Target setting 
Limits put on the % of 
staff per performance 
Rating 
Target setting 
Limits put on the % of 
staff per performance 
Rating 
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Training & Increase in T & D Increase in T & D Increase in T & D 
Development Overseas T & D for high Overseas T & D for high Overseas T & D for high 
potentials/managers potentials/managers potentials/ managers 
T & D to develop skills & Succession planning Succession planning 
cultural change T & D to develop skills T & D to develop skills & 
Succession planning & cultural change cultural change & 
Training the Generic training plans intégrate subsidiary. 
responsibility of the Training the Clear emphasis on 
subsidiary. responsibility of the intégration & corporate 
Parent more active in subsidiary. culture. 
the development of high Parent intervenes in Generic training plans 
Potentials. the management and Emphasis on corporate 
development of high culture 
potentials. Training the . 
responsibility of both 
the parent and the 
subsidiary 
Central corporate career 
and succession planning 
Rewards Salary increases Salary increases Salary increases 
Performance related New pay structure - New pay structure -
pay. linked job to position linked job to position 
Bonuses Performance related Performance related pay 
(No consolidation of pay Bonuses 
pay increase into basic Bonuses Promotion linked to 
salaries of seconded Promotion linked to performance 
staff) performance 
Communî- Improved two-way Improved two-way Increased two-way 
-cation communication Communication communication and 
& Emphasis on employée participation 
Consultation No Trade Union rights and benefits 
Little consultation with Strong consultation with 
T.U. T.U. 
High level of flow of 
communication with 
parent and other 
subsidiaries. 
As can be seen from Table 8.1, a lot of similarities existed between the three organisations 
in terms of the nature of changes that were being introduced. For example, expatriâtes 
were utilised extensively and appointed to key positions, and the appraisal schemes in the 
three companies were revised and based on évaluations against set targets and objectives, 
and a limit was put on the number of employées who could receive a spécifie performance 
rating. In addition, individual performance related pay Systems, as well as group bonus 
schemes, were established, to motivate better performance and efficiency. 
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In a similar vein, in each of the organisations more emphasis was placed on the issue of 
training and development, particularly in respect of the overseas training of managers and 
high potential staff, in order to both enhance technical and managerial skills and support 
the broader process of cultural reform. A l l three companies also revamped their 
communication systems to improve communication and engender greater employee 
involvement, and where trade unions existed, the management tried to establish and 
maintain good relations with them. 
More generally, new HR functions were created which were given a more strategic role in 
order to achíeve greater horizontal and vertical integration: a process demonstrated by the 
fact that the directors appointed to head these functions were made members of the 
executive committee/board responsible for the day-to-day running of the company. At the 
same time, action was taken to devolve greater HR responsibilities down to Une managers. 
At the same time, each of the organisations experienced diffículties in terms of 
implementing aspects of their reform programme. For example, all three companies had 
not gone as far as they wanted in terms of devolving HR responsibilities to line managers. 
In a similar vein, Water Co and Cement Co had yet to succeed in extending their new 
appraisal schemes to all categories of staff and Telecom Co had yet to fully operationalise 
its new bonus scheme. 
In addition, there were four áreas of difference in the findings obtained from the case 
study organisations. First, in relation to how the above reforms were determined. 
Secondly, the pace with which they were introduced. Thirdly, the use made of 
participative change mechanisms. Fourthly, the relative reliance placed on the different 
types of methods that can be used to control subsidiaries. 
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In the cases of Cement Co and Telecom Co a gradual approach to change was adopted 
whereby it was envisaged that the reform process would occur over a period of up to three 
years. In addition, these two companies seemed to put more emphasis on a participative 
process of reform rather than one driven by top management. In contrast, in Water Co, no 
working parties were established and the HR policies were designed rapidly by the 
expatríate HR director in cooperation with the executive board. 
As regards the authorship of the reforms, in both Water Co and Telecom Co a good deal of 
autonomy was given to the subsidiary, as the parent maintained mainly an advisory role 
and did not issue written instructions and guidelines. This autonomy was, however, 
constrained by the use of a number of mechanisms, including the specification of a 
number of common-guiding HR principies, the use of trusted and socialised expatríales in 
key positions, the exchange of visits between the parent and the subsidiary and the 
establishment of reporting systems. Nevertheless, the reporting relationship between the 
local and corporate HR was indirect and corporate HR did not take a direct and active role 
in the management of human resources in the subsidiaries. 
In contrast, developments at Cement Co were far more centrally determined and corporate 
HR took a more direct and active role in the management of human resources in its 
subsidiaries through the laying down of clear instructions and guidelines and the 
implementation of company-wide HR policies. This central control was furthermore, as in 
the case of Water Co and Telecom Co, supplemented by a number of more indirect 
mechanisms, including direct reporting relaüonships, the conducting of regular HR audits 
and reviews, intensive mutual visits, and training and development programmes. 
Strikingly, these observed differences accorded reasonably well with the responses that 
corporate level managers gave when asked to assess their organisation in terms of 
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Perlmutîer's (1969)/Heenan and Perlmutter's (1979) four styles of IHRM: ethnocentric, 
polycentric, regiocentric and geocentric (see question G.5 Appendix 4.9). Thus, Water Co 
was described by top management as "Polycentric", Telecom Co as "More Polycentric1' 
and Cernent Co as being mix between "Polycentric" and "Geocentric". 
More generally, as is shown in Table 8.2 below, while the companies used ail four of the 
methods of control detailed in Chapter 3, they differed with regard to the emphasis placed 
on them. For example, in terms of 'personalised central control', greater use was made of 
expatriâtes in Water Co and Telecom Co. In contrast, Cernent Co, although also making 
use of expatriâtes, placed more emphasis on control via socialisation and the création of 
information networks, as demonstrated by the higher use made of overseas training and 
the greater flows of information that occurred between subsidiaries and the parent 
company, as well as among subsidiaries Worldwide. It also exercised greater bureaucratie 
control through the préparation of detailed written policies and manuals and the existence 
of a direct reporting relationship with corporate HR. 
Table 8.2 Level and Type of Control1 
Level of personal 
Centralised control 
Level of 
Bureaucratie 
formalised control 
Level of 
Socialisation 
& networks 
Output 
control 
Water 
Co 
High Low Medium Low/medium 
Telecom 
Co 
High Low Medium Medium/high 
Cernent 
Co 
Medium/high High High High 
This last point can be clearly illustrated in the area of training and development and 
communication. Thus, in the case of Cernent Co there was a strong emphasis on the 
development of an international.cadre and to this end a central HR plan that incorporated 
ail the subsidiaries' career and succession plans was put in place. In contrast, in Water Co 
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and Telecom Co, training and development was decentralised and the subsidiarles were 
free to choose the programmes that suited them. 
Factors Influencing the Changes 
A comparison of the Fmdings from the three case studies therefore reveáis five main areas 
of similarity and différence. In brief thèse are the marked similarity that existed in terms of 
the types of HR reforms being introduced, and the différences that existed with regard to 
the way in which thèse reforms were authored, the relative use made of a participative 
approach to change, the types of methods used by the parent companies to control their 
subsidiarles, and the pace with which the desired changes were being introduced. 
Thèse five features of the fmdings appeared to reflect the influence of a number of inter-
related factors. The most important of thèse were the beliefs that senior management held 
conceming what constituted 'good and appropriate' HR. Others related to the 
characteristics of the industries in which the MNCs operated and their associated 
international stratégies and structures; the parent company's expérience in managing 
international opérations; the stratégie role of the subsidiarles and their mode of 
establishment; and a number of host country effects. The role of each of thèse factors is 
discussed below. However, their contribution to the noted similarities and différences are 
highlighted in summary form in Table 8.3 below. 
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Table 8.3 Similarities and Differences and the Factors Influencing them 
Similarities and Differences Influencing Factors 
Type of HR Reforms Management beliefs/country of origin 
Host country effects 
Subsidiary's strategic role 
Authorship of Reforms Industry characteristics and strategy 
Host country effects 
Subsidiary mode of establishment 
Approach to Reform Management beliefs/country of origin 
International experience 
Subsidiary mode of establishment 
Pace of Reform Subsidiary mode of establishment 
Host country effects 
Subsidiary's strategic role 
Management beliefs/country of origin 
Control Methods . Industry characteristics and strategy 
International experience 
Subsidiary's strategic role 
Host country effects 
Subsidiary's mode of establishment 
Corporate Management Beliefs and Country of Origin 
It was apparent that top management in each of the organisations had a set of beliefs about 
the H R M practices that were important to achieve their business objectives and were, at 
the same time, suitable to be transferred and implemented in their subsidiarles Worldwide. 
As a resuit, in Cernent Co, company-wide universal HR policies were applied. Thèse were 
considered the company's "best practice", as they were, in their terms, 'proven, accepted 
and internationally usedpolicies'. Similarly, in Telecom Co and Water Co the policies 
introduced were based on "common principies" which stemmed from the parent 
company's general policies and way of doing things to achieve their business objectives 
and organisational goals. 
What is particularly noticeable about the HR reforms introduced in the three companies is 
that they appeared to be Iinked to the Anglo-Saxon model of H R M , as demonstrated by 
their use of goal-setting performance appraisals, and individual performance-related pay. 
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In the case of Cement Co, this link with Anglo-Saxon thinking was particularly clear 
because the company had long-standing operations in the United States, and in its 2001 
annual report described itself as being primarily "Franco-American" during the period 
between the mid- 1950s until the early 1990s, after which the parent company also opened 
operations in Eastern European and Asian countries. 
Nevertheless, this process of Anglo-Saxoninsation appeared to also be shaped by aspects 
of the companiesVorganisational history and socio-cultural environment. For example, as 
illustrated earlier in chapter 7, Telecom Co's use of redeployment of staff as an altemative 
to reducing the size of the workforce echoed the approach it had adopted in France 
following the company's privatisation. In addition, and more generally, the parent 
company followed its wider corporate approach of placing considerable emphasis on 
protecting and respecting the rights of employees. This is best illustrated by the following 
quote made by the sénior vice president of HR and Communications: 
'We have some management principies. I think before we were an 
administration and our culture is very dedicated to the users and the 
respect of everybody in the company. Therefore, one of our main 
principies is to respect workers' rights and this is one of the very basic 
principies and objectives ....1 think that our multi-domestic approach is 
based on our culture too because we respect people so we believe that we 
have to adapt our policies to the local markets.... In the HR policies first 
we analyse the structure and after we recommend.... It is done in two or 
three steps...the most important thing is the rights of workers...we think it 
is very important to respect the law and respect the workers and 
eventually we organise the company with the HR... we consider that the 
HR policies have to be adapted to the company ...we have a way to 
manage the people, so we introduce our style but we take the time to 
introduce our style'. 
Similarly, in Cement Co consideration for employees and the need to reduce the negative 
effects of change were reñected in a gradual approach towards the implementation of the 
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change in the subsidiary: an approach which was seen as an attribute of the company's 
national culture. For example, the Middle East director for HR related issues noted: 
'...Lafarge is not an American company — we are not wild capitalists. We 
say that the employees are at the heart of the organisation, so it takes time 
in Lafarge culture to start and implement the change process because we 
do not want the individuáis and employees to suffer as a result of the 
changes, which are going to be conducted within the company. At any rate 
there will be resistance to change because change is painful but the 
degree ofityou can adjust, and with timeyou can do it and it can be less 
painful'. 
¡ndustry Characteristics, International Strategy and Structure 
A number of aspects of the industry sector and markets within which the companies 
operated appeared to have exerted an important influence over the human resource 
management orientation of each of the case study organisations and the extent to which 
each M N C integrated and coordinated its activities in different countries. 
In the case of Water Co, it appeared that the prime factor that infiuenced the parent 
company's approach towards the management of its human resources worldwide was the 
"industry's sector/type". Thus, "Water" was considered to be a very local business and as 
a result, the parent company pursued a multi-domestic international strategy, and a 
competitive business strategy based mainly on differentiation, whereby overseas 
subsidiarles were managed as relatively independent businesses. Henee, a more 
decentralised approach was adopted towards the management of human resources 
overseas in order to achieve a higher degree of responsiveness and adaptation to the needs 
of local environments. This is best illustrated by the following quotes made by the 
international HR director at corporate headquarters: 
'We are polycentric....We are cióse to multi-domestic, We believe that 
we are decentralised and we try to behave in a decentralised way.... The 
major factor is the nature of the business. It is a community business and 
it is a local business.... Each country and each business unit is specific to 
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i/5 local environmenî...The most important factors that affected this 
approach are the nature of the industry and the fact that typically we don 't 
own the Company and don V own the assets. It is the structure of the 
market '. 
In contrast, Cernent Co was embracing a more global perspective in the pursuit of a global 
cost leadership position. Thus, despite the fact that traditionally cernent has been a local 
and multi-domestic business, the company was increasingly seeking to lay down 
international performance standards, integrate activities where possible, such as in the 
areas of marketing and information technology, and implement standardised production 
techniques to reduce costs. 
The major reason behind this shift appeared to be the internationalisation of compétition. 
As a resuit, the parent sought a relatively high degree of intégration and coordination of its 
opérations across countries through the implementation of common HRJvI policies and 
processes. At the same time, thèse policies were moderately flexible to account for légal 
and cultural différences among countries. Furthermore, the parent company appeared to 
heavily utilise control by socialisation and networks to achieve the unified corporate 
culture necessary for its intégration strategy. 
As for Telecom Co, during the study the company appeared to be operating more along 
multi-domestic lines, with a compétitive strategy mainly based on differentiation, although 
it was operating globally in some domains, such as IT, marketing and purchasing. 
However, due to increased global compétition in the industry and the accelerated 
internationalisation of the company, the M N C was moving towards adopting a more 
global approach. Consequently, it was reviewing its organisational structure, Systems and 
processes, including its approach to the management of its human resources Worldwide, in 
a way that would allow more internai consistency. However, the volatility of the market 
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and the need for quick decision-making, also meant that more responsibility was being 
given to subsidiaries to enable them to respond to changes in the market more effectively. 
It therefore appeared that the companies varied in their degree of centralisation in part 
because of the différent industry sectors that they were operating in. At the same time, ail 
of them were confronting a "think global - act local paradox", albeit to différent degrees. 
Thus, they recognised the need for local responsiveness but also faced intemal pressures 
for consistency to achieve and maintain required levels of performance Worldwide. 
For example, in Cernent Co the company was faced with a tension between a désire for 
inter-unit linkage (intégration) to capture économies of scale and reduce costs, as it 
pursued a cost leadership compétitive strategy, as mentioned above, and the need to be 
locally responsive in each of its local environments Worldwide (differentiation). This is 
best illustrated by the following quote made by the senior vice président of human 
resources and intégration of the cernent division noted: 
'Our strategy is to give auionomy to local businesses because our sector 
has two characteristics. One is that it is a very local one. The second is 
that globalisation has a lot of influence in this sector.... Globalisation 
means that the market is a world market and we have to be and compete 
everywhere... When we acquire a new company we try to intégrale it in our 
group. We need to build our central group globally '. 
Similarly, Water Co, despite the high need to be locally responsive, also sought to obtain a 
standard level of performance worldwide and préserve its réputation and image. For 
example, the international HR director noted: 
'We are a fédération of local businesses operating in quite a sensitive area 
of public services.... But of course, at the end of the day we are a business 
quoted on the stock exchange and we have shareholders to satisfy, so we 
have to find that balance It is this balance between being a local 
community business but bringing everybody to the same standard of 
behaviour and performance - think local act global... We are close to 
multi-domestic. We have to have global standards but we have to 
implement them in a local context '. 
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The case was no différent with Telecom Co, as the following quote from the senior vice 
président of HR and communications illustrâtes: 
7 think we are both multi-âomestic and global.,.. Now we are more multi-
domestic but in the future, in the next two years may be, we will be more 
global.... The reason is that the market and our group are 
changing.....The factors that influenced this structure and approach are 
the competitiveness of our competitors '. 
It should be noted, however, that even within the individual companies themselves 
différent approaches were adopted depending on the sector/s that it was operating in. Thus, 
for example, in Water Co, it was indicated that in the water sector the Company was 
following a multi-domestic strategy, while it pursued a more global strategy in other 
sectors. Similarly, in Telecom co, it was reported that in the fixed Unes communication 
business the Company adopted a more polycentric/multi-domestic approach, while it 
operated more globally in other businesses such as mobiles, Internet and data processing. 
Expérience in Managing International Operations 
Water Co and Cernent Co were long established international companies. For example, in 
1998, among the world's 100 largest TNCs, Water Co was ranked 13 l h largest in terms of 
foreign assets and 63 r d on the index of transnationality, while, in 1997, Cernent Co was 
ranked 68 , h in terms of foreign assets and 23 r d on the index of transnationality (UN, 
2000:77). However, this was not the case with Telecom Co and this factor seemed to have 
had implications for it as illustrated below. 
Telecom Co had pursued an aggressive international growth strategy since its privatisation 
in 1996. Thus, within less than 6 years of its privatisation it began to operate in 75 
countries and increased its revenue from overseas opérations from 2% to almost 50%. To 
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achieve this rapid growth, initially the M N C adopted a decentralised approach to its 
subsidiaries but relied on home country expatriâtes to transfer parent company Systems 
rapidly to control the subsidiaries. However, the company came to realise that it needed to 
have more control over its subsidiaries, particularly as its international trusted home cadre 
was no longer sufficient to cover this wide expansion. Consequently, during the study the 
company embarked on a programme to create more cohérent international HR stratégies 
and policies, and to move to an organisational structure that would provide more control 
and coordination, and at the same time, gives room for manoeuvre and flexibility in 
decision-making. 
Subsidiary Characteristics 
Certain features of the subsidiaries themselves also exerted an influence. Thèse are 
considered below through an exploration of two issues: their stratégie importance and the 
mode by which they were established. 
Subsidiary 's Stratégie Importance 
Each of the Jordanian subsidiaries were starting from relatively low technological, and 
technical knowledge bases. Consequently, in part, the relatively high scale of flow of 
information and resources to them reflected the need to deal with thèse weaknesses. On 
the other hand, in each case the long-term stratégie importance of thèse subsidiaries as 
"footprints" in the région had certain implications for how the M N C s approached change 
and reform in them. As a resuit, the subsidiaries' stratégies were developed within the 
trame of the parent's overall international strategy. For example, in Cernent Co the 
gênerai manager noted: 
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'In terms ofprofits and sales the subsidiary has lüde importance...In terms 
of stratégie importance, it has high importance because it is the first 
Operation in the Middle East. Therefore, it could be the basis for market 
access and future opérations and development in the area.... When we find 
opportunities in the area and we can acquire new companies we can do it 
through Cernent Co in Jordan. We make Jordan Cernent think and develop 
in the région within the strategy of the group.... Our aim afier two or three 
years is to train and develop and prépare local people to take over...also 
potential human resources in the Jordanian Company will become 
expatriâtes and take missions overseas and train the people in the new 
companies that we acquire to integrate and join our system '. 
Similarly, Water Co was strategically very important because it was the first large contract 
in the area and could facilitate market access not only to the rest of Jordan but also to the 
whole région. Thus, aecording to the HR director, 'this represented a footprint in the 
région...and in this contract the parent Company we are looking into the future and have 
less interest in making money from this contract'. In fact, it was indicated that the parent 
Company was investing in human resources at this stage due to the future role of the 
subsidiary in the area. 
The same seemed to apply to Telecom Co. For example, aecording to the senior vice 
président for human resources and communications: 
'Jordan is very important. For us it is one of our main subsidiaries 
worldwide and it is a very important subsidiary in the région... So we may 
also say that business unit stratégies must fit into an Overall strategy 
which is decided by the Company at head Office '. 
The Strategie importance of the subsidiary was further highlighted by the Treasurer and 
Taxation manager (later finance director) who noted: 
'They want it to be a foot print for them especially in the area and in terms 
of internet and data. They want to make it the centre, as a hub, for Internet 
and data and link to other countries from here. Profits are also important 
for them. Qualifications are available in Jordan and technical people and 
staff in Jordan are well trained compared to other people in the région 
and their cost is not high. So it is a sound combination for them. (In 
summary: hub for the région and access to other markets, good 
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qualifications with lower costs. From Jordan they want to move to other 
countries such as Syria, Iraq and the Gulf States) '. 
This stratégie importance of the subsidiaries seemed to médiate the parent companies' 
désire for higher levels of control and pushed for more local responsiveness and sensitivity 
to the local environment. For example, in Cernent Co the parent Company kept its promise 
to the government and did not lay off employées for almost two years, and when it did 
reduce the size of the workforce this was done through an optional retirement scheme that 
provided reasonable compensation. Furthermore, the trade union was able to achieve a 
number of concessions, such as salary increases and changes to the new appraisal scheme, 
because the M N C did not want any conflict which could harm its réputation and interests 
in the area. 
Similarly, as a resuit of Water Co's concern about its relationship with the government, it 
did not implement all the desired H R M policies and practices immediately, such as the 
introduction of a more extensive results based reward System, and preferred to wait until 
the contract was extended. In a similar vein, at Telecom Co, the M N C agreed not lay off 
employées for two years, and later introduced an optional early retirement scheme and 
gave donations to educational and social programmes to reflect its good image and 
réputation. 
Subsidiary 's Mode of Establishment 
The three MNCs ail entered well-established organisations with their own policies and 
organisational structure and cultures. Awareness of such pressures for 'local isomorphism' 
resulted in both Cernent Co and Telecom Co adopting graduai and participative 
approaches to change, albeit that thèse approaches reflected the parent company's more 
gênerai way of incorporating acquired subsidiaries into their opérations. Thus, initially, no 
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or very limited, changes were introduced and efforts were made to reduce resistance and 
generate commitment on the part of the workforce to such changes through the 
establishment of working parties. More generally, in both companies it was envisaged that 
the change process would take place over a period of up to three years. 
The situation was slightly different in the case of Water Co, which had to introduce the 
changes relatively faster than the other two organisations because it was constrained by the 
four-year contract and the need during this time to implement improvements in order to 
demonstrate its value to the government. Accordingly all the new HR policies were 
designed immediately after privatisation, although the implementation of some of these 
policies was delayed due to situational factors, such as the departure of the expatriate HR 
director and the need to train line mangers on the use of the new appraisal scheme. 
Furthermore, since the M N C did not own the company and the management contract was 
only for a limited period, the company decided not to apply its international transfer policy 
to Jordan, and it also placed relatively less emphasis on training and development and the 
creation of a strong corporate culture. 
The Host Country Influences 
A number of features of the local environment also seemed to play a role in influencing 
the H R M strategies adopted by the three MNCs. These can usefully be considered under 
two headings. First, the surrounding political environment and the role of the government. 
Secondly, broader legal, socio-cultural and economic factors. 
Political Environment 
Concerns about public opposition to privatisation were reflected in government policies 
and conditions that not only sought to control the behaviour of the MNCs but also to 
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protect the rights of the employees, allay public concerns over the relinquishing of 
national assets to foreigners, and demónstrate that the introduction of foreign companies 
could contribute to the development of the country through, for example, the transfer of 
know-how. 
Three main actions were taken by the govemment to achieve these objectives. First, the 
govemment imposed requirements of some local ownership. Henee, for example, Water 
Co and Telecom Co had to form consortiums and partnerships with local firms in order to 
conclude their deals with the govemment. The govemment also sold some of its shares to 
the local staff, as was the case in Cement Co and Telecom Co. Secondly, the govemment 
made agreements with each of the firms in order to ensure the transfer of know-how and 
the development of local staff. Thirdly, the govemment imposed post-privatisation 
conditions, such as restrictions on redundancies and limitations on the number of 
expatriates employed. 
A l l of these govemment actions had obvious implications for what the companies did in 
terms of human resource management. Nevertheless it needs to be recognised that the 
degree of govemment influence varied between the companies according to way in which 
the privatisation had been carried out. 
The privatisation strategy adopted by the govemment and thus, the mode of establishment 
and operation of the three firms were different. In the case of Water Co, it was privatised 
through the award of a four-year management contract which was financed by a World 
Bank Loan. This contractual agreement therefore provided the govemment and the World 
Bank with an opportunity to impose a variety of contractual conditions relating to such 
matters as performance, staffing, training and development and rewards, as illustrated in 
chapter 5. On the other hand, Telecom Co and Cement Co were both privatised through 
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the sale of shares to stratégie partners. Thus, the government had less incentive to lay 
down many conditions since both the government and the new MNCs had représentation 
on the board of directors and décisions were therefore taken jointly. For example, during 
the study, the new management in Cernent Co did not consolidate a number of allowances 
into basic pay because other board members were not yet convinced about îts desirability. 
The privatisation strategy adopted and the degree to which the government sought to 
exercise control also reflected différences in the industry sectors concemed. For example, 
maintaining a relatively tight control over Water Co via the management contract was 
important for the government because the water sector was considered to be essential and 
therefore had political significance. The situation was différent with Cément Co and 
Telecom Co, as they were operating in sectors which were considered to be more 
commercially based, and non-essential, activities. In addition, both companies were losing 
their monopoly powers as the government opened up both sectors to compétition, with the 
resuit that it was seen as necessary to give the companies the freedom to opérate on a more 
commercial and compétitive basis. 
Accordingly, it was found that the government gave a freer hand to the new management 
teams in thèse companies than was the case at Water Co. Thus, in the case of Telecom Co, 
the main conditions imposed by the government related to the composition of the 
executive operating committee and the number of expatriâtes employed, a prohibition on 
the dismissal of employées for two years and a requirement that the new company 
provided training to employées and transferred know-how. Meanwhile, in Cernent Co the 
main conditions were Usted in a technical agreement which specified the number of 
expatriâtes to be appointed, and required the transfer of know-how, and the training and 
development of local staff. The company did, however, in seeking to buy the company and 
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allay govemment fears about unemployment and related potential social and political 
problems, promise the govemment not to make extensive lay offs, to preserve the 
environment and to abide by the country's laws and regulations. 
Legal, Socio-Cultural and Economic Environment 
The choice of the H R M strategy was also influenced by the legal environment. The legal 
frameworks relating to the companies were different. In Water Co, the seconded 
empfoyees were still subject to civil service regulations and pensión arrangements. 
Therefore, the new company was restricted as to what it could do with these employees. 
On the other hand, Telecom Co was registered as a company and was operating on a 
commercial basis prior to privatisation and, as a consequence, of this the majority of the 
employees had already been transferred to it and henee were covered by general labour 
and company laws. Similarly, Cement Co was a registered company operating on 
commercial basis and the employees were already subject to the general labour and 
company laws. Henee, it was easier for the incoming management to adjust and/or 
introduce new policies, such as early retirement schemes. 
Nevertheless, Cement Co was unable to extend working hours due to the union's use of 
labour law regulations to oppose this. Similarly, in the case of Water Co, the British 
director agreed on the carrying forward of annual leaves for more than one year, despite 
his opposition to this, because this was allowed under govemment regulations. 
The socio-cultural and economic situation of the country also seemed to influence the 
MNC's strategies. The decisions of the companies to avoid redundancies but instead to 
reduce the workforce by means of optional retirement schemes partly reflected an 
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awareness of the relatively high unemployment and the role íhat these previously publicly 
owned enterprises played in providing employment to many citizens for social reasons. 
The cultural factor also was taken into consideration and affected the way and speed in 
which the desired practices were transferred to the operating units. For example, since the 
Jordanian subsidiaries had all been run in an authoritarian management style it was 
decided not to delégate HR responsibilities to Une management rapidly because the MNCs 
felt it was necessary to First change the attitudes and mindsets of the people and train them. 
Furthermore, in Cement Co, the company's attempt to introduce a meal for the employees 
and extend the working hours was opposed not only for legal reasons but also for cultural 
reasons since the employees preferred to go home at an earlier time to have lunch with 
their families in accordance with Jordanian traditions. 
Conclusión 
In this chapter the three case study organisations were compared and contrasted to 
highlight the similarities and the differences in the H R M reforms pursued and 
implemented in the Jordanian operating units after privatisation, as well as the factors that 
influenced the introduction of these changes. 
The findings from these case studies exhibit both marked similarities and signiñcant 
differences. In terms of similarity, the MNCs were found to be revising organisational 
structures and policies and seeking to support these reforms with attempts to re-shape 
existing organisational cultures. It was also found that in each of the three case study 
organisations the reforms being introduced were essentially aimed at making the acquired 
companies more business and target oriented and to this end incorporated iniüatives to 
improve existing selection and appraisal procedures, establish closer linkages between pay 
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and performance, improve communication and participation, and introduce more devolved 
and decentralised management structures. In addition, expatriâtes were being widely 
employed to develop and implement thèse reforms, and training and development 
activities were being extensively used to provide employées with necessary skills and 
knowledge and as a central part of attempts to engender supportive attitudinal changes. 
The three companies seemed to share the belief that expatriâtes are the quickest way to put 
in place policies and procédures and socialise local staff. However, particularly, in the HR 
area, they also seemed to believe that the existence of a strong local HR director who is 
knowledgeable and familiar with the local culture and régulations is essential to the 
process of change management. 
At the same time, marked différences existed with regard to how the above reforms were 
being determined. Thus, in "Water Co while the parent company used expatriâtes 
intensively, those appointed to senior management positions were accorded considerable 
freedom and discrétion as to the precise policies and local management style that were to 
be adopted. Water Co also seemed to adopt a relatively faster approach to change and 
there was no participation form the local staff in designing the policies. 
In contrast, developments at Cernent Co, notwithstanding the use made of participative 
working parties, were far more centrally determined and embodied far clearer attempts to 
incúlcate a 'corporate culture'. The situation in Telecom Co seemed to lie in between the 
other two organisations. Thus, while the M N C allowed a good deal of local discrétion and 
used working parties to design the HR policies, it closely monitored the development of 
the HR policies and gave constant advice to the subsidiary. 
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It should be noted, however, that although the relationship between the parent and the 
subsidiar/ seemed relatively more informal and decentralised in both Water Co and 
Telecom Co, in both companies the subsidiaries had to apply common HR principies. 
These similarities and differences seemed to reflect the influence of a number of factors. 
First, perhaps the most importan! was similar top management beliefs about the H R M 
policies and practices that could be diffused to their subsidiaries worldwide in order to 
achieve wider corporate objectives: beliefs that appeared to be strongly influenced by 
Anglo-Saxon notions of what constitutes good H R M practice. However, the MNCs ' 
approach to H R M was also influenced by their corporate cultures and organisational 
histories, which led them, for example, to implement gradual change and manage by 
consensus rather than confrontation. 
The industry characteristics also appeared to exert an important influence over the 
corporate human resources strategies of the MNCs. Thus, while none of the three 
companies were engaged in markets conducive to highly integrated approaches to either 
production or the delivery of services, both Cement Co and Telecom Co did face 
competition from other cement manufacturers and Telecom operators. As a result, and in 
contrast to the situation at Water Co, where the main priority was to comply with the 
requirements of its management contract, Cement Co did see the need to have centrally 
determined and integrated management systems in place that would ensure competitive 
levéis of production efñciency. In a similar vein, against the background of increasing 
competition, Telecom Co was also taking steps to increase the degree of intemal 
consistency. 
Another factor which seemed to have an impact on the way the MNCs managed the 
subsidiaries was the strategic importance attached to them and the degree of their 
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dependence on trie parent company. Thus, as the subsidiarles in Jordán lacked technical 
and technological know-how and managerial expertise, this entailed a high ílow of 
resources from the parent. At the same time, the long-term strategic importance of the 
subsidiaries as footprints in the región led to the adoption of a cautious approaches 
towards the mangement of human resources in order not jeopardise future expansionary 
prospects. 
The way the subsidiary was established also influenced the pace and degree to which the 
reforms were introduced. Thus, taking over already established subsidiaries led to the 
adoption of gradual and participative approaches to change in both Cement Co and 
Telecom Co. In contrast, the pace of change was relatively faster in Water Co due to the 
limited time period of the management contract. 
A number of features of the local environment also seemed to play a role in mediating the 
H R M strategies adopted by the three MNCs. These included attempts by the governmem 
to influence, for political reasons, the activities of the MNCs through such means as the 
retention of some degree of ownership, the imposition of contractual requirements, and the 
securing of other commitments from the three Frenen companies conceming certain 
aspeets of their future behaviour. They also included an increased abílity of trade unions, 
against the backeloth of the political concems about privatisation, to restrict the actions of 
the MNCs, the requirements of local employment and social security laws, and constraints 
arising from wider social and cultural considerations within both the subsidiaries and 
Jordanian society as a whole. 
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Notes 
' Table 8.2 is based on the framework developed by Harzing, A. (1999; 2000b). A 
distinction has been made by Harzing between bureaucratic formalised control and output 
control. The first refers to pre-specifying, mostly in a written form the behaviour that is 
expected from the employees. Thus, it includes written policies and manuals, rules and 
regulations. Output control refers to specifying goals/results/outputs and monitoring them 
through reporting systems. 
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CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, the overall aim and related objectives of the study are initially reviewed. 
The key findings that emerged rrom the two literature chapters and the case study research 
are then highlighted. Following this, attention is paid to how thèse findings relate to 
existing knowledge conceming the human resource stratégies and policies of MNCs. 
Finally, the last section discusses the présent study's limitations and, in the light of thèse, 
identifies possible avenues of future research. 
The Aim and Objectives 
The primary aim of the study was to examine the impact of foreign ownership/control on 
the H R M policies and practices of three Jordanian companies taken over by French MNCs 
under the Jordanian govemment's privatisation programme. More specifically, at the 
outset of the study, four key objectives were defined: 
Objective 1: to examine the nature and scale of privatisation policies in Jordan, including 
the rôle played by foreign companies; 
Objective 2: to review the literature on multinational human resource stratégies; 
Objective 3: to investigate how foreign ownership/control arising from privatisation has 
affected the H R M policies and practices of Jordanian companies; and 
Objective 4: to analyse the variables that have influenced the adoption of thèse 
H R M policies and practices in the privatised companies 
Accordingly, the nature and scale of the privatisation process in Jordan were described in 
chapter 2 and the literature on multinational human resource stratégies was reviewed in 
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chapter 3. Following this, the changes in the H R M policies and practices of the privatised 
companies and the factors that had influenced those changes were described, analysed and 
compared ¡n chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
The Key Findings 
Following an economic crisis in 1989, the Jordanian government initiated a programme of 
privatisation during the early 1990s as part of an economic restructuring plan under the 
guidance of the IMF and the World Bank. However, no real progress was made on this 
programme for a number of related reasons: a lack of political consensus within 
government about the desirability of privatisation; a failure to créate an infrastructure 
through which the programme could be effectively taken forward; and social concerns 
particularly, about potential labour redundancies, in the overstaffed public enterprises. 
Subsequently, the World Bank published a report in 1995 in which it urged the 
government to speed up the privatisation process. Accordingly, in 1996, the government 
developed a new privatisation programme and a strategy to implement it. The first major 
privatisation transaction subsequently took place in November 1998, and so far six out of 
the eight privatisation transactions identifíed in the first phase of the programme have been 
completed. 
As regards the literature review on the human resource strategies of multinationals, this 
revealed that four broad themes domínate it. First, the nature of the overall international 
human resource management strategies of multinational companies. Secondly, the types 
of factors that influence the choice and adoption of these strategies. Thirdly, the modes of 
control utilised to implement them. Fourthly, the extent to which the H R M practices of 
MNCs are converging or diverging against the backcloth of globalisation. 
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With regard to the first issue, it was found that various attempts have been made to 
catégorise M N C s ' human resource stratégies through the construction of typologies. The 
first such typology was developed by Perlmutter (1969). This, initially, distinguished 
between three broad approaches that MNCs adopt: ethnocentric, polycentric and 
geocentric. Later a fourth typology was added, namely regiocentric (Heenan and 
Perlmutter, 1979). Although subséquent typologies (e.g. Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989, 1998; 
Adler and Ghadar, 1990; Milliman et al, 1991) have been developed, it was noted that the 
literaturę broadly supported that developed by Perlmutter and his colleagues. 
Tuming to the factors that influence the particular H R M stratégies adopted by MNCs, it 
was found that thèse encompass a range of influences which can be seen as relating to five 
main sets of variables: the country of origin of the parent company; features of the host 
country of the subsidiary; the characteristics of the industry in which the company 
operated, and its associated international strategy and structure; stages of the company's 
internationalisation process; and the characteristics of the company's subsidiaries (Schüler 
et al. 1993; Taylor et al, 1996). It was further noted that various control mechanisms can 
be used by multinationals to implement their chosen stratégies, the most important of 
which could be classified under three main headings: personal centralised control; 
bureaucratie and output control; and control by socialisation and networks (Harzing, 1999; 
Ferner, 2000). However, it was also found that that these control mechanisms could be 
used in combination and hence should be regarded as compléments rather than alternatives 
(Edstrom and Galbraith, 1977; Martinez and Jarillo, 1989). At the same time, there was 
some évidence that, as firms become more global, bureaucratie and output-based controls 
become less important than control through socialisation (Marschan et a/., 1996). There 
was also some évidence that the process of globalisation is encouraging a convergence of 
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MNC approaches (Saka, 2001) and an associated process of homogenisation (Sisson, 
2001). 
More generally, however, the literature review confirmed the central weakness of the 
existing literature on the intemational human resource strategies of MNCs that prpvided 
the fundamental rationale for this study (see chapter 1), namely a marked lack of research 
into the strategies adopted by MNCs in developing economies, particularly where they 
become involved under the auspices of privatisation programmes. Consequently, the 
literature review served to further confirm the potential of examining the H R M policies 
and practices adopted by three French MNCs in privatised Jordanian companies and the 
factors that influenced their adoption. 
In general, the fieldwork undertaken in these companies revealed that in each of the 
Jordanian subsidiarles a wide range of changes had been made to the previously existing 
H R M policies. These changes encompassed the creation of new and better staffed, HR 
divisions that were accorded a more strategic place and role, notably through the linking of 
them directly to the sénior management committee/board responsible for the running of 
the company. They also encompassed the making of reforms in each of the specific áreas 
of HR activity investigated: the people management responsibilities of Une managers; 
staffmg, recruitment and selection; rraining and development; performance appraisal; 
rewards; and communication and consultation. 
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, taken together, the three case studies highlighted 
simílarities in terms of the objectives and the broad thrust of the structural, policy and 
cultural reforms introduced by the three French companies which were found to be 
essentially aimed at creating a more efficient and business oriented organisation, but 
differences in terms of the way in which the reforms were centrally 'authored', the extent 
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to which they were implemented in a participative way, the types of control mechanisms 
that were used to support the reform process, and the pace with which the reforms were 
introduced. Thèse similarities and différences were further seen to reflect the influence of 
five main groups of factors: corporate management beliefs about transférable best H R M 
practices; characteristics of the industries in which the companies operated and the 
implications of thèse for their relevant international stratégies and structures; the parent 
company's country of origin and expérience in managing international opérations; 
characteristics of the subsidiarles involved, notably their stratégie role and mode of 
establishment; and a number of host country effects. 
Theoretical Implications 
A comparison between the empirical findings obtained and the main conclusions to 
emerge from the literature review reveáis a number of areas in which the findings of the 
case studies contribute to the literature. Thèse theoretical contributions are highlighted in 
this section through the discussion of four central issues identified in the literature review: 
international H R M stratégies, déterminants of H R M stratégies, methods of control, and 
convergence vs divergence. 
International HRM Stratégies 
As was noted in chapter 3, a number of typologies of 1HRM stratégies have been 
developed (e.g. Perlmutter, 1996; Heenan and Perlmutter, 1979; Bartlett, 1986; Bartlett 
and Ghoshal, 1989; Adler and Ghadar, 1990). The most widely accepted of thèse is that of 
Perlmutter (1969)/Heenan and Perlmutter (1979), and for this reason their typology was 
explicitly utilised in the présent study. 
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Heenan and Perlumutter have distinguished between four types of IHRM strategies: 
ethnocentric, polycentric, regiocentric and geocentric, and in doing so identified a number 
of dimensions of variation between them. These dimensions included the degree of 
centralisation/decentralisation of MNCs, and the source of their human resource 
management orientation. 
Heenan and Perlmutter (1979) argued that under the polycentric approach decision­
making is highly decentralised and foreign subsidiaries adopt local employment practices. 
In contrast, under an ethnocentric approach decision-making is characterised by 
significant centralisation and an attempt to impose employment practices from the home 
country on overseas operations. Differently again, the regiocentric approach involves the 
establishment of standardised practices at the regional level which are determined 
regionally. Finally, the geocentric approach embodies a similar approach to the 
regiocentric one, except that the standardised practices are applied to the whole 
corporation globally rather than to regional blocks within them. These central standardised 
practices are based on an amalgamation of what is considered universal best practices and 
implemented throughout the organisation to meet the needs of the business worldwide. 
The findings show that the case study companies did differ in terms of the degree to which 
decision-making was centralised/decentralised. Thus, in both Water Co and Telecom Co, 
corporate HQs gave considerable autonomy to the subsidiaries, made relatively little use 
of formal written guidelines and those that did exist could be applied flexibly, and 
established an indirect reporting relationship between local and corporate HR. In contrast, 
developments in Cement Co were more centrally determined, and involved the 
introduction of universal company-wide HR policies and the establishment of a direct 
reporting relationship between the local subsidiary and corporate HQ. Indeed, these 
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variations were reflected in how the companies described themselves when asked to 
evaluate their organisations in terms of Perlmutter's (1969)/Heenan and Perlmutter's 
(1979) typology. Thus, "Water Co was described as Polycentric, Telecom Co as more 
polycentric and Cernent Co as being a mix between polycentric and geocentric. 
On this basis, it would therefore seem that Perlmutter's/Heenan and Perlmutter's typology 
continues to have some validity. At the same time, the findings indicated that the MNCs 
not only adopted somewhat différent IHRM stratégies, but also utilised a mix of them 
(Heenan and Perlmutter, 1979: 21). For example, Water Co was classified as being more 
polycentric in the water sector, while more global in other sectors. Similarly, Telecom Co 
and Cernent Co were operating along both multi-domestic and global Unes, although to 
varying degrees. Consequently, it would seem that MNCs do not fall neatly into one 
strategy or another and that Tayeb (1998) is right to argue that the positioning of a 
straightforward choice between one of thèse major stratégies is too simplistic to fully 
comprehend the relationship between a parent Company and its subsidiaries. Nevertheless, 
it would also appear that thèse stratégies still remain relevant tools for understandmg the 
behaviour of MNCs since, as noted above, senior executives in ail of the case study 
organisations felt comfortable in classifying their companies in relation to them. 
ïn addition, as wil l be discussed in more détail later, although the HR approaches that the 
MNCs adopted appeared to reflect to some extent French traditions and culture, the 
overwhelming impression to corne out from the fmdings was that they were in large part 
adopting Anglo-Saxon based HR practices. Consequently, insofar as developments in 
them reflect those occurring in other non-Anglo-Saxon MNCs more generally, they 
consequently serve to make problematic the use of 'source of human resource orientation' 
as a basis for distinguishing between the IHRM stratégies of such organisations. Thus, for 
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example, such a trend would seem to potentially be leading to a situation whereby only 
Anglo-American companies could in future be categorised as ethnocentric. Such an 
interprétation, moreover, accords with Mueller's (1994) argument that 'organisational 
effects' begin to over-ride 'societal effects' as MNCs diffuse 'best practice' across 
countries, with the resuit that the influence of national business Systems déclines: an issue 
which is considered in more detail below. 
More generally, there seemed to be no distinction between the stratégies that the 
companies applied to subsidiaries in developed économies and those they utilised in 
developing ones. Consequently, the study's fmdings contradict Mueller's (1994: 421) 
argument that while organisational effects, (which include the diffusion of best practices 
and benchmarking, the Implementation of global production stratégies, and the transfer of 
technologies and knowledge), lcan be observed between highly industrialisée nations, 
there would be greater limits to MNCs transferring their best practices to subsidiaries in 
developing countries'. However, based on the study's fmdings, it would appear that this 
transfer may be done within différent time frames because of différences in the resources 
and infrastructures available to facilitate it. 
Déterminants of Strategy 
The fmdings from the three case studies also serve to shed further light on the influences 
exerted by a number of factors that have been identified in the literature as constituting 
important déterminants of the human resource stratégies adopted by MNCs. The factors 
concemed are the country of origin of the parent Company; the characteristics of the 
industry in which an M N C opérâtes and its associated international strategy and structure; 
the M N C s expérience in managing international opérations; the subsidiary's 
characteristics; and features of the host country. 
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Country of Origin 
The three French MNCs, as will be explored further below, had to a large extent 
introduced similar reforms in their Jordanian opérations. Nevertheless, it was apparent that 
powerful idiosyncrasies stemrning from their French homeland existed (Supiot, 2000; 
Sisson,2001). 
For example, the notion of the "cadre", a unique French concept (Brunstein, 1992, 1995; 
Sorge, 1993; Gordon, 1993), was utilised in Cernent Co. Similarly, the strong emphasis 
each of the companies placed on their social responsibilities towards employées accorded 
with the noted French emphasis 'on the social and economic rôle of the enterprise as a 
producer of xvealth from which everyone benefits' (Rojot, 1990: 100). In the case of 
Cernent Co, for instance, the Company rejected the legal option of laying off employées as 
part of its restructuring programme and instead chose to develop a relatively 'generous' 
early retirement scheme: an approach that has been noted to be commonly used by French 
firms to minimise the social impact of workforce réductions (Mtar, 2001: 64). Meanwhile, 
at Telecom Co, workforce réductions in some areas were initially secured by re-training 
and re-deploying employées to other departments in line with the strategy that the parent 
Company had adopted in France following its privatisation. Later, when this option was 
feit to no longer be available, as in Cernent Co, a voluntary early retirement scheme was 
introduced. 
The adoption of a graduai and participative approach to change seemed to reflect this 
concem for employée well being, as well as being in Une, according to Belanger and Giles 
(2001), with the ^central tenets of organisational sociology, especially in the French 
tradition '. For example, in Cernent Co it was noted: 
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'....// is Lof arge poiicy not to lay off people. Lafarge is not an American 
Company. We are not wild capitalists. We say that the employées are at the 
heart of the organisation and it takes time in Lafarge culture to start and 
implement the change process because we do not want the individuals and 
the employées to suffer as a resuit of the changes.... For example, we are 
starting an early retirement plan which I think is a very generous 
programme...Lafarge is trying to createparticipation to change as change 
must corne indigenously...The culture of Lafarge is very humanistic, works 
with the individuals. It is a consensus seeking culture rather than 
confrontation culture '. 
In addition, the strong emphasis in ail three case companies on the identification, 
recruitment and development of high potential people and high fliers may well have also 
reflected the 'French societal emphasis on hierarchy and intellectual achievement' 
(Sparrow and Hiltrop, 1994; Barsoux and Lawrence, 1992 cited in Tregaskis, 2000: 154). 
Similarly, the noted tendency for French employment practices to be mainly based on 
internai labour markets (Sparrow and Hiltrop, 1994; Tregaskis, 2000) and to embody a 
strong reliance on internai promotions, permanent employment, and extensive training and 
development (Whitely, 1992) also appeared to be reflected in the human resource reforms 
introduced in the three Jordanian subsidiaries. 
There were, furthermore, signs that the approaches of the MNCs were still to some extent 
embedded in insider Systems, despite growing stock markets pressures (see below), and 
hence still placed a corresponding emphasis on longer-run performance (Ferner and 
Quintanilla, 1998; Marginson, 2000). Thus, as was shown in the previous chapters, the 
opérations of the three MNCs in Jordan were not aimed at achieving short-term financial 
profits but rather at establishing long-term investments by creating a foothold in the 
country and in the région as a whole (Child et al, 2000). For example, in Cernent Co it 
was emphasised that 'our goal is to create an industrial partner not a financial 
partner ...our culture is industrial not financial'. 
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At the same time, the findings indícate that, at one level, the differences found between the 
case study organisations simply served to confirm that MNCs differ in the degree to which 
they are centralised (Hamill, 1994). At another, the fact that the differences were identified 
in case studies involving French companies, inevitably acts as a waming against assuming 
too cióse an association between the human resource strategies of MNCs and the 
nationality of the parent company. As a result, the findings therefore reinforce Taylor et 
al'sy (1996) observation that: 'National origin does not help us to predict which of the 
three SIHRM orientations MNCs from a given couniry will adopt' (Taylor et al, 1996: 
937). They also add weight to Marginson's (2000) argument that all of Perlmutter's 
original three strategies (ethnocentric, polycentric and geocentric) can be found amongst 
MNCs headquartered in any given country. 
Industry Characteristics, Strategy and Structure 
The findings confirm that the industry in which MNCs opérate exerts an influence on the 
approach they adopt towards the management of its human resources overseas. In 
particular, the findings indícate, in Une with other studies (e.g. Kennly and Florida, 1995; 
Abdullah and Keenoy, 1995; Traxler, 1996; Colling and Clark, 2001), that the companies 
were changing their strategies/approaches as a result of wider industry changes. 
Evidence from Cement Co and Telecom Co also showed, in common with Femer's et al, 
(2001) observations in respect of US MNCs, that they were going through a dynamic 
process of change and development, which included a 'rapid oscillation between poles of 
centralisation and decentralisation' in response to rapidly changing market conditions 
manifested by intensified global competition, accelerated technological change, and 
shareholder and fínancíal market pressures. The shifis in the strategies of Cement Co and 
Telecom Co further lent support to the view that there are now pressures for an increasing 
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number of multi-domestic industries to compete globally and henee become globally 
integrated (Mathews, 2000; McGraw and Harley, 2001). Thus, the findings add weight to 
Komache's (1996) argument that globalisation is moving the integration-differentiation 
balance towards the former and henee leading to more inftuence by the parent company 
over its overseas operations. 
However, as was evident in the case of Telecom Co, the degree of volatility of the market 
can, it would seem, mediate the level of influence the parent wishes to exert upon a 
subsidiar/ and result in the granting of some flexibility to business units. This therefore 
lends support to the view (e.g. Sabel, 1989, cited in Coller, 1996) that the greater the 
volatility of the market, the less the degree of central involvement of the parent company. 
More generally, the shifts in these strategies, and the differences between them, appeared 
to reflect each company's attempt to strike a balance between pressures for internal 
consisteney to maintain common standards of behaviour and performance globally, and 
the perceived need for local responsiveness - differentiation (Schuler et al, 1993; Monks, 
1996; Dowling et al, 1999; Venaik et al, 2001). Nevertheless, the findings appear to 
support the view that multi-domestic industries in the classical form, where HR policies 
mirror local practices, do not exist any more (McGraw and Harley, 2001). Thus, it would, 
on the basis of the three case study organisations, appear that in multi-domestic industries, 
where there are high pressures for local isomorphism, firms still seem to try to implement 
similar practices in order to pursue global objectives and protect their image and 
reputation. Insofar as this is the case, the findings of the study indícate that globalisation 
and internationalisation are promoting the internal convergence of human resource 
management (Belanger et al, 1999). 
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Subsidiary Characterisîics: Mode of Entry and Role of Subsidiary 
Within the context of privatisation, a subsidiary is more likely to be set up by taking over 
an already existing local company, whether this be through mergers and acquisitions, or 
management contracts. One implication of this is that MNCs confront subsidiarles that 
already have their own established norms and cultures. This had led some authors (e.g. 
Ferner and Edwards, 1995; Tayeb, 1998) to argue that in such situations H R M policies 
will initially be more likely to resemble local practices until gradually the parent company 
has asserted its organisational culture. 
In fact, as has been seen, this view is borne out by the developments that occurred in each 
of the three case study organisations. Thus, it was recognised by the three companies that 
change takes time and that, in already established organisations with their own cultures 
and norms, résistance to change was likely to be high. Consequently, in each of the 
Jordanian subsidiaries local practices were only gradually reformed and the change 
process was supported by extensive attempts to secure related attitudinal changes. 
Linked to this is the role of the subsidiary. The findings indícate that the three Jordanian 
subsidiaries in Jordan were seen to have a 'stratégie role' to play in terms of the MNCs ' 
future expansionary ambitions in the région. This role appeared, at one level, to encourage 
the companies to focus a great deal of attention on ensuring that the desired H R M policies 
and practices were effectively implemented in order to prepare the subsidiaries to fulfil it. 
At another, however, the role appeared to genérate a considerable concern to avoid taking 
actions that would attract government or public disapproval (see further below). This 
concern, in turn, led each of the companies to delay or abandon the introduction of some 
desired practices, such as the payment of higher salaries than those agreed with the 
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government, and the introduction of a remuneration policy that was more results-based in 
Water Co. 
Notwithstanding the above, developments still occurred more rapidly in Water Co. This 
reflected the fact that it was operating under a four-year management contract during 
which time it had to demónstrate its valué. Consequently, it was important to quickly put 
in place reforms that supported the achievement of the various targets set (Luostarinen and 
Welch, 1990). 
Host Country Effects 
Whitley (1999b) has argued that the host country effect is uninteresting because it is less 
likely to instígate major organisational change throughout an M N C . The existing Iiterature 
does, however, suggest that host country factors can act to influence the human resource 
management approaches that MNCs adopt in respect of national subsidiaries, 
The evidence obtained in the present study supports this íatter view. Thus, at the general 
level, it suggests, as indicated above, that such factors can act to shape, or at least 
constrain, the actíons taken by MNCs. In addition, at a more specific level, they indícate 
that governmental conditions imposed on sales and within management contracts, can 
have implications in such áreas as the scale of workforce reductions, the role of 
expatríales, in both the short-and long-term, the training and development of staff, and, 
more generally, the transfer of know-how in terms of technical and managerial skills. 
In fact, the conditions imposed by the Jordanian government on the three companies, but 
partícularly Water Co vía a management contract, fit well with De Castro and 
Uhlenbruck's (1997), and Uhlenbruck and De Castro's (1998) argument that governments 
in developing countries are more likely to impose local ownership requirements and other 
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post-privatisation conditions due to the need to demonstrate that assets are not being given 
away to foreigners and in order to maintain political stability. They also lend support to 
the argument that developing countries tend to combine authoritative planning with private 
property (Murtha and Lenway, 1994 cited in De Castro and Uhlenbruck, 1997), with the 
resuit that their political processes emphasise nationalism and a need to maintain 'political 
conditions1. 
The case study findings indicated, as already noted, that political controversies 
surrounding the privatisation of public assets not only impacted on the privatisation 
policies of the Jordanian govemment, but also served to impose further constraints on 
MNCs that had ambitions to expand their activities in the country, as well as the wider 
surrounding région. In addition, the enhanced influence that the trade union in Cernent Co 
was able to wield following its privatisation raises the more gênerai point that, in contrast 
to the way in which privatisation in western countries such as the U K generally served to 
weaken the power of unions (Ferner, 1989; Parker and Martin, 1993; Beaumont and 
Harris, 1995), privatisation in Jordan could act to increase the rôle that unions play in 
Jordanian society. In fact, there are three reasons why this may well be likely. The first is 
that one effect of privatisation is to remove employées from the coverage of the civil 
service law and hence the prohibition that this places on union membership. As a resuit, a 
growing number of workers will have the right to join and take part in the activities of 
trade unions. Indeed, the developments in Jordan Telecom serve to highlight this point. 
The second is that the political sensitivity surrounding privatisation that enabled the union 
in Cernent Co to increase its influence remains, at least for the time being. Consequently, 
unions in other privatised undertakings may also be able to exploit it in order to gain 
concessions. Finally, insofar as foreign multinationals entering Jordan have, in common 
with the three investigated here, wider expansionary objectives in the M E N A région, it can 
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be speculated that, like Cement Co, they will seek to avoid confrontations with unions 
which could harm their régional réputation. This would seem particularly so if the unions 
in Jordan continue to develop cross-border networking and connections (Martinez Lucio 
and Weston, 1995) that can be used to facilitate the threat of adverse 'propaganda' in 
negotiations (Marginson et al, 2003). Furthermore, the fact that, in Jordan, govemment 
employées had a distinctive legał status, and terms and conditions of employment, served 
to create additional complications for the MNCs that had acquired their organisations, as 
well as for the govemment itself. 
In summary, as Baddar (2000) and Baddar and James (2001) have argued, research on the 
human resource stratégies and policies adopted by MNCs in subsidiaries acquired through 
privatisation programmes in developing économies therefore needs to pay due regard to 
the vvay in which they are affected by governmental policies and wider political and légal 
considérations. In addition, as the case study findings show, they also need to pay attention 
to the role played by negotiations between governments and MNCs, both prior to 
privatisation and after it. 
Modes of Control 
The literaturę suggests that MNCs can use a variety of control mechanisms to direct and 
control the behaviour and performance of their subsidiaries (Egelfhoff, 1984). In this 
respect, a major distinction has been made between 'personal', 'bureaucratie, including 
output monitoring' and 'social' modes of control (Child, 1972; 1973; Edstrom and 
Galbraith, 1977; Harzing, 1999, 2000b; Ferner 2000). The personal centralised control 
relies on maintaining control by confining décisions to the senior levels and closely 
monitoring local compliance with thèse décisions. In contrast, the impersonal bureaucratie 
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method relies on formal rules and procedures, written policies and manuals, the 
monitoring and recording of data, and budgetary controls (Calori et ai, 1994; Harzing, 
1999) , while socialisation is achieved through such means as international transfers, the 
creation of informal networks and contacts, and international management training and 
development. 
The ñndings obtained from this study indícate that the MNCs appointed 'trusted' 
expatriates in key positions in order to control the performance of the subsidiaries (Ferner, 
2000) and implement- desired changes in management practices (Child et al, 2000, Calori 
et al, 1994). The role of these expatriates was, however, not only to implement corporate 
policies and procedures but also to train and develop local staff and change their mindsets 
and the organisational culture. Thus, in the terms of Baliga and Jaeger (1984), expatriates 
facilitated 'cultural' control, direct personal control and control by socialisation. Henee, 
and in line with Harzing, the need to sepárate the direct and indirect control effeets of 
expatriation may not be so important if their role is seen to facilitate both forms of control 
(Harzing, 1999). 
The important role played by expatriates in the three companies adds weight to another 
argument in the literature, namely that the use of such staff, who have intemalised 
corporate valúes and norms, and know the parent's way of doing things, provides a de 
facto centralismg control mechanism (Marschan et al, 1996). As a result, the presence of 
relatively decentralised management structures may conceal a much greater degree of 
centralised control. Or to put it another way, as Brooke and Remmers (1978) and Melin 
(1992) have argued, a decentralising ideology might indeed disguise a centralising reality 
(cited in Marschan et al, 1996). 
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At the same time, each of the case study companies used methods of bureaucratic control, 
such as financial and budgetary controls and reporting systems, to monitor the 
performance of the subsidiary managers, including expatriates. They also utilised a 
number of other forms of informal control and socialisation, such as international 
management training and development, the encouragement of networking, and the 
organisation of exchange visits, as illustrated in chapters 5,6 and 7. 
Hence, in line with Femer (2000), it is possible to conclude that MNCs rely on complex 
combinations of formal and informal modes of control and coordination that operate 
alongside each other. As a result, such methods of control should not be viewed as 
mutually exclusive, but as complementary. Consequently, on the basis of the findings 
obtained, doubts must be expressed regarding the view, advanced by such writers as 
Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) and Martinez and Jarillo (1989), that MNCs are moving from 
bureaucratic to social forms of control in line with the evolution of multinational corporate 
structures from 'hierarchy1 towards 'integrated network'. 
Indeed, the case findings suggest, in line with Ferner (2000), that social control tends to be 
used to underpin rather than replace personal control, and that this latter form of control is, 
in turn, underpinned by bureaucratic methods. Furthermore, it also appears that personal 
direct control through centralised decision-making and the use of expatriates, and the 
establishment of bureaucratic modes of control can act to create infrastructures that impact 
on the culture that prevails within subsidiaries. Thus, socialisation and personal control 
can overlap through the role that expatriates play as both voices of centralised decision­
making and as cultural change agents (Baddar Alhusan and James, 2003). 
More generally, in each of the case study organisations, the HR function was seen to have 
a major role to play in facilitating cultural integration. The study's findings therefore 
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accord with those who have drawn attention to the way in which such functions can act as 
a 'unifying forcé' within the international operations of MNCs (Evans el al, 1989; 
Mueller, 1994). They also provide some support for Scullion and Starkey's (2000) 
argument that HR strategy emerges as the primary device for strategic implementation and 
control in multinational firms. At the same time, the study's findings suggest that, at least. 
in the three case study organisations, this HR role was seen to be facilitated by the 
presence of a knowledgeable local HR manager. 
Convergence v Divergence 
The findings of this study contribute to the debate on the convergence of capitalist systems 
stimulated by such authors as Orru et al, (1991). More specifically, the study sheds light 
on the debate conceming whether MNCs are becoming stateless, without specific national 
identification (Ohmae, 1990), or alternatively, whether they remain deeply embedded in 
their country of origin (Femer, 1994; 1997) and therefore tend to transfer and implement 
their own home country practices in their operations overseas. 
The findings obtained, in general, support Schmidt's (1993) argument that the French have 
adapted their management style to become more dynamic, and somewhat less autocratic, 
centralising and distant from staff. It also seems that in doing so, and in line with other 
arguments in the literature (e.g. Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998; Mayer and Whittington, 
1999; Marginson, 2000), that the French MNCs were ' Anglo-Saxonising' in terms of their 
organisational structures, and management practices and policies. For example, each of 
the companies were utilising the Anglo-Saxon systems of performance management that 
have become dominant in recent years (Femer and Quintanilla, 1998: 720; Sparrow and 
Hiltrop, 1994; Femer and Varut, 2000: 94), as illustrated by their use of goal-setting 
performance appraisals, and performance-related pay. They similarly seemed, in 
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accordance with the Anglo-Saxon model, to be emphasising 'shareholder valué' and the 
importance of stock exchange markets and therefore to be departing to some extent from 
continental models of corporate govemance (Ferner and Quintanilla, 1998). Henee, even 
in Telecom Co, where the government was still a major shareholder, it was indicated that 
an important factor that influenced its approach and structure was 'to be quoted on París 
and New York stock exchange'. 
Consequently, the findings obtained suggest five features of the case study organisations 
which accord with arguments advanced in the literature. First, a process of internal 
convergence was underway (Belanger et al, 1999) whereby, in order to meet global 
standards of performance, attempts were being made to maintain corporate organisational 
ísomorphism (Ferner, 1997; Coller and Marginson, 1998) by applying similar employment 
systems and management styles; a process that was manifested in applying 'corporate 
common principies' in Telecom Co and Water Co, and 'corporate company-wide' H R M 
policies in Cement Co. Secondly, in conformity with the views of other researchers (e.g. 
Femer and Quintanilla, 1998; Marginson,, 2000), the Frenen companies were increasingly 
adapting their systems and practices 'towards those associated with the Anglo-Saxon 
model of the multidivisional enterprise': developments which support the argument that 
there is a trend of convergence in organisational thinking which reflects the Anglo-Saxon 
model of H R M , irrespective of the country of origin of the M N C (Sparrow, 1999: 110; 
Edwards et al, 1999; Ferner and Varal, 2000; Dorrenbacher, 2001). Thirdly, in doing so, 
the MNCs could be seen to be acting in a way which fíts well with the argument that 
MNCs are contributing to a homogenisation of HR practices (Sisson, 2001). Fourthly, as a 
result, the study's findings suggest, in line with Ferner et ai (2001) and Sisson (2001), that 
there is a need to avoid a static approach to the influence of national business systems and 
national culture. 
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Fifthly, the fact that, despite this process of Anglo-Saxonisation, the case study companies 
seemed, as noted earlier, to be retaining some of the distinctive national features of their 
country of origin, suggests that Frenen MNCs are Anglo-Saxonising in a 'distinctly French 
manner', a finding which echoes that of Ferner and Quintanilla (1998), and Ferner and 
Varul (2000) who concluded that the Anglo-Saxonisation of international H R M in 
Germany was occurring in a 'distinctly Germán manner'. Insofar as this is the case, it adds 
support to the view that Anglo-Saxonisation is occurring in ways that are 'nationally 
spécifie*> or to borrow Muller's (1999) words, that there is a 'constrained convergence' 
rather than full convergence. It also adds weight to the view of Mayer and Whittington 
(1999) that French, Germán and British MNCs are 'neither wholesale universalists nor 
diehard locáis, but rather synthesizers ofboth international and national Systems' (1999: 
953). 
Avenues of Future Research 
The research strategy utilised in this study embodied a longitudinal multiple case study 
approach, utilising in-depth interviews conducted at both the subsidiary level in Jordan 
and corporate headquarters in France, with the intention of testing and drawing theoretic 
généralisations as opposed to drawing population généralisations (Yin, 1994). More 
speciñcally, the study provided a systematic comparison of three cases - Water Co, 
Cernent Co and Telecom Co - in order to examine the impact of foreign ownership/control 
on the H R M policies and practices of three privatised Jordanian companies taken over by 
French MNCs. 
In general, the study, it is argued, delivered what qualitative case study research is 
supposed to yield, that is 'thick' and 'rich' descriptions and data which provide 
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justification for analytical generalisation, enable the contextualisation of organisationat 
change, and serve as a reference point for comparisons with other cases (Yin, 1998; 
Martin and Beaumont, 1998; 1999). Nevertheless, it has to be recognised that the fmdings 
of the srudy are limited in a number of ways. 
First, it remains the case that this study was based on case studies of three Frenen MNCs. 
As a result, it leaves open the question of whether MNCs from other countries, as well as 
France, are, in common with those studied here, adopting similar approaches to the 
management of their subsidiarles in both developing and developed economies. For this 
reason, one área of future possible research is the systematic comparison of how MNCs 
from differing countries of origin approach the management of human resources in 
countries such as Jordán. 
Secondly, while the research design did incorpórate a longitudinal element, this element, 
although it did facilítate a more in depth understanding of the nature of the reform 
processes, was fairly limited in terms of timescale. An important consequence of this was 
that it was not possible to adequately explore an important feature of the human resource 
strategies of the three MNCs, namely their intention to develop local managers to 
subsequently become expatriates that could be used to support the companies' 
expansionary objectives in the wider M E N A región. Consequently, given the potentially 
important role that such local expatriates could play in supporting the regional expansión 
of M N C business activities in developing parts of the world, there would seem a case for 
future research to utilise longitudinal studies to explore it in greater depth. 
Thirdly, although the present study's findings, as already noted, do lend support to the 
view that a convergence of M N C human resource strategies is oceurring and that this is 
stemming from the adoption of Anglo-Saxon 'best practices', it has been unable to shed 
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much light on the way in which thèse practices have come to be seen as superior to those 
traditionally used. Given that this weakness is echoed in much of the existing literature, 
there would also seem grounds therefore for future research to be conducted in this area. 
Fourthly, and related to the above point about convergence, the présent study's finding 
that the main area in which the HR approaches of the three companies varied related to the 
way in which they approached the management of change has potentially. important 
implications for future research. For it suggests that its expansionary focus should be îess 
on explaining différences in the broad IHRM stratégies of MNCs and more on accounting 
for variations between them in how they go about implementing the process of reform 
within acquired subsidiarles. 
Fifthly, the study's finding that the IHRM stratégies of the three MNCs were far from 
stable and also differed between différent parts of their business, suggests that there 
remains scope for further exploring not only the links that exist between such stratégies 
and broader business ones, but also the way in which thèse links change in response to 
shifts in the external business environment. It further suggests that one way in which this 
could be done would be to focus attention on the opérations of MNCs as a whole rather 
than restrict attention, as many previous studies have done, to one part of their business 
portfolio. 
Sixthly, the présent study focused only on the nature of the H R M reforms that were being 
introduced in the Jordanian subsidiarles and the factors that influenced them. It did not 
therefore explore in détail how thèse reforms were being operationalised and the impact 
that they were having on workers. In fact, it is noticeable that the 'workers voice' features 
relatively little in the current IHRM literature. There does consequently seem considerable 
scope for addressing this gap in both the présent study and the wider literature. 
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Finally, an important implication of the findings of this study is that the policies that 
MNCs adopt in respect of subsidiaries acquired under the privatisation programmes of 
developing countries can be influenced by explicit govemment policies, as well as wider 
and related political pressures. Given the fact that most of the expansion of MNCs in such 
countries is occurring via privatisation, this therefore seems another issue where additional 
research could usefully be conducted. Indeed, as much of this privatisation is taking place 
with the support and encouragement of the World Bank and IMF, and the current study 
found that the former did exert some influence over the three MNCs both directly and via 
its rôle in shaping government policies, it would seem that the nature of this influence 
merits a far more detailed examination than was possible in the preceding pages. 
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